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ABSTRACT 
 
The central goal of this study is to produce an in-depth understanding of the nature and 
dynamics of China-related transnational environmental crime (TEC). To that end, this 
study takes the Greater China – including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan – as the specific geographic focus for its investigation into three key TEC 
sectors (illegal trade in wildlife, forest products, and ozone depleting substances (ODS)).  
 
Overall, this study seeks to achieve the central goal in a four-step sequence. First, it 
builds a network-centric conceptual framework based on the idea of “networked threats 
require networked responses” advocated by many influential scholars. This framework 
focuses on addressing two puzzles: what essentially constitutes a network threat; and 
what forms a networked response. Second, it applies the concept of networked threats to 
the study of China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, and ODS. Third, it 
examines China’s TEC-related legal frameworks and enforcement responses and 
identifies key challenges that China has encountered in each of the three selected TEC 
sectors. Fourth and finally, it combines the above three lines of understandings – the 
accounts of networked responses, the empirical findings of China’s illegal trade, and the 
key regulatory and enforcement challenges identified – to develop practical suggestions 
on how can China apply the notion of networked responses to the formulation of 
regulatory and enforcement strategies for addressing the identified key challenges.  
 
This study makes two broad arguments: one theoretically oriented and one empirically 
directed. First, this study argues that while the concept of networked threats can be 
approached along the dimensions of transaction networks and directed networks, 
networked responses are not a standard, formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement 
responses. Instead, networked responses should be understood as a special way of 
thinking and acting: a way that sees a bright-side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as 
operating in an environment occupied by various networks and entities, which 
simultaneously present challenges in terms of amplified (networked) threats, as well as 
opportunities in terms of power amplifiers for the bright-side actor, in the sense that 
they could potentially be leveraged for tackling these threats.  
 
Second, China’s global trade in environmental contraband is typified by the substantial 
scale of China’s black markets and the deep embeddedness of China in the international 
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and regional illicit trade chains. These two features, on the one hand, pose a serious 
challenge to the Chinese government in tackling its TEC; while on the other hand, they 
imply that Chinese effort and progress made toward addressing its illegal internal trade 
will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the whole of the 
international and regional illegal trade.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THE STUDY 
As one of the emerging forms of cross-border criminality,1 transnational environmental 
crime (TEC) – the illegal trade and trafficking across borders of species, resources, 
wastes or pollutants – has become a growing worldwide concern that features highly on 
the policy agenda and discourse of many international conferences and organisations. 
TEC is a transnational issue, involving the cross-boundary movement of 
environmentally sensitive goods illegally taken or produced in the source countries to 
the consumer markets or disposal sites in a different country. Moreover, in line with the 
latest wave of globalisation and information revolution, TEC has truly become a global 
problem, as those involved capitalise on the “freer trade, increases in the frequency and 
volume of commodity shipments, fewer border controls, and easier transfers of funds 
through global financial and banking system” to extend their reach, as well as to hide, 
transport, and redistribute illicit goods, and launder the criminal proceeds into legitimate 
business (Elliott and Schaedla 2016, 4).  
 
TEC is a serious crime with severe adverse impacts on the environment, economic, and 
social security. However, as opposed to its considerable gravity, TEC is not taken 
serious enough by both the academia and the wider transnational crime fighting 
community. 2  Present approaches to TEC – which rely mainly on national resource 
management and conservation policy on the one hand (COP 2010, 10), and the 
individual and chance seizure strategies and administrative sanctions on the other3 – 
have largely failed to recognise the many facets of the complexity and severity of TEC. 
As a result, it leaves TEC as an area “where the risk of detection and punishment is all 
too low”, as the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) put 
                                                          
1 At the Expert Consultation of the Fifth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in October 2010, TEC was for the first time 
expressly identified as one of the emerging forms of transnational criminality along with cybercrime, 
piracy, and trafficking in cultural property, human organs, and counterfeit medicines. 
2 In the field of transnational crime, the majority of scholarly attention has been given to drug trafficking, 
human smuggling, illegal cigarette trade, and transnational criminal networks as a whole. TEC and 
several other transnational crimes such as trafficking in arms, nuclear materials, and organised cybercrime 
have only received sporadic scholarly treatments. Moreover, even within the domain of TEC research, 
attention is not evenly distributed across TEC’s multiple sectors. This can probably be granted by a 
glance at the numerous resolutions adopted by UN’s associated bodies (e.g., the ECOSOC and CCPCJ) 
on environmental crime, among which, trafficking in wildlife and timber apparently remain the prioritised 
matters of concerns. 
3 UNICJRI (United Nations International Criminal Justice Research Institute). “Environmental Crime”. 
http://www.unicri.it/topics/environmental/. 
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it.4 The discrepancy between the TEC challenge and existing policy and enforcement 
approaches implies an urgent need for advancing our understanding of the nature of 
environmental crime and the ways to deal with it more effectively.5 This provides the 
overall focus of the Australian Research Council Linkage Grant Project on 
Transnational Environmental Crime, with which this PhD research project is 
associated.6   
 
China – with its prominent role as the world’s leading supplier or consumer of a variety 
of illegal environmental goods including wildlife, timber, and ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS) – remains at the hub of the international and regional TEC chain. 
International perception of China’s expanding demand for, or supply of, illicit 
environmental commodities centres around the detrimental effects on the environmental, 
economic, and social dimensions in source and consumer countries involved in China’s 
transnational illegal trade. Such multifaceted negative outcomes mainly include 
deforestation (EIA 2012), biodiversity loss (UNEP 2013a), species endangerment (EIA 
2007, 2009), revenue loss (Thornton 2005), damage to local livelihoods (Mackenzie 
2006; Mackenzie and Ribeiro 2009), and ozone layer depletion (Clark 2005). In reality, 
not only does China’s illegal trade provide a striking counterpoint to the Chinese 
government’s political commitments to the “harmonious society” and “ecological 
civilisation” domestically and a responsible global citizen internationally, it also proves 
to be a thorny policy and enforcement challenge for other “victimised” countries 
entangled in China’s transnational illicit trade chain.  
 
The substantial scale of China’s illegal trade and the deep embeddedness of China in the 
                                                          
4 The ICCWC was formally established in November 2010 under the partnership of five lead inter-
governmental organisations: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) Secretariat, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
the World Bank, and the World Customs Organisation (WCO). Driven by the discontent with the “present 
situations where the risk of detection and punishment [on wildlife and forest crime] is all too low”, the 
alliance is devoted to assisting national law enforcement agencies and regional networks in developing a 
formidable and coordinated response to such criminal activity. CITES Secretariat. “ICCWC’s Mission is 
to Usher in a New Era Where the Perpetrators of Serious Wildlife Crime and Forest Crime Face a 
Formidable and Coordinated Response”. 
https://cites.org/eng/prog/ICCWC.php. 
5 This kind of need has also been recognised by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Resolution 16/1 (CCPCJ Resolution 16/1 2007) and the United Nations 2010 Salvador 
Declaration (UN 2010), both of which stressed the relevance of “studying the nature of the challenge of 
environmental crime” and “identifying ways of improving national capability to prevent and combat such 
crime”. 
6 The Transnational Environmental Crime Project is based in the Department of International Relations, 
Australian National University. It has been conducted by TEC research team and coordinated by 
Professor Lorraine Elliott. 
15 
 
international and regional illicit trade chain, on the one hand, pose a significant 
challenge to the Chinese government in tackling its TEC problems. While on the other 
hand, they also imply that Chinese effort and progress made toward the addressing of its 
illegal internal trade will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the 
whole of the international and regional illegal trade. These unique contextual features 
place China in a distinctive position where the Chinese government should seize the 
opportunity and take on a more important or even leading role in the international and 
regional effort to fight against TEC.     
 
For such reasons, an in-depth understanding of the nature and dynamics of China’s 
illegal trade in environmental goods constitutes an important part of the intellectual 
preparation for the effective control of TEC at the national, regional, and international 
levels. However, much of the existing research on TEC as it relates to China is ad hoc in 
nature. In the meantime, a number of factors – including the transnational and large-
scale nature of China’s black market, the involvement of a broad range of 
environmental goods, the engagement of sophisticated networks of diverse perpetrators, 
and the differentiated legislative and regulatory systems between China and its trading 
partners – have added extra layers of complexity and difficulty to the understanding of 
and fight against TEC.  
 
Against this backdrop, this PhD research takes mainland China and three adjacent 
territories (Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) as the specific geographic focus for its 
investigation into three key TEC sectors (illegal trade in wildlife, illegal trade in forest 
products, and illegal trade in ODS). In doing so, this study also adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach that draws the conceptual insights from sociology, economics, 
criminology, and political science to excavate and understand the utility and relevance 
of network models in facilitating TEC (for illegal operators) and addressing TEC (for 
law enforcement agencies).  
 
Overall, this PhD research is designed to achieve two central objectives. First, it aims to 
theorise and systemise various scholarly understandings of the idea of “networked 
threats require networked responses” to build a cohesive “network-centric” conceptual 
framework. This framework focuses on addressing two critical questions: what 
essentially constitutes a network threat; and what forms a networked response. Second, 
this thesis applies the network analytical framework to the study of China’s illegal trade 
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in three selected categories of environmental goods and develops feasible suggestions 
on how the Chinese regulatory and enforcement agencies may themselves form 
networked responses to the TEC challenges facing them. 
 
 
1. Aim One: Developing a conceptual framework based on the idea of 
“networked threats require networked responses”.  
1.1. Networked threats: to understand the key aspects and utilities of networks 
that facilitate dark-side actors in structuring their organisation and 
undertaking their illegal business.7  
1.2. Networked responses: to understand the key aspects and utilities of 
networks that make designs or arrangements espousing them a prospective 
solution for bright-side actors to deal with those dark-side threats. 
 
2. Aim Two: Applying the conceptual framework to the study of China’s 
illegal trade in three selected categories of environmental goods. 
2.1. To investigate the nature and characteristics of criminal networks and illicit 
chain of custody involved in China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest 
products, and ODS. 
2.2. To identify the key challenges facing China in each of the three selected 
TEC sectors, and to develop practicable prescriptions on how the Chinese 
regulatory and enforcement agencies may apply the idea of networked 
responses to the formulation of their regulatory and enforcement strategies to 
deal with TEC. 
 
The following pages of this opening chapter provide a brief overview of TEC in terms 
of its definition, scale, market value, and major characteristics. This chapter finishes 
with an outline of the thesis structure, the key issues each chapter intends to address, 
main methods employed, sources of data used, and the brief arguments. 
 
                                                          
7 “Dark-side actors’ is a term quoted from Raab and Milward (2003). In this thesis, dark-side actors or 
networks are used as a generic term to refer to entities in illegal or malign forms such as terrorism and 
transnational crime of various kinds, including perpetrators involved in environmental crime. Dark-side 
actors represent the opposite of the term ‘bright-side actors’ which refer to legal actors such as law 
enforcement agencies that strive to destroy those dark-side actors or networks.    
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1.2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TEC 
TEC generates profits of billions of dollars for individuals and criminal networks, 
undermines environmental protection and sustainable development, robs 
governments of income, compromises the rule of law, fosters corruption, brings 
violence to local community, and puts those who defend against this form of 
criminal activity in danger (Elliott 2012, 100). 
 
TEC involves cross-border trading of environmental resources that either violates 
prohibitions or regulatory regimes set up by multilateral environment agreements or, 
contravenes national laws. Currently, there is no single conceptual roof under which 
TEC can be united. According to COP 2010, TEC or international environmental crime 
can be defined as encompassing the following two broad groups of activity: trafficking 
in natural resources and trafficking in hazardous substances (COP 2010, 9).8   
 
Typical illegal practices under the rubric of trafficking in natural resources include: (1) 
trafficking and trade in endangered, threatened, and protected species of wild fauna and 
flora or derivatives and products thereof in contravention of the 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); (2) 
trafficking and trade in timber when timber is logged, transported, bought, or sold in 
violation of national laws; 9  (3) illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing in 
transgression of controls imposed by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations; (4) 
exploitation of and trafficking in minerals and precious stones (e.g., oil, diamonds, gold, 
or other valuable metals and ores) that infringe on national laws. 
 
Illegal practices under the heading of trafficking in hazardous substances include: (1) 
trafficking and trade in ODS in contravention of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; (2) dumping of toxic and hazardous wastes 
(including electronic wastes) in violation of international agreements such as the 1989 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal or the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.  
 
                                                          
8 TEC and “international environmental crime” are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
9 There are no binding international controls on the international trade in forest products, with the 
exception of a small number of endangered or threatened flora species under the protection of CITES. 
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Apart from above six main areas of TEC, scholars have identified some other emerging 
types of environmental offences that share similar characteristics with TEC. Among 
others, these offences include: (1) illegal market of genetically modified organisms and 
illicitly obtained genetic materials in contravention of the 2003 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Elliott 2007a, 1); (2) trafficking 
and trade in prohibited or regulated chemicals in violation of the 1998 Rotterdam 
Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade or the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (Elliott 2007b, 502); (3) carbon fraud and corruption with REDD 
projects (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) (Elliott 2011, 
2); (4) water management crime.10 
 
1.2.1. ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND MARKET VALUE OF TEC 
Highlighting the scale of a black market or the profits accumulate to it can generate 
important benefits, such as increasing attention paid to specific issues from decision 
makers and the public. However, as with most other forms of illegal trade, quantifying 
the overall size and cash value of TEC to a desirable level of accuracy can be a 
challenging task. This is in part due to the absence of an universally accepted definition 
of TEC either in the academic arena or among practitioners, in part due to the 
clandestine nature of TEC and the poor documentation of the illicit trade information 
concerning the involved products, trade volumes and values (Barber-Meyer 2010; 
Broad et al. 2003, 6–7). As a result, in many cases the evaluation of the scale of TEC 
relies on extrapolation from actual seizures and educated guesswork (Elliott 2012, 91).  
 
Lawson (2007a) identifies three techniques which have frequently been used in the 
literature to produce estimates of the scale of a specific form of environmental crime, 
with each technique having a preferred application. The first method is to reach the 
estimates by extrapolating from anecdotal information such as media reports of the 
seizures of illegal environmental goods, market surveys, or admissions by illegal 
traders. Based on the analysis of seizures or other data, this method begins with coming 
up with a crude range estimate (e.g., 20–30%) of the level of illegal trade as a percent of 
                                                          
10 INTERPOL. “Environmental Crime”. http://www.INTERPOL.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-
crime/Environmental-crime. According to the “Water Crime Research Project”, water crime takes 
different forms, including causing damage to water sources (e.g., surface water pollution) or to water 
management infrastructure; drinking water theft; and internal flooding or the deliberate poisoning of a 
water supply. Water Crimes. “What are Water Crimes?” http://www.watercrimes.eu/#about. 
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the legal trade. Then it applies the range estimate to the legal trade value in a selected 
year to produce the estimated annual value for the black market under study. The 
estimate by the non-profit policy institute, Chatham House, and the environmental 
NGO, Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) of the global illegal ODS trade in 
2006 at something between 10–20% (US$25–60 million) of legitimate trade is an 
example use of this method (Chatham House and EIA 2006, 5). In addition, there are 
scholars who rely not totally on speculation, but on developing a database with a fairly 
large number of seizure records to evaluate the magnitude of a black market. For 
example, Rosen and Smith (2010) used some 967 media reports of wildlife seizures 
occurred during 1996–2008 to assess the size of international illegal wildlife trade. In a 
recent publication World Wildlife Crime Report, the UNODC (2016) compiled some 
164,000 wildlife seizures reported by 120 CITES States Parties to the CITES Secretariat 
during 1999–2015 to excavate the scale and patterns of transnational illegal trade in 
endangered wildlife species.     
 
The second method is “input-output balance modelling”. This method estimates the 
level of environmental crime in a particular country by comparing the legal production 
(domestic legal production plus legal imports) against the actual consumption (domestic 
use plus legal exports), with the part where actual consumption exceeds the legal 
production being assumed to be made up from illicit production and/or imports. The 
input-output method is often employed in TEC sectors like illegal timber trade where 
seizures are often difficult to make due in large part to the lack of a mutually-accepted 
and enforceable definition of the legality of concerned goods between the importing and 
exporting countries. Lawson’s (2007b, 79, 83) estimates of the levels of illegal logging 
in timber producer countries Cameroon and Malaysia during 1997–2005 were based on 
this method. 
 
The third method is “trade data discrepancies”, which produces estimates of the scale of 
illegal trade in environmental goods by calculating the discrepancies in trade data 
between importing and exporting countries. This method has been applied mostly in the 
ODS sector to identify and measure the illegal trade. For example, EIA’s analysis of 
ODS trade between China and Indonesia found that reported exports from China to 
Indonesia of CFCs from 2001 to 2004 were more than 1,000 tonnes higher each year 
than Indonesia’s reported imports of CFCs from China (Clark 2005, 16). UNEP’s study 
of transboundary movements of CFCs documented great discrepancies in reported CFC 
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trade data of up to 2,000 tonnes a year between particular importing and exporting 
countries in the Asia-Pacific (Liu and Bagai 2007, 10). In the two cases, the shortfall of 
1,000 or 2,000 tonnes is regarded as an indicator of illegal trade. 
 
By using the above techniques, a number of estimates have been made in the past as to 
the market value of illegal trade in certain environmental goods. In general, when it 
comes to illustrate the combined global value of different forms of transnational 
environmental crime, there are several oft-cited figures, which include US$22–31 
billion (The U.S. Government 2000, 28), US$40 billion (Lovell 2002),11 US$30–70 
billion (OECD 2012, 14), and more recently a pair of figures offered by UNEP and 
INTERPOL: US$70–213 billion (Nellemann et al. 2014, 13) and US$91–258 billion 
(Nellemann et al. 2016, 7). When narrowing down to specific sectors of TEC, for 
example, the global revenues generated from the trafficking in endangered wildlife 
species are estimated at EU€18–26 billion per year by European Police Office (Europol 
2011, 30) or US$7.8–10 billion per year by Global Financial Integrity (Haken 2011, 
11).12 The annual criminal proceeds yielded from global illicit timber trade are assessed 
to be of US$10–15 billion by the World Bank (2007, 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: The black market value for the five major TEC sectors 
Environmental Crime Estimated scale or annual market value (in US$)* 
Illegal trade in wildlife 
 
6–10 billion (The U.S. Government 2000, 29); 5–20 billion (Wyler and Sheikh 
2008, 1); EU€18–26 billion (Europol 2011, 30); 7.8–10 billion (Haken 2011, 
                                                          
11 The original source for the US$40 billion estimate was attributed to Gavin Hayman (Lovell 2002). 
12 Global Financial Integrity is a non-profit, research, advisory, and advocacy organisation located in 
Washington DC. 
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11); 7–23 billion (Nellemann et al. 2016, 20)  
Illegal logging and 
associated trade 
10–15 billion (World Bank 2004a, 1); 10 billion in global revenue loss (OECD 
2012, 27); 10–30% of the volume of wood traded globally or 30–100 billion 
(Nellemann 2012, 13); 50.7–152 billion (Nellemann et al. 2016, 20) 
Illegal trade in ODS 
10–20% of legitimate trade or 25–60 million for global illicit trade in CFCs 
(Chatham House and EIA 2006, 5)   
Illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing 
4–5 billion (The U.S. Government 2000, 29); 10–23.5 billion in 2003 (OECD 
2012, 27); 11–23.5 billion (Nellemann et al. 2016, 20)  
Illegal trade and 
dumping of hazardous 
wastes 
10–12 billion (The U.S. Government 2000, 30) 
Total 29–211 billion 
* Estimates listed in Table 1.1 have been tracked down as much as possible to their original sources to 
avoid mistakes that might occur in the course of circular quotation. 
 
Turning the focus to regional black markets, the Asian black market for illegal 
environmental commodities for example, in its 2010 “Transnational Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment”, the UNODC (2010, 17) provides some fresh data on the extent and 
annual value for illicit trade in selected wildlife products and illegally logged timber in 
this region. It is estimated that the East Asian market for ivory is worth around US$62 
million per year, for rhino horn US$8 million per year, and for tiger parts US$5 million 
per year; the timber products illegally sourced from Southeast Asia are assessed to be 
worth US$3.5 million per year. 
 
1.2.2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TEC 
In COP 2010, the cross-border nature, governance failure, and the established 
involvement of organised criminal groups have been identified as the three most 
prominent factors that sustain environmental crime (COP 2010, 9). 
 
Environmental crime is by its nature transnational in terms of many of its basic 
components including the contraband involved, perpetrators, impact, and the movement 
of criminal proceeds. In commodity terms, in a context where the production and 
demand markets are globally distributed, environmental crime is similarly bound to be a 
transnational issue, involving wildlife, timber, ODS chemicals, and other environmental 
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goods being illegally harvested or produced in source countries and smuggled across 
borders to the end-use markets which are often in a different country. In perpetrator 
terms, environmental crime involves multilateral exchanges of illegal goods and 
passages of illegal profits among an array of illegal operators who are diffused along the 
chain of custody and who are taking up different roles as harvesters or poachers, 
processors, couriers, middlemen or intermediaries, exporters, importers, wholesalers, 
and retailers. In impact terms, environmental crime can cause far-reaching, damaging 
environmental, economic, political, and societal influences that would never be 
confined within the national boundaries of individual countries, but rather extending 
downwards and upwards to multiple affected countries or localities along the trade 
chain. Moreover, stimulated by globalisation and technological change, the movement 
of nearly everything from people, goods and capital to information has been greatly 
increased. The vast magnitude of transboundary flows makes it extremely difficult for 
national governments to inspect or police every single flow, thus creating a sort of 
regulation vacuum in which illicit goods and legal ones are moved together through the 
“front door”, with paperwork provided through fraud, forgery, and corruption (UNODC 
2016, 23). 
 
Perceived as an area where the profits can be extraordinarily high, and the risks of 
detection and of facing penalties that match their crimes are often low, environmental 
crime has become an attractive option not only for organised criminal groups, but also 
for terrorist elements and armed insurgent groups. 13  Organised criminal groups 
specialised in more traditional forms of transnational crime (e.g., trafficking in drugs, 
people) have taken advantage of their financial capability, established smuggling routes, 
and networks of collection, transportation, and distribution, diversifying readily their 
range of illegal undertakings into the area of environmental crime. This brings about a 
converging threat that approximates to what Bratton (2007, 22-24) referred to as the 
                                                          
13 The organised elements in part of the international illicit trade in environmental goods have been 
increasingly recognised by the CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, World Bank, World Customs 
Organisation, UN bodies (e.g., UNEP and UNODC), and other inter-governmental organisations. For 
example, starting from 2001, on recognising the involvement of organised criminal groups in all aspects 
of illicit trafficking in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) has issued several resolutions that urged the Member States to consider 
treating such offences as a “serious crime” in their national legislation, especially when there are elements 
of organised crime involved (ECOSOC Resolution 2001/12, 2002/18, 2003/27, 2008/25, 2011/36, 
2013/40). In 2014, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) adopted a similar 
Resolution (CCPCJ Resolution 23/1), calling for Members States to make illicit trafficking in forest 
products a serious crime, and to promote enforcement, research, and technical assistance measures to 
combat the illicit trafficking. According to article 2, paragraph (b) of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime, “serious crime” is defined as “conduct constituting an offence 
punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty”.   
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“mutation of illegal trade markets”, a new threat that blends traditional forms and 
emerging forms of transnational criminality. 
 
There is a body of evidence confirming the organised nature and elements in the 
international illicit trade in environmental goods. Between 1989 and 2010, the Elephant 
Trade Information System (ETIS) recorded more than 55 large ivory seizures with an 
average volume weighing around 2.3 tonnes (UNODC 2010, 158). The magnitude of 
the volume and monetary value in ivory trafficking strongly suggests the involvement 
of well financed and systematically organised criminal groups. The 2011 Europol threat 
assessment report on organised crime noted that Chinese organised groups, mainly 
based in Hong Kong, have specialised in the supply of traditional Chinese medicine 
(TCM) containing ingredients of endangered species to several companies across the 
EU (Europol 2011, 40). In June 2010, some 12 cylinders of CFC-12 were ferreted out 
by the Gambian Customs together with a consignment of over two tonnes of cocaine 
(estimated value at around US$1 billion), demonstrating the link between illegal ODS 
trade and organised criminal groups involved in cocaine smuggling (WCO RILO A/P 
2012).  
 
In other cases, exploitation and trafficking in natural resources have rapidly become a 
key activity for terrorists and armed insurgent groups. For example, media reports 
showed that militants affiliated with Al Qaeda are raising funds for their causes through 
illegal poaching and trade of ivory, tiger pelts, rhino horns, and other animal parts in the 
Kaziranga jungle in northeastern India and natural parks and reserves in Nepal, Burma, 
and Thailand (Levy and Scott-Clark 2007). Militias, armed groups, and insurgent 
groups based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Somalia have been 
reported in engaging in poaching of ivory and wildlife trafficking in Chad, Kenya, and 
other East and Central African countries (Cardamone 2012, 3–4). 
 
Illegal operators have learnt to create new leverage to conduct their illicit business. A 
U.S. Congressional Research Service report observed that organised crime groups have 
now incorporated the outsourcing strategy into their illegal commerce through 
subcontracting portions of their operations offshore to avoid keeping it all “in-house” 
(Bjelopera and Finkleam 2012, 21). Advanced techniques and sophisticated 
concealment methods are adopted in the course of trafficking. Illicit goods are hidden 
deep inside or underneath genuine cargo, wrapped in aluminium foil to hinder detection 
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by X-ray machines, painted to obscure their original appearance, or concealed in false 
bottoms or other hidden compartments in baggage, cargo containers, trains, boats, and 
motor vehicles (Sellar 2007). TEC also triggers and fosters other forms of criminal 
activities such as corruption, money laundering, certificates fraud, and others. For 
example, in an investigation into the illegal trade in Asian big cats in Linxia, China in 
2009, researchers from EIA was informed by local wildlife traders that they often used 
animal skins and exotic goods to bribe local authorities in exchange for tacit permission 
to sell protected wildlife products (EIA 2009, 6).  
 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters, with Chapter 1 as the Introduction and 
Chapter 7 as the Conclusion. Chapter 2 establishes the conceptual framework around 
the idea of “networked threats require networked responses”. Chapter 3–5 are three case 
studies of China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, and ODS. Chapter 6 
examines China’s present legislative and regulatory frameworks and enforcement 
responses in each of the three TEC sectors, identifying key challenges facing China and 
developing feasible suggestions for how Chinese regulatory and enforcement agencies 
can deal with TEC in a networked manner. Because the three case studies involve the 
use of the network conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, it is necessary to 
provide a brief synopsis of the context and main analytical components of the 
framework before jumping into the case-study chapters.   
 
1.3.1. CHAPTER 2. NETWORKS: A FACILITATOR FOR CLANDESTINE ACTORS OR AN 
APPROACH TO THEM 
As noted above, Chapter 2 is tasked with developing a network-centric conceptual 
framework, which can then be applied to the study of China-related environmental 
crime. In doing so, this chapter will synthesise and theorise the various insights about 
the utilities and relevance of networks from the interdisciplinary literature of network 
study to answer two central questions: what in essence are the so-called networked 
threats, and what in essence are the so-called networked responses.  
 
1.3.1.1. DISCOURSE CONTEXTUALISATION 
These two questions are fertilised and raised on the work of several influential scholars 
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from different disciplinary domains that points to a key proposition underpinning this 
PhD research: that is, networks and networking matter.  
 
In short, on one side of the proposition, there have been scholars including among 
others Elke Krahmann (2003; 2005), David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla (1996; 2001) 
arguing that an array of dark-side actors, such as terrorist groups and transnational crime 
of various kinds, are adopting networks in designing their organisational structures and 
operational tactics. Within this research context, networks are claimed to afford illegal 
and covert actors a set of selective strengths that empower them to better adapt to and 
capitalise on the openness of globalisation and advances in information technologies, 
responding quickly to opportunities and constraints on a global scale. As a consequence, 
such dark-side actors are said to be evolving into a transnationalised, networked threat 
posing serious challenges to nation-states. On the other side of the proposition, in 
reaction to the networked threats, many eminent scholars including, inter alia, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Manuel Castells, and Phil Williams propose another chorus of 
assumption arguing for the great potential and prospect of networked approach for 
bright-side actors to deal with the networked problems. For example, Slaughter (2004, 
160) claims that in the world of today where a diversity of clandestine actors are 
increasingly operating through global markets, global travel, and global information 
networks, the best strategy for governments to defeat these networked threats is to adopt 
a networked response. Williams (1998, 159) argues that governments and law 
enforcement agencies wishing to dismantle criminal networks have to think and act in 
networked terms. 
 
Therefore, to some extent, networks present a seeming paradox, or a double-edged 
sword, in that they act simultaneously as a facilitator for actors on the dark side to 
achieve their “organisational success” (e.g., profitability, longevity) and a solution for 
the actors on the bright side for addressing those dark-side threats.  
 
1.3.1.2. STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER 2 
To disentangle this paradoxical puzzle, Chapter 2 is organised into three sections. First, 
considering that much of the network research involves theoretical expansion and 
application extension based on an assortment of conceptual tools developed by social 
network analysis, Section 2.1 offers a succinct overview of present network study in 
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sociological literature and identifies the ways in which the concept of networks is being 
approached and their tangible referents in specific empirical milieus.  
 
Following that, Section 2.2 explores answers to the first facet of the paradoxical puzzle: 
what are networked threats. This section proceeds along “one trend and two central 
themes” that I have identified in the literature dealing with organised criminality. First, 
“one trend” refers to a tendency in which the concept of networks has been treated as a 
unifying theoretical framework for the analysis and interpretation of changes in the 
structures and operations of organising criminals. Second, “two central themes” refers 
to two key motifs that have repeatedly been underscored under the network analytical 
model. The first motif relates to a growing recognition in both academic arena and 
policy discourse that traditional theoretical approaches to the organisation of criminal 
groups and activities as a formal organisation (hierarchical model) or an economic 
enterprise (market model) are no longer adequate. Relatedly, it is claimed that various 
dark-side actors including terrorist groups, drug dealers, human traffickers, money 
launders, and other forms of transnational organised crime have been increasingly 
morphing into sprawling global networks. The second motif pertains to the argument that 
networks as a form of social organisation confer on illegal actors a set of organisational 
and operational strengths, which make them a prickly networked threat or “network-
based threat” for state actors to handle. In Section 2.2, I draw on this body of literature 
to reflect on the notion of networked threats, exploring what are the key utilities and 
strengths that networks grant their organisational carriers and how network models 
function as a facilitator for dark-side actors in enhancing and improving their 
performance. 
 
Section 2.3 explores answers to the second facet of the paradoxical puzzle: what 
constitutes a networked response. To that end, this section builds on the premise of 
“taking networks to fight networks” and further seeks to enrich this idea with insights 
from relevant strands of literature that treat networks as a key source of structural power 
and that see networking as an effective way of dealing with transnational issues. The main 
objective is to develop a nascent yet coherent account for the conceptual logic and 
underpinnings of the notion of networked responses. 
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1.3.1.3. TWO FORMS OF CRIMINAL NETWORKS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK 
Two forms of criminal networks have been identified within this study’s conceptual 
framework. First, criminal networks are understood as “transaction networks” in which 
specific illegal commodities are moved along a series of dispersed independent 
individuals and/or groups who act around the black markets for illicit proceeds. Illegal 
operators involved in transaction networks can be diverse, ranging from opportunistic 
individuals, organised criminal groups, small ad hoc groups of associates, corporations, 
and corrupt officials. In this sense, transaction networks are employed to describe the 
basic dynamics of smuggling or trafficking activity and to portray the criminal markets 
or illegal industry as a whole. Transaction networks typically take the shape of a 
commodity chain that intersects the localities (e.g., territories, countries, or regions) of 
source and consumer, sometimes with a third party implicated as a transiting point.  
 
When applied to TEC settings, transaction networks represent the overall chain of the 
black markets for specific environmental goods such as wildlife, timber, ODS chemicals, 
and hazardous wastes. As discussed in Section 1.2, environmental crime tends to 
assume a transnational character, involving cross-border movements of illegal 
environmental goods from the source countries to consumer countries. Therefore, the 
analytical focus of transaction networks is on the black market in its entirety. 
Investigation of TEC transaction networks helps to reveal many aspects that are directly 
relevant to the formulation of effective policy and enforcement responses to illegal 
trade. Points of investigation are identified as including among others the defining role 
(source/transit/consumer) of a particular country involved in the international/regional 
illegal trade chain, the scale and scope of the black markets, the magnitude and diversity 
of environmental contraband involved in trafficking or trade, the methods used in 
conveyance and concealment of illegal goods, the established smuggling routes, and the 
affected countries. 
 
Second, criminal networks can be “directed networks”, created and sustained by a 
coterie of core organisers for specific purposes, for example, organised crime groups 
specialised in drug trafficking that employ networks as their organisational structure. 
Directed networks can take shape in two basic structural modes: the hub (also called 
“star or wheel”) networks and the all-channel (or full-matrix) networks. When applied 
to TEC settings, directed networks refer to the organised criminal groups involved in 
trading and smuggling of environmental goods. As shown in Section 1.2.2, the 
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involvement of organised elements in international environmental crime is fairly 
evident. Directed networks can pose a significant threat to the international and national 
efforts to protect the biodiversity, forest, and ozone layer. This is not only because of 
their large-scale, systematic sourcing, smuggling, and supplying of environmental 
resources, but also because of their usual linkages with crossover crimes such as 
corruption, money laundering, and certificates fraud. Investigation of directed networks 
may focus on their organisational structures, relationships among network members, 
identification of key participants that are strategically important or unique for the 
operation of the directed networks, and so forth.  
 
For three reasons below, this study has decided to only focus on applying the concept of 
“transaction networks” to the three case studies, while leaving for future research the 
examination of whether or not there have been organised crime groups involved in 
China’s illegal trade in environmental goods and whether or not these organised crime 
groups are structured in directed networks.   
 
First, in the absence of a robust literature that identifies and analyses China’s role and 
utility in the international/regional illicit trade, a focus on understanding the 
transnational and transaction dimensions of China-oriented illegal trade chain should be 
the starting point. By “China-oriented”, I mean the transnational illicit trade chain where 
China sits in the middle as a major source supplying the international black market with 
illegal goods, or as a dominant consumer absorbing cross-border inflows of illegal 
goods from around the globe. As will be revealed at length in the three case studies, the 
part played by China in the international/regional illegal trade of environmental goods 
changes by cases. In the wildlife sector, China acts as the world’s dominant consumer 
for illegal wildlife; in the timber sector, China remains the world’s largest importer of 
illegally felled and traded timber and the major exporter of value-added wood products 
made of the imported illegal wood. In the ODS sector, China has emerged as the 
world’s leading supplier of illegal ODS in the international black market. Therefore, a 
deep mapping and thick description of China-related illegal trade in transnational and 
transaction terms should be the first and prime task for understanding China’s global 
trade in illicit environmental goods. 
 
Second, by focusing the case study on mapping and analysis of China’s illegal trade 
from the perspective of transaction networks, this study adopts a research design that is 
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akin to “plausibility probes”.14 That is, it takes the first but crucial step of applying the 
conceptual framework to grasp a great deal about the transaction dimension of China-
oriented illegal trade chain, while in the process seeking to detect and accumulate 
potential signs for the involvement of organised crime groups in China’s illegal trade. 
Such signs may include significant financial support, international management of 
shipments, sophisticated forgery of paperwork, well-armed participants, the 
involvement of other illegal goods (e.g., cocaine) in the trafficking of environmental 
contraband, and so forth. Only after we have had reliable evidence supporting the 
existence of organised crime groups in China’s illegal trade, are we then able to 
investigate whether or not these organised crime groups are structured in directed 
networks, shaped in wheel or all-channel networks.   
 
Third, evaluating whether or not perpetrators involved in China’s illegal trade fit in the 
directed networks in terms of their organisational structures and illegal undertaking 
requires a different kind of approach and different sources of data.15 As shown in the 
following sections, this study has developed, for each of the three case studies, a 
relatively large-scale empirical database for the mapping and analysis of transaction 
networks in China’s illegal trade. Collecting and compiling an extra mass of data 
specifically for directed networks goes beyond the scope of this individual effort. 
 
Each of the case study chapters (as well as the discussion below in this introductory 
chapter) provides more detail on the sources of data that underpin the analysis. On the 
rationale for the selection of data sources, this research is informed by a multiple-
method approach similar to the analytical approach known as triangulation. This 
approach integrates multiple data or evidence sources to offer a more detailed and 
balanced analysis that cannot be provided by any one type of data source. In social 
science, triangulation is increasingly accepted as an approach that can assist in the 
reliability and validity of research findings, add richness and complexity to the analysis, 
improve the understanding of a problem or research question and provide better 
                                                          
14 A plausibility probe is one of the many methods for designing case studies in social science. This 
method is comparable to a pilot study in experiment or survey research. Its main aim is to allow the 
researcher to refine the operationalisation of key variables, or to explore the suitability of a particular case 
as a vehicle for testing a theory or conception before engaging in a costly and time-consuming research 
effort (Levy 2008, 3–4). 
15 For example, potential data sources for researching directed networks might involve judicial verdicts on 
cases of organised crime offences, interviews with those who are used to be a member of an organised 
crime group involved in TEC, detailed information about perpetrators involved in large-scale smuggling 
of environmental goods, media coverage and government reports of the large-scale seizures of 
environmental goods, and so forth.   
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guidance for decision-making (Olsen 2004; Downward and Mearman 2007). Data 
gathering in this thesis relies on a range of primary sources including the UN Comtrade 
Database, FAOSTAT Database, TRAFFIC Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions, Chinese 
Customs Statistics Yearbook and others. Excel is chosen to be the main tool for data 
pooling and analysis. Numerical data such as bilateral trade information are directly 
input into the Excel. Textual data like media reports of seizures of illegal environmental 
goods are coded into a categorical database that encompasses categories like “date of 
seizure, country of origin/destination, method of transport, number of individuals or 
items seized”. Tables and figures have been greatly used in this thesis for a more 
readable presentation of the analytical findings. In addition, this evidence base has been 
supplemented through semi-structured and open-ended elite interviews conducted with 
Chinese officials, scholars and NGOs. It has also been supplemented through an 
extensive review of primary and secondary literatures, including official reports from 
international organisations such as UN bodies, CITES Secretariat and Ozone Secretariat.  
 
In terms of the approach to the use of above data, this thesis draws lessons from some 
descriptive practices by “deep mapping” and “thick description”. In humanities deep 
mapping is characterised as an approach to place that involves intensive topographical 
exploration that aims to present diverse knowledge systems (e.g., histories, ecologies, 
poetics, memoires etc.) as being of equally important (Springett 2015, 624). Within this 
thesis’s context, I invoke the term to underscore my commitment to, by cross-
referencing diverse sources of knowledge and information, developing a multi-layered 
and –faceted sense of networked responses and China’s illegal trade. For instance, in the 
process of developing accounts for networked responses in Chapter 2, I aspire to build a 
logical chain that is able to provide a step-by-step explanation of the drivers for, the 
consequences of, and the adaptive responses by both dark-side and bright-side actors to, 
the rise of global networks. While in this thesis’s case studies, I treat each source of data 
as equally important so that I can overcome the weaknesses borne with certain sources 
of information (for example, seizures only reflect a fraction (or the intercepted 
shipments) of the entire illegal trade). On the other hand, thick description as used in the 
fields of anthropology, sociology and religious studies refers to the process of paying 
attention to the contextual detail in observing and interpreting the social meaning of a 
human behaviour or an event. It often involves describing a phenomenon in sufficient 
detail such that the conclusions drawn from a specific case can have a cross-setting 
validity (Dawson 2010). In this thesis, I use the term in a more metaphorical way to 
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describe my endeavors to unpack in minute detail the complexity of the transnational 
and transaction dimensions of China-oriented illegal trade in environmental goods. 
 
1.3.2. CHAPTER 3. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL WILDLIFE  
Chapter 3 represents this thesis’s first case study of China-related TEC with a specific 
focus on China’s illegal trade in wildlife. The primary objective is, based on extensive 
literature review and concrete hard data collected from public sources, to understand the 
transaction networks involved in China’s global trade in illegal wildlife.  
 
This chapter is organised into three sections. Section 3.1 reviews the international legal 
trade in wildlife, identifies emerging trends in global trade, and discusses the conceptual 
range of illegal wildlife trade. In addition, given that existing published estimates of the 
scale and commodity structure of international wildlife trade are a little out-dated, this 
section produces an updated estimate by using the 2012 wildlife import and export data 
extracted from the UN Comtrade Database (the latest data at the time of drafting this 
chapter).16 Section 3.2 categorises the sources of “catalysts” that fuel a worldwide worry 
over China’s role in the international illegal trade in endangered wildlife.  
 
Section 3.3 collates and analyses 363 anecdotal records of China-related seizures of 
wildlife drawn from the TRAFFIC Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions (TRAFFIC 
1997–2013).17 Time period for the seizure data span 16 years from March 1997 to April 
2013. The term “China-related” is defined to include seizure cases involving China as 
the consumer or supplier of the seized wildlife, irrespective of whether the seizure 
occurring within China or outside China. Overall, the main objective of this empirical 
analysis is to, in triangulation with other sources of information such as field surveys by 
environmental NGOs, provide a comprehensive yet evidence-based understanding of 
China’s profile in the international and regional trade in illicit wildlife. More 
specifically, analytical effort has been given to a range of key issues associated with the 
transaction networks. These include: (1) the nature and scale of illegal wildlife trade in 
China and its territories; (2) the magnitude and diversity of wildlife illegally traded from 
                                                          
16 UN Comtrade Database contains import and export data reported by statistical authorities of close to 
200 UN member countries or regions and is considered the world’s most comprehensive database for 
international merchandise trade. UN Comtrade Database. http://comtrade.un.org/. 
17 TRAFFIC Bulletin is a compilation of global media reports on wildlife seizures and prosecutions that 
took place worldwide in the past ten more years. It is updated and released regularly by TRAFFIC, an 
environmental NGO monitoring international wildlife trade. 
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and to China; (3) the hotspots, smuggling routes, and prevailing modes of transport and 
concealment for illegal wildlife products. 
    
1.3.3. CHAPTER 4. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL FOREST PRODUCTS 
Chapter 4 is the second case study of China-related TEC with a specific focus on 
China’s illegal trade in timber and wood products. The main objective of this case study 
is to, based on extensive literature review and bilateral trade data collected from public 
sources, understand the “transaction networks” involved in China’s global trade in 
illegal forest products.  
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. Section 4.1 reviews the present state of the 
world’s forest resources and deforestation. Section 4.2 summarises published estimates 
of the scale of illegal logging and trade at the global level and in individual countries 
and defines the term “illegal logging and associated trade”. Section 4.3 provides an 
overview of China’s global forest footprint, analysing the trends and patterns in China’s 
production, consumption, imports, and exports of forest products during 2000–2011 
based on the bilateral trade data collected from UN Comtrade Database and FAOSTAT 
Database.18  
 
Section 4.4 draws upon the “import-source analysis” that incorporates two sources of 
baseline data: (1) the latest statistics of China’s forest product imports from China 
General Administration of Customs (GAC) and; (2) published estimates of the level of 
illegal logging or trade in China’s high-risk supplier countries from government reports 
or respected research institutions 
 
1.3.3.1. IMPORT-SOURCE ANALYSIS  
In the case of China as the subject of investigation, import-source analysis calibrates the 
illegal content in wood flows from a particular high-risk supplying country to China by 
multiplying the total RWE (Roundwood Equivalent) volume of the forest products 
imported by China from that country with the estimated level of illegal logging or trade 
                                                          
18 The Food and Agriculture Organisation Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), is an information 
system maintained by the Statistics Division of FAO. This database collects and disseminates information 
relating the global production and trade of food and agricultural commodities. FAOSTAT. 
http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E.  
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in that country.19 Two sources of baseline data have been employed in this analysis. 
 
1.3.3.2. BASELINE DATA ONE: CCSY 2012  
This analysis uses the Chinese Customs Statistics Yearbook (CCSY) 2012 to calculate 
the physical volume of China’s 2012 imports of forest products. CCSY is the only 
official source of China’s trade statistics and generally regarded as the best 
approximation of the actual trade. The 2012 version of CCSY was the latest series 
available at the time of this analysis. 
 
1.3.3.3. BASELINE DATA TWO: PUBLISHED ESTIMATES OF THE LEVEL OF ILLEGAL 
LOGGING OR TRADE IN CHINA’S SUPPLIER COUNTRIES  
Estimates of illegal logging are available in the literature for most of the world’s 
significant high-risk producer countries such as Mozambique, Indonesia, and the 
Russian Federation. These countries are often amongst China’s major wood suppliers. 
Through an extensive literature review, this analysis has been able to garner estimates of 
illegal logging or trade for a total of 44 countries, which virtually cover all China’s 
outstanding high-risk wood supplying countries. Countries that are not on the list are 
often those from which wood flows to China are marginal in quantity. Therefore, 
excluding them from the analysis will unlikely affect the reliability of the ultimate 
assessment in any significant manner. 
 
By doing so, this analysis intends to achieve two main objectives. First, most of the 
existing estimates of the share of illegal timber in China’s forest product imports tend to 
only cover a limited number of high-risk supplying countries and/or only consider an 
incomplete spectrum of wood-based products. This analysis elects to overcome those 
limitations by coming up with a conservative yet reliable estimate with a fairly broad 
coverage in terms of both the major forest products imported by China and the high-risk 
supplying countries involved in China’s imports. Second, this analysis develops a 
comprehensive study of the extent and commodity composition of China’s illegal wood 
flows, identifying the major high-risk suppliers and mapping out the routes for major 
tainted wood flows.  
 
                                                          
19 RWE is a standard measure of the volume of roundwood required for the manufacture of a unit of 
specific wood-based products. 
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1.3.4. CHAPTER 5. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL ODS 
Chapter 5 is the third case study of China-related TEC with a specific focus on China’s 
illegal trade in controlled ODS. The main objective of this case study is to, based on 
extensive literature review and concrete hard data collected from public sources, 
understand the “transaction networks” involved in China’s global trade in illegal ODS. 
 
This chapter is organised into three sections. Recognising that the scholarly treatments 
of many key issues of global trade in illegal ODS have been presented less 
systematically, Section 5.1 reviews the various discourses and lays them out in an 
organised and coherent fashion. In doing so, this section firstly brings clarity to the term 
“illegal ODS trade” which many scholars rarely attempt to clarify when they discuss the 
issue. Secondly, this section periodises the historical evolution of the international trade 
in illegal ODS into three phases: origins, proliferation, and history repeating itself. In 
each phrase, this section analyses the scale and scope, trading routes, major sources, 
transiting points, and leading destination markets. 
 
Section 5.2 holds the view that the core mechanism behind the international illegal trade 
in ODS has been the special market conditions where demand remains unmet due to 
controlled and curtailed supply. Therefore, this section garners and collates treatments 
from the literature to categorise factors and drivers that are believed to be responsible 
for the formation of such market conditions. 
 
Section 5.3 firstly uses the bilateral trade data drawn from the Ozone Secretariat Data 
Centre and UN Comtrade Database to document China’s history and present state of 
ODS production, consumption, and trade. Secondly, this section compiles and analyses 
85 records of China-related ODS seizures that occurred during the period from January 
2000 to April 2014. The seizure data is collected from a number of reports by 
government agencies, environmental NGOs, and international organisations. The main 
purpose of this analysis is to investigate China’s role in the international trade in illegal 
ODS, the scale of China’s black market, the magnitude and diversity of ODS chemicals 
involved, major destination markets for Chinese-produced ODS, and the prevalent 
methods for smuggling and concealment. 
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1.3.5. CHAPTER 6. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO TEC 
Chapter 6 examines China’s legal frameworks and enforcement responses in the three 
selected TEC sectors. This chapter is organised into three sections. In each section, in 
conjunction with the empirical findings of the transaction networks by the case studies 
and the understanding of networked responses developed in Chapter 2, this chapter 
identifies the key challenges facing China in tackling its illegal trade, and pinpoints the 
critical points where China’s wildlife enforcement agencies can step in to maximise 
their effort.  
 
1.3.6. MAIN ARGUMENTS 
This study makes two broad arguments: one theoretically oriented and one empirically 
directed. First, this study argues that while the concept of networked threats can be 
approached along the dimensions of transaction networks and directed networks, 
networked responses are not a standard, formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement 
responses. Rather, networked responses should be understood as a special way of 
thinking and acting: a way that sees a bright-side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as 
operating in an environment occupied by various networks and entities, which 
simultaneously present challenges in terms of amplified (networked) threats, as well as 
opportunities in terms of power amplifiers for the bright-side actor, in the sense that 
they could potentially be leveraged for tackling these threats. In other words, in addition 
to the traditional logic of increasing resource power, network thinking emphasises 
cultivating connections or relational resources rather than cultivating physical or hard 
resources. 
 
On the other hand, network thinking analyses an actor first by looking at whether or not 
it is a participant of an influential network, and whether it is placed in an advantageous 
or disadvantageous, a favourable or less favourable position in that network. Then, 
network thinking will consider strategies to move that actor from a less favourable 
position to a favourable one. This study argues that the overall logic underlying 
networked way of thinking and action is that, in an increasingly networked, horizontal 
world, power comes from connections with and the positioning of influential networks 
and, that power is critical for dealing with transnational issues (including TEC). 
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Second, China’s global trade in environmental contraband is typified by the substantial 
scale of China’s black markets and the deep embeddedness of China in the international 
and regional illicit trade chain. These two features, on the one hand, pose a serious 
challenge to the Chinese government in tackling its TEC; while on the other hand, they 
imply that Chinese effort and progress made toward the addressing of its illegal internal 
trade will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the whole of the 
international and regional illegal trade. In the meantime, this study argues that a good 
starting point for addressing China’s illegal internal trade is to overcome the regulatory 
and enforcement obstacles identified by this study.  
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2. NETWORKS: A FACILITATOR FOR CLANDESTINE ACTORS, 
OR AN APPROACH TO THEM? 
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2012a, 45), a noted political scientist, once put it that in the 
world of the twenty-first century, the most important contextual transition in the 
international system is not the rise or decline of great powers, but the “ubiquity and 
density of global networks”. The last decades have witnessed the phenomenal 
expansion in the quantity, density, global reach, power, and influence of global 
networks of varying kinds with infiltration into nearly every domain of both “the world 
of states” and “the world of society”. A wide spectrum of social, economic, and political 
actors – whether in benign or malign forms, ranging from nation-states, government 
officials, financial regulators, to corporations, NGOs, universities, social and political 
advocacy groups, and to criminals and terrorists – are all interacting with their domestic 
partners and foreign counterparts through network-like associations of various scales 
and configurations to deal with a broad range of transnational issues (Slaughter 2004a, 
159–61). Networks, Slaughter argues, are reshaping and redefining the ways in which 
individuals and institutions “communicate, produce value, consume, collaborate, 
compete, fight, organise, express themselves, lead and follow” in an era of globalisation 
and information (Slaughter 2012a, 46).  
 
In the research areas of non-traditional security and transnational criminality, a number 
of other scholars including John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (1996, 2001), Elke 
Krahmann (2003, 2005), Phil Williams (1994, 1998, 2001), Mark Duffield (2005) and 
many others, too, present a chorus of concerns with an ostensibly networked trend in 
contemporary international and national security environment. Inspired by the notion of 
“cyberwar”, in their coauthored report, The Advent of Netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
coined the term “netwar” to describe what they saw as an emerging form of low-
intensity societal conflicts and crime waged by “social networked actors” in the 
information age. These new forms of conflicts and crime are distinguishable from 
traditional modes of conflict and crime, in which the protagonists prefer to develop 
“formal, stand-alone hierarchical organisations, doctrines, and strategies”. In contrast, 
these networked actors, such as transnational terrorist groups, criminal syndicates, law 
enforcement agencies, and militant groups, are employing “network forms of 
organisation, doctrine, and strategy” in an effort to improve their performance (Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt 2001, 7). Similarly, in her article Security Governance and Networks, 
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Krahmann (2005) draws attention to a networked transformation in the contemporary 
security environment. The scholar contends that a networked mode of coordination has 
proliferated remarkably both horizontally and vertically: among new fields of security 
threats such as terrorism, transnational crime (including TEC), and WMD proliferation, 
as well as among a multitude of state and non-state actors. The concepts of networks 
and security governance are said to be more precise in grasping the core aspects of the 
changing nature of contemporary security architecture.  
 
With a review of above scholars’ work, an image of a confrontational interaction can be 
sketched. That is, at one side of the “battle”, an array of entities in malign forms 
including terrorism and transnational crime of various kinds, or “dark-side” actors as in 
Raab and Milward’s (2003) language, are adopting networks in designing their 
organisational structures and operational tactics. Within this research context, networks 
are claimed to empower illegal and covert actors, including those involved in TEC, to 
better adapt to and capitalise on the openness of globalisation and advances in 
information technologies, so as to respond quickly to opportunities and constraints on a 
global scale. As a consequence, dark-side actors are said to be evolving into 
transnationalised, networked threats posing serious challenges to nation-states.  
 
While along the opposing line of the confrontation, an alignment of state actors 
including government institutions and military units as well as non-state actors such as 
international organisations, NGOs and other “bright-side” agents are also developing 
network-based strategies and coordination with a view to strengthening their capacity to 
deal with above new threats. The doctrine of network-centric warfare developed by the 
US military in countering terrorism and drug trafficking (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998; 
Ladymon 2001), the grand strategy of network centrality proposed by Slaughter 
(2012a), the emergence of multilateral intergovernmental and non-governmental 
networks on issues such as combating money laundering and global crime, freezing 
terrorist assets, and sharing vital information (Slaughter, 2004a), all are part of the 
tangible manifestation of a variety of networked forms of security, regulation, and 
enforcement practices and arrangements. “Networked responses to networked threats” 
seems to become a promising development favoured in the worlds of both theory and 
practice. 
 
39 
 
In a nutshell, to some extent, networks present a seeming paradox, or a double-edged 
sword, in that they act simultaneously as a facilitator for actors on the dark side and a 
solution or a toolset for the actors on the bright side for addressing those dark-side 
threats. Then the core question is how can networks simultaneously be a “capacity 
enhancer” for two opposing lines of actors? When we resort to the existing literature to 
garner treatments to flesh out our understanding of what in essence are the so-called 
networked threats and networked responses, we find significant knowledge gaps. That is, 
although the literature allows us to collect a number of suppositions, such as “it takes 
networks to fight networks” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 15) or “networked threats 
require networked responses” (Slaughter 2004a, 160), these propositions have largely 
been dealt with in more general terms that lack in-depth diggings into the more nuts-
and-bolts issues including, for example, what are the key aspects and utilities of 
networks that make designs or arrangements espousing them as prospective facilitators 
or solutions.  
 
This chapter elects to address this gap. To disentangle this paradoxical puzzle, this 
chapter is organised into three sections. First, since much of the network research 
involves theoretical expansion and application extension based on an assortment of 
conceptual tools developed by social network analysis, Section 2.1 reviews the present 
network research in sociological literature to understand how the concept of networks is 
being approached by the relevant literature. Following that, Section 2.2 will address the 
first facet of the paradoxical puzzle of this chapter: in what sense do networks act as a 
facilitator for criminal actors in terms of improving their performance. It will do so by 
examining the literature of organised criminality research, and exploring the sets of 
defensive and offensive strengths that networks grant the dark-side actors. In the final 
part, Section 2.3 explores answers to the second facet of the paradoxical puzzle: what 
constitutes a networked response. In doing so, this section takes the proposition of 
“taking networks to fight networks” as the starting point and then, it will develop 
around this idea by absorbing various insights from the literature on how to treat 
networks as a key source of structural power and how can networking be an effective 
way of dealing with transnational issues. The focused aim is to develop a nascent yet 
coherent account for the conceptual logic and underpinnings of the notion of networked 
responses, which can then be used as the guidance for the development of suggestions on 
how the Chinese regulatory and enforcement agencies might formulate their own 
networked responses to TEC 
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2.1. PRESENT STATE OF NETWORK RESEARCH 
Network research flourishes today in social sciences, invoking an upsurge of interest 
from sociologists, economists, and political scientists in the study of contemporary 
practices and arrangements and resulting in multiple productive lines of scholarship.20 
Moreover, as network research advances along substantive strands of academic 
disciplines, the terrain of its application has been widened, including now a plurality of 
issues and topics that span over network governance, political and policy networks, 
issue networks, social networks, networked economy, cultural, scientific and scholarly 
networks, social movements, criminality and terrorism, and the network society 
(Freeman 2004, 5; Lewis 2010, 51).   
 
Among the multiple lines of network scholarship, in addition to the allegorical use of 
networks, network theorists and analysts often distinguish between two separate yet 
interrelated branches of network literature, with each embracing a distinct approach to 
the concept of networks. In their seminal work, Networks and Economic Life, Powell 
and Smith-Doerr (1994, 368–70; 2005, 380) identify two independent strands of socio-
economic literature on network research. The first is, in their vocabulary, “formal 
network analyses”, which is anchored deeply in sociology and organisational theory and 
employs networks as an analytical or empirical device to analyse associations of social 
actors. The key theoretical and empirical values of this vein of scholarship are on the 
instrumental role of networks in enabling analysts to explore and understand the 
patterns of sophisticated social relationships and their impact on economic outcomes. 
The second strand of network literature is more multi-disciplinary and theoretically 
oriented, invoking networks as a metaphor to characterise a form of economic 
organisation, governance, or organising motif that is fundamentally distinctive from the 
hierarchical or market-based kinds. Likewise, Thompson (2003, 5) provides a 
comparable account with respect to the conceptual positioning of networks in socio-
economic literature. He demarcates networks as both “a method of thinking through the 
contemporary nature of social existence and a concrete form of social organisation; a 
conceptual category or tool of analysis and an object of analysis in the form of an actual 
                                                          
20 According to Knoke and Yang (2008, 1–2), the volume of social science publications with “social 
network” as a key concept has mushroomed exponentially since 1975; while Borgatti et al.’s (2009, 892) 
investigation of the published research with the topic of “social networks” in the “Web of Science” also 
indicates that its amount has nearly tripled in the past decades. 
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mode of coordination and governance”. 21 Lewis (2005, 10–1; 2009, 51–2) agrees to the 
typology that approaches networks as a conceptual device and a form of governance and 
coordination. She adds that networks as a conceptual model can be further differentiated 
between networks as a theory and as an analytical technique, with the former serving as 
a means for thinking about the interconnectedness of actors and organisations, and the 
latter providing tools for measuring and analysing it. 
 
2.1.1. NETWORKS AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL 
As an analytical device, network analysis contains a toolkit of concepts and a set of 
statistical techniques and methods, which originate largely in social network analysis 
and are then being introduced to other disciplines (e.g., politics, criminology). Network 
analysts following this line of research use a set of nodes connected by relations to 
represent a network. In a broad sense, nodes can be persons, groups, organisations, or 
other socially-relevant objects such as countries, neighbourhoods, departments within 
organisations, and positions and locations. Relations connecting a pair of nodes – also 
termed connections, ties or links – can vary among collaborations, friendships, trade 
ties, flows of information or resources, exchanges of social support and others (Marin 
and Wellman 2011, 11-2).22 A network connecting nodes via links reflects a pattern of 
relations, and can be conceived of as a type of structure (Ward et al. 2011, 246). Thus, 
the main focus of network analysis is on exploring the patterns of relations among 
social, economic, and political actors to understand how certain patterns of relations or 
certain types of network structure shape social, economic, and political outcomes.  
 
Network analysts diagnose networks through two lenses: the network level and the node 
level. At the network level, analytical attention is given to how the network of interest is 
structured (for example, its components are densely or sparsely interconnected) as well 
as the effects of the network structures on the performance of the network. At the node 
level, the main concern of network analysis is the opportunities and constraints that are 
generated by a network position and their effects on the outcomes of the occupant of 
that network position. Borgatti et al. (2009, 894) classify outcomes at the node level into 
                                                          
21 In Thompson’s (2003: 37) views, there is a nuanced difference between coordination and governance. 
Coordination refers to the state in which the constitutive elements of a given system “are somehow 
brought into an ordered pattern, considered and made to act together”, while governance points to “the 
regulation of these elements, the effectiveness of their reproduction, of their alignment and coordination”. 
22 Borgatti et al. (2009, 893) categorise the dyadic relations between network members into four basic 
groups: similarities (in terms of locations, memberships, etc.), social relations (kinship, affective ties, etc.), 
interactions, and flows (exchange or transfer of resources or information). 
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two major categories: homogeneity and performance. First, node homogeneity refers to 
the similarity in attitudes or behaviours between a pair of actors. For example, social 
influence literature asserts that the convergence in attitudes and behaviours of two 
individuals can be attributed to the similarity in their social network positions, which 
cause the two to expose to similar constraints and opportunities, and thus push them to 
make the same choices (Christakis and Fowler 2007). Second, the performance of a 
given node can have multiple meanings under different research and social settings. For 
example, when the nodes represent individuals, the study of node performance might 
focus on how the opportunities and constraints bound to a network position function in 
the occupant’s attempts to find a job, get a promotion, or get financial capitals to start 
businesses. When the nodes stand for organisations, the study of node performance 
might be concerned with how the ties of a network position help or restrain its occupant 
in seeking access to valuable information and resources, to more rapid product 
development, or to enhanced innovation (Powell and Smith-Doerr 2005, 389; Marin and 
Wellman 2011, 17).23  
 
Network positions – which are defined as an actor’s structure positions in relation to 
other actors in a relational network – both empower and constrain the action of the 
occupants, in the sense that they impose limits as well as offer opportunities. Therefore, 
occupants of a network position that faces fewer constraints and enjoys more 
opportunities are in favourable structural positions, and enjoy a set of structural benefits 
brought about by the favourable positions (Burt 1993). The structural benefits – such as 
mobilising resources, selectively sharing information, exerting greater influence, 
drawing more attention, extracting better bargains in exchanges and so forth – can be 
translated into the node’s power and influence in certain social environments (Van der 
Hulst 2009, 107–8).  
 
Although assessing whether a position is favoured or weak needs to consider in terms 
specific to concrete social contexts, normally, structural holes and centrality are two 
pragmatic kinds of advantageous network positions that are argued to afford occupants a 
range of competitive benefits. According to Burt (2009), structural holes refer to a gap 
between two disconnected actors who have complementary resources or information. 
Actors who are able to extend their social networks to cover the structural holes and 
                                                          
23 In explaining the correlation of particular network structures and network positions with particular 
outcomes, network researchers introduce four mechanisms or effects of networks: transmission, binding, 
adaptation, and exclusion. More details see Borgatti et al. 2009, 894; Lazer 2011, 62. 
43 
 
connect the two disconnected can use their position as a source of power by controlling 
the path of communication. 
 
In social network analysis, the concept of centrality is differentiated among degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality measures 
the number of direct contacts that a node has in a given network. Actors with high 
scores in degree centrality are assumed to have access to multiple behavioural 
alternatives. The kinds of power that generate from a network position with a high 
degree centrality embody in two aspects. First, by having more direct ties, the actor 
commands a degree of control over other nodes whose exchanges with one another rely 
on the path through the central actor. In other words, this kind of control power is a 
function of the circulatory effect of networks, which assumes networks as a structure 
through which things (e.g., information, social support) circulate. Second, by having 
multiple choices in terms of securing needs, the actor is able to remain less dependent 
on others. As Keohane and Nye (1998, 86) point out, “the ability of being less 
vulnerable to manipulate or escape the constraints of an interdependent relationship at 
low cost is an important source of power”. 
 
Closeness centrality refers to actors who are closer to more other actors in a given 
network. Actors with high scores in closeness centrality are presumed to be able to 
transfer resources more quickly, or remain more reachable by other actors. By 
positioning closer to more nodes in a network, the actor can have his or her views being 
heard by larger number of nodes, which allows the actor to occupy the centre of 
attention. This structural benefit enabled by closeness centrality might prove vital in 
today’s information society, where the flows of information are often overloaded, and 
the attention becomes a scarce resource (Keohane and Nye 1998, 89). Betweenness 
centrality measures the number of paths that are required for an actor to reach all other 
nodes in a given network. Actors with high scores in betweenness centrality are 
assumed to be capable of transferring the items through the network in the fastest 
manner (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  
 
Since the opportunities and constraints associated with a network position are directly 
relevant to the occupant’s “ability to produce intended effects on the attitudes and 
behaviours of other actors” (Knoke 1990, 9), network positions are further employed in 
the study of power and influence (e.g., Brass 1984; Bonacich 1987). Power deriving 
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from a network position can be understood as both relational and structural expressions. 
Being relational is that it indicates the relatively preponderant influence that the 
occupant of a network position has over other network members. In this way, power is a 
consequence of patterns of relations. A pattern of relations reflects a type of structure. 
Therefore, power is also a structural expression of the network: certain network 
structural positions are more advantageous or favourable than others in terms of 
empowering their occupants.  
 
In sum, network positions in a relational network empower or constrain the action of 
their occupants due to the limits or opportunities bound to that network position. 
Network positions that expose to fewer limits and more opportunities are advantageous 
or favourable positions. The empowerment mechanism of a favourable network position 
on its occupant speaks that the former is able to provide the latter with a set of structural 
benefits. Such benefits can enhance that occupant’s ability to alter the attitudes and 
behaviours of other actors in certain social contexts in order to produce the intended 
results. 
 
2.1.2. NETWORKS AS A FORM OF GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION 
Empirical evidence for the prosperity of networking developments in substantive issue 
areas is plentiful. In the business world, firms and enterprises are engaging in an array 
of collaborative activities that involve various forms of relational contracting, for 
example, subcontracting, strategic alliances, joint venture, and research consortium, to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges and to adapt to environmental contingencies 
(Powell 1990; Powell and Smith-Doerr 2005). In public management and policy sector, 
a new governance model wrapped in various packages such as “policy networks”, 
“inter-organisational networks”, and “horizontal government” has come along to be a 
strong addition to the traditional large-scale and bureaucratic public organisations in the 
delivery of public goods and services (Kim 2014). In non-traditional security domain, 
scholars claim that there has been a proliferation of networked modes of coordination 
that operate under the rubrics of either the transnational governmental networks that link 
legislative, judicial, regulatory and enforcement communities across borders, or the 
public-private partnerships that connect government officials, international 
organisations, and private actors (Krahmann 2003, 2005; Slaughter 2004b). In global 
environmental regulatory and enforcement arena, multiple regional and national 
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enforcement and regulatory networks have been established to bring together 
government officials from the source, consuming and transiting countries to cope with 
the cross-border nature of environmental offences (Elliott 2012, 98–9).  
 
In the interdisciplinary field of network study, such network-like arrangements and 
practices are capped with different brands in different empirical ambiences. Socio-
economists frequently use such terms as “network organisation”, “network forms of 
organisation”, “inter-firm networks”, or “business groups” to describe inter-firm 
collaborative networks and consider them as a distinct, separate form of coordinating 
economic activity (Powell 1990, 301; Jones et al. 1997, 913); the one with its own 
defining order and attributes (e.g., reciprocity and trust) that enable it to stand 
distinguished from bureaucratic structures (hierarchies) and formal contractual 
relationships (markets) (Thompson, 2003). Public policy research invokes the term 
“network governance” to characterise an emerging network-based governance model 
(Kim 2014). Security policy studies categorise the collaborative networks among public 
and private security providers under the notion of “security governance” – which is 
construed as a new mode of coordinative mechanism that allows “a set of public and 
private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making 
and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political 
authority” (Krahmann 2005, 20).  
 
Despite the differences in the names, aims, activities, and memberships of the above 
empirical referents, a shared core character cuts through all these diverse networked 
variations. That is, they are inclusive and lateral coordinative structures or processes 
that deny the presence of a formal contractual relationship or central command and 
invite the participation of a variety of public, private, and nonprofit actors. More 
prominently, behind the myriad networked manifestations, we might sense a shared 
logic of managing and dealing with contemporary social, economic, and political 
problems. It is the logic of “networking”: the one of joining things up toward a common 
goal, or bringing relevant autonomous agents into a distinctive governance and 
coordination structure that is specifically designed for the addressing of a particular 
issue. 
 
Scholarly attempts have been made from different perspectives to explore the enabling 
conditions that foster the formation and thriving of networked coordination. The 
 46 
 
enabling conditions will assist us in understanding the rationale behind the actors’ 
choices of forming networked coordination or governance rather than market or 
hierarchy-based ones. Transaction Cost Economics Theory (TCE) factors in three 
dimensions associated with an exchange: the uncertainty (e.g., deriving from the 
environmental complexity or opportunistic activity), the degree of asset specificity (e.g., 
the unique knowledge developed by participants in exchanges), and the interaction 
frequency between exchange partners (Rossignoli and Ricciardi 2015, 12). This theory 
argues that compared to markets and hierarchies, the strengths (e.g., fast access to 
information, responsiveness to changing demands) and social mechanisms (e.g., 
restricted access to exchanges, reputation, and collective sanctions) of networks make 
them a more cost-efficient form of governance in rapidly changing markets 
characterised by high levels of demand uncertainty, complex and customised tasks, and 
recurrent and frequent exchanges (Jones et al. 1997, 926).   
 
In contrast with TCE that sees network coordination as a result of the firms’ initiatives 
to minimise transaction costs for increased profits, Resource-dependency Theory (RDT) 
offers an external perspective that focuses on the environment where the said actors 
operate. RDT ascribes the activity of one organisation forging external relations with 
others to the need for controlling and securing the resources that are critical to the 
organisation’s survival or grow. Studies of interorganisational relations assume that 
firms are not self-sufficient entities, but are rather operating in uncertain environments 
where resources vital for the firms’ survival or functioning are often in the hands of 
other organisations due to such factors as resource scarcity or industrial specialisation. 
In order to reduce environmental uncertainty, firms attempt to take measures to secure 
access to the complementary resources controlled by others. In contrast with 
integration-oriented strategies such as merger or acquisition, collaboration-based 
interorganisational partnerships or coalitions (e.g., joint venture alliances or long-term 
outsourcing agreements) proves a more agile, less costly, and less irreversible means to 
connect the resources (Preffer and Salancik 2003, 167). Just as Porter and Fuller (1986, 
321) point out: “the choice of a coalition implies that it is perceived as a less costly or 
more effective way to configure than the alternatives of on the one hand developing the 
skills to perform the activity in-house or on the other hand of merger to gain the 
capabilities to perform the activities or to buy products or skills in arm’s-length 
transactions”. Additionally, arguments have been made from other theoretical angles for 
the comparative advantages of networked alliances over integration. For example, 
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scholars working on the theory of knowledge and learning laud the relevance of 
cognitive distance and discrete sources of experiences and knowledge among group 
members in promoting complementary cognition and devalue integration because it 
reduces the cognitive distance and forces cognitive convergence (Nooteboom 2004: 
192).24 
 
2.2. NETWORKS: A FACILITATOR FOR CLANDESTINE ACTORS? 
There has been a trend in the literature of international relations and criminology on the 
study of criminal activities from the perspective of networks. The concept of criminal 
networks has increasingly become a “theoretical framework” or “theoretical paradigm” 
for analysing and interpreting changes in the structures and operations of the 
“organising criminals” (Van Duyne 1997, 219; Slaughter and Zaring 2006, 215; 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, 7). Within this network research framework, two 
themes have repeatedly been emphasised.  
 
First, it is claimed that traditional theoretical approaches to the organisation of criminal 
groups and activities as a formal organisation (hierarchical model) or an economic 
enterprise (market model) are no longer adequate (Williams 1998, 16; Waring 2002, 44–
45; Shelley and Picarelli 2002, 305; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, 79; Bjelopera and 
Finklea 2012, 21). Findings in a number of empirical studies of various criminal 
activities, especially the market-oriented trafficking or smuggling activities, reveal a 
distinct form of social organisation in which the manner that criminal activities are 
organised and co-offenders are connected bears no resemblance to either the authority 
mode of hierarchy or the competition mode of market. For example, Natarajan’s (2006) 
study of some 2,408 wiretapped conversations among 294 members of a heroin-dealing 
gang in New York found that this criminal group did not form a unitary organisation; but 
instead it had developed into a loosely structured network with little or no hierarchy. 
Michael Kenney’s research on drug trade in Colombia suggested that the Colombian 
cocaine trade was largely patterned with “a fluid social system” filled with flexible 
exchange networks of various shapes, scales, and shades of organisational 
                                                          
24 The concept of cognitive distance was proposed by Nooteboom and defined as a way “to interpret 
resource heterogeneity between the firms that hold these different resources”. It can be understood as the 
distance between the specialised knowledge bases of the actors involved in a collaboration (Balconi et al. 
2012, 6). 
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sophistication, expanding and contracting according to “market opportunities and 
regulatory constraints” (Kenney 2007, 179). 
 
Second, it is argued that networks as a form of social organisation afford illegal actors a 
set of organisational and operational advantages, which make them a thorny “networked 
threat” or “network-based threat” for whomever to combat. For example, Klerks (2001) 
stated that for present-day sub-legal activities such as producing and trafficking illicit 
products, the network form of organisation proved to be better adapted to modern 
modes of collaboration, trading, and communication than traditional hierarchical 
structures. Naim (2005) chronicled a range of illicit trading networks of trafficking in 
arms, drugs, people, and of intellectual piracy, contending that these networks were 
highly decentralised, agile, stateless, and capable of quickly entering into complex 
arrangements in response to market opportunities and threats. 
 
In this section, I draw on this body of literature to reflect on the idea of networked 
threats, exploring what essentially the characteristics and utility can the network-based 
organisation grants its carriers and how does network models function as a facilitator for 
dark-side actors to achieve their “organisational success” (e.g., profitability, longevity). 
The purpose of doing so is to develop answers to the first facet of the paradoxical puzzle 
raised by this Chapter: what are networked threats. 
 
2.2.1. CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND NETWORK STRUCTURES 
Marin and Wellman (2011, 16) suggest that “one approach to applying a network 
perspective to a substantive area is to take a key concept within that area and define it in 
network terms”. Then what constitutes a “criminal network”? In its simple form, a 
network can be understood as a compilation of nodes that are connected through formal 
or informal links of communication and/or exchange of resources (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
2005, 7–8). Networks vary along multiple dimensions including size, shape, 
membership, goal, portfolio of undertakings, and other parameters. When applied to 
illicit settings, extending from the work of Phil Williams (1998, 154; 2001, 69; 2006, 
199), criminal networks, especially those revolve around certain black markets 
(including those involved in TEC), can come in two different but correlated forms: 
transaction networks and directed networks. 
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2.2.1.1. TRANSACTION NETWORKS 
First, criminal networks can be “transaction networks”, in which specific illegal 
commodities are moved along a series of dispersed independent individuals and/or 
groups who act around the black markets for illegal proceeds. Illegal operators involved 
in transaction networks are diverse, ranging from opportunistic individuals, organised 
criminal groups, small ad hoc groups of associates, corporations, and corrupt officials.  
 
Transaction networks are usually employed to describe the basic dynamics of 
smuggling or trafficking activities and to portray the criminal markets or illegal industry 
as a whole. In this sense, transaction networks can be equated literally with the concept 
of “commodity chains”, in that both concepts view the licit/illicit markets as a dynamic 
process composed of decentralised yet articulated activities at discrete custodian stages 
of the chain. Through the transaction chain, illicit goods are being produced, taken or 
harvested, processed, transported, exported, imported, distributed, sold, and consumed.  
 
Transaction networks often assume a transnational character, engaging a multiplicity of 
illegal operators that spread in the countries of source, transit, and destination. They are 
typically characterised by properties of “self-organising, decentralised and horizontal 
structures, arm’s length transactions” and agents’ behaviours being disciplined by price 
and competition mechanisms (Kenney 2007, 31; Thompson 2003, 23).  
 
2.2.1.2. DIRECTED NETWORKS 
Second, criminal networks can be “directed networks”, created and sustained by a 
coterie of core organisers for specific illicit ends, for example, organised criminal 
syndicates specialised in drug trafficking which employ networks as their organisational 
structure. The interrelationship between transaction networks and directed networks lies 
in that transaction networks are made up of a web of dispersed directed networks and 
individual offenders whose self-interests-driven activities articulate with one another 
along the chain of custody and work as a whole in prompting the smooth functioning of 
the overall black markets.  
 
The archetypal type of directed networks may take shape in two basic structural modes 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 7–8; Kenney 2007, 29–36). First, directed networks may 
be shaped in “hub, star or wheel” structures, which encompass a central actor (e.g., a 
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group or an individual) and a set of peripheral nodes that are all tied to the central actor. 
The defining characteristic of wheel networks is that the central actor assumes a 
preponderance of power, influence, and status within the network. There are no 
horizontal connections among peripheral nodes whose communication and coordination 
with other peripheral nodes thus must go through the central actor (Williams 2001, 72). 
Relationships among members of core nodes are often stable, usually underpinned by 
bonding mechanisms such as family, kinship, ethnicity, or common experiences. Core 
actors are undertakers of multitasks, involving making decisions, initiating and 
organising illegal activities, orchestrating the dispersed efforts of peripheral nodes, 
providing security and resolving disputes among participants, establishing and 
sustaining coordinative relationships with corrupted law enforcers and so forth. In short, 
core actors act as the “steering mechanism” for the wheel networks (Kenney 2007, 29).  
 
By contrast, nodes in the peripheral zone are featured with “less dense patterns of 
interaction and looser relationships” (Williams 2001, 73). Peripheral nodes may be 
formal members with enduring, stable relations with a criminal network, yet they may 
be independent groups or individuals but contracted with the network to perform 
specific tasks or provide specific services (e.g., money laundering, commodity 
transportation or distribution). Accordingly, wheel networks may contain a stable core 
actor and a finite set of formal peripheral actors, but may enjoy a series of informal 
linkages, ties, or relationships with other criminal groups or individuals. For example, a 
research on Asian Organised Crime (AOC) operations reveals the “structural flexibility 
and fluidity” of many AOC groups in that members of some AOC groups 
simultaneously involve two or more roles (e.g., organiser or low-level labours) in 
different AOC groups at the same time (Beare 2010, 8).   
 
Second, directed networks may be structured in “all-channel or full-matrix” model, in 
which every node is connected to everyone else. In the views of Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
(2001, 8–9), all-channel networks are the paradigmatic organisational structure that 
typifies netwar adversaries. All-channel networks are thought of as the one that is most 
difficult to organise and sustain due partly to the requirement for highly dense and 
secure communication capacity. Meanwhile, they are also the one that affords a host of 
strengths that are believed to be critical for both effective collaboration among network 
members and defence against law enforcement attacks. This is because all-channel 
networks are flat in organisational structures (relatively few management layers) and 
51 
 
decentralised in decision-making and operations. There is no single, central leadership, 
command or headquarter that can be targeted by law enforcers. This also means that 
dismantling single nodes will not necessarily lead to the dysfunction of the networks as 
a whole. 
 
In practice, demarcating lines between various archetypal network structures are not 
always clear-cut. The more common case is that a variety of hybrids or mutations of 
network structures, or combinations of different organisational structures (e.g., networks 
or hierarchies), come into existence and obscure the theoretical classification.  
 
First, components of a transaction network may be structured in wheel or all-channel 
forms. In wheel networks where the central actor dominates in terms of the influence 
and power, there may exist varying degrees of vertical connection (either one-way or 
two-way) between the central actor and peripheral nodes as well as varying degrees of 
lateral interaction among peripheral nodes, rather than the case that peripheral nodes 
exclusively rely on the central actor to exchange information with one another. Out of 
consideration for safety, between the core leaders and peripheral nodes, there may be 
firewall-like intermediaries or brokers who are authorised to exercise part of the leaders’ 
discretion in order to buffer the central actor from direct complicity in criminal activity. 
This thus adds a third organisational tier to the two-level wheel networks.  
 
For example, by comparing three cases of the drug-trafficking networks, the Al Qaeda 
terrorist networks, and the diamond trafficking networks in West Africa, Raab and 
Milward (2003, 430) argue that attempts to find a united pattern of organisational 
structure in all these covert networks are fruitless. Network structures vary greatly 
depending on the specific opponents and competitors, “from complex overlapping and 
interlinked structures of the diamond and arms trade to the chain of bilateral contract 
relations of the heroin trade”. The need for survival in a hostile environment determines 
that illegal networks must have a flexible structure that would enable them to react 
rapidly to changing pressures from their legal adversaries and illegal competitors. Ming 
Xia’s study of contemporary organised crime in China suggests that Chinese criminal 
organisations may come in four different network structures: multi-polar networks, 
cobweb (zhizhuwang), production and distribution chains, and hub-and-spokes 
structures (lunfu). According to Ming Xia’s (2008, 17–21) interpretations, the “hub-and-
spokes structures” and “production and distribution chains” are structurally equivalent 
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to the wheel networks and transaction networks respectively, while the remaining two 
network modes are actually the mutations of the archetypal wheel networks. For 
instance, the “multi-polar networks” can be construed as a web of multiple independent 
wheel networks connected by arms-length transactions. The “cobwebs” are in effect an 
enlarged wheel network, or dubbed by Ming Xia as “stratified unipolar system”, in 
which there are a few dominant leaders as well as a number of peripheral groups that, 
although taking orders from the central leader, act in relatively independent terms in 
developing their illegal businesses.  
 
Second, networks may coexist with hierarchies at different organisational levels within 
a single structure. Rigid hierarchies, for example, may predominant at the core of some 
criminal syndicates, but hubs and chains preponderate in tactical operations. There may 
also be organisations that are overall structured in networks, but have particular nodes 
designed in hierarchies and vice versa (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, 8–9).   
 
2.2.2. STRENGTHS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
Another frequently highlighted theme in the literature of organised criminality study is 
that the reliance on network structures confers on illegal actors a set of selective 
strengths which make them a threat difficult for state actors to cope with. The challenge 
further complicates in difficulty especially when the government authorities that are 
responsible for combating them reflect the qualities described by Williams (1998, 159) 
that they are, “composed of and reliant on large, bureaucratic hierarchies that operate 
according to standard operational procedures, and are bound by budgetary constraints, 
and are, for the most parts, cumbersome”. 
  
On the basis of review of several scholars’ work on network strengths and 
characteristics (Williams 2001, 69–84; Williams and Godson 2002, 332–5; Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 2001, 11–2; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2005, 9–10; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 
2008, 13–6; Kenney 2007), the coming section synthesises the strengths and 
characteristics of networks into two broad dimensions: defence and offence. Overall, 
network strengths can be briefly summarised as, on the defensive end, the networked 
design enables illegal actors to be resilient and resistant in the face of adversity. While 
in terms of the offence potential, illicit networks can be flexible and adaptable in 
response to both challenges and opportunities.  
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2.2.2.1. DEFENSE: RESILIENCE AND RESISTANCE 
The defensive capability of criminal networks consists mainly in their resilience and 
resistance to the infiltration and disruption of their legal counterparts or illegal 
competitors. According to Julie Ayling (2009, 185), the resilience of criminal networks 
is their capacity “to absorb and withstand disruption” and “to adapt to changes when 
necessary”. The sources of resilience for criminal networks may include the 
environmental factor, 25  and the network structural characteristics such as “loose 
coupling” and “redundancy” (Williams 2001, 80–1; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 
2008, 15–6).  
 
Loose coupling indicates the little reliance of a node on other nodes within a network, 
especially among peripheral nodes that are susceptible to outside depredation. To 
achieve a loose-coupling structure, criminal networks may compartmentalise their 
peripheral nodes into separate, semi-autonomous cells that are relatively isolated from 
other network nodes. Decision-making authority may be devolved to “cell manager”, 
contacts between network members are minimised, and the sharing of information and 
intelligence is confined to a need-to-know range (Kenney 2007). Compared to the 
tightly-coupled systems where dependency and interaction among nodes are intense, 
loosely-coupled relationships make criminal networks more effective in limiting the 
“cascading or knock-on effects” caused by law enforcement attacks, allowing the 
resulted damage to be confined to parts where attacks are inflicted on, thus leaving other 
parts of the network remaining intact (Williams 2001, 80).  
 
Redundancy is another source of resilience. In economic sociology, redundancy is a 
network property that reflects the degree of overlap among contacts in one’s social 
networks (McGloin and Piquero 2010, 65). Individuals with high redundancy (or with a 
high degree of overlapping contacts) in their social networks tend to have access to a 
limited versatility of information, knowledge, and opportunities. Although the empirical 
research on criminal entrepreneurs suggests that a high level of non-redundancy in 
individual social networks would improve one’s monetary earnings and status amongst 
co-participants (Morselli and Tremblay 2004, 777), redundant contacts prove useful for 
                                                          
25 Ayling identifies three environmental sources for gang resilience: the thick crime habitats, community 
support, and a high level of interpenetration between gangs and legitimate businesses and state authorities. 
See Ayling 2009, 187–9. 
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criminal networks in developing ability to mitigate consequences and facilitate 
restoration from damage (Williams 2001, 81). Kenney’s (2007) research on Colombian 
drug trafficking, for example, discovers that local drug smugglers build network 
redundancy by contracting with multiple groups or individuals to provide the same kind 
of resources or services as a tactic to prevent law enforcement agencies from 
immobilising the entire operation of the smuggling networks by dismantling single 
nodes. 
 
In summary, the defensive mechanisms of criminal networks in defending against 
outside depredation inform that networks can respond effectively in different ways at 
different temporal phases. First, before an attack is initiated, the personal nature of 
strong ties makes the members of a criminal network resistant to the temptations of 
exiting or betraying the organisation. Second, when external attacks are underway or 
parts of the network have been targeted, the loosely-coupled relationships among 
network members enable the criminal network to limit the possible damage to the extent 
that would not affect the network’s organisational integrity. Finally, when the damage 
does occur, the existence of redundant contacts or access to other latent functional 
equivalents allows the criminal network to be able to quickly replace the damaged 
nodes with the redundant ones, letting the network continue to operate as usual. 
 
2.2.2.2. OFFENCE: FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY  
The offensive capability of criminal networks may well be demonstrated by their 
flexibility and adaptability reflected in many ways that the networks operate and expand 
in response to market opportunities. The loose and decentralised organisational structure 
implies that criminal networks can scale in a relatively free manner. Scalability here can 
be understood in two different ways.  
 
On the one hand, scalability points to that criminal networks can expand in size or scope 
at domestic or transnational level through either absorbing new nodes into the range of 
their formal membership, or establishing (geographically-distant) informal, transaction-
oriented or patron-client relations with relevant outsiders. These nodes possess valuable 
expertise, skills or resources needed for the networks to address specific problems 
facing them. Expansion in this kind makes Williams (2001, 77) label criminal networks 
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as the “boundary spanner”, an advantage of networks that allow them to “flow around 
physical barriers and across legal or geographical boundaries”.  
 
In addition, the expansion may be mirrored in the ability of criminal networks to 
diversify their portfolio of illegal undertakings, extending their reach into areas where 
profit margins are largest and risks are the least (The White House 2011, 5). Organised 
criminal networks, especially those who have specialised in trafficking in drugs, arms, 
people, counterfeit goods, and other contraband, have less difficulty extending or 
transposing their reach from the established domains to unfamiliar ones. This is because 
such criminal networks often have a strong financial capacity to buy up a bulk of 
prohibited goods; they can take advantage of the existing smuggling routes and 
distributing networks, and use established linkages in law enforcement agencies to buy 
themselves the way in or out of the official checkpoints.  
 
On the other hand, scalability also means that criminal networks can shrink their size or 
scope through abandoning redundant nodes that are targeted by law enforcers, while 
bringing little or no prejudice to their illegal operation. The size shrinking can be 
achieved via the dissolution of contract with nodes that are incapable of supplying 
satisfied products or services so as to prevent the networks from being locked in 
ineffective relationships. 
 
In short, this section has thus far discussed networks as a form of organisation for illegal 
actors with respect to their definition, typology, and structures, as well as the strengths 
and characteristics of importance to the development of their defensive and offensive 
capacities. Insights into such attributes of networks will not only deepen our 
understanding of why networks have become particularly prevalent in contemporary 
organised criminality, but also provide critical implications for the strategic and 
operational aspects of approaching them. Here let’s revert to the first facet of the 
paradoxical puzzle proposed at the beginning of this chapter: what are networked threats. 
Based on above discussions, this chapter conceives of networked threats as containing 
two-fold meanings.  
 
First, networked threats refer to transaction networks, which are difficult for state actors 
to deal with due largely to their nature of transcending national borders. The 
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transnational dimension warrants transaction networks a challenge that can hardly be 
successfully addressed solely by a state’s own effort and resources. 
 
When applied to TEC settings, transaction networks represent the overall chain of the 
black markets for specific environmental goods such as wildlife, timber, ODS chemicals, 
and hazardous wastes. The analytical focus of transaction networks is on the black 
markets in its entirety. Points of investigation on transaction networks include among 
others the defining role (source, transit, or consumer) of a particular country (e.g., 
China) involved in the international/regional illegal trade chain, the scale and scope of 
the black markets, the magnitude and diversity of environmental contraband involved in 
trafficking or trade, the methods used in conveyance and concealment of illegal goods, 
the established smuggling routes, and the affected countries.  
 
Second, networked threats point to directed networks, standing for the covert and illegal 
organisations that adopt networks as the organisational structure to deploy their 
members and align their relationships, or as a strategy or tactic to design their illegal 
operations. Networks applied in this manner afford covert operators a host of 
organisational and operational advantages, including the adaptability and resilience, over 
their legal foes the hierarchically-organised state actors.  
 
When applied to TEC settings, directed networks refer to the organised criminal groups 
involved in trading and smuggling of environmental goods. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the involvement of organised elements in international environmental crime is fairly 
evident. Directed networks can pose a significant threat to the international and national 
efforts to protect the biodiversity, forest, and ozone layer. This is not only because of 
their large-scale, systematic sourcing, smuggling, and supplying of environmental 
resources, but also because of their usual linkages with cross-over crimes such as 
corruption, money laundering, and certificates fraud. Investigation of directed networks 
may focus on their organisational structures, relationships among network members, 
identification of key participants that are strategically important or unique for the 
operation of the directed networks, and so forth. 
 
For the three reasons clarified in Section 1.3.1 in Chapter 1, this thesis has decided to 
only focus on applying the concept of “transaction networks” to the three case studies, 
while leaving for future study the examination of whether or not there have been 
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organised crime groups involved in China’s illegal trade in environmental goods and 
whether or not these organised crime groups are structured in directed networks. In the 
following three case-study chapters (Ch3–5), I will use the notion of transaction 
networks and points of investigation as the guidance for the exploration of China’s 
global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, and ODS. In each case study, I will 
develop a deep mapping and thick description of China’s illegal trade in the three 
selected categories of environmental goods from the perspective of transaction 
networks.  
 
2.3. NETWORKS: AN APPROACH TO CLANDESTINE NETWORKS?  
In reaction to networked threats, several influential scholars from different disciplinary 
backgrounds raise another chorus of assumption arguing for the great potential and 
prospect of the networked approach to networked problems. For example, in their 
conception of netwar and counter-netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001, 15) stress the 
idea of taking networks to fight networks and assert that “whoever masters the network 
form first and best will gain major advantages”. Slaughter (2004a, 160) claims that in 
today’s world where a diversity of clandestine actors are increasingly operating through 
global markets, global travel, and global information networks, the best strategy for 
governments to defeat these networked threats is to adopt a networked response. 
Williams (1998, 159) argues that “governments and law enforcement agencies [wishing 
to dismantle criminal networks] have to think and act in network terms”. The scholar 
(2001, 95) further proposes that one important component of an effective attack on 
criminal networks is the mimicking of network structures into the creation of innovative 
law enforcement structures to overcome the many constraints associated with the 
normal bureaucratic ways of doing business. 
 
Indeed, these propositions are thought provoking, but they only impart vague and 
aphoristic knowledge about our key puzzles (what are networked responses and how to 
achieve them, particularly in the context of countering TEC), and stop short of 
elucidating specific actionable prescriptions. Therefore, this section builds on the 
fundamental work of above scholars as the starting point and further seeks to enrich this 
idea of networked response with insights from other relevant lines of literature that treat 
networks as a key source of structural power and that see networking as an effective 
way of dealing with transnational issues. The main objective of this section is to 
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develop a nascent yet coherent account for the conceptual logic and underpinnings of 
the notion of networked responses, which can then be used as the guidance for 
developing practicable suggestions on how the Chinese regulatory and enforcement 
agencies might formulate their own networked responses to the TEC challenges (this 
part will be addressed in Chapter 7). 
 
2.3.1. NETWORK SOCIETY 
Understandings of the major trends in a constantly changing environment where the 
objects of analysis inhabit are undoubtedly crucial for the making of a solid policy. 
Joseph Nye (2008, 87–8) dubs such understandings “contextual intelligence”. In Section 
2.2, I have identified an evident trend in the criminal market-oriented operations that 
implies a transnationalising and networked morphology in the organisational structure 
and illicit undertaking of clandestine actors. This part of contextual intelligence 
constitutes the answer to the first facet of the paradoxical puzzle of this chapter – that is, 
in what sense are networks understood as a facilitator for dark-side actors. Relatedly, a 
parallel question built on the second facet of the paradoxical puzzle can be expressed as: 
are there any major changes going on in the environment where the bright-side actors 
(e.g., enforcement agencies) operate?  
 
For both scholars Anne-Marie Slaughter and Manuel Castells, the answer lies in the rise 
of global networks. In her preeminent work, A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality 
(more on this article later), Slaughter (2012a, 45–6) contends that the primary 
contextual shift in today’s international system is not the rise or decline of great powers, 
but the multiplication of diverse global networks among a range of actors that cover 
governmental and non-governmental, licit and illicit, and social, civic and market 
actors. The phenomenal rise of global criminal, political, economic, and social networks 
is in motion in transforming and reshaping the ways in which individuals and institutions 
communicate, collaborate, and conflict. On the other hand, in his magnum opus on the 
“network society”, Manuel Castells (2009, 25) poses a more radical assertion, arguing 
that in the global network society, “the core activities that shape and control human life 
in every corner of the planet are organised in global networks”. Network-organised 
activities and processes pervade in every domain of society, cutting across sectors of 
transnational production, management, and distribution of goods and services, mass 
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media, the Internet networks, international institutions, religions, culture and art, 
criminal economy, transnational NGOs, and the social movements. 
 
If Slaughter and Castells’s empirical observation about the ubiquitous pervasiveness 
and significant potential of networks correctly grasps the core of the world we live in 
today, then following and extending from that, two questions can be elicited. First, what 
have been the conceptual logic underlying the explosion of networks? And second, what 
implications will this trend have on our understanding of the networked responses? To 
explore these two questions, I draw on the work of Castells and Jan Van Dijk on 
“network society” as well as the work of Ronfeldt and Arquilla on “TIMN (tribes, 
institutions, markets, and networks) Framework” and “Netwar”, with a view to 
unpacking an articulated chain of conceptual logic that account for the rise of networks 
and its implications.  
 
In his trilogy, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Castells traces the 
effects of three independent processes that occurred during the second half of the 
twentieth century – the information technology revolution, the economic crises of 
capitalism, and the blossoming of cultural social movements (e.g., environmentalism 
and feminism). The author proposes that these three processes’ coming together induced 
a new social structure (network society), a new economy (global informational 
economy), and a new culture (a culture of “virtual reality”).26 In the first volume of his 
trilogy, the concept of network society is defined as follows:  
 
As a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the Information Age are 
increasingly organised around networks. Networks constitute the new social 
morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially 
modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, 
power, and culture. While the networking form of social organisation has existed 
in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the 
material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure… 
Presence or absence in the network and the dynamics of each network vis-à-vis 
others are critical sources of domination and change in our society: a society that, 
therefore, we may properly call the network society (Castells 2010a, 500). 
                                                          
26 For the purposes of this chapter, here I focus only on the concept of “network society”. The treatments 
of global informational economy and virtual reality can be seen in Castells (2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
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In another co-edited book as well as in an interview with the University of California 
Berkeley, 27  Castells further qualifies his definition by adding that, in simple and 
concrete terms, network society is a social structure made around networks activated by 
information and communication technologies (ICT) (Castells 2005, 7). By “social 
structure”, Castells refers to the “organisational arrangements of humans in 
relationships of production, consumption, reproduction, experience, and power” 
(Castells 2000a, 695; 2009, 24). So the network society in Castells’s formulation is not 
only about networks or social networks given the fact that networks as a form of 
organisation have long existed in history. Rather and more critically, it is about social 
networks powered by information and communication networks to process and manage 
information. 
 
Van Dijk, another important contributor to the concept of network society, conceives of 
the network society as a new type of society where its prime mode of organisation at the 
individual, organisational, and societal levels is based on social and media networks. It 
is noticeable that the focus of the network society approach is on the changing 
organisational forms and infrastructure of the societies. This focus is what differentiates 
the network society from another popular concept – the “information society”, which 
concentrates its attention on the changing substances of social activities and processes 
(Van Dijk 2006, 19–20). 
                                                          
27 Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. “Identity and Change in the Network Society: 
Conversation with Manuel Castells”. Conversations with History Series. February 15, 2008. 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con0.html. 
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Figure 2.1: The chain of conceptual logic for the rise of networks 
 
Note: Figure 2.1 is based mainly on a synthesis of the work by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996, 2001), 
Castells (2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), Nye (2002, 2008, 2011), Ronfeldt 
(1996), Slaughter (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2009, 2012a, 2012b), and Van Dijk (2006). 
 
Several critical points that typify the network society can be highlighted from the work 
of Castells and Van Dijk. First, the network society concept specifies the advent of a 
new social structure built on networks or social networks supported by information and 
communication networks. It ushers in a substantive realignment in the organisation of 
production, power, and meaning-making from the previous “mass society” to the 
present information and network society. 28  Second, the convergence of social 
                                                          
28 The mass society, as defined by Van Dijk (2006, 29), is “a social formation with an infrastructure of 
groups, organisations and communities (masses) that shapes its prime mode of organisation at all levels. 
In contrast with the network society where networks or individuals linked by information networks 
constitute the basic units of the society, the main components of the mass society are all kinds of 
relatively large collectivities (e.g., groups, organisations, communities).  
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organisational evolution and information revolution created a solid organisational and 
material basis for the wide diffusion of networks as a dominant form of social 
organisation. Third, a self-expanding networking logic permeates all domains of social, 
economic, political, and cultural life, shaping key activities and functions in the network 
society, transforming or even redefining the nature and source of power and the way of 
domination and counter-domination. These three focal points, which comprise the key 
junctures of the conceptual logic chain for the rise of global networks (see Figure 2.1), 
will be discussed at length in sequence in the following sections. 
 
2.3.2. NETWORKS IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY 
For Castells and Van Dijk, the network society is made up of networks of various types. 
Networks become the basic components of network society. Then what constitutes a 
network? In abstract terms, networks are a set of interconnected nodes (e.g., individuals, 
groups, organisations, and states) among which flows of information, ideas, goods, 
values, and other resources take place (Castells 2000a, 695; Van Dijk 2006, 24). To 
create a network, there have to be at least three nodes and two links intersecting the 
nodes. A single link of two nodes only makes up a relation (Van Dijk and Winters-van 
Beek 2008, 3). Nodes exist and function as components of a network. The relative 
importance of a given node in relation to other nodes within a network is determined by 
that node’s ability to contribute to the network’s effectiveness in achieving its goals. A 
network may allow for the existence of some redundant nodes in case of contingencies. 
But when nodes cease to add value or even become an obstacle to the networks’ 
performance, the network can readily reconfigure themselves by deleting irrelevant and 
valueless nodes and adding new ones (Castells 2009, 19–20). This point concords with 
the scalability feature of criminal networks that we have discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
 
When seen as a form of organisation, networks encompass a distinctive set of 
fundamental principles that serve to govern and coordinate the relations and activities of 
their components as well as distinguish networks from other forms of organisation such 
as hierarchies. Lipnack and Stamps (1994, 18) identify five most important organising 
principles for networks. The first principle is “unifying purpose”, which includes shared 
views, values, challenges, and goals that act as a “glue” to hold a network together. 
Second is the “independent members”, which requires the components of a network 
must have certain degrees of autonomy, so that they can stand on their own feet while 
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benefiting from being part of that network. This principle of networks rightly 
counterpoints hierarchies, of which the constituent parts are differentiated between 
higher and lower levels and the lower ones are fully included in the higher. The third 
principle is “voluntary links”, which enable networks to expand freely so long as flows 
of communication can be built between the network and other individuals or 
organisations. Note that the omnidirectional property of the links of networks does not 
mean that networks are a completely open system with no boundaries or no thresholds 
for entry. As will be discussed later, networks “communicate and incommunicate” at the 
same time (Castells 2005, 5), and the capacity to determine membership 
(inclusion/exclusion) is one of the central mechanisms to exercise network-related 
power in the network society.  
 
The fourth principle is “multiple leaders”. Networks are leaderful, rather than leaderless. 
A network contains a few “bosses”, but it may be structured around a few clusters, each 
of which is led by a handful of individuals or organisations who have something unique 
to contribute to the shared purposes of the network and who are thus able to control a 
certain special structural position within the network. Recall that the multiple-leader 
organisation is akin to the cobweb structure (discussed in Section 2.2) in which a 
number of peripheral groups, though revolve around and take orders from the central 
actor, act relatively independently in their own illegal businesses. The fifth and final 
principle is “integrated levels”. Extending from the multiple leader principle, networks 
might internally consist of relations structured on different levels, such as individual 
relations, individual vis-à-vis clusters or groups, and clusters vis-à-vis clusters. This 
principle runs counter to one popular mistaken view in the network research literature 
that sees networks as an entirely flat and horizontal structure. As Van Dijk (2006, 110–1) 
points out that the introduction of networks may cause a decrease in the distance that 
communications need to bridge, but that does not always trigger the reduction in the 
number of hierarchical levels in an organisation, especially when control and authority 
are required. 
 
In reality, the concrete referents of the nodes and networks appear in both natural and 
social systems, and abound in every sphere of society. There are networks of real-time 
financial transactions, production sites, markets, and labour pools that constitute the 
global economy. There are networks of firms or segments of firms organised around the 
performance of co-tasked business projects that frame the so-called “network 
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enterprises”. There are networks of environmental crime that link up professional 
poaching groups in source countries, brokers in transit countries, wholesale and retail 
groups in consumer countries, money laundering financial institutions, and corrupt 
officials. There are decentralised and networked social movements connected via the 
Internet and instant communication tools that spread across cities and countries. There 
are global media networks composed of nodes of television systems, entertainment 
studios, news teams, and mobile devices that influence public opinions or even 
implicitly shape public preferences (Castells 2000a, 695; 2010a, 501; 2010b, 427). In 
short, the pervasion of the network form of organisation goes for every domain of 
activity and every context, cutting across realms of production, distribution, financial 
circulation, power, information, communication, images and experiences (Van Dijk 
2007). For Castells, it is these network-directed processes and activities that configure 
the main terrain of network society. 
 
Social networks figure at all levels and systems of society. Based on social units, four 
levels of societal relations in the network society can be identified (Van Dijk 2006, 25–
7). The first and most basic is the level of individual relations where individuals are 
connected by bonds of families, friends, acquaintances, neighbours, colleagues and so 
forth. The second one is the level of group and organisational relations. This is level on 
which various groupings and collectives, either contemporary and loose or permanent 
and fixed, interplay in competition and coordination. For Van Dijk, with the support of 
networks of information and communication, many organisations today have actually 
evolved themselves into network organisations, which internally build on networks of 
relatively independent departments and teams on the one hand, externally cooperate 
with other organisations or parts of them in the undertaking of a common task on the 
other.  
 
The third is the level of societal relations that encompasses networks of individuals, 
groups and organisations in the societal subsystems of politics, economy, culture, and 
civics. The penetration of networks into these subsystems leads to the creation of a 
number of new phases. For example, a new economy called “network economy” – 
marked off by the diffusion of organisational networking of production, distribution, 
and management – has been argued as the key factor for the substantial productivity 
growth in many countries around the world. In this new economy, corporations of 
various sizes have adopted different networking strategies, with large corporations 
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decentralising themselves as networks of semi-autonomous units and, small and 
medium firms engaging to form business networks that act as providers and 
subcontractors to large corporations. Organisational units have shifted from being 
capability-oriented to being project-oriented. Strategic partnerships between large 
corporations and ancillary networks are built around a specific project under which 
employees, consultants and other businesses are assembled to work on a particular 
project, then separated and reallocated upon the completion of the project (Castells 2005, 
9). Politically, a new form of governance called “network state” or “network 
governance” has come into existence and brought together the nation-states, 
supranational associations, international institutions, regional and local governments, 
and quasi-public NGOs in response to shared problems such as economic crises, 
political conflicts or social protests (Castells 2010b, 346, 364). The fourth and final 
level is the level of global relations where a web of government networks comprised of 
national governmental officials is increasingly working alongside the international 
institutions to address global problems (Slaughter 2004a, 162).  
 
It should be noted that one level of relational networks is not exclusive of other levels. 
This is because, on the one hand, networks can realise interaction within and between 
levels, just as some sociologists argue that networks based on informal ties (e.g., 
friendship or tacit workplace norms) play an important role in bridging departmental 
boundaries and overcoming stifling organisational routines (Powell and Smith-Doerr 
2005, 385). On the other hand, patterns and trends substantiated valid in one level of 
relations may be applicable to another level of relations. For example, theorising about 
the power of nation-states is indeed different from theorising about that of individuals. 
But some conceptual tools offered by social network theories do have cross-level 
utilities. As in the case of the positive correlation of centrality and power revealed in 
individual networks, this correlation may be equally guidable when analysing networks 
of groups or organisations. 
 
2.3.3. SOCIAL ORGANISATIONAL EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 
According to Castells (2010a, 502), the convergence of social evolution and information 
revolution formed the organisational and material basis for the diffusion and rise of 
networks throughout the entire social structure. In the regard, Ronfeldt’s “TIMN 
Framework” provides useful insights of the interaction between social evolution and 
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technology advances from a historical and organisational perspective.   
 
In his 1996 report, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: A Framework about Societal 
Evolution, Ronfeldt devises the TIMN framework to sum up his findings of the 
historical evolution of social organisation. The author posits that most societies 
historically went through a process of structural change that began with tribal structures 
(T), then expanded into hierarchical institutions (I), and finally into the competitive 
markets (M). Each form, from tribes through hierarchies to markets, sprouted, matured, 
prevailed, and dominated in certain realms of society in different historical epochs, but 
all ended up with the failure in the continuation of being the dominant form of social 
organisation due to their inherent limits. The author explains that the tribal form faded 
into the background because of its inefficiency in dealing with problems of rule and 
administration. The hierarchies lost grip thanks to its incapability of processing complex 
exchanges and information flows. Finally, the market went into decline owing to its 
built-in tendency of creating social inequality and its inability to address such 
inequality. In the author’s views, networks – especially the multi-organisational 
networks buttressed by new ICT – are on the rise and continue to spread into the many 
realms of society including state, market, and civil domains.  
 
Ronfeldt cautions that the rise of a new organisational form does not mean the complete 
abandonment of the old ones. From an overarching perspective of society evolution, the 
author argues that a society’s advance has always relied on its ability to combine new 
forms of social organisation with the established ones into a coherent functioning 
whole. Each combination will strengthen the society and make it more powerful and 
capable of dealing with more complex tasks. This is demonstrated by the replacement of 
government-planning economy by market economy, which certainly generated more tax 
revenues and thus enhanced the state’s ability to conduct its affairs at home and abroad. 
While for any specific hierarchically-organised institutions, Ronfeldt suggests that a 
responsive institution should evolve internally from hierarchical toward flexible models 
that mix hierarchies and networks. 
 
On the point of the relations between networks and the old forms of social organisation, 
Castells develops another line of interesting analysis. Castells (2005, 4–5; 2009, 25–6) 
argues that network society is dependent on social networks and digital communication 
networks as its basic infrastructure. Both types of networks have the capacity to 
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transcend territorial, institutional, and cultural boundaries. Accordingly, this grants 
network society the potential to be networking globally and to configure its structure on 
a global scale. However, the global expansion of networks and network society is a 
gradual, uneven, and selective process, following a binary logic of inclusion/exclusion. 
Being “gradual” means that it takes time to incorporate previous social forms into the 
new dominant networking logic. As such, it is expected that for a long period, the 
network society might have to work on “the pre-existing sites, cultures, organisations, 
and institutions” and coexist with the “industrial, rural, communal, or survival 
societies”. Being “uneven” and “selective” is that not all entities will be included in 
networks and network society. Networks are self-configurable structures, but their 
configuration acts on a basic principle: incorporating nodes that are valuable to the 
performance and goals of the network on the one hand, and bypassing or rejecting 
territories, activities, and people that have little or nothing to contribute to the 
performance and goals of the network on the other. Just as Van Dijk (2006, 36) writes, 
“in the individualised network society, you have to fight for a particular place. You have 
to show your value for every network. Otherwise, you will be isolated in or excluded 
from the network”.   
 
To elaborate the dynamics of the rise of networks, Ronfeldt develops a central 
proposition which states that the information revolution – as epitomised by the advance 
of new ICT, especially the Internet, mobile technologies, and various communication 
tools based on them – erodes hierarchical institutions, and in turn the erosion favours 
and strengthens multi-organisational networks. In further explanation, the author adds 
that on the one hand, the revolution diffuses power, ignores boundaries, and compels 
closed systems to open up. This process hurts and makes life difficult for institutions 
like government agencies that are traditionally built around hierarchies and that incline 
to operate alone. On the other hand, information revolution paves a concrete technical 
ground for the proliferation of multi-organisational networks as it allows small and 
dispersed actors to “connect, coordinate, and act jointly across greater distances and 
across more issue areas than ever before” (Ronfeldt 1996, 13).  
 
The interaction between the new technical paradigm and networks has multiple effects. 
First, new ICT has helped to maximise the advantages of networks, while at the same 
time, overcoming their disadvantages. In contrast with other forms of social 
organisation (e.g., hierarchies), networks throughout the history had major upsides and 
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downsides. In terms of advantages, networks are flexible and adaptable organisational 
forms. As discussed in Section 2.2, networks are open, dynamic structures, able to 
expand in size by integrating new nodes whilst without imposing new limits on 
themselves, or shrinking in size by discarding redundant nodes whilst without 
threatening their balance and sacrificing their performance. These special qualities, once 
being realised, can make networks an ideal form of organisation for a volatile and 
mutable environment. On the other hand, the major disadvantage of networks is their 
embedded inability to “manage coordination functions beyond a certain threshold of 
size, complexity and velocity” (Castells 2000b, 15; 2004, 221). In addition, fostering 
and maintaining networks of relationships usually require a high level of mutual trust 
and reciprocity (Ronfeldt 1996, 12). For the potential of networks to be realised to an 
ideal extent, there also needs an infrastructural capacity for constant, dense flows of 
information and communication in order to enable a prompt and instant exchange of 
information (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 11). As such, in the past, networks were often 
confined within the domain of private life and were largely active mainly in personal 
interaction, solidarity building, and reciprocal support. The territories of mass 
production, power, and war were mostly occupied by large, vertical organisations such 
as states, religious apparatuses, armies, and corporations that were able to mobilise and 
marshal large pools of resources (Castells 2000a, 695; Castells 2005, 4). 
 
These limitations encumbered networks and inhibited them from being a widely-
adopted form of social organisation in history. However, the rapid advance of 
computers, communications, and software has substantially reduced the cost of 
information transmission and increased the number of transnational channels of 
communication, allowing for free, convenient, and affordable communication with 
distant parts of the globe. In turn, this technology advance makes it possible for the co-
existence in a network arrangement of both centralised decision-making and a 
decentralised organisational layout and operations among geographically-dispersed, 
autonomous components of the network.  
 
Second, the interaction between the Information Revolution and the spread of the 
network form has resulted in a process of power diffusion: a power rebalancing process 
characterised by “the rise of non-state actors” and “the relative decline of nation-states”.  
 
In the first dimension of power diffusion, the cheapening of information transmission 
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has lowered the barrier for the entry into international collective action and thus opened 
the field to nonstate actors and individuals (Keohane and Nye 1998, 83). As Marvin 
Ammori (2005, 44–6) observes, the Internet has dramatically reduced the cost of 
receiving, producing, transmitting, searching, and advertising of information and in 
turn, this leads to the marginalisation of the cost for collaboration. This ability has 
helped online participants to overcome the technological, logistic, and organisational 
constraints of cooperation and enabled them to be more readily engaging in online and 
offline ad hoc organisation and coordination of political action. 
 
Networks, as a social form, are value-free or neutral in nature. Networks can be 
employed by state actors (e.g., transnational governmental networks) and non-state 
actors (e.g., business network organisations), and by bright-side actors (e.g., NGOs or 
peaceful social activists) for productive and beneficial causes and uncivil actors (e.g., 
terrorists, organised criminals) for deadly and destructive ends. However, nonstate 
actors in both malign and benign forms seem to be often ahead of state actors in 
adopting the network form. This is not only because nonstate actors have strong 
interests in, and benefits to harvest from, becoming part of a collaborative network 
while preserving a degree of autonomy, but also because as compared to hierarchically-
organised state actors, nonstate actors face less institutional limits and more pressure of 
survival and are thus more willing to adapt and experiment. The combination of the 
lowered cost of transnational communication and the adoption of network form allows 
nonstate actors to decentralise their organisational structure and performance along 
networks of relatively independent components, while still being able to communicate 
and coordinate with their dispersed parts toward the shared purposes prescribed by the 
network. As a culmination, what we have seen now are not only the growing number 
and influence of international organisations, private corporations, NGOs, and advocacy 
networks who are now competing with state actors in the stage of transnational politics 
and vying for greater participation in transnational policymaking and implementation. 
On top of that, we have also witnessed the growing threat posed by transnational 
criminal groups such as terrorist groups like Al Qaeda that increasingly operates as 
loose networks with a transnational franchise, or like the well-funded and well-
organised wildlife smuggling networks that line up collectors and transporters of illegal 
wildlife products in the source country, and corrupt officials at the checkpoints and 
consumption sites (e.g., restaurants selling exotic meals, underground niche markets) in 
the consumer country.  
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In fact, in the report, The Advent of Netwar, by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996, 2001), the 
idea of the rise of networks and its impacts on the societal end conflict and crime has 
been reflected on in their discussion of the netwar and counter-netwar. Overall, the two 
scholars argue that the spread of multi-organisational networks among various dark-side 
actors such as terrorists and criminals alike has brought in new meanings to how social 
conflicts are being waged and unfolded in the Information Age, as well as to how 
countermeasures should be formulated and implemented for bright-side actors.  
 
On the one hand, Arquilla and Ronfeldt herald that modern conflicts and crimes are 
more likely to be waged by uncivil networks (as opposed to hierarchies) that consist of 
dispersed organisations, small groups, and individuals who adopt network-related 
doctrines, strategies, and technologies to communicate, coordinate, and operate on a 
global scale. Recall discussed in Section 2.2, it is understood that the adoption of 
networks as either an organisational form or an operational design affords illicit bearers 
a range of offensive and defensive robustness and resilience. Moreover, the authors 
assert that the conduct and outcome of conflicts tend to increasingly rely on the actors’ 
ability to command knowledge and to use the soft power (discussed later). As in the 
cases of terrorist groups or environmental activists, the Internet and other media-
oriented tools have become important channels for disseminating knowledge/beliefs, 
attracting public attention, competing for audience, and shaping targets’ preferences. 
Another good example for this might be an online network phenomenon called 
“Anonymous”, a loosely-associated international network of activist and “hacktivist” 
entities that operates on ideas, contests the alleged abuse of power by governments and 
corporation, and promotes transparency in politics and business (Yochai Benkler 2012). 
Taylor Owen (2015, 37) characterises Anonymous as a form of “disruptive power”, 
which thrives on the network attributes of “formless, instability, decentralised 
governance, loose and evolving ties”. Those are attributes that would weaken the power 
of a nation-state, but make individuals powerful and less susceptible to the 
manipulation, control, and suppression by traditional sources of power (e.g., 
surveillance). 
 
On the other hand, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2011, 15) advise that government officials, 
law enforcement agencies and other hierarchically-based actors need to engage 
fundamental adjustments if they want to avoid “having a difficult time fighting 
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networked threats”. In many cases, the adjustment requires not only the technical 
innovation and upgrading, but more critically, a willingness to innovate organisationally 
and doctrinally through, for example, building new mechanisms for interagency and 
multi-jurisdictional cooperation.   
 
The second dimension of power diffusion is that traditional hierarchies will likely 
experience increasing faults and inefficiencies in performing functions and activities in 
responding to the growing complexity of many issues that they are tasked to address. As 
such, the influence and activity scope of traditional institutions are likely to decline in 
those areas. In Castells’s network society framework, this point has been discussed 
under the subtitle of “the crisis of the nation-states” (Castells 2010b, 356–66). Castells 
contends that in network society, nation-states are losing sovereign power largely as a 
consequence of the many key social, economic, political, and cultural processes no 
longer contained within the nation-states, but instead increasingly operating on a global 
scale. This leads to many central aspects of a state’s domestic policy susceptible to more 
influence of forces and factors outside than inside the national borders. In effect, the 
trend concerning the key processes increasingly going international can be seen as the 
resulting effect of the first face of the power diffusion: the proliferation of networks into 
the social, economic, political, and cultural domains of society and thereby, the 
increasingly diversified sources of power among networks of capital, production, 
communication, international institutions, non-governmental organisations, 
transnational religions, crime, terrorists, and social movements of all kinds (Castells 
2010b, 357). 
 
In political terms,29 Castells attributes the loss of (part of) the sovereignty to the rise of 
transnational issues, such as environmental degradation, global criminal networks, and 
global epidemics (e.g., AID, SARS). The cross-border component of these issues makes 
them hard to be fully addressed on a national basis. As a result of the inability of nation-
                                                          
29 Castells’s exploration of “the crisis of the nation-states” is a comprehensive one, involving discussion 
of changes in social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions that increasingly go internationally and 
that, acting together, contribute to the nation-state’s loss of sovereignty power. In economic terms, the 
loss of sovereignty is related to the increasingly important role played by the international financial 
market in the making and execution of national monetary policies on the one hand, and to the 
contradiction between the internationalisation of investment, production, and consumption and the 
national basis of taxation systems on the other. Militarily, means of violence are no longer exclusively 
controlled by nation-states, but slipping into the hands of terrorist networks and organised crime. 
Societally and culturally, nation-states are losing control over the media (see Castells 2010b, 356, 360, 
362; Felix Stalder 2006, 105–10). These four axes of changes (including the political changes discussed 
in the main text) constitute the main areas in which nation-states are losing sovereignty in the network 
society.  
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states to act effectively alone in these areas, a host of non-state actors have entered the 
international domain and challenged the nation-state’s monopoly on international 
policymaking. It is worth noting here that in this chapter’s understanding, the 
transnational dimension is only one aspect of the changing nature of the issues facing 
nation-states. There are two more aspects that also contribute to the growing complexity 
of transnational issues (including TEC), that is, the requirement for interagency 
cooperation and multi-pronged approach. First, as revealed in Raad and Milward’s 
(2003, 414) The Rationale for Network Collaboration, problems confronting 
governments and public organisations in an increasingly complex and differentiated 
world of today are more often than not a problem with which any specific government 
institutions only intersects in part in their functional jurisdiction. This necessitates the 
interagency collaboration if progress in alleviating that chained problem were to be 
made. Second, solutions to such issues often require a multi-pronged approach that 
involves a combination of societal, economic, political, and enforcement interventions. 
Therefore, it demands a way of thinking about transnational issues from the perspective 
of an interaction of social, economic, political, and cultural causes that need to be 
addressed by a constellation of linked social, economic, political, and cultural 
instruments (Slaughter 2012a, 48). 
 
Transposing the “changing-nature” model in the context of countering TEC, it will find 
that environmental enforcement agencies – if they fail to make adjustments or 
traditional way of acting alone perpetuates – will also likely experience “increasing 
difficulties and inefficiencies” in the face of the three aspects of environmental offences. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 1, in the context where the demand and production are 
globally distributed, environmental crime is bound to be a transnational issue that 
involves environmental goods being illegally harvested or taken in one country and 
moved to the consuming market in another country. Second, even within a single 
country such as China as the major consumer for illegal wildlife, from their first step 
landing on China’s territory to the final stop in the hands of consumers, illegal wildlife 
products wade through the jurisdictional provinces of a chain of law enforcement 
agencies that cover customs, forest police, industry and commercial bureau, and other 
government agencies. Transnational and cross-agency nature adds the first layer of 
difficulty for government institutions who have long been accustomed to acting alone in 
their own remit areas. Third, TEC is not only a legal issue, but also a societal, economic 
issue. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, motivations behind wildlife 
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offences vary among cases. Some perpetrators hunting protected wild animals are 
driven by poverty, expressed in the forms of hunting for self-subsistence use, or for 
trade as an emergency source of income. But other professional criminal groups are 
likely to be purely driven by the pursuit of illegal proceeds. Single-dimensional 
measures such as enforcement crackdowns or poverty-improving policy might work in 
either case, but may have constrained effects in reversing those galvanised by another 
type of motivation.        
 
2.3.4. CHANGING NATURE AND SOURCES OF POWER IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY 
Nye (2011, 213) uses the metaphor of a three-dimensional chess game to describe the 
current international relations and the world’s power distribution. This metaphor helps 
us to position transnational actors and issues in the world economic and political system. 
According to Nye, the top layer of the chessboard is the world of interstate military 
power which is presently highly concentrated in the United States. The second layer is 
the world of interstate economic power which is currently distributed in a number of 
countries including the U.S., the EU, Japan, and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China). The bottom layer is then the world of nonstate actors and transnational issues 
such as financial crisis, climate change, mass migration, pandemics, organised crime, 
and international terrorism. Nye claims that measures developed from the military and 
economic power on the top and second boards will do little good in solving the 
problems arising from the third layer of the chessboard. 
 
On the bottom chessboard, as a result of the power diffusion away from nation-states to 
a variety of transnational actors, power is widely diffused and chaotically distributed, no 
longer residing “in institutions, not even in the state or large corporations. It is located 
in the networks that structure the society” (Castells 2004, 224). More profoundly, on the 
bottom chessboard, the nature of power and the way of exercising it have transformed in 
a way that traditionally-formulated understandings of power in terms of ranks in a 
hierarchy or of resources make little sense.  
 
Power is a fundamental property of both social structures and social relations (Goverde 
and Tatenhove 2000, 106). Yet power is also a highly contested concept. Given the 
focus of this thesis is on developing a “networked response” that will inform 
enforcement agencies about how to enhance their ability to address TEC, this chapter 
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follows Joseph Nye’s (2011, 6) definition of power as “the capacity to achieve the 
desired outcomes”. Translating this definition into the context of this thesis, power is 
then construed as “the capacity of enforcement agencies to address TEC challenges”.  
 
A distinction can be drawn between resource- and behaviour-based power (Keohane and 
Nye 1998, 86–7; Nye 2002, 8–9; 2011, 8–10). Both definitions have frequently been 
used in the theoretical and practical discussions of global affairs. Resource-based power 
defines power in terms of the tangible or intangible resources (e.g., economic or military 
resources) that an agent has at disposal and can utilise them to produce the desired 
outcomes. Behavioural power, also called relational power, refers to the ability to affect 
others to get the preferred outcomes. Despite the ultimate goal for both types of power 
is about obtaining the intended outcomes, the mechanisms of how to achieve the 
expected results are distinct. Resource power involves the crafting of smart strategies 
that helps convert the resources into realised power to produce the desired outcomes, 
while relational power relies on one’s ability to alter others by virtue of coercion, 
reward, and attraction to get the preferred outcomes. Depending on the nature of the 
means in use, relational power can further be differentiated between hard power – the use 
of threats or rewards to coerce others to change their behaviour against their initial 
preferences, and soft power – the use of co-optive means such as framing agendas, 
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to alter others’ behaviours. 
 
Traditionally, power is measured in terms of two objects of reference: resources at 
disposal and ranks in a hierarchy. In the first scenario, those possessing a relatively large 
amount of resources are regarded as more powerful than those having fewer resources. 
In the second case, those at the top of a hierarchy are seen as the most powerful within 
that system. This kind of power is being exercised via one-directional flows of 
command-and-control, with the one at a higher rank sending orders to and overseeing 
the performance of those inferior. However, on the third layer of the chessboard, 
especially for nation-states aspired to address those transnational issues, power has 
changed in a way that resource-based power loses strength to relational power and hard 
power outperformed by soft power.  
 
The rise of transnational issues has made the national borders of all countries becoming 
so porous that even the most powerful country like the US will unlikely have all the 
resources required for the containment or solving of any substantive issues concerned. 
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Global climate change, the proliferation of WMDs, international terrorism, and 
transnational crime, to name but a few, are all beyond the resource-based capacity of 
any single nation-state. In TEC sector as the focus of this thesis, the “beyond-the-
capacity” qualification instantiates specifically in the regulatory failures and 
institutional constraints suffered by governmental agencies, which substantially obstruct 
the national effort to tackle environmental crime. In illegal timber trade, for example, 
customs officials in importing countries rely entirely on the exporting countries’ 
legislation on timber legality before they can separate illegal imports from legal ones. In 
illegal wildlife trade, market demand in consumer countries has been one of the major 
drivers for wildlife poaching in source countries, but environmental enforcement in 
source countries often has little to do than banking on the consumer countries to temper 
or suppress their internal market demand. In addition to regulatory constraints, national 
enforcement agencies also face a number of institutional obstacles like constrained 
resources, untrained or undertrained staff, manpower shortage, and cumbersome 
administration, which all prevent the effective operation of the environmental control 
(more discussion in Chapter 5).  
 
To Slaughter (2004c, 284), the contemporary states’ inability to govern effectively 
without external interference constitutes one of two fundamental challenges to the 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty, which emphasises states as a unitary entity with 
legitimate and complete control of its territory and with the right to be left alone, to 
exclude, and to counter any external meddling or interference.30 Therefore, Slaughter, 
along with other scholars such as Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), argues for 
a new conceptualisation of sovereignty, one that focuses on the right and the capacity to 
participate in the trans-governmental regimes and international institutions that would 
allow states to work together toward the addressing of global and regional problems. 
 
A shift has occurred in the course of states exercising the new sovereignty. Slaughter 
(2004a, 186; 2004b, 12) qualifies such shift as “disaggregating states”, in which 
nominally unitary states are effectively coming apart into their component government 
institutions – be they regulatory agencies, ministries, courts, and legislators – all of 
                                                          
30 According to Slaughter (2004c, 284), the second challenge to the Westphalian terms of sovereignty is 
the “interference challenge”. States can no longer assume that if they refrain from interfering in the affairs 
of other states, they will remain free from outside interference. This is much caused by a growing 
international consensus on the idea of “the Responsibility to Protect” and an increasing number of 
international legal regimes in fields such as human rights.  
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which are increasingly interacting in specific issue fields not only with their foreign and 
supranational counterparts, but also with the private and civic nonstate actors. The result 
of such interactions is the formation of an ever-denser web of government networks 
composed of national government officials of various kinds “operating across borders to 
regulate individuals and corporations operating in a global economy, combat global 
crime, and address common problems on a global scale” (Slaughter 2004c, 283). As 
such, it can be said that government networks become the major organisational carrier 
for the building and exercise of the new sovereignty power. These government networks 
conduct a range of routine practices, including exchanging regular information, 
developing databases of best practices, and offering technical assistance and 
professional expertise for members in need. Such routine activities facilitate the 
development of mutual trust and, with it, reputation, both of which will, in turn, 
engender more concrete actions such as law harmonisation and enforcement 
cooperation. For Slaughter, government networks help to compensate the decreasing 
territorial power by extending the global reach of individual government institutions. 
 
Slaughter (2012b, 294–8) likens the landscape of government networks as the “Lego 
world”. Like the interlocking plastic bricks of a Lego-brand construction toy, 
government institutions as the building blocks of sovereign states can be taken apart, 
put together with one another and with a wide range of NGOs, civic and corporate 
actors in varying coalitions. The Lego world is a networked, horizontal world with no 
hierarchies and no “ladders”, and thus no playing field for hierarchy-based command 
power. A core element of power in the Lego world consists in the ability to mobilise 
relevant entities and connect them toward a common purpose. Such connectivity-based 
power is not the power to impose outcomes since “networks are not directed and 
controlled as much as they are managed and orchestrated” (Slaughter 2009, 100). 
Instead, it starts with one’s ability to build a maximum number of valuable connections 
and is exercised through developing skills and knowledge to harness those connections 
toward the addressing of shared political, economic, or social concerns.  
 
Since the relationships between government officials and their foreign counterparts as 
well as between governmental officials and nonstate actors are equal and horizontal, as 
they are interacting as partners and competitors, then how do government officials 
excise such “connectivity power” to create government networks or to strive for a 
collective decision within that network? Slaughter argues that there are a set of tools of 
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soft power available to government institutions. The power flowing within the 
government networks is soft indeed. Even when in a vertical network where 
supranational entities coexist with their national counterparts, the former usually has no 
actual means of enforcing the latter to accept a special offer or take a special action. 
Therefore, government officials use “everything from expertise to endearments” – such 
as the force of example, distillation and dissemination of credible information, 
persuasion, and socialisation – to affect others in order to arrive at a collective decision 
designed to change behaviours (Slaughter 2004c, 291–2). But once a decision about 
certain changes has been settled, Slaughter adds, the national government officials 
operating in such government networks possess hard command power to enforce the 
decision within their domestic political systems. 
 
2.3.5. THE POWER OF NETWORKS 
Accordingly, we need to build a new narrative of power and a new strategy for the 
building of them, in light of the two aforementioned backdrops: (1) power shifts from 
resource-based to relational and from hard to soft in the sense of addressing 
transnational issues; (2) networks have actually become the major organisational carrier 
for the building and exercise of the new sovereignty power. This narrative should be 
able to help us identify the new potential sources or dimensions of network-related 
power emerging from the third layer of the chessboard. And this power-building 
strategy should be able to instruct government institutions about “networking and 
networked” ways of enhancing their capacity to better exercise the new sovereignty in 
terms of addressing transnational issues.  
 
Based on Castells’s network theory of power and Slaughter’s grand strategy of network 
centrality, this section presents a conception of the power of networks that analyses 
power in three different dyads of relations: the power of a network over other 
individuals and collectives that are not members of that network, the power of a 
network over its members, and the power of one network member over other network 
members. This conception identifies two critical abilities as key sources of network-
related power: the network-making power (connectivity-based power) – the ability to 
constitute networks or networks of networks; and the network positional power 
(favourable network position-based power) – the ability to occupy the advantageous 
network positions (e.g., centrality). While the former power largely depends on the 
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valuable connections that an agent builds, the latter ability stems mainly from the 
circulatory or control effects associated with a specific advantageous network position.  
 
a. Network-making Power 
Based on her empirical observation of the rise of multifarious global networks, 
Slaughter (2012a) advocates a grand strategy of network centrality for the protection 
and advance of the political, military, diplomatic, economic, and societal interests of the 
United States in the twenty-first century. Within this grand strategy, Slaughter rejects a 
traditional view of the global environment as a configuration of unipolar, bipolar or 
multipolar system of nation-states. Rather, the scholar argues for a network perspective 
that sees states as participants in an ever-shifting landscape of intersecting global and 
regional networks. As such, the focal point of the grand strategy is on how to foster two 
important abilities of the states: the ability to mobilise, orchestrate, and create networks 
and the ability to position itself as close to the centre of critical networks. “Critical 
networks” are defined by Slaughter as those most relevant to advancing the intended 
interests in certain fields and those most connected to other networks in those areas. 
Slaughter values these two abilities as vital sources of power and best ways to achieve 
the desired national interests of the United States in a networked world of today. 
 
To formulate and implement such grand strategy, Slaughter (2012b, 46) designs a series 
of steps. First, it should gather intelligence about existing networks in concerned issue 
areas, assess if there currently exists a proper network arrangement and which kinds of 
networks would best work for which affirmative purposes. Second, it should identify 
key players who have a stake in addressing such issues and who hold valuable 
resources, then it should invest into building relationships with the identified players, 
and create an official infrastructure to host and foster those networks. Depending on the 
major functions anticipated, Slaughter (2004a, 19–20; 2004c, 290–1) classifies 
government networks into three broad groups: harmonisation networks, enforcement 
networks, and information networks. This categorisation serves as a salutary reference 
when it comes to the need for figuring out which kinds of networks should be created. 
Harmonisation networks refer to the effort to standardise laws and regulations among 
network members in order for the establishment of a common regulatory standard in 
specific issue areas such as environmental regulation and regional or international trade 
agreement. Enforcement networks are intended for facilitating cross-agency and cross-
border cooperative enforcement. Information networks are mainly built to assist 
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government officials in exchanging information, collecting and distilling good practices, 
and offering technical assistance and training programs. Although each of these three 
ideal types is designed to solve specific cooperative problems, in practice, their 
activities overlap substantially.  
 
In his heuristic network theory of power, Castells argues that in the network society, 
power is principally exercised by and through networks. Under the social and technical 
conditions of network society, four distinct forms of network-related power can be 
discerned (Castells 2009, 42–7; 2011, 773–7). Among them, “network-making” power 
largely resembles the first form of power (the ability to create networks) discussed in 
Slaughter’s grand strategy, but Castells extends it to include the ability to create 
networks of networks.  
 
Network-making power is acclaimed by Castells as the “paramount form of power” 
(2009, 47) or “the most crucial form of power” (2011, 776) in a world of networks. For 
Castells, network-making power is the power to set up and “program” a network. This 
form of power is exercised by two key roles designated by Castells as “programmers” 
and “switchers”. Programmers are those who have the ability to “constitute network(s), 
and to program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the goals assigned to the 
network”. Switchers are those who are capable of connecting and ensuring “the 
cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals and combining resources, 
while fending off competitions from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation” 
(Castells 2009, 47).  
 
Castells explicates that the capacity to program the goals of a network is decisive 
because “once programmed, the network will perform efficiently, and reconfigure itself 
in terms of structure and nodes to achieve its goals” (Castells 2009, 46). For Castells, 
networks are complex structures of communication constructed around a set of goals 
and operating procedures. Once the shared goals and rules of interaction and 
communication are clarified for a network, the structure of that network will keep 
evolving and reconfiguring along the path of an endless searching for valuable additions 
and more efficient networking arrangements. Thus the programming should be 
understood as involving prescribing the basic principles that will define how the 
network should reconfigure itself through adjusting its structure and including or 
excluding nodes so as to improve the network’s effectiveness in achieving its 
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established goals. This explains why programming capacity is vital. But how to program 
a unifying goal among multiple social agents whose interests and values diverge or even 
contradict? On this point, Castells accentuates the relevance of communication 
networks, and claims that the “control of, or influence on, networks of communication 
and the ability to create an effective process of communication and persuasion along the 
lines that favour the projects of the would-be programmers, are the key assets in the 
ability to program each network” (Castells 2009, 46). 
 
On the other hand, the power of switchers mainly lies in their control of the connecting 
points between various strategic networks. Castells illuminates that in reality, switchers 
can be those controlling connections between political leadership networks and media 
networks to produce and diffuse specific political ideologies, or those manipulating 
connections between religious networks and political networks to advance a religious 
agenda, or those straddling criminal economy and legal financial markets to launder and 
legitimise the illicit “dirty” money (Castells 2004, 224; 2009, 46). Nonetheless, being at 
the intersection of a set of political, media, academic, and business networks enables 
switchers to mobilise and leverage the resources of each network toward desired 
outcomes. Therefore, the power of switchers can be seen in a way as the “amplified 
version of programmers”, only with the ability changed from creating networks to 
creating networks of networks. 
 
A quick reprise, the potentialities and constraints of the network model, its processes of 
configuration and communication as well as the possibility to be programmed and 
connected with other networks are central elements that affect the making of power 
(Dragona 2013, 18). With the power to program the goals of a network and decide on 
the “protocols” for the network’s configuration and communication on the one hand, 
and with the power to block or enable connections between various strategic networks 
on the other, the programmers and switchers retain the main control of the networks.    
 
b. Networking Power 
In Castells’s network theory of power, networking power refers to the power of those 
included in critical networks that “constitute the core of the global network society” 
over individuals and collectives excluded (Castells 2009, 42). In each domain of social, 
political, and economic life, there are always some networks more influential than 
others due partly to the flows within such networks of the scarce resources and valuable 
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information that are in high demand by others. But the entry into these influential 
networks is controlled by “gatekeepers”, as Castells points out, a role that social actors 
can obtain by creating and programming a network that accumulates valuable resources 
and then by exercising their gatekeeping strategies to control (bar or allow) the access to 
the network.  
 
A few points relating to the networking power deserve special attention. First, it is 
important to be present in a network and not to be excluded. There are benefits for being 
in the network and costs for remaining excluded. Tongia and Wilson’s (2007) study of 
the network exclusion reveals some interesting results. In a given size of sample 
population dyadically differentiated between those included in a network and those 
excluded from that network, an increasing number of the included means a growth in 
the size of the network and the number of connections, as well as the decreasing number 
of the excluded. By positing that the costs for being excluded from a network depend on 
the total number of people excluded, the scholars apply this assumption to three leading 
theoretical formulations proposed by the Metcalfe’s Law, Reed’s Law, and Odlyzko’s 
Law concerning the calculation of the value of a network and of those included. 
Findings show that both the value of being in the network and the costs for being 
outside increase exponentially as the network expands in size. Moreover, in all three 
formulation models of the network “Laws”, the costs of exclusion grow much faster 
than the increase in the value of being included. In particular, the penalties for exclusion 
will “get worse…as only a few people are left out of the network” (Tongia and Wilson 
2007, 11), because of the declining number of opportunities in reaching other elements 
outside the network (Castells 2010a, 72). 
 
Second, the selective inclusion/exclusion process operates on two criteria. The first 
criterion is that participation in a network is determined by the contribution that an actor 
can make to the specific goals of that network. Castells (2000a, 695) demonstrates that 
in theory all regions and countries around the world can integrate themselves into the 
global economy, but actually only those that can add value (e.g., providing raw/human 
resources or markets) to the value-making chain of the economy are admitted to be 
linked into the mainstream global exchanges. While those having little or nothing to 
contribute will have to face two fates: either being bypassed by the global flows of 
wealth and opportunities due to being treated as the redundant nodes, or being allowed 
into the exchange circle but forced to be the producers of “raw materials” (Stalder 2006, 
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118). Nonetheless, the subtle inclusion/exclusion suggests that in the network society, 
sometimes being connected is itself an indicator of an actor’s worthiness. Perhaps this is 
why Nye (2011, 18) argues that networks and connections become an important source 
of relevant power, and that the extent to which a state engages in the global networks 
can be an important point for assessing the state’s power in the twenty-first century.  
 
The second criterion is that the entry into a network is conditional, those potential nodes 
wishing to join the network are mandated to accept a set of standards inscribed in the 
network. Such standards often stipulate the shared ways of communication and 
interaction among network components, and thus function as the enabler of 
coordination among multiple network members. The standards display a type of power 
called by David Singh Grewal the “network power” or the “power of a standard”. 
 
c. Network Power 
In his book Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalisation, Grewal (2008) 
pioneers a new theorisation of globalisation from the perspective of networks and 
standards. The author argues that globalisation involves social coordination enabled 
through the designating and propagation of common standards. Standards are shared 
norms or practices that are embedded in a network and that act to facilitate cooperation 
among network members (Grewal 2008, 21). In this way, globalisation can be 
understood as the process of creating and formatting international networks and 
standards that set the ground for social coordination on a global scale. 
 
Network power or the power of a standard is then the power of the standards 
programmed in a network over its components. This type of power has triple effects. 
First, the standards of a network are imposed over the members of that network whose 
acceptance of and compliance with the standards are the prerequisite for inclusion in the 
network. Second, as the network expands in size, network power grows, and the 
pressure on non-network members to join the network intensifies. As Grewal (2008, 10) 
writes, “the larger the network, the more powerful [and more valuable] the standard 
underlying it will be – and the more pressure non-users will feel to adopt that standard”. 
This statement echoes the previously discussed point that both the value of inclusion in 
a network and the costs for exclusion go up in line with the network expansion. Third, a 
standard has the potential to become a universal convention so long as the number of 
people accepting and using it increases to a critical point. In the elevation of a standard 
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towards a convention, it associates with the possibility that that standard will eliminate 
other coordinating standards and become the sole solution to coordination in a specific 
issue area. 
 
d. Networked Power 
Networked power refers to power at the level of network positions. For Castells (2009, 
10), networked power can be articulated as “the relational capacity that enables a social 
actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that 
favour the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values”. Castells ambiguously 
attributes the source of this type of power to the “structural capacity of domination” 
embedded in a network, but without a further expansion on what the structural capacity 
of domination is. 
 
In Slaughter’s grand strategy of network centrality, the ability to occupy the central 
position of critical networks is an equally important source of power in parallel with the 
power of creating networks. The notion of network centrality – which is, as discussed in 
Section 2.1, exactly a special kind of favourable network position – has two 
implications on policy making and implementation. First, it requires the identification of 
existing critical global or regional networks that are most instrumental in addressing the 
issues concerned, followed by attempts to join the network and to subsequently become 
the most central node in that network. Second, it follows with the strategy that the actors 
invest resources into turning the network where the actors have a preponderant 
influence into the global or regional hub of a web of the same-kind networks. The 
assumption for the network centrality strategy is that the central position grants power 
to its occupant – whether being central in a network or being the hub of a web of 
networks. 
 
Based on the above discussions, we are now able to draw a chain of conceptual logic 
that accounts for the rise of global networks (see Figure 2.1). 
 
At the first logical juncture of the logical chain, the convergence of social organisational 
evolution and information revolution lays down the organisational and material basis for 
the proliferation of networks. Although networks, as a form of social organisation, have 
existed in other times and spaces, the present advances in ICT enable the networks to 
maximise their advantages and potentials, while overcoming their limits. The blend of 
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the network form and new ICT allows for the co-existence in a network arrangement of 
both centralised decision-making and a decentralised organisational and operational 
layout among geographically distant, functionally or managerially autonomous 
components of the network. 
 
At the second logical juncture, the pervasive expansion of networks throughout the 
entire social structure induces a process of power diffusion on the bottom layer of the 
three-dimensional international system. In one dimension of the power diffusion, dark-
side actors such as terrorism and transnational crime (including TEC) are adopting 
networks in designing their organisational structures and operational tactics. The unique 
defensive and offensive strengths that networks afford their carriers transform the dark-
side actors into a transnationalised, networked threat for state actors. This links back to 
what we have discussed in Section 2.2. 
  
In another dimension of the power diffusion, in the face of the rise of transnational 
actors and issues, hierarchically-based state actors experience increasing faults and 
inefficiencies in dealing with the growing complexity of such issues. This directly leads 
to the inability of the nation-states to govern effectively by acting alone. In a hope to 
enhance their ability to cope with transnational issues, unitary states are adapting by 
disaggregating themselves into the component government institutions, such as 
regulatory and enforcement agencies. These government units are interacting 
independently in specific issue areas not only with their foreign counterparts under the 
framework of government networks, but also with the private and civic non-state actors 
under various forms of public-private partnership. The landscape of the government 
networks and public-private partnerships is an analogue of what may be called a “Lego 
World”. 
 
In this emerging Lego World, the nature and source of power – which is defined in 
terms of the capacity to address transnational issues – have changed in a way that 
resource-based power is losing strength to relational power and, hard power is 
increasingly outperformed by soft power (at least relatively). A core element of power in 
the Lego World consists in the ability to mobilise relevant entities and connect them 
toward a common purpose (e.g., tackling TEC). Against this backdrop, two critical 
abilities are identified as the key sources of network-related power that are most 
relevant for the addressing of transnational issues. The first is network-making power 
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(connectivity-based power), which stresses the ability to create networks or networks of 
networks. The second is networked power (favourable network position-based power), 
which focuses on the ability to occupy the advantageous network positions within an 
influential network. 
 
Let’s return to the second facet of the paradoxical puzzle raised at the outset of Section 
2.3: what are networked responses? Based on the understandings of the conceptual logic 
chain for the rise of global networks, this chapter argues that networked responses are 
not a standard, formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement responses. Instead, 
network responses should be understood as a special way of thinking and acting: a way 
that sees a bright-side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as operating in an environment 
occupied by various networks and entities, which simultaneously presented challenges 
in terms of amplified (networked) threats, as well as opportunities in terms of power 
amplifiers that could be leveraged for tackling these threats. In other words, in addition 
to the traditional logic of increasing resource power, network thinking emphasises 
cultivating relational resources rather than cultivating physical/hard resources. 
 
On the other hand, network thinking analyses an actor first by looking at whether or not 
it is a participant of an influential network, and whether it is placed in an advantageous 
or disadvantageous, a favourable or less favourable position in that network, and then, it 
considers strategies to move that actor from a less favourable position to a favourable 
one. Again, the overall logic underlying networked way of thinking and acting is that, in 
an increasingly networked, horizontal world, power comes from connections with and 
the positioning of influential networks and, that power is critical for dealing with 
transnational issues. 
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3. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL WILDLIFE 
 
This chapter represents this thesis’s first case study of China-related TEC with a 
specific focus on China’s illegal trade in wildlife. The primary objective of this chapter 
is to understand the nature and patterns of transaction networks involved in China’s 
global and regional trade of illegal wildlife.  
 
This chapter is organised into three sections. Section 3.1 reviews the international trade 
in wildlife, identifies emerging trends in global trade, and discusses the conceptual 
range of illegal wildlife trade. Section 3.2 categorises the sources of “catalysts” that fuel 
global concerns over China’s role in the international illegal wildlife trade. Section 3.3 
analyses 363 anecdotal records of China-related wildlife seizures drawn from the 
TRAFFIC Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions 1997–2013 to disentangle China’s role 
and function in the global and regional transaction chain of illegal wildlife trade.    
 
3.1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE 
3.1.1. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE 
“Wildlife trade”, in a straightforward term, refers to the sale and exchange by people of 
wild animal and plant resources (Broad et al. 2003, 4; Engler and Parry-Jones 2007, 9). 
It can involve a wide spectrum of live animal, plant, and fungal species – whether 
terrestrial or aquatic – being harvested and traded in many forms to produce a variety of 
products including food, clothing, ornaments and furnishings, pets and hobbies, 
ornamental plants, manufacturing and construction materials, and others (Roe 2008, 3–
4).  
 
Wildlife trade is a major element of global commerce, accounting for billions of dollars 
annually. Each year, hundreds of millions of live animals and plants from thousands of 
species as well as a vast array of products derived from them – e.g., food, exotic leather 
goods, wooden musical instruments, timber, tourist curios, and medicines – are being 
traded across the globe at local, national, and international levels to meet growing 
market demands.31 For many countries around the world, especially those cash-poor but 
biodiversity-rich countries in the Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America, 
wildlife resources are critical natural assets that contribute significantly to both the 
                                                          
31 TRAFFIC. “Wildlife Trade: What is it?” http://www.traffic.org/trade/. 
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national economies and the well-being of millions of rural households. Not only does 
wildlife resources trade generate a considerable proportion of government revenues,32 
they also provide poor rural villagers with vital sources of food, fodder, fibre, medicines, 
and supplementary or even primary source of cash income. Conservative estimates of 
the number of people with varying dependence on non-wood forest products for living 
or (part of) cash income range from 200 million worldwide to one billion in the Asia-
Pacific region alone (van Rijsoort 2000). Though the relative importance of wildlife 
trade as a source of income for rural households varies greatly across countries and 
regions, the World Bank estimates that an average of 20 percent of the overall income 
for poor rural families around the globe is from the trade of forest products (Roe 2008, 
20). In Eastern and Southern Africa, Barnett (2000) estimates that 34 percent of 
household income derives from trade in wild meat. 
  
Technically, quantifying the true scale and value of the world’s wildlife trade is a tough 
task. According to the literature, there are two main reasons for this. First, this relates to 
the nature of the business. Wildlife trade manifests itself at varying dimensions and 
scales (Roe et al. 2002). Wildlife resources harvested in a country may be used for 
subsistence purposes such as food and clothing, or sold into the local cash economy, or 
shipped across borders to neighbouring countries or more distant the regional and 
international markets. The dividing line between self-consumptive use and commercial 
trade is often blurred (Freese 1998, 10–11). Trade taking place at the local communities 
and markets accounts for over half of the world’s wildlife trade. However, the local-
level trade is often carried out through “informal” trade networks, which sometimes 
involve various forms of non-cash barter. This wildlife trade’s predominantly local 
nature, especially when coupled with the practice of bartering and its importance for 
subsistence, often makes a substantial portion of wildlife trade go beyond the 
governments’ monitoring and statistical range and therefore remain unregistered (CEC, 
2005; Karesh et al. 2005).  
 
Second, where there exist statistics of wildlife trade, they tend to be vulnerable to many 
systematic shortcomings such as underreporting, double counting, inconsistent grouping 
among traded commodities, and the use of unrealistic pricing (Sial 1995). Broad et al. 
(2003, 7) point out two main sources of data on international wildlife trade: national 
                                                          
32 For example, in Cambodia, wild plants and animals were a major source of foreign exchange between 
the first and 20th Centuries (Martin and Phipps 1996).   
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customs data as well as international trade data in the form of annual reports submitted 
by member states to the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).33 However, both sources of data 
suffer from significant informational deficiencies. On the former, customs agencies 
document information on reported trade volumes and declared values of imports and 
exports as well as detected illegal wildlife trade. Smuggling and illegal trading that have 
successfully escaped from official monitoring and detection remain undocumented and 
uncaptured by customs’ databases. As for the CITES reporting process, despite a 
relatively good performance by states in recording trade of CITES-listed species, such 
species only constitute a small fraction of the overall number of species traded 
worldwide. Trade in wildlife species that are not on CITES Appendices falls outside the 
purview of existing statistics.  
 
Despite these practical difficulties and complications researchers face, various attempts 
have still been made to document as much as possible the size and value of international 
trade in wildlife since the late 1980s. Given different data sources and methods in use 
and each study’s different focus (in terms of the aspects and types of commodities of 
wildlife trade emphasised), these efforts have produced different estimates. For example, 
the wildlife trade monitoring NGO TRAFFIC made an estimate of the import value for 
international trade in the early 1990s at US$15 billion for wildlife products (not 
including timber and fisheries products). This figure jumped to close to US$160 billion 
when wild-sourced timber and fish were counted (Broad et al. 2003, 13). Based on the 
declared import value of 2005, Engler (2008, 4) assessed that the global trade in wildlife 
was worth between US$60.9 billion when excluding timber and fish, and US$332.4 
billion with timber and fish included. 
 
Overall, according to the literature, there have been two observable trends in the 
international wildlife trade. First, the global trade in wildlife has grown dramatically in 
terms of the trade value over the past three decades. In the 1980s, the import value of 
global wildlife trade was estimated to be around US$5 billion per annum (Roe 2008, 7). 
However, as noted above, this figure quickly surged to over US$15 billion in the early 
                                                          
33 CITES is an international treaty drawn up in 1973 to protect wildlife against over-exploitation and to 
prevent international trade from threatening species with extinction. Presently, 180 Parties, including 
China, are signatories to CITES. The CITES Secretariat is administered by the United Nations 
Environmental Programme and is located in Geneva, Switzerland. It has a pivotal role, fundamental to the 
Convention and its functions are laid down in Article XII of the text of the Convention. See CITES. 
“What is CITES?” https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php. 
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1990s, and further climbed to US$60.9 billion in 2005.34 Another trend pertains to the 
ongoing changes in the trade patterns and the roles of individual countries involved in 
global trade. On the one hand, though the general direction of trade flows is one of 
developing countries (e.g., Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Thailand) serving as the 
primary suppliers of wildlife products, and of developed countries and regions (e.g., the 
EU, US, and Japan) serving as the major consumer markets, in recent years there has 
been a notable increase in wildlife trade among developing countries as well as in 
intraregional trade like the Asia-Pacific and North America (Broad et al. 2003).  
 
On the other hand, a shift pertaining to the role of individual countries in global and 
regional wildlife trade has taken place. As we know, there are three basic types of roles 
played by countries in transnational wildlife trade: supplier, consumer, and intermediary 
(as a point of transit or transhipment). In reality, the part played by a country in 
international wildlife trade is not always so clear-cut. A much more common scenario is 
one where states simultaneously take up more than one role, and they are distinguished 
only in terms of the extent to which the country may lean more or less toward one 
position or the other. As demonstrated in the case of Vietnam, thanks to the sharp shrink 
of its domestic wildlife resources driven by the overexploitation and illegal hunting and 
smuggling, Vietnam has transformed in the last four decades from being a major 
supplier to being a conduit through which wildlife legally or illegally sourced from 
Cambodia and Laos are shipped to China, Thailand, and South Korea (Lin 2005, 203).   
 
Existing published estimates of the scale and structure of international trade in wildlife 
are a little outdated. As such, this section uses the UN Comtrade Database to extract and 
compile data on the declared import value of 2012 (the most recent for which data is 
available at the time of drafting this chapter) to produce an updated overview of the 
international wildlife trade.35 The UN Comtrade Database is chosen because it contains 
import and export data reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 UN member 
countries or regions and is considered the world’s most comprehensive database for 
international merchandise trade. Due to limits to availability of data, estimates are 
confined to international trade and China-related trade in wild animals and products in 
2012; timber, fish (except ornamental fish), and non-timber forest products are not 
included. To facilitate the comparison with previous estimates made by the literature, 
                                                          
34 Timber and fishery products are not included in these three figures. 
35 The Statistics Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. “UN Comtrade 
Database.” http://comtrade.un.org/.  
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the 2002 Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS 2002) is chosen 
as the reference for search.36 Given the complicated nature of wildlife trade as discussed 
previously as well as the limitations and deficiencies associated with UN Comtrade 
trade data,37 estimates presented in Table 3.1 shall at best serve as a crude indicator of 
the broad outlook of 2012 international trade and China-related trade in wild animals 
and products.   
 
Based on the 2012 declared import value, the total value of international trade in wild 
animals and products is estimated at approximately US$8.8 billion. From Table 3.1, it 
can be seen that among the imported items, mammal furs and fur products, with an 
import value of US$6.1 billion, constituted the single largest contributor to the 
international trade in wild animals and products. Natural pearls, reptile skins and 
products, ornamental fish, corals, shells of molluscs and crustaceans, game meat, and 
live primates amounted to the second largest group of contributors. A sum of the import 
value of the eight commodity categories accounted for 98.5% of the total import value 
in 2012. 
 
In comparison with the 2005 estimate of US$6.9 billion by Engler (2008, 4), or US$7.9 
billion after adjusted for inflation up to 2012 levels using the US GDP Deflator,38 there 
has been a ten percent increase observed in the 2012 estimate. This increase has an 
overall effect, as reflected in the rise of the import value of many categories of wildlife 
products. For example, the value of mammal furs and fur products in 2012 is estimated 
at US$6.1 billion, six percent growth compared to the 2005 figure (US$4.9 billion, or 
US$5.7 billion after adjusted for inflation). For reptile skins and products, its 2012 
import value is assessed to be of US$538.1 million, 28 percent increase against the 2005 
estimate (US$339 million, or US$387 million after adjusted for inflation). 
 
                                                          
36 The HS system is an internationally standardised system of nomenclature and codes to classify the 
merchandise in international trade. World Customs Organisation. “What is the Harmonised System (HS)?” 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonised-system.aspx. 
37 Domestic trade is not included in UN Comtrade Database despite it constitutes the bulk of the world’s 
wildlife trade. Furthermore, as stated in the UN Comtrade “Read Me First (Disclaimer)”, there are a 
number of deficiencies associated with the UN Comtrade data, which include unreport or underreport of 
trade in certain commodities by countries due to confidentiality, inconsistent commodity classifications, 
discrepancies between the export and import values due to valuation and differences in 
inclusion/exclusion of particular commodities and so forth. UN Comtrade. “Read Me First.” 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx. 
38 Areppim. “Converter of Current to Real US Dollars”. 
http://stats.areppim.com/calc/calc_usdlrxdeflator.php. 
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Table 3.1: Estimates of the value for the international trade and China-related trade in wild animals and 
products (excluding fish), based on 2012 import value (in US$) 
Commodity Global trade value 
China’s trade value 
(Export + Import) 
Live animals, except farm animals 
Mammals   
-- Primates 94.9 million  28.7 million 
Reptiles (including snakes and 
turtles) 
41.4 million 8.3 million 
Birds   
-- Birds of prey 4.4 million -- -- 
-- Cage birds* 12.9 million  1.0 million 
Ornamental fish 317.9 million  7.3 million 
Animal products for food (excluding fish) 
Primate meat 0.8 million  -- -- 
Reptile meat (incl. snakes and 
turtles) 
4.7 million  -- -- 
Game meat 165.4 million 39.1 million 
Edible snails  48.7 million  4.4 million 
Frogs’ legs 5,153 -- -- 
Animal products for clothing/ornamental 
Mammal fur and fur products  6.1 billion 1.5 billion 
Ivory (unworked or simply prepared) 15.4 million 18.4 million 
Reptiles skins and products 538.1 million 4.2 million 
Corals; shells of molluscs, 
crustaceans 
177.8 million 24.5 million 
Natural pearls 1.3 billion 330.9 million 
Total 8.8 billion 2.0 billion 
(Source: The UN Comtrade Database 2012) 
* Including parrots, parakeets, macaws and cockatoos 
 
3.1.2. ILLEGAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE 
The conceptual range of illegal wildlife trade or wildlife crime is itself an unresolved 
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issue.39 There are scholars arguing that wildlife crime can be defined as a range of 
activities including poaching for trade or personal possession, illegal killing for bush 
meat, and killing animals due to human-animal conflict (Pires and Moreto 2011, 104). 
Others claim that illegal wildlife trade encompasses illegal exploitation of native species, 
illicit import of exotic species, and unauthorised internal trade in indigenous and exotic 
species (Bricknell 2010, 49). Outside academic circle, there are international 
organisations such as the INTERPOL that broadly define wildlife crime as “the illegal 
exploitation of the world’s wild flora and fauna”.40  
 
There are two primary reasons for the inconsistent conceptual scopes and elements of 
wildlife crime. First, it pertains to the overriding lack of a comprehensive international 
legal norm that specifically deals with the many facets and aspects of offences in the 
wildlife sector.41 Over the past four decades, there has emerged a body of treaties, 
agreements, and declarations that seek to protect the environment, natural resources, 
habitats, and the world’s fauna and flora.42 Among them, CITES is the single most 
important international instrument in the wildlife sector to regulate and control (prohibit 
or limit) international trade in protected specimens of wild animals and plants so as to 
ensure the trade does not threaten their survival. To do so, the Convention creates three 
separate Appendices which combined cover a total of roughly 5,000 species of animals 
and 29,000 species of plants. Each Appendix houses a range of wildlife species 
according to their conservation status and risk from international trade, and each 
Appendix grants a different level of protection to the species within it. Under the CITES 
control system, import and export of species listed in CITES Appendices are subject to 
the licensing and reporting mechanisms. Further, under Article VIII of the Convention, 
Parties are required to “take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the 
present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation of thereof”. 43 
                                                          
39 “Illegal wildlife trade” and “wildlife crime” are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
40 INTERPOL. “Environmental Crime.”  
http://www.INTERPOL.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Environmental-crime. 
41 As will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4, not only the wildlife sector, but also the forestry sector has 
also been experiencing the dilemma of the lack of an overarching international legal setup that 
specifically defines and tackles the problems of illegal logging and associated trade in forest products. 
42 In addition to CITES, there are other international treaties that might be applicable to wildlife 
conservation and to wildlife crime in certain circumstances. For example, the Convention of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals, signed on 23 June 1979, aims to conserve terrestrial, aquatic, and avian 
migratory species throughout their range; the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime is appropriate for legal reference when organised criminal organisations are involved in the 
trafficking and trading of wildlife; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption can be invoked 
when wildlife offences are connected with corrupt practices.  
43 CITES Secretariat. “The Text of the Convention.” Article VIII. 
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php#top.  
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Specifically, such measures include “penalising” the illegal trade in, or illegal 
possession of, protected species, and confiscating illegally acquired or traded wildlife 
products.  
 
Strictly speaking, CITES is an international trade agreement, not a vehicle of 
international criminal law. It works mainly through a system of licensing mechanisms 
that allows the member states to provide mutual protection to one another’s indigenous 
species covered under the CITES Appendices. Therefore, much of the transnational 
wildlife crime tends to come in the form of import or export of CITES-listed species 
without an appropriate import/export permit or certificate issued by the CITES 
Management Authority (MA) in the exporting/importing countries.44 This is evidenced 
by the China-related wildlife seizure data collected by this chapter (discussed in the 
second part of this chapter), which indicates that the majority of shipments of wildlife 
products to China were seized on the grounds of lacking valid import permits issued by 
the CITES China MA or legal export certificates issued by the MA in exporting 
countries.     
 
From above, two points can be highlighted with regards to the CITES control 
framework. First, CITES does not provide a clearly delimited definition for wildlife 
crime, nor does it provide any guidance as to the design of wildlife crime under 
domestic law. Relatedly, it is left to the states parties to internalise the provisions of 
CITES into their national legal framework to define the nature, scope, and consequences 
of wildlife offences and to provide protection not only to native species but also to 
protected species from other parts of the world. However, the great distinctions of 
national legalisation and policies, culture, and the range of species in trade and under 
protection among countries lead to the absence of a widespread consensus about the 
exact scope and elements of the wildlife crime. Hence some undesirable and 
unsustainable wildlife practices may be identified as offences against the criminal law 
or as violations of administrative regulations in one country, but be deemed as legal 
activities in other nations. Second, current controls enabled by CITES are limited to 
regulating international trade (import/export), the trade of CITES-listed species and 
other related activities such as illegal harvesting or poaching that occur entirely within 
                                                          
44 Under CITES, all Parties are requested to designate one or more national Management Authorities in 
charge of administering and issuing the permits or certificates for the import/export of CITES-listed 
species. CITES Secretariat. “How CITES Works”. https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php. 
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the borders of a country are actually beyond the regulatory scope of CITES.45  
 
The absence of a widely accepted definition of wildlife crime in conjunction with the 
inability of CITES to directly regulate domestic wildlife trade can sometimes be a 
loophole exploited by individual countries. As will be explored in Chapter 6, although 
commercial trade in tiger parts and products is prohibited by CITES at the international 
level and banned by states like India on the national scale, internal trade of captive-bred 
tigers is enabled and legalised by the Chinese government’s “special marking scheme” 
and is going on at a commercial scale. The continuing presence of a national legal 
market with tremendous buying potential for endangered wildlife will certainly 
stimulate the poaching activities in source countries and undercut the efforts made by 
the international community and source countries to conserve endangered species. 
 
Table 3.2: Wildlife crime and crossover offences at the custodian points of origin, transit, and destination 
 Wildlife offences Associated cross-over offences 
Countries of 
Origin 
 
(1) Poaching (illegal hunting) 
(2) Use of prohibited hunting equipment or 
methods  
(3) Taking of restricted prey (breeding females, 
young protected species) 
(4) Violation of seasonal restrictions 
(5) Illegal possession  
(6) Illegal processing of animal material  
(7) Illegal export 
Corruption  
Tax evasion and non-payment of 
fees 
Documentation fraud  
Money laundering 
Illegal possession of weapons 
subject to police control 
Countries of 
Transit 
 
(1) Illegal import 
(2) Illegal possession 
(3) Illegal supply and sale 
(4) Illegal processing 
(5) Illegal export 
Corruption  
Tax evasion and non-payment of 
fees 
Document fraud  
Money laundering 
Countries of 
Destination 
 
(1) Illegal import 
(2) Illegal processing 
(3) Illegal possession 
(4) Illegal supply and sale  
(5) Illegal consumption 
Corruption 
Tax evasion and non-payment of 
fees 
Document fraud  
Money laundering 
(Source: UNODC 2012, 35. Revised by the author) 
                                                          
45 So long as the CITES-listed species harvested or traded do not enter the international market, it lies 
beyond the CITES control purview. 
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The second reason for the inconsistency in understandings of wildlife crime relates to 
the complexity of wildlife-related illegal practices. Such complexity – which tends to be 
one of the common characteristics throughout the many sectors of environmental crime 
– has two-fold meanings.  
 
On the one hand, illegal wildlife trade involves complex multi-level “chains of custody” 
and the illegality can arise in many forms at any custodian points. As shown in Table 
3.2, wildlife crime comprises a diverse range of offences from illegal hunting or 
poaching, processing, trafficking, export, import, supplying, to the unlawful acquisition, 
possession, and consumption of wild fauna and flora. In addition to the “mainstream” or 
proximate crimes, a list of crossover offences including document fraud, money 
laundering, tax evasion, and corruption might be involved as a means to facilitate the 
commission of the mainstream wildlife crime. These offences occur equally and often 
repeatedly at each custodian point from the country of origin, transit, to the country of 
destination.  
 
On the other hand, illegal wildlife trade engages a constellation of perpetrators varying 
from harvesters and poachers, middlemen and intermediaries (sometimes called 
“brokers”), wholesalers, processors, and exporters, to importers and retailers. These 
illegal operators tend to draw different levels of proceeds from the collecting and 
marketing chain by either direct complicity in the mainstream wildlife offences or 
indirectly providing a variety of products and services (e.g., fraudulent documents, 
money laundering) which are necessary for the “smooth” undertaking of the mainstream 
wildlife crime.  
 
Wildlife offenders appear to come from a broad spectrum of socio-economic profiles 
and are driven by a myriad of motivations. Some perpetrators are impoverished locals, 
tourists, and private collectors whose participation in illegal harvesting and trade is 
sporadic or at a small scale. The motivations behind this type of offenders vary by cases. 
In some cases, killing of wild animals is mainly for self-subsistence use (e.g., food, 
clothing, and medicines), or for trade as an emergency, supplementary or primary 
source of cash income, or for the purposes of private collection. In other cases, it is a 
response to the threat posed by animals to human property (e.g., livestock, crops) or 
human life (Treves and Karanth 2003; Warchol 2004; WWF 2006). TRAFFIC’s 2008 
survey on the expert opinions about the legal/illegal wildlife trade in Cambodia, 
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Indonesia, Laos, and Vietnam indicates that wildlife harvesting for trade across the four 
countries is mostly carried out as a planned, rather than ad hoc or opportunistic, activity 
by local dwellers with poor economic status. The dominant motivation for harvesting 
for trade is the need for cash earnings, expressed either in the form of a long-term and 
persistent need for household income owing to the extremely restricted access to 
alternative livelihoods, or as a resort to unforeseen or emergency needs for cash income 
(TRAFFIC 2008, 26).  
 
Opposed to the small-scale extraction and trade of wildlife, there are professional 
poachers and members of organised crime groups involved in large-scale, systematic 
cross-border sourcing, smuggling, and supplying of protected species. The motivation 
behind this type of offenders is often categorical, mostly for the high profits generated 
from illegal activities. Indicators of the organised nature of parts of the international 
illicit trade in wildlife can take many forms, including detailed planning, significant 
financial support, international management of shipments, sophisticated forgery of 
permits and certificates, well-armed participants, and others (Sellar 2007). By meeting 
many of the above benchmarks, seizures of large-scale and cross-border shipments are 
often a good measure of the presence of organised criminality. This is because the 
trafficking of large quantities of wildlife across a long distance from source countries to 
the end-use markets involves a complicated process that can only be handled with a 
competent level of expertise, financial resources, and the managing, organising, and 
marketing capabilities. As discussed in Chapter 1, between 1989 and 2010 the ETIS 
(Elephant Trade Information System) recorded over 55 large ivory seizures with an 
average seizure size of around 2.3 tonnes (UNODC 2010, 158). 46  More recently, 
UNODC conducted a grand empirical analysis of some 164,000 wildlife seizures 
occurred globally during 1999–2015. Under the category of ivory seizures, during 
2009–2014 some 99 large ivory seizures (each weighing over 500 kg) were made by 
enforcement agencies worldwide (UNODC 2016, 44). With the significant monetary 
value involved in any single of these large seizures, it is hard to deny the role of 
organised criminal groups in the trafficking. 
 
Given the objective of this case study is to explore China’s role and function in the 
international transaction chain of illegal wildlife trade, this chapter adopts a definition 
                                                          
46 ETIS is a comprehensive information system for tracking illegal trade in ivory and other elephant 
products. It is currently run by TRAFFIC and based in Harare, Zimbabwe. CITES Secretariat. “What is 
ETIS?” https://cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php.  
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that conceives of wildlife crime as containing two dimensions of illegal activities. First, 
at the international level, (transnational) wildlife crime refers to the import or export of 
wild fauna or products thereof that violates the regulatory regime established by CITES. 
As noted previously, this form of illegality makes up the majority of the detected 
transnational wildlife crime and often comes along as proceeding without a valid 
permit/certificate issued by the national CITES MA. Second, at the national level, 
wildlife crime refers to harvesting, transport, purchase, sale, or consumption that 
contravenes China’s wildlife-related laws and regulations.  
 
3.2. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL WILDLIFE 
3.2.1. GLOBAL CONCERN OVER CHINA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ILLEGAL 
WILDLIFE TRADE 
 
“The teenaged cook grabs a handful of slim green snakes from their cage outside 
the kitchen, seizing them by their necks as he wields his cleaver in the other hand. 
In a matter of minutes, he slits the skin of each snake from neck to tail, the 
squirming reptiles still alive and moving in a frenzy as they are chopped into a 
wok” (Mclaughlin 2010). 
 
The local restaurant, where the gruesome scene above was pictured, is just one among 
hundreds of the same kind secretly or even openly serving wildlife-based cuisine in 
Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong Province. The snakes are also just one among 
thousands of wildlife species caught around the globe and moved legally or illegally to 
China to feed a burgeoning market.  
 
In comparison with its role as a supplier of wildlife products (Wyler and Sheikh 2008; 
Nijman 2010), China has created a greater global concern over its shift toward being 
one of the world’s largest consumers of wildlife illegally sourced from within China, to 
its north and south neighbours, and to the African continent. Tens of tonnes of a wide 
spectrum of wild animals are reputed to be shipped to China on a daily basis (UNODC 
2010, 159). A crude estimate of China’s annual black market value hovers around 
US$10 billion (McLaughlin 2010). This black market is claimed to have expanded as an 
outcome of the confluence of the increasing number of wealthy Chinese (Martin and 
Vigne 2011, 4; Vigne and Martin 2014, 79) and the “enabling” socio-cultural milieu for 
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wildlife consumption (Wasser and Jiao 2010; UNODC 2010, 154). Either because they 
are treasured for the purported medicinal benefits according to traditional Chinese 
medicine (TCM), or because they are regarded as status symbols or prized as pets or 
exotic meat, these wildlife species and their derivatives and products are being used for 
a variety of goods ranging from foods, medicines, pets, fashion and cultural items, 
industrial resins and extracts, and household decorations. 
 
In July 2005, based on ETIS’s two successive analyses of the seizure records of ivory 
tusks and products, CITES Secretariat declared China as “the single most important 
influence on the increasing trend in illegal trade in ivory since 1995”.47 It seems that 
China’s role as the world’s major consumer coupled with its failure to take adequate 
measures to curtail its illegal internal trade have ignited a worldwide worry over a 
possible scenario. That is, if things remain unchanged, with its growing but somehow 
uncontrolled hunger China would be gobbling up the wildlife treasures of the world – 
from pangolins, turtles, and snakes in Southeast Asia, bears in the Russian Far East, to 
tigers and leopards in India and Nepal, Saiga antelopes in Kazakhstan, and to elephants 
and rhinos in Africa – to extinction.   
 
It appears that there has always been a rich body of catalysts that fuel or even heighten 
this unease. With an extensive literature review, this chapter categorises such possible 
catalysts into three broad sources. 
 
3.2.1.1. SOURCE ONE: LARGE-SCALE WILDLIFE SEIZURES  
In recent years, there has been a spate of headline-grabbing large-scale seizures of 
illegal wildlife related to China as reported by law enforcement authorities and 
propagated by international media. These at least include large hauls occurred within 
China and its territories and those outside China, but evidence indicating the ultimate 
destination of the involved contraband was China.  
 
For instance, within mainland China, in February 2013 along a border road connecting 
Ruili, Yunnan Province and the northern Burma, local police intercepted one of its 
largest ever-recorded seizures of illegal wildlife. Some 4,815 live snakes including 
                                                          
47 CITES Secretariat. “Control of Trade in African Elephant Ivory.” SC53 Doc. 20.1. July 2005. 
https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/53/E53-20-1.pdf. 
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cobras, vipers and Indian rat snakes (Ptyas mucosus), with their total weight at nearly 
four tonnes, were contained in 176 wooden crates loaded on a truck heading for inland 
China.48 On 7 June 2012, a bust into a rental apartment in Nanning, Guangxi Province 
brought the forest police a seizure of 343 frozen pangolins (weighing around 2.2 tonnes), 
141 bear paws, 37 frozen big-headed turtles (Platysternon megacephalum), and 20 kg of 
meat believed to be harvested from the CITES Appendix I-listed species the Asiatic 
black bears (Ursus thibetanus). The haul, with an estimated value of CN¥20 million, 
marked the biggest seizure that the Nanning forest police had made in the past decade.49 
In Hong Kong, on 6 August 2013, acting on a tip from customs officials in mainland 
China, the Hong Kong Customs seized 1,120 polished ivory tusks, 13 black and white 
rhino horns, and five leopard skins (combined weighing 2,266 kg) from a shipment 
arriving from Nigeria for Shanghai. The haul, with its value estimated at HKD$41 
million (or US$5.3 million), came on the heels of a string of massive seizures of illegal 
wildlife exports that Hong Kong authorities had made in 2013 alone.50 And 1,120 ivory 
tusks came only to be the tenth large-scale ivory seizure made in Hong Kong since 
2010.51 
 
Outside China, on 8 February 2010, 447 bear paws (515 kg) loaded on two lorries 
destined for China were seized by the Russian border patrol agents at a Russian south 
border village. 52  On 5 August 2008, the Indonesian National Police Criminal 
Investigation Bureau confiscated 14 tonnes of frozen Malayan pangolins (Manis 
javanica) and 50 kg of pangolin scales from a warehouse in Palembang, South Sumatra 
where the illegal cargo was stored and ready to be exported to China. A weight of 14 
tonnes also broke the record of pangolin seizures that the Indonesian authorities have 
ever made.53  
 
                                                          
48 Sina News. “Yunnan Forest Police Seized 4,815 Live Snakes.” February 25, 2013 (in Chinese). 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-02-25/115226352286.shtml. 
49 Xinhua News. “Nanning Forest Police Cracked Down on the Largest Wildlife Smuggling Ring.” June 6, 
2012 (in Chinese). http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-06/26/c_112293098.htm. 
50 The Wall Street Journal. ”Hong Kong Seizes Massive Ivory Haul.” 7 August, 2013. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/07/hong-kong-seizes-massive-ivory-haul/. 
51 CITES defines “large-scale” ivory seizures as equivalent to 500 kg or more. CITES Secretariat. 
“Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens (Elephantidae spp.).” 
http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/valid16/16_78-83.php. 
52 The New York Times. “Russia: Cargo of Bear Paws Seized.” 10 February, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/world/europe/10briefs-Bears.html?_r=0. 
53 TRAFFIC. “Indonesian Police Smash One of the Country’s Largest Illegal Wildlife Smuggling 
Operations.” 5 August, 2008. http://www.traffic.org/home/2008/8/5/indonesian-police-smash-one-of-
countrys-largest-illegal-wild.html. 
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Seizures are only indicative of a fraction of the actual overall illicit trade. However, they 
provide strong evidence to support two claims about China’s role in global illegal 
wildlife trade. First, mainland China stands as a prominent destination hub absorbing 
unremitting cross-border inflows by sea, air or land of illicit wildlife from multiple 
directions around this country. Second, Hong Kong is a significant transit point for 
illegal wildlife being smuggled by sea into mainland China.54  
 
3.2.1.2. SOURCE TWO: INVOLVEMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALS IN WILDLIFE-RELATED 
OFFENCES   
There have been increasing incidences involving Chinese nationals being arrested or 
prosecuted for smuggling or illegal possession of wildlife in source countries in Africa 
and at flight transit points like the UK and Belgium in Europe. In particular, these 
involved two types of cases. First, Chinese tourists got caught at airports for possessing 
endangered wildlife products in their carry-on luggage without a legal permit when 
transiting the returning flights. During May–June 2010, for example, customs at the 
Brussels Airport in Belgium confiscated an accumulation of 3,000 dried seahorses 
(Hippocampus), 250 ivory items, and 25 bags made of crocodile skins from over 100 
Chinese passengers when they transited Belgium from Guinea to Beijing. This had 
directly led the INTERPOL, CITES Secretariat, and World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) to officially notify China’s CITES MA about this unusual spike in Chinese-
related seizures. Responding to the notice, the Chinese authorities had subsequently 
tightened up its customs control at the Beijing International Airport and launched a 
campaign to sensitise the Chinese tourists to the illegal nature of purchasing and 
carrying home the endangered wildlife products.55  
 
Secondly, Chinese labourers working overseas, especially those employed in 
infrastructure construction projects in Africa, have been reportedly involved in the 
illegal trade or even poaching of local wild animals. Michael E. Ranneberger, the 
former American Ambassador to Kenya (2006–2011), once accused in a cable the 
Chinese of “being behind the increasing incidences of poaching in Kenya” and the 
Chinese government of having not “demonstrated any commitment to curb ivory 
                                                          
54 As will be discussed later in this chapter, the role of Macau and Taiwan as transit points for smuggling 
wildlife into mainland China is not empirically conspicuous. 
55 Green Times News. “China CITES MA Warns Chinese Tourists Not to Purchase and Carry Home 
Endangered Wildlife and Products” (in Chinese). July 7, 2010. 
http://203.187.172.102/green/news/dzbh/bhdt/content/2010-07/07/content_97943.htm. 
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poaching” (Wambui 2010). The evidence he used to support his allegations was the 
Kenyan Wildlife Service’s (KWS) reports on the marked increase in poaching 
incidences in wherever Chinese labour camps were located as well as the quote of KWS 
director Julius Kipng’etich’s, who stated that “ninety percent of all the people who pass 
through our airports and are apprehended with illegal wildlife trophies are Chinese” 
(McConnell 2011). 
 
3.2.1.3. SOURCE THREE: WIDESPREAD NON-COMPLIANCE IN INTERNAL MARKET  
The third source of catalysts relates to the observations of the present state of illegal 
wildlife trade in China. As exposed by several international and Chinese environmental 
NGOs through their market surveys and undercover investigations in many parts of 
China, the Chinese government has not imposed tight enough control over its domestic 
black market for wildlife. Specifically, the not-tight-enough-control assessment derives 
from two aspects of China’s current illegal trade.  
 
On the one hand, protected wildlife and body parts and products were found widely 
available on local niche markets; restaurants and hotels were disclosed secretly or semi-
openly serving wildlife-based meals. In 2007, a field survey aimed at understanding the 
status of wildlife trade as food in south China was carried out by the China Wildlife 
Conservation Association and TRAFFIC China. This survey involved field investigation 
of 25 niche marketplaces for pet birds, ornamental plants, aquatic and agricultural 
products as well as 50 luxury restaurants selected from five southern cities including 
Kunming, Nanning, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Haikou. Final results found that 13 (52%) 
marketplaces visited harboured protected live animals and their body parts and products 
in open sale, and 20 (40%) restaurants examined offered wild animal-based meals. 
Among the traded wild animals, two species were identified as under China’s first class 
special state protection (Class-I SSP), six species were under the second class special 
state protection (Class-II SSP),56  and two species were on CITES Appendix I, and 
fifteen species on CITES Appendix II (Meng et al. 2009).  
 
In west China, in 2008 with the assistance of volunteers from the China Wildlife Trade 
                                                          
56 Based on the grading and categorization of wildlife species, China adopts a three-level protection 
system. For species classified as rare and valuable or endangered, the State affords the highest level of 
protection as under “Special State Protection” (SSP), which is further differentiated between species 
under Class-I SSP and Class-II SSP. A more in-depth exploration of China’s wildlife protection system is 
provided in Chapter 6. 
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Monitoring Network, TRAFFIC coordinated a field survey on niche markets for birds as 
pets, animal furs, ornamental plants, traditional Chinese costumes, and jewellery craft in 
eighteen cities from Provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Investigation 
recorded a notable decrease in the number of observable sale of wildlife on sample 
marketplaces in contrast with the 2007 survey. However, wild animals under CITES 
Appendix I and Class-I SSP such as skins of snow leopard (Uncia uncia) and tiger as 
well as Tibetan accessories made of red coral (Antipatharia spp.) were still found 
openly displayed for sale (Xu 2008, 4–5).57      
 
On the other hand, government accredited workshops and pharmacies – where legal, 
regulated trade should at least be expected – have been discovered to be manufacturing 
and processing smuggled wildlife materials and selling Traditional Chinese Medicines 
(TCM) containing ingredients of protected species without a valid permit. The problem 
is particularly acute in the field of ivory trade. This is not only because of the disclosed 
industry-wide non-compliance, more important was such violations coming at a time 
after the Chinese government had levelled up its effort to regulate its domestic ivory 
market. In 2003, China introduced an official identification mechanism, stipulating that 
ivory items can only be crafted and sold in registered workshops and retail outlets. 
Every ivory item in sale or on exhibition is required to be accompanied by an identity 
card issued by the State Forestry Administration (SFA). However, in January 2011 a 
market survey conducted by the environmental NGO “Elephant Family” in Guangzhou 
and Fuzhou – two cities believed to be the most important centres for ivory trade in 
south China – uncovered alarmingly weak enforcement. In Guangzhou, 3,947 (61%) out 
of 6,437 ivory objects counted on display for sale were not affixed with a compulsory 
ID card. Some 72 (92%) out of 80 retail outlets did not present ID cards next to the 
ivory items in sale. While in Fuzhou, 282 ivory items in 39 stores were with not 
accompanied with ID cards (Martin and Vigne 2011).58 
 
                                                          
57 In August 2009, EIA conducted similar market surveys in Xining (Qinghai Province), Linxia (Gansu 
Province), Lhasa (Tibet), Shigatse (Tibet), and Nagchu (Tibet) and also found animal parts and products 
of Asian big cats (tiger and leopard) openly available for sale in local marketplaces (EIA 2009).  
58 In addition, there was another media exposure concerning the non-compliance at ivory crafting 
workshops in China. In February 2011, Sky News undercover investigation at a government registered 
ivory workshop documented an ironic and contradict story. A manager of the workshop alleged that their 
business only accepts ivory tusks coming with a certificate to prove their legal origin. But when she left, 
one of her workers told the undercover crew privately that he had also carved smuggled ivory tusks. And 
to prove this, he showed off chunks of smuggled ivory. The detailed information about the city where this 
ivory workshop locates was undisclosed. Sky News. “China Ivory Demand Spurs Elephant Slaughter.” 
February 9, 2011. http://news.sky.com/story/836138/china-ivory-demand-spurs-elephant-slaughter. 
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For China’s TCM trade, it can be seen in a 2007 report to CITES concerning China’s 
trade in Saiga horns (Saiga tatarica), a species listed in CITES Appendix-II and Class-I 
SSP. This report was based on a field survey of 195 pharmacies selected from 12 
trading markets known as local TCM wholesale hubs in seven cities of four provinces.59 
The survey results were truly astounding, not only because of a high percentage (66%, 
122) of pharmacies in all four provinces found selling Saiga horns and derivatives 
without permits, but also because of the prevalence of distorted trading rules held tacitly 
by both the market dealers and regulators that trade in whole Saiga horns is illegal, but 
trade in Saiga horn parts or derivatives is tolerable and acquiescent (Li et al. 2007).  
 
At a Press Conference on 18 February 2013, in answer to the questioning of China as 
the world’s leading consumer for ivory poached from Africa, the Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Hong Lei stated that:  
 
“The Chinese government has consistently attached great importance to the 
protection of wild animals including elephants. It has enacted a series of wildlife-
related laws and regulations and established internal joint law enforcement 
mechanisms to orchestrate efforts from police, customs, and commercial 
department to combat and suppress wildlife-related crimes and offences. The 
government has also actively participated in international law enforcement 
cooperation to crack down on smuggling and trafficking of wild animals and their 
products. China’s efforts have achieved significant progress, as the number of 
smuggling and illegal trade of ivory products has declined remarkably.”60 
 
Nevertheless, the China- and Chinese nationals-related occurrences summed up above 
are clearly critical part of the ground that fuels the growing global concern over China’s 
role in the international illegal wildlife trade. Such incidents have generated significant 
unwanted “negative” impacts on China’s global image. Therefore, it is in China’s 
interest to do something about it if it is concerned with alleviating such global unease. 
 
                                                          
59 These seven cities included Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, and Huizhou in Guangdong Province; 
Lanzhou in Gansu Province; Chengdu in Sichuan Province; Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province. 
60 China Foreign Ministry. Regular Press Conference on 18 February 2013 (in Chinese). 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjdt_611265/fyrbt_611275/t1014544.shtml. 
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3.2.2. PROFILING CHINA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL WILDLIFE 
An effective control of illegal wildlife is built on a better understanding of China’s role 
and function in the global and regional transaction chain of illegal wildlife trade. This 
requires not only a panoramic grasp of the overall illegitimate trade related to China, but 
also an evidence-based understanding of the many detailed facets (e.g., smuggling 
routes, hotspots) associated with the illicit transaction chain which can provide more 
directed and tailored guidance on the design of enforcement interventions.  
 
Existing literature (including both English and Chinese written work) dealing with 
China’s illegal wildlife trade tends to either focus on illicit trade in selected wildlife 
species or products such as ivory (Martin and Stiles 2003; EIA 2007), Saiga antelopes 
(Li et al. 2007), or tiger skins (EIA 2004; Nowell and Xu 2007), or else focus on trade 
in selected localities such as Guangxi (Li et al. 2010), Yunnan (Li and Wang 1999; 
Gong et al. 2012), or the Himalaya region of China side (Li et al. 2000). In more 
common cases, research on China’s wildlife trade adopts a combined focus that studies 
illicit trade of selected species in selected localities, for example, Asian turtle trade in 
Southern China (Cheung and Dudgeon 2006). Currently, there have been no empirical 
studies that analyse illegal trade in China and its territories as a whole, and that consider 
a broad coverage of wildlife species involved in illicit trade.     
 
This section collates and assesses China-related seizures of illegal wildlife trade, reports 
of which were extracted from the TRAFFIC Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions 
(TRAFFIC 1997–2013). TRAFFIC Bulletin is an archive of global media reports on 
wildlife seizures and prosecutions that took place worldwide in the past ten more years. 
Typically, a seizure is made when a shipment of wildlife contraband is detected and 
intercepted by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the quantity of seizures is 
indicative of both the presence and levels of severity of a problem and the endeavour 
and levels of effectiveness by law enforcement authorities to tackle it. Admittedly, 
seizures are imperfect data because they only represent the detected cases and the bulk 
of wildlife trafficking probably proceeds the undetected. However, when aggregated in 
relatively large numbers and triangulated with other information, seizure data are 
capable of providing more penetrating insights into the hidden patterns of black markets 
(UNODC 2016, 28).  
 
In ideal cases, a complete media coverage contains information on the date of the 
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seizure, the country of origin, destination, and transit (if present), the name (common or 
scientific), number or weight of the confiscated, the CITES protection status, the 
methods for conveyance and concealment, the number of suspects detained (or arrested 
or prosecuted), the penalties applied if suspects were convicted and so on. The key 
objective of this analysis is to achieve a comprehensive yet evidence-based 
understanding of China’s profile and function in the global transaction networks of 
illegal wildlife. More specifically, attention has been given to the following critical sub-
issues: (1) the scale and scope of illegal wildlife trade in China and its territories; (2) the 
magnitude and diversity of wildlife species illegally traded to and from China; (3) the 
hotspots, smuggling routes, prevailing modes of transport and concealment associated 
with China’s illegal trade. 
 
Based on the localities where seizures took place, “China-related” is defined to include 
the following three classes of cases. “Class A” refers to seizures occurred within China 
(including its three territories) with evidence indicating that China was the destination 
for the contraband. “Class B” consists of seizures occurred outside China, but evidence 
showed that the involved contraband was ultimately destined for China. “Class C” 
comprises seizures occurred within China, but evidence indicated that the contraband 
was intended for illegal export, or seizures occurred outside China, but evidence 
confirmed that China was the source country for the contraband.  
 
In the course of amassing the database, care was given to screen out the duplicated 
records. For example, the same incidents were reported twice: one was at the time when 
the seizure was made and suspects were arrested, the other was at the time when the 
suspected was convicted.  
 
As such, I have compiled a total of 363 records of China-related seizures, which span 16 
years from March 1997 to April 2013.61 Of the whole, Class A contains 256 records 
(71%), Class B has 89 records (25%), and Class C has 18 records (4%). The uneven 
                                                          
61 Two cases have not been pooled into the database. One case involved undisclosed numbers of Chinese 
nationals being detained on 11 February 2007 at a farm in Camperdown, South Africa for suspected 
implication in abalone (Haliotis) smuggling. From the farm garage, the local authorities recovered 
between 5 and 6 tonnes of abalone. There was no disclosed information showing China was the 
destination for the haul. Another case involved two Chinese tourists reported to be arrested at the Maputo 
International Airport, Mozambique in June 2012 for the possession of 25 kg of ivory in their luggage 
without a permit. The destination of the two Chinese was undisclosed. All Africa News. “Mozambique: 
Two Chinese Nationals Arrested for Ivory Trafficking.”  June 5, 2012. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201206060147.html. 
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proportion among the three classes, with the sum of Class A and Class B constituting 96 
percent of the total seizures, further substantiates the overwhelming role of China as the 
world’s leading consumer market for illegal wildlife than as a supplier. Only a very 
limited number of wildlife species and their products were found in illegal export out of 
China. These mainly included Tibetan antelopes (Pantholops hodgsoni), saker falcons 
(Falco cherrug), Chinese alligators (Alligator sinensis), and TCM-containing 
ingredients of protected flora and fauna such as pangolin scales, musk deer (Moschus), 
seahorses (Hippocampus), orchids (Cymbidium), and costus root (Saussurea cotus). 
 
3.2.2.1. SCALE OF CHINA’S BLACK MARKET FOR WILDLIFE PRODUCTS 
The annual number of recorded seizures varies greatly, from only six in 2003 to 64 in 
2009. No clear directional patterns can be discerned as seizure number increased in 
general during the period between 2000 and 2009, but started to decrease since 2010 
(see Figure 3.1). However, irrespective of the annual variation of seizure number, 
China’s illegal wildlife trade has been clearly enormous in terms of both the diversity of 
species and the volume of wildlife involved.  
 
Figure 3.1: Variation of the annual number of recorded seizures by year (March 1997–April 2013) 
 
 
More than 124 species of wild flora and fauna were traded illegally. Among them, 38 
species involved in 213 seizures were listed on CITES Appendix I; 46 species in 159 
seizures were listed on CITES Appendix II, and four species in two seizures were listed 
on CITES Appendix III. The illicit trade also stretched to a variety of species including, 
for example, sables (Martes zibellina), moose (Alces alces), red squirrels (Sciurus 
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vulgaris), and sugar gliders (Petaurus breviceps), which have not been designated as 
endangered or threatened. Besides, the protection status of seized species was not 
always clear and easy to identify as the taxon of some species was only recorded at the 
level of “Genus” in the taxonomic hierarchy. For example, in one case it was reported 
that “37 raw musk (Moschus spp.) pods” were recovered by customs officials. As 
species under the genus of Moschus spp. include both CITES Appendix I- and II-listed 
depending on the locations of the specimen’s habitats. In such cases, it is often unable to 
identify their accurate protection status under CITES. 62 
 
In total, 363 seizures contributed to the confiscation of over 108,077 animals including 
both live (75,160) and dead (32,917). Reptiles were the largest taxonomic group in 
terms of the total numbers of individuals seized (over 85,379). Although the number of 
seized mammals (15,395) was far smaller than reptiles, mammals and mammal parts and 
derivatives dominated the illegal trade as they comprised 76 percent (276 seizures) of 
all seizures. 
Figure 3.2: Comparison among the major taxonomic groups of seized animals 
 
Note: (1) “others” in this pie chart refers to those that fall outside the five major taxonomic groups 
(mammals, reptiles, birds, amphibians, and fish). In this case, they mainly consist of whale sharks 
(Rhincodon typus), black and stony corals (Antipatharia spp., Scleractinia), brown mussels (Perna, perna) 
and so on. (2) Figures in this chart stand for the number of seized animals, including both live and dead, 
of each taxonomic group. (3) The sum of these figures is smaller than the real total of the seized animals. 
                                                          
62 Under the CITES Appendices, the taxonomic ranks employed to classify fauna include, from low to 
high, species, genus, family, order, class, and phylum. An accurate recording of specific animals in 
seizure should reach to the level of “species”. CITES Secretariat. “Appendices.” 
https://cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php. 
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This is because in a number of cases seized animals were recorded in unconvertible units like “seven 
truckloads” or no records provided at all as to the number or weight. 
 
3.2.2.2. HIGH-PROFILE SPECIES INVOLVED IN CHINA’S ILLEGAL TRADE 
Of the high-profile species and derivatives illicitly traded to China, bears (paws, gall 
bladders), leopards and tigers (pelts, bones), ivory, rhino horns, pangolins (live, meat, 
scales), lizards, snakes, turtles and tortoises are on the list. Moreover, pangolins, ivory, 
bear paws, snakes, lizards, turtles and tortoises were often traded on a substantially 
massive scale. For example, a total of more than 12,227 live and dead pangolins plus 
96,820 kg of pangolin meat and 12,512 kg of pangolin scales were recovered from 77 
seizures over the 16 years studied. Some 100 seizures involved the forfeiture of around 
62,723 kg of ivory tusks and products (e.g., bangles, beads, bracelets, carvings, 
chopsticks, sculptures, seals) by enforcement authorities within and outside China. 
Using the estimate of average tusk weight of 3.95 kg (Rosen and Smith 2010, 26), the 
impounded ivory represents harvesting from 7,939 elephants. In addition, some 3,949 
bear paws, most from the Siberian brown bears (Ursus arctos) and few from Asiatic 
black bears (Ursus thibetanus), were netted from 33 seizures. In reptile taxa, some 68 
seizures led to a total haul of 55,650 snakes, 11,353 lizards, and 28,871 turtles and 
tortoises (including both live and dead).  
 
For Asian big cats, pelts and bones of tigers and leopards were most commonly seen in 
seizures. In total, some 78 tiger skins and 517.4 kg of tiger bones as well as 837 leopard 
skins were documented in 42 seizures. Although the scale of illicit trade in Asian big 
cats was not comparable with that of other high-profile mammals, existing scale was 
still shockingly large when considering their remaining small population size in the 
world.63 Other less well-known mammal species – for example, slow lorises (Nycticebus 
coucang), crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis), rhesus macaques (Macaca 
mulatta), ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), and sables – were also occasionally traded 
on a small scale. 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 According to the latest data, only around 3,890 tigers now exist in the world, a marked increase 
compared to the figure of 3,200 estimated in 2010. World Wildlife Fund (WWF). “For the First Time in 
100 Years, Tiger Numbers are Growing.” April 10, 2016. http://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/for-the-
first-time-in-100-years-tiger-numbers-are-growing.  
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Table 3.3: High-profile species and derivatives involved in China-related illegal trade during 1997–2013 
 
Species and 
derivatives 
Major indicators Supplement indicators 
Number of 
seizures 
Pangolins 
 
12,227 individuals (both live or 
dead); 96,820 kg meat; 12,512 kg 
scales 
– –  77 
Ivory 62,723 kg ivory tusks and products 
1,150 pieces of ivory tusk 
and 2517 ivory products or 
items 
100 
Rhino horns 
113 rhino horns plus 11.26 kg rhino 
horn 
0.53 kg rhino horn products 17 
Bears 3,949 paws, 
27 bear gall bladders; 1 bear 
penis; 1 bear skin; 5 bear 
carcases; 18 live bear cubs 
33 
Tigers 78 skins; 517.35 kg bones 
543 pieces of tiger bones; 6 
skulls; 4 paws; 7 carcases 
23 
Leopards 837 pelts 
17 leopards (dead and live); 7 
skeletons, 3 heads 
19 
Snakes 55,650 individuals (live and dead) 
1,087 kg snake meat; 557 
snake scales The three 
reptile taxa 
consist of 68 
seizures 
Lizards 11,353 individuals (live and dead) 22.6 kg lizard meat 
Turtles and 
tortoises 
28,871 individuals (live and dead) 
4,433 kg turtles and tortoises; 
556 kg turtle scales 
 
Shipment size varied tremendously, ranging from tiny numbers or little weight to 
thousands of individuals or tens of tonnes involved in just a single seizure. In particular, 
mammals and mammal derivatives (e.g., pangolins, ivory) and reptiles were most likely 
involved in bulk smuggling. For example, on 13 July 2010, Guangdong Customs foiled 
an attempt of cross-border smuggling to China of an enormous amount of pangolins. 
More than 7.8 tonnes of frozen pangolins (2,090 individuals) and 1.8 tonnes of pangolin 
scales were seized from a fishing vessel headed to Zhuhai, Guangdong Province.64 The 
biggest China-related seizure of ivory took place in Westports, Malaysia in December 
2012 when local customs intercepted some 1,500 ivory tusks weighing over 24 tonnes 
                                                          
64 TRAFFIC. “Huge Pangolin Seizure in China.” July 13, 2010. 
http://www.traffic.org/home/2010/7/13/huge-pangolin-seizure-in-china.html. 
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from a shipment arriving from Togo en route to Malaysia for China. 65 The largest 
China-related reptile seizure was made in February 2008 by Shantou Customs in 
Guangdong Province: some 5,776 monitor lizards (Varanus), 1,170 cobras, 260 
Malaysian box turtles (Cuora amboinensis), and 370 giant Asian pond turtles 
(Heosemys grandis) were recovered from a vessel and a pick-up lorry.66  
 
Large-scale seizures often have decisive implications for the total haul. In ivory seizures, 
for example, some 20 large-scale ivory seizures had been recorded, with confiscated 
ivory involved in each seizure exceeding 500 kg. These 20 seizures, although only 
accounting for 20 percent of the total ivory seizures, constituted nearly 95 percent 
(59,416 kg) of the total ivory haul. As discussed early in this chapter, large-scale 
seizures are often a strong indicator for the organised elements in illegal wildlife trade. 
In this case, the sheer size of illicit ivory involved in individual shipments clearly 
suggests the devastating role played by professional and well-organised criminal 
networks in trafficking ivory from the source countries to China.   
 
3.2.2.3. METHODS FOR SMUGGLING AND CONCEALMENT 
A variety of methods has been employed in smuggling practices to conceal illegal goods 
and evade border inspection. In small-scale and tourist trafficking, aeroplane, ferries, 
cross-border commuting coaches, and trains were often utilised as transport vehicles. 
Small wildlife products were wrapped in clothing and packed in carry-on luggage, or 
bound to the passengers’ bodies with elastics and tapes, or hidden in passengers’ 
custom-designed clothing including vests and underwear with secret pockets. In some 
cases, illegal sellers deliberately provided buyers with special designs like belts with 
secret room for containing illicit goods as a trick to promote their business. International 
express services were sporadically used for smuggling in and out of China, with wildlife 
being packed in parcels and mislabelled as gifts, toys, or food.  
 
For bulk shipment, trucks were usually seen in land transport. Wildlife products were 
packed in crates, cartons, and sacks and were mixed with legal or similar looking 
                                                          
65 The Star Online. “Customs Seize 1,500 Elephant Tusks worth RM60mil.” December 11, 2012. 
http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=%2f2012%2f12%2f11%2fnation%2f20121211191659&sec=
nation. 
66 China General Administration of Customs (GAC). “Shantou Customs Seized Large Quantities of Live 
Wild Animals” (in Chinese). March 5, 2008. 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab506/info104998.htm. 
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commodities, or hidden in secret spaces like lorry tyres or under heavy materials like 
scrap metals or in secret purpose-built compartments like extra-built containers of oil 
tank outlook. Contraband was deliberately left unattended in public transport until 
arrival at the final destination. Unwitting drivers were hired to escort the illegal 
shipment through enforcement checkpoints. In a few cases, trucks with forged military 
or police registration number plates were used to ease the inspection intensity. There 
were also a number of cases in which contraband was transported openly across the 
border without any special effort at concealment.  
 
Containerised cargo by air or sea was often used in large-scale, long-distance smuggling. 
Misdeclaration was used in collusion with faked or expired documentation. CITES 
Appendix-listed species were falsely declared as non-CITES listed species, and wild-
caught specimens were misdeclared as captive-bred specimens. To decrease the risk of 
detection, officials working at airports, customs, border checkpoints, and post offices 
were sometimes bribed in exchange for green passage (nothing to declare). Speedboats 
were used in short-distance delivery to transport illegal wildlife from container 
transhipment terminals to nearby destinations, for example, from Hong Kong to 
neighbouring mainland coastal cities such as Guangzhou or Zhuhai. 
 
Modes of transport and concealment change over time, usually as an adaptive response 
by illegal traders to enforcement interventions, for example, avoiding using vehicles for 
smuggling that have been evaluated by local authorities as prioritised targets for random 
inspection. As noted in an early study of China’s saker falcons smuggling, foreign 
trappers and smugglers shifted their means of transportation from aeroplanes and trains 
to taxis for crossing the Chinese borders, which directly resulted in the increase in 
difficulty for detection by law enforcement (Ming, 2004).  
 
Pangolins, birds, and reptiles were often trafficked alive, but with many perishing 
during transit due to the poor conditions. In one case, Malaysian authorities seized over 
900 crab-eating macaques which were believed to be destined as food in China or for 
laboratories in the Netherlands. Some monkeys were so hungry that they started to eat 
their new-born offspring and hurt each other in desperation.67 In another case of live 
pangolin trafficking, smugglers used sedatives to tranquilise pangolins before they 
                                                          
67 Reuters. “Malaysia Seizes 900 Monkeys from Poachers.” July 9, 2007. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/07/09/uk-malaysia-monkeys-idUKKLR30398920070709. 
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walked them through the checkpoints at the train station. Even more reprehensibly, they 
used a high-pressure jet to stuff live pangolins with water so that the extra weight can be 
added to the pangolins and additional profits can be made when sold to the buyers. 
Some of the point-noised animals were so full of water that they could not survive even 
when rescued.68 
 
3.2.2.4. SMUGGLING ROUTES AND HOTSPOTS 
As seen from the above statistics, China is surely one of the world’s leading consumers 
for a large share of illegal wildlife sourced from around the globe. Despite the 
distinctions in the variety of wildlife in supply, seizure data offer strong evidence that 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, DR Congo, 
Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania in Africa, and India and the Russian Far East are 
specifically outstanding suppliers for China of a broad diversity of wild animals and 
products. While ivory tusks and rhino horns dominate the illegal export of wildlife from 
Africa to China, Southeast Asia and the Russian Far East provide a more diverse 
spectrum of wildlife spanning over many specimens under the taxa of mammal and 
reptile and their derivatives and products. 
 
Figure 3.3: China’s major suppliers of illegal wildlife (based on the seizure numbers) 
 
Note: Only half of the total seizure records provide information on the country of origin for the wildlife 
involved. 
 
                                                          
68 Xinhua News. “The Nationwide Largest Wildlife Smuggling Ring were Smashed” (in Chinese). April 
25, 2006. http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/25/content_6841503.htm. 
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After wildlife being collected from the wild, a variety of routes is being used to funnel 
them into China. While Hong Kong continues to be the most important point of 
entrance for wildlife being smuggled by sea into mainland China, terrestrial border 
areas of China are also evidently a point of vulnerability for transnational wildlife 
trafficking. Every direction of China’s border areas – from the northeast (Heilongjiang 
Jilin) and north (Inner Mongolia), to the west (Xinjiang), and to the southwest (Tibet) 
and south (Yunnan, Guangxi) – all have reported seizures involving large volumes of 
illegal wildlife. Again, although these seizures only stand for the failed trafficking 
attempts, they imply much more about behind the scene a sizable scale of illegal 
wildlife trade going on regularly and successfully.  
 
a. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 
Hong Kong serves as a significant transhipment point through which vast amounts of 
wildlife illegally harvested in Southeast Asia and Africa enter mainland China. Overall, 
47 Hong Kong-related seizures of illegally imported or exported wildlife have been 
extracted from the TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013. Among them, 28 records containing 
explicit information regarding the destination for the seized wildlife showed that 
mainland China was the intended end-use market. Source countries involved in this line 
of trafficking mainly concentrate in Southeast Asia and Africa, with Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines constituting the leading suppliers of lizards, 
pangolins, snakes, and turtles and tortoises, and Cameron, Kenya, South Africa, and 
Tanzania comprising the major suppliers of ivory and rhino horns.69  
 
Another publicly accessible source of data on seizures of illegal wildlife made by Hong 
Kong is the biennial reports submitted by Hong Kong Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Conservation Department to the CITES Secretariat during 2003–2010, with 2010 being 
the latest data at the time of writing.70 Biennial reports only contain numeric figures for 
seizures of illegal exports, imports, and possessions, without providing detailed 
information on the content of the seized or the source countries for the imported and the 
destination markets for the exported. As shown in Figure 3.4, import-related seizures 
accounted for the largest share of total seizures. But considering the realities concerning 
                                                          
69 Since international commercial trade in ivory was banned in 1989, global seizures of illegal ivory 
peaked in 2002, 2006, and 2009. While in the 2006 peak, some 2,600 kg of seized ivory in Hong Kong 
and 5,200 kg in Taiwan were substantiated by the DNA test to be originated from Selous (Southern 
Tanzania) and Niassa (Northern Mozambique) (Wasser et al. 2010).  
70 Hong Kong SAR. “Biennial Reports.” http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/reports/biennial.php. 
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Hong Kong’s role as one of the world’s busiest container ports and its limited wildlife 
consumption capability (Seabrooke et al. 2003), it is reasonable to speculate that the 
illegal wildlife involved in many of these import-oriented seizures was likely for re-
export to mainland China. Accordingly, the main reason that illegal dealers choose to 
transit through Hong Kong is likely to be for the expected lower rate of inspection, 
because the huge volumes of daily cargo throughput that Hong Kong has to handle 
make its over-stretched customs authorities unable to police every shipment. 
 
Figure 3.4: Seizures of illegal wildlife trade made by Hong Kong authorities during 2003–2010 
 
 
After illegal wildlife arrives in Hong Kong, high-power speedboats are often used in 
transferring the goods from Hong Kong’s container terminals (e.g., Kwai Chung 
container terminal) to several key coastal cities in mainland China, including Chaoyang, 
Shenzhen, Shekou, and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Beihai and Fangchenggang in 
Guangxi Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. Owing to the fact that wildlife is 
being transported mostly by sea via containerized cargo and few by air cargo, large-
scale seizures most likely take place along this line of trafficking. As noted early in this 
chapter, since 2010 the Hong Kong Customs officials have intercepted ten significant 
seizures of ivory products, with each haul weighing over 500 kg. In effect, Hong Kong 
has been in the past years the most important transit point for smuggled ivory sourced in 
Africa en route to mainland China. This can be verified by another piece of evidence: 
the statistics released by the MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) and 
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ETIS about the volumes of seized ivory between 1989 and 2011,71 mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan were all high on the top-ten list (see Figure 3.5).72  
 
Figure 3.5: Top ten countries by the amount of seized ivory during 1989–2011 (kg) 
 
 
As mainland China has surpassed Japan and Hong Kong to become the dominant ivory 
manufacturing centre in the Asia-Pacific (Martin and Vigne 2011), it is expected that 
Hong Kong’s role as the transit route will perpetuate into the foreseeable future. Large 
quantities of smuggled ivory from Africa will likely continue to be transported by sea 
via Hong Kong into the Mainland China, processed and crafted there, and re-exported 
through Hong Kong again to Europe, Japan, North America, Singapore, and Thailand 
(Milliken et al. 2009). 
 
Macau’s role as a transit point for illegal wildlife to be channelled in or out of mainland 
China is not empirically conspicuous. While there are no records of wildlife seizures in 
Macau that can be found in the TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013, I collected one media 
report on Macau-related ivory seizure from the Timeline of China and the (Illegal) Ivory 
Trade 2008–2011, a collection of online news on ivory trade released by the 
                                                          
71 MIKE is an international collaboration established in pursuance of the resolution made at the 10th 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in 1997. Its overall goal is to record the illegal killing 
of elephants, to provide information needed for elephant range states to make appropriate management 
and enforcement decisions, and to build capacity within the range States for the long-term management of 
the elephant populations. CITES Secretariat. “Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE).” 
https://cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php. 
72 African Conservation Foundation and EIA. “Elephant Poaching: Vanishing Giants, Facts about 
Elephant Poaching and the Ivory Trade.” Factsheet. 
http://www.africanconservation.org/images/files/Elephant_Poaching_Brochure.pdf. 
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environmental NGO “Save the Elephant”.73 The Macau Daily Times reported that on 16 
October 2010, in a joint operation with Guangdong Border Defence Bureau, the Macau 
Customs busted the biggest ivory smuggling case since 1999. Around one tonne of 
ivory tusks and crafted ivory contained in nylon bags and wooden crates were recovered 
on the shoreline of Hac Sá Beach, Macau, where the goods were believed to be awaiting 
transhipment by speedboats to mainland China.74 
 
The biennial reports provided by Macau Economic Services to CITES Secretariat 
confirm that wildlife seizures in Macau have been restricted in scale in the past eight 
years. During 2003–2010, there was only a total of 200 wildlife seizures made by 
Macau authorities (see Figure 3.6). The declining pattern in the number of seizures by 
year is visible, down from 112 in 2003–04 to only 12 in 2009–10. Interesting is that all 
seizures documented in the biennial reports have been written as illegal imports as they 
violated “the requirement of prior authorisation”, not a single seizure being recorded 
under the heading of “illegal export” or “illegal possession”.75 In addition, the 2009–10 
report indicated that the weight of the confiscated ivory tusks and products between 
2009 and 2010 was only 230 kg. Clearly, the ivory seizure in October 2010 mentioned 
above was, for unknown reasons, not included in the biennial report to the CITES 
Secretariat.     
 
Figure 3.6: Seizures of illegal wildlife made by Macau authorities during 2003–2010 
 
                                                          
73 Save the Elephant. “Timeline of China and the (Illegal) Ivory Trade 2008–2011.” 
http://www.saveafricananimals.org/attachments/article/111/china-ivory-timeline.pdf. 
74 Macau Daily News, “Ivory Smuggling Busted at Hac Sá Beach, Macau.” October 18, 2010. 
http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/18088-Ivory-smuggling-busted-Hac-Beach.html. 
75 Again, no information on the source countries of the illegal imports was provided in the biennial 
reports. Macau SAR. “Biennial Report.” https://cites.org/eng/resources/reports/biennial.php.  
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Taiwan, based on seizure statistics, appears to be more of a consumer than an 
intermediate point for illegal wildlife transiting to mainland China. In total, some 42 
anecdotal reports on wildlife seizures made in Taiwan during 1996–2013 have been 
drawn out from the TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013. Illegal imports made up the 
dominant share of total seizures, with some 34 (81%) seizures containing destination 
information clearly pointing out that Taiwan was the intended end-use market. Only a 
handful of cases (4) involved illegal wildlife seized in Taiwan were bound for Hong 
Kong or Manila. 76  On the taxonomic composition of seized wildlife, reptiles and 
mammals and mammal derivatives constituted the most traded, then followed by the 
trade of limited scale in amphibians, birds, fish, and plants.  
 
Illegal trade in turtles and tortoises and their derivatives – with live turtles and tortoises 
being used as pet and food and chelonian shells being consumed as an ingredient for 
TCM – represents a significant proportion of Taiwan’s black market for wildlife. 
Despite the size of confiscated turtles and tortoises recorded in the database being 
incomprehensive (only 1,823 turtles and tortoises (live and dead) recovered from 15 
seizures), existing studies on Taiwan’s TCM market suggest that imports of turtle shells 
for TCM use have been vast in trade volume terms. Based on Taiwan Customs trade 
statistics, Chen et al. (2009) reported that during 1999–2008, Taiwan imported a total of 
1,989 tonnes of shells of hard-shelled chelonians from mainland China, Cambodia, and 
Indonesia and 290 tonnes of shells of soft-shell turtles from mainland China. Trade 
volumes of turtle shells for TCM in Taiwan fluctuated substantially, with the import of 
shells of soft- and hard-shell turtles and tortoises surging to its ten-year-peak in 2002 
(346,396 kg) and dropping by year gradually to 177,201 kg in 2008. However, after 
many of the common species traded in Taiwan TCM market were added to CITES 
Appendix II between 2002 and 2005, the trade volumes – including trade in CITES 
protected species like Malayan box turtle (Cuora amboinensis), Malayan snail-eating 
turtle (Malayemys subtrijuga) and black marsh turtle (Siebenrockiella crassicollis) – 
still maintained a very high level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 The remaining four seizures did not contain information about destination countries. However, it is 
surprising that there was not a single seizure involving mainland China as the destination for the seized 
wildlife. 
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b. Sino (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia)–Russia 
Illegal trade in animal parts is widespread along the Sino-Russia borders. Bear paws and 
gall bladders, frogs, tiger bones and pelts, deer musk, and the genitals of spotted deer, 
which are valued by Chinese for their medicinal, aphrodisiac, decorative, and ritual dish 
qualities, are smuggled into China on a daily basis.77  
 
Along this line of trafficking, several Russian border parts including Primorsky Kray, 
Amur Oblast and their contiguous counterparts at the China side were identified by this 
analysis as being used intensively as channels for border crossings. Through Primorsky 
Kray, smugglers use trucks and jeeps to transport wildlife poached in the Russian Far 
East to Dongling in Heilongjiang Province and Hunchun in Jilin Province. During 
2002–2008, the Russian authorities made at least five China-related seizures in several 
localities including Leninskoye, Khorol settlement, Pogranichny, and Polyavka in 
Primorsky Kray. Among the five seizures, four were of substantially large-scale, 
leading to the interception of a large batch of protected animal parts including bear paws, 
tiger skins, Saiga horns and other mammal furs. On 19 March 2004, customs officers at 
Poltavka, Primorsky Kray seized what was reported to be the largest haul of poached 
animal parts in Russia over the past decade.78 Included in the haul were 768 bear paws 
(believed to be from the Himalayan black bear, Ursus thibetanus), 24 bear gall bladders, 
5,500 fur skins,79 280 musk deer pods, 64 deer penises, 142 deer antlers, 338 kg of sea 
cucumber (Stichopus japonicus), and 49 kg of frog fat (estimated to be from 100,000 
frogs). The involvement in the smuggling of vast amounts of a wide portfolio of animal 
parts as well as the arrest of the Chinese driver escorting the shipment within Russian 
territory might reveal that Chinese organised smuggling rackets have stretched their 
reach into the source countries. Moreover, it may also reflect a specific trafficking tactic: 
using vehicles to move large volumes of wildlife at one time to reduce the transport cost 
on the one hand, while hiring unwitting drivers to downsize the risk of detection on the 
other.  
 
Amur Oblast, another Russian border territory adjoining Heilongjiang Province of 
China, is also a primary conduit for wildlife entering China’s underground markets. On 
                                                          
77 New York Times. “At Russia-China Border, Bear Paws Sell Best.” June 30, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/asia/30animals.html?_r=0. 
78 WWF. “Russian Far East, More Smugglers Caught in Primorsky.” April 16, 2010. 
http://www.wwf.ru/resources/news/article/eng/6448. 
79 Fur skins were derived from Siberian Weasels (Mustela sibirica), Sables, Raccoon Dogs (Nyctereutes 
procyonoides), Red Foxes (Vulpes vulpes), and Red Squirrels (Sciurus vulgaris). 
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15 July 2010, Amur Customs foiled an attempt to smuggle by road from Russia to 
China 6.7 tonnes of animal furs from Muskrats (Ondatra zibethicus), weasels (Mustela), 
and sables.80 Blagoveshchensk in Amur Oblast, a border city opposite to the Chinese 
town of Heihe, has been reported as a hotspot for wildlife trade and smuggling. With its 
location at the confluence of Heilongjiang River and the Zeya River in China’s 
Northeast, it is reputed that in Blagoveshchensk, bear meat-made dumplings, must deer 
venison, and wild boar are openly displayed behind frosted glass for sale at local meat 
markets. Usually a casual inquiry at a butcher counter or dialling the phone number 
advertised on the bulletin board at the marketplace would find the way to illegal wildlife 
dealers.81    
 
Aside from the smuggling routes between Amur Oblast and Heilongjiang and between 
Primorsky Kray and Jilin, Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is also a 
reported entry point for illegal wildlife from Russia to China. During the period from 
2007 to 2012, at least four seizures involving smuggling by trains or trucks from Russia 
to China of bear paws, tiger bones, and sables had been made by law enforcement 
agencies in Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia. On 22 May 2013, the biggest seizure of 
smuggled bear paws ever made by Chinese customs occurred in Manzhouli, where local 
customs intercepted 213 bear paws hidden in five tyres (plus a spare tyre) of a minibus 
together with the arrest of two smugglers of Russian national. An officer working at the 
Manzhouli Customs disclosed that he and his colleagues had witnessed several similar 
attempts of smuggling a small number of bear paws via Manzhouli into China during 
winter and early spring. However, it was unusual both to see a single shipment 
involving such a large quantity and to see it being carried out in the summer time, since 
the hot weather is unfavourable for keeping the paws fresh during transport.82 
 
c. Sino (Xinjiang)–Kazakhstan 
The number of recorded anecdotal reports on China-related wildlife seizures occurred in 
border areas straddling Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Kazakhstan was 
limited. Only five seizures were extracted from the TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013. 
While three out of the five involved poaching of local protected animals including snow 
                                                          
80 Rianovosti News. “Russian Customs Agents Seize 6 tonnes of Luxury Furs at China Border.” July 16, 
2010. http://en.ria.ru/russia/20100716/159834014.html. 
81 New York Times. “At Russia-China Border, Bear paws Sell Best.” June 30, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/asia/30animals.html?_r=0 
82 Tencent News. “Inner Mongolia Intercepted the Largest Smuggling of Bear Paws” (in Chinese). May 
17, 2013. http://news.qq.com/a/20130617/015041.htm. 
 120 
 
leopards, sables, and red deers, only the other two documented transnational smuggling 
of Saiga horns from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. For example, on 30 March 2012, during a 
routine check at Jimunai Port bordering Kazakhstan, Altay Customs recovered 876 (163 
kg) horns of Saiga antelope from a China-registered international coach plying between 
Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. 83  These horns were concealed in an extra purpose-built 
container of oil tank outlook within the luggage compartment. It is worth noting that 
there was no report on arrests. This probably suggests another tactic used by smugglers 
to decrease the risk of detection: leaving the contraband unattended intentionally during 
transport but collecting at the final stop.   
 
Despite the limited number of records of cross-border illegal wildlife trade, existing 
literature indicates that Xinjiang remains a significant avenue for Saiga horns – a 
signature commodity to this line of trafficking which is highly valued in TCM in China 
– being smuggled from Central Asia into China (Li et al. 2007). According to CITES 
data on import and export of Saiga horns during the period 1995–2004, while 
Kazakhstan and Russia stood as the world’s two largest exporters, China was the 
world’s biggest importer and Hong Kong was a prominent hub importing unprocessed 
Saiga horns mainly from Singapore and Malaysia and re-exporting Saiga horn products 
(e.g., TCM, ribbons, healthcare products) to Singapore and Japan (Meibom et al. 2010).  
 
At the 59th Meeting of the Standing Committee of CITES in Doha, Qatar 2010, concern 
was raised that “China seems to have continued to import large quantities of Saiga horn 
from Kazakhstan after the recommended trade suspension” (CITES Secretariat 2010, 
25). During 1999–2007, the anti-smuggling department under the Urumqi Customs in 
Xinjiang documented an accumulation of 5,386 kg of seized Saiga horns (Saiga 
Conversation Alliance 2009, 6). No further information was provided on the possible 
source of these horns. However, given the fact that since 2004 the range States of Saiga 
antelopes have banned the commercial trade in Saiga horns, and China has no wild 
Saiga antelopes living within its borders, so the likely sources for these seized horns 
were illegal imports from the range states in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
  
 
                                                          
83 China News. “Xinjiang Crack Down on Smuggling of Large Quantities of Animal Parts” (in Chinese). 
April 1, 2012. http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2012/04-01/3793429.shtml. 
121 
 
d. Sino (Tibet)–Nepal–India 
The India-Nepal-Tibet line represents a relatively well-investigated route for the 
international illegal trade of Asian big cats. Animal parts and products of tiger, leopard 
and other endangered big cats have been poached mostly in India and smuggled 
overland via Nepal into Tibet, China (EIA 2004, 2009; UNODC 2010; Raza et al. 2012). 
Table 3.4 is an extraction from the TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013 of China-related 
seizures occurred in India, Nepal, and Tibet during the said period. In total, 15 seizures 
involving smuggling wildlife products via Nepal in or out of China have been recorded. 
Among them, four took place in India, nine in Nepal and two in Tibet. Tiger skins and 
bones, leopard skins, otter skins, shahtoosh shawl,84 and wool of Tibetan antelopes were 
the most frequently traded goods in the trans-Himalayan area. The first four items are 
often being smuggled into China and the last one the Tibetan antelope wool being 
smuggled out of China into India for the making of shahtoosh shawls. Besides, a 
number of less commonly traded commodities like pangolin scales, rhino horns, and 
ivory products were also observed in several seizures. 
 
From the source to end-use market, animal parts and products go through a number of 
staging points and a transnational relaying chain of couriers before their ultimate arrival. 
At the starting point, India acts as the primary source along this transaction chain. By 
holding 70 percent of the world’s tiger population,85 India is naturally the chief target 
for illegal skin traders. Several seizure records containing information on the origin of 
the confiscated wildlife identified India as the source country. Tigers and other Asian 
big cats were poached from India’s major conservation spots like the Sariska National 
Park and Kaziranga National Park which owe a high tiger population in India. In 
October 2003, officials at a police checkpoint in Sangsang, Rikaze (Tibet) intercepted a 
large consignment of animal furs which included 31 tiger skins, 581 leopard skins, and 
778 otter skins stowed under sacks of wool and loaded on a truck heading for Lhasa.86 
The skins born several bullet holes and the newspapers used to wrap the skins were 
                                                          
84 Shahtoosh, also known as “Chiru wool”, “the King of wool”, or “ring shawls”, is the down hair of the 
endangered Tibetan antelope which can only be obtained by killing the animal. WWF. “Biggest Ever 
Seizure of Shahtoosh in Nepal.” January 11, 2013. http://www.wwfnepal.org/?207229/Biggest-ever-
seizure-of-Shahtoosh-in-Nepal. 
85 According to Indian Environment Minister Prakash Javadekar, the latest estimate of the number of 
tigers in India is around 2,500 in 2016. The Indian Express. “India Now Has 70 Percent of World’s Tiger 
Population.” April 13, 2016. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/tiger-population-in-
india-prakash-javadekar-narendra-modi/. 
86 Sina News. “Tibetan Authorities Confiscated One Thousand Skins of Tiger, Leopard, and Otter” (in 
Chinese). February 14, 2004. http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2004-02-14/09061798098s.shtml. 
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found printed in an Indian language. These tips suggested that this batch of skins was 
highly likely sourced from poached animals in India. In addition, the coordinated field 
trips of EIA and WPSI (Wildlife Protection Society of India) to many major and remote 
markets in Tibet during 2004–2006 substantiated with the statement of local illegal 
traders that “all the tiger skins and most of the leopard skins” available on Tibetan 
market were sourced from India (EIA and WPSI 2006, 4). 
 
On 6 April 2005, the New Delhi police seized 45 leopard skins and 14 otter skins from 
two Indians and one Nepalese who were acting as couriers delivering the goods to 
Nepal. Marks in Tibetan script were found on the surface of the skins, indicating that 
these items were pre-selected.87 The confession of the arrests confirmed that Tibetan 
buyers stationed in Nepal travelled to India and purchased illegal skins from local 
organised criminal rackets specialised in procuring and processing animal parts. They 
checked and selected the goods for quality, signed or marked the skins in a unique way 
that was hard to be tampered with. After that, they barely took the risk of moving the 
goods themselves, but instead hired experienced local couriers to handle the storage 
issue and transport the items to designated destinations. As a result, despite there were 
some chance seizures with the arrests of Nepalese and Tibetan individuals in India, 
Nepal, and Tibet, most of those arrested tended to be the couriers, tanners, and 
middlemen (EIA, 2004). There have been very few cases of successful bust of the so-
called “big fish” (relatively high level individuals in the transitional smuggling 
networks). Such big fish actually remains as the main force that control and perpetuate 
the cross-border trafficking and illegal trade. 
 
Nepal shares an extended stretch of international borders with both India and Tibet. 
Porous border lines and widespread mountainous terrain in the Himalayan region make 
monitoring and control of border crossings a challenge, while position Nepal to be a 
geographically well-suited transit route for wildlife trafficking between India and China. 
Several China-related seizures made by Nepali authorities indicated that a number of 
Nepali districts – including Kathmandu, Surkhet, Sindupalchok (bordering Nyalam in 
Tibet), Rasuwa (bordering Gyirong in Tibet), and Gandaki (bordering Zhongba and 
Gyirong in Tibet) – were heavily used by smugglers as staging points for the 
transhipment of animal parts originated in India to Tibet.  
                                                          
87 Indian Jungles. “International Gang of Smugglers of Wildlife Trophies Busted.” April 7, 2005. 
http://www.indianjungles.com/160405d.htm. 
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Table 3.4: China-related wildlife seizures occurred in Nepal, India, and Tibet during 1997–2013 
Date Seizure location 
Intended 
destination 
Seized 
6-Nov.-97 
Meghalaya, Assam, 
India 
Via Myanmar to 
mainland China 
113 kg of ivory, a piece of tiger skin measuring 9 feet, 
13.5 kg of tiger bones, 4 pieces of leopard skins, 13 
pieces of river Otter skins, 20 kg of Pangolin scales 
8-Oct.-03 
Sangsang, Ngamring, 
Tibet 
Tibet  31 tiger skins, 581 leopard skins and 778 otter skins 
6-Apr.-05 Delhi, India 
Via Nepal to 
China 
45 leopard skins, 14 otter skins 
5-Jun.-07 Kathmandu, India India 
Illegal sale of 19 pieces of shahtoosh shawls (made of 
Tibetan antelope furs) 
4 -Jan.-08 
Surkhet District, Mid-
Western Region, Nepal 
Tibet 
1 tiger skins, 125 pieces of tiger bones, 22 dried meat 
pieces  
6-Jan.-08 Rasuwa, Nepal Tibet 
5 full size tiger skins, 113 kg of tiger bones, 37 leopard 
skins, 238 otter skins 
23-May-10 Quxu, Lhasa, Tibet 
Via Zanda, 
Ngari, Tibet into 
India 
101.65 kg of wool of Tibetan Antelope 
4-Jun.-10 
Guwahati Airport, 
Assam, India 
Mainland China 2 Bengal tiger skeletons, 600 kg of pangolin scales 
8-Aug.-10 
Nilopul district, 
Kathmandu, Nepal 
Mainland China 1 rhino horn (1.278 kg), 2 bear gall bladders (396 kg) 
22-May-10 
Barhabese checkpoint, 
Sindupalchok, Nepal 
Tibet 46 kg of pangolin scales 
25-Jun.-12 
Khokundol Bazaar, 
Sindupalchok, Nepal 
Tibet 40 kg of pangolin scales 
13-Oct.-12 
Lamosangu checkpoint, 
Sindupalchok, Nepal 
Tibet 37.8 kg of pangolin scales 
11-Jan.-13 
Manaslu Conservation 
Area, Western Region, 
Nepal 
Tibet 4 tiger skins, 53 kg of tiger bones 
12-Jan.-13 
Manaslu Conservation 
Area, Western Region, 
Nepal 
Tibet 5 tiger skins, 114 kg of tiger bones 
6-Jan.-13 
Gorkha, Western 
Region, Nepal 
Unknown Over 1,000 kg of shahtoosh 
(Source: TRAFFIC Bulletin 1997–2013) 
 
Illegal wildlife goods were firstly trafficked to Nepal-Tibet border wildness. Soon 
thereafter, these smuggled items were divided into several batches as a tactic to avoid 
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“putting all eggs in one basket”. Seasoned porters were paid a high price for trekking 
with the goods through the mountain passes into Tibet. EIA investigation revealed that 
the price in 2010 was CN¥9,000 (or US$1,300) for each trip (EIA 2009, 6). In 
September 2005, Nepali Army personnel at Langtang National Park seized a shipment 
of five full tiger skins, 113 kg of tiger bones, 37 leopard skins, and 237 otter skins from 
a lorry heading toward Syphru Bensi, Rasuwa district. From there, the contraband was 
reported to be carried across borders to Tibet by porters owing to the lack of passable 
roads for vehicles. Along with the seizures was the detention of two Nepalese and one 
Tibetan conveying the shipment. Wildlife Conservation Nepal (WCN) uncovered from 
the admission of one of the arrests that the owner of the consignment was Tashi Tsering, 
a notorious international trader alleged to be camouflaged within the Tibetan 
community in Nepal and implicated in a string of criminal activities involving 
transporting animal parts and products of tiger and leopard from India and selling in 
China (WCN 2005, 1). 
 
Tibetan market demand for parts of Asian big cats remains the key driving force for the 
trans-Himalayan wildlife trade. Tiger and leopard bones are used in TCM with the latter 
sometimes being prescribed as the substitute for the former (Raza et al. 2012, 7). Pelts 
of tiger, leopard, and otter are consumed by Tibetan minority, either being cut up into 
trims or making materials for the traditional costumes “chupas”, or being sold as a 
single whole to foreign and Chinese Han tourists who prize pelts as prestigious gifts, 
taxidermy, or home decorations (e.g., rugs, wall hangings, sofa coverings). There have 
been signs that the pelt market in Tibet is shifting toward the demand for whole skins as 
decorative use in homes among an assortment of consumers including European tourists, 
military stationed in Tibet, local government officials, and wealthy Chinese from 
Beijing, Chengdu, Taiwan, and Hong Kong who are willing to pay exorbitant sums for 
the luxuries (EIA 2004; EIA and WPSI 2006).  
 
Wildlife products enter Tibet via several border entry points including Gyirong, Mount 
Kailash, Ngari, Yadong, and Zhangmu. In addition to employing porters to haul animal 
parts through mountain passes, wildlife products were also smuggled into Tibet via 
official border checkpoints, with the intensive effort given to concealment such as 
sandwiching contraband in cargo, packed in sealed trucks, or hiding in passenger 
luggage like sleeping bags.  
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Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet, is the primary destination and distribution point for the 
majority of wildlife sourced in India. While a portion of the wildlife products is digested 
by local markets, the remaining is dispatched to other trade hubs in west China 
including Nagchu in Tibet and Linxia in Gansu Province. In 2005, 2006, and 2009, EIA 
conducted three separate field surveys in Lhasa and other neighbour cities. All three 
trips found parts and products of Asian big cats on sale at stalls concentrated in Barkhor 
area and Hui District in Lhasa (see Table 3.5). Traders in Lhasa expressed a variety of 
ways for their procurement of animal parts. Some crossed into the source country 
regularly to purchase the skins and bones of big cats from local middlemen and 
poaching gangs. Others travelled to Tibetan border towns like Ali and purchased 
wildlife products at local seasonal markets or from the Nepali and Tibetan nomads who 
involved in sporadically bringing skins of tiger and leopard from Nepal to Tibet for 
profits. Still others claimed that they had relatives in Nepal or India, so they could ask 
their relatives to collect desired animal products and arrange return shipments to Tibet 
(EIA 2009, 7–10).  
 
Linxia in Gansu Province has long been a traditional centre for wild animal skins 
market in Western China (Meng et al. 2009). Meanwhile, Linxia also harbours China’s 
biggest market for otter skins. EIA’s 2006 field trip to Linxia recorded over 1,800 skins 
of otter species including Eurasian and smooth-coated otter (see Table 3.5). Furs of tiger, 
leopard, and otter are brought by dealers in Lhasa to Linxia and sold to local Hui 
Muslin-Chinese minority who are highly skilled tanners with generations of experiences 
in turning out soft, pliable skins. Chupas made of animal skins are in turn sold to 
Tibetans in Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces (EIA and WPSI, 2006). 
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Table 3.5: Summary of findings by EIA’s three field trips to Lhasa, Linxia, and Nagchu, China 
City EIA 2009 field trip EIA & WPSI 2006 field trip 
EIA & WPSI 2005 field 
trip 
Lhasa in 
Tibet 
- 3 full tiger skins 
- 2 full leopard skins  
- 4 full snow leopard skins 
 
- 11 whole tiger skins, 1 tiger 
skull 
- 8 whole leopard skins, 1 
leopard skull  
- 60 leopard and snow leopard 
claws 
- 1 tiger skin chupa, 3 leopard 
skin chupas, and 38 otter skin 
chupas 
- 3 whole tiger skins  
- 7 leopard skins 
- Chupas: 24 tiger skin 
chupas, 54 leopard skin 
chupas, and over 300 otter 
skin chupas 
 
Nagchu 
(Tibet)  
Horse 
Festival 
9 people wearing tiger skin 
chupas, 25 people wearing 
leopard skin chupas 
5 people wearing tiger skin 
chupas, 33 wearing leopard 
skin chupas, and dozens 
wearing otter skin chupas 
------ 
Linxia in 
Gansu 
 
- 5 full leopard skins 
- 7 full snow leopard skins 
- 2 full clouded leopard 
skins  
- 1 snow leopard rug  
- 5 skulls of leopard and 
smaller cats 
- several pieces of bone 
and around 100 leopard 
claws 
- 1 tiger skins 
- 42 leopard skins  
- 1,800 skins of different otter 
species including Eurasian 
and smooth-coated otter 
- 60 snow leopard skins, 4 
snow leopard waistcoats 
- 160 whole fresh leopard 
skins; 
(Source: EIA and WPSI 2006; EIA 2009) 
 
e. Sino (Yunnan and Guangxi)–Burma, Laos and Vietnam 
Southeast Asia overlaps four of the world’s biodiversity hotspots and encompasses 
about 20 percent of the global plant, animal and marine species (Sodhi et al. 2004). 
Owing to this character, illegal trade from Southeast Asia to China covers a more 
diverse range of wildlife species than that of other China-oriented transnational trade 
chains like Xinjiang–Kazakhstan or Inner Mongolia–Russian Far East.  
 
With China remaining as the major consumer and Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Thailand acting as the suppliers or re-exporters, illegal trade in wild animals in the 
127 
 
Greater Mekong Sub-region has been at its most intensive point for the past two 
decades (World Bank, 2005). For example, it is estimated that approximately 20 million 
seahorses are taken each year from the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand, 95 
percent of which believed to be transported to China for TCM use to treat a variety of 
ailments (e.g., asthma, heart disease, impotence) (Gray 2004). Much of the bear parts 
illegally extracted in Burma is traded at several border wildlife markets between Burma 
and Yunnan, China (Shepherd and Nijman 2007, 36).  
 
By bordering Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, Yunnan Province is strategically located as a 
land bridge between Southeast Asia and mainland China. Historically, the province has 
been reported as a crucial terrestrial gate for the trafficking of wildlife sourced in 
Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, and Malaysia to Guangdong, Sichuan, and Tibet (Li and 
Wang 1999, 21). From the TRAFFIC Bulletin, some 29 seizures made by enforcement 
authorities in Yunnan during 1997–2013 were recorded. Repeatedly occurred localities 
in the illegal trade include Baoshang, Dehong, Honghe, and Linchang in Yunnan, all of 
which are border prefectures. In particular, Dehong Prefecture turned to be a vital 
smuggling tunnel. Through border counties Lianghe, Ruili, and Yingjiang in Dehong, a 
range of wildlife sourced in Burma or other Southeast Asian countries – including Asian 
elephant tusks, pelts and bones of tiger and leopard, pangolin scales, meat and scales of 
various snake species (e.g., Asian cobras, rat snakes, vipers, pythons), and turtles and 
tortoises (e.g., Burmese eyed turtles, Indian flapshell turtles) – were brought into 
Dehong. From Dehong, the majority of smuggled wildlife was transported to the 
provincial capital Kunming, processed and further dispatched to Guangdong or other 
consumer centres in mainland China. 
 
Guangxi is a coastal province, bordering Vietnam. As with Yunnan, Guangxi has long 
been the main passageway for wildlife sourced in Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam being smuggled via land or sea into China (Li and Li, 1998). During the first 
half of the 1990s, it was argued that much of the live wildlife sold in markets in 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen (Guangdong), Hong Kong, and Macau came from Vietnam, 
mainly through the Guangxi border (Lau et al. 1995).  
 
In total, some 15 seizures made by Guangxi authorities over the studied period were 
gathered from the TRAFFIC Bulletin. Baise, Fangchenggang, Rongsui, and the 
provincial capital Nanning in Guangxi were identified as entry points for wildlife 
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trafficking. Bear paws, elephant tusks, monitors, pangolins, rhino horns, and turtles and 
tortoises were the primary targets of traffickers along the Guangxi–Vietnam borders. In 
January 2013, Guangxi forest police caught the ever biggest rhino horn trafficking since 
1993, leading to the seizure of 14 rhino horns, one tiger skins, a tiger skeleton and 55.5 
kg of ivory as well as the arrest of three suspects including a Vietnamese national.88 A 
recent report by Xinhua News indicates that Guangxi enforcement agencies seized 
around 150,000 animal products during crackdowns on illegal wildlife trade in 2014 
alone, which were 40,000 less than the number of products seized in 2013.89 In the latest 
seizure case in November 2015, border patrol forces in Fangchenggang, Guangxi busted 
an illegal shipment of 970 kg of pangolin scales and 307 kg of ivory.90 
 
3.3. CONCLUSION 
In this case study, based on the analysis of 363 seizure records coupled with the cross-
reference to other sources of information, this chapter has scrutinised China’s global 
trade in illegal wildlife with respect to its scale, high-profile wildlife commodities, 
methods for conveyance and concealment, and the smuggling routes and hot spots. 
Weaving the various pieces of information together, this chapter is able to derive a 
comprehensive understanding of China-oriented transaction chain of illegal wildlife 
trade. Following is a number of key findings concerning China-oriented transaction 
networks in the global trade in illegal wildlife summarised from this case study: 
• In the international and regional transaction chain for illegal wildlife, China sits 
at the core by acting as a dominant consumer. China’s burgeoning internal 
market demand for wildlife products for a variety of uses – including among 
other TCM, food, healthcare products, clothing, house decorates, and means of 
financial investment – has tended to be the most relevant driver for China-
related transnational illicit trade and smuggling of endangered wildlife. 
 
• China’s illegal wildlife trade has been enormous in terms of the diversity of 
species and the volumes of wildlife involved in illicit trade. On the one hand, 
                                                          
88 TRAFFIC. “Anti-smuggling Focus on Wildlife Crime Enhanced in China’s Guangxi Province.” June 6, 
2013. http://www.traffic.org/home/2013/6/6/anti-smuggling-focus-on-wildlife-crime-enhanced-in-chinas-
gu.html. 
89 Xinhua News. “Xinhua Insight: Fighting Illegal Wildlife Trade at China-Vietnam Border.” December 4, 
2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/04/c_134886188.htm. 
90 Guangxi News. “Border Patrol in Fangchenggang seized 307 kg of ivory and 970 kg of pangolin scales” 
(in Chinese). November 26, 2015. http://news.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20151126/newgx56565ca8-
13989973.shtml. 
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over 124 species of wild fauna and flora, many under the CITES protection and 
China’s SSP, were traded to China recurrently. On the other hand, more than 
108,077 animals, live or dead, were seized by enforcement authorities around 
the world during 1997–2013. The bulk of the seized were intended for export to 
China. Considering that the seized only represent the failed attempts and often 
account for a fraction of the entire illegal trade, it is arguable that the real scale 
of China-related illegal wildlife trade is likely much more sizable than what has 
been detected.  
 
• Bear paws, tiger and leopard pelts and bones, ivory, rhino horns, pangolin 
scales and meat, lizards, snakes, and turtles and tortoises constitute the high-
profile species or goods in the illegal trade. In particular, pangolins, ivory, bear 
paws, snakes, lizards, turtles and tortoises were often traded on a substantially 
massive scale. 
 
• A multitude of methods has been employed to smuggle and conceal illegal 
goods and elude border inspection. Some are simple, but others are 
sophisticated, involving, for example, hiding contraband in secret, custom-
designed compartments, or hiring unwitting drivers to escort the shipment. 
Moreover, modes of trafficking may change over time as an adaptive response 
to enforcement interventions.   
 
• Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, DR 
Congo, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania in Africa, and India and the Russian 
Far East have been identified as leading suppliers for China of a broad diversity 
of wild animals and products. 
 
• Multiple trafficking routes exist around the borders of China. While Hong Kong 
continues to be the most important entrance gate for wildlife being smuggled by 
sea into mainland China, the role of Macau and Taiwan as an intermediary point 
for illegal wildlife transiting to mainland China is not nearly as prominent 
according to available empirical records. 
 
• Terrestrial border areas of China are evidently a point of vulnerability for 
transnational trafficking and illegal trade in wildlife. Seizure data have 
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disclosed that among every direction of China’s border areas – from the 
northeast (Heilongjiang Jilin) and north (Inner Mongolia), to the west 
(Xinjiang), and to the southwest (Tibet) and south (Yunnan, Guangxi) – all have 
reported seizures involving large volumes of illegal wildlife. Each of the 
directional trade routes, for example, Sino-Russia, Sino (Xinjiang)-Kazakhstan, 
and Sino (Tibet)-Nepal-India, can actually be seen as a chain of bilateral or 
multilateral transaction networks. Each of the transaction chains connects nodes 
in China as the consumer and specific neighbouring countries as the source or 
transit. And each of the transaction chains is typified by the trafficking or 
trading of a specific range of wild animals. Knowledge about these China-
oriented transaction chains will be instrumental in assisting China’s border 
enforcement agencies in developing a more targeted enforcement intervention 
strategy.  
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4. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL TIMBER AND WOOD 
PRODUCTS 
 
This chapter is the second case study of China-related TEC with a specific focus on 
trade in illegal timber and wood products. The main objective of this case study is to 
understand the “transaction networks” involved in China’s global trade in illegal forest 
products.  
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. Section 4.1 reviews the present state of the 
world’s forest resources and deforestation. Section 4.2 summarises published estimates 
of the scale of illegal logging and related trade at the global level and in individual 
countries and defines the term “illegal logging and associated trade”. Section 4.3 
provides an overview of China’s global forest footprint, analysing the trends and 
patterns in China’s production, consumption, imports, and exports of forest products 
during 2000–2011 based on the bilateral trade information collected from UN Comtrade 
Database and FAOSTAT Database. Section 4.4 draws upon the import-source approach 
that employs two sources of baseline data: China’s forest products imports from 
Chinese Customs Statistics Yearbook; and published estimates of the level of illegal 
logging or trade in China’s high-risk supplier countries from government reports or 
respected research institutes. The purpose of doing so is to present a full diagnosis of 
the nature and patterns of China’s global imports of illegal forest products and identify 
the major transaction chains of illegal wood between the high-risk supplying countries 
and China. 
 
4.1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRESENT GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCE AND 
DEFORESTATION 
Forest resources, thanks to their renewability, recyclability, versatility, and 
sustainability, have played, and will very likely continue to play in the future, an 
increasingly important role in global economic life. According to the State of the 
World’s Forests 2012 by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), existing forests 
cover around 31 percent (4 billion hectares) of the earth’s total land area, corresponding 
to an average of 0.6 ha per capita (FAO 2012, 9). Non-tropical (temperate and boreal) 
and tropical forests share a similar proportion in the composition of global forests 
(Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007, 7). Global distribution of forests exhibits an 
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extremely uneven pattern, with Brazil, Canada, China, the Russian Federation, and the 
US constituting the five most forest-rich countries. In aggregate, the five countries’ 
forests account for more than half (53 percent) of the world’s total forest area (FAO, 
2010a, 10).  
 
Deforestation, the long-term or permanent losses of forest cover caused by the human-
induced removal of a forest or stand of trees, continues today at a high rate.91 Globally, 
each year during 2001–2010 an estimated 13 million ha – an area roughly equivalent to 
the size of Greece – of the world’s forests was cleared and converted to other land uses 
(mainly agriculture) (FAO 2012, 5). Even taking account of the countervailing effect of 
the remarkable gains of forest areas from afforestation (large-scale planting trees on 
previously unforested land) and forest natural expansion over the last decade, the 
estimated annual net loss of forest area at the global level is still on a very high order, 
reaching an average of 5.2 million ha per year (FAO, 2010a: 17).  
 
Equally, global deforestation rates and net changes of forest area display an uneven 
pattern among regions. While South America and Southern Africa continue to suffer 
from the largest net loss of forest during 2000–2010, Asia and the EU have achieved a 
varying extent of net gains (FAO 2010a). In addition, concerns were raised in recent 
years by the UNEP and INTERPOL that the efforts to reduce deforestation in one 
geographic location have been offset by increases elsewhere (Nellemann 2012). In 
Indonesia, for example, the decline in logging after 2005 in several parts of the country 
has triggered an increase in demand in elsewhere including Burma, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), and the Greater Congo Basin (Serge Wich et al. 2011, 67). Studies on the issue 
of “leakage” – an increase in deforestation in one country caused by the reduction of 
deforestation elsewhere – reveal a more explicit correlation between the increase-vs.-
decrease balances. Research on forest transition in Vietnam by Meyfroidt and Lambin 
validates such a relation between Vietnam and other countries. The scholars argue that a 
national-scale shift from the net deforestation to net reforestation in Vietnam since the 
1990s was achieved in essence by “exporting” domestic forest extraction at an average 
annual rate of 2.5 million cubic metres to its neighbouring countries, notably Cambodia 
and Laos (Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009, 16140). 
 
                                                          
91 Society of American Forests. “The Dictionary of Forest.” 
http://dictionaryofforestry.org/dict/term/deforestation. 
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The drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are multifaceted. While various 
proximate and underlying factors often interplay as a whole resulting in the eventual 
forest loss (Geist and Lambin 2001), the agents of the drivers that are most relevant for 
the deforestation in a particular country or continent vary a great deal (Boucher et al. 
2011, 1). However, it is for certain that deforestation is now becoming more driven by 
enterprise-led and market-related processes in which timber operations, oil and gas 
development, large-scale farming, and exotic tree plantations all play a critical part in 
the forest loss occurred in many areas of the world (EU Commission 2013, 5).  
 
Adding to that, illegal logging (especially industrial logging) and related trade – that is, 
harvest and trade of timber that violate national laws – are also perceived as a 
“reasonably important” cause of forest loss and a multitude of negative social impacts in, 
in particular, the developing countries (Lawson and MacFaul 2010, 82–83). During 
2003–2007, recorded annual wood removals internationally amounted to 3.4 billion 
cubic metres annually, valued at over US$100 billion per year (FAO 2010a, 86). Of the 
total wood removed, it is estimated that half was being used for basic energy needs such 
as cooking and heating, while half went into the industrial roundwood sector 
(Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007, 11). Given that the forests that are removed 
informally for subsistence use (e.g., woodfuel) or removed clandestinely for illegal 
profits are usually not grasped by official statistics, the true scale of the world’s total 
wood removals is unquestionably more substantial.  
 
4.2. THE SCALE AND DEFINITION OF ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE 
Since the landmark event of the 2001 East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance Ministerial Conference, illegal logging and associated trade have become a 
growing concern on the agenda of many international conferences on forestry 
governance. A series of regional and national level efforts, for example, the expansion 
of Forest Stewardship membership,92 the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and 
                                                          
92 Forest stewardship is a voluntary worldwide certification and accreditation governance system run by 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an international non-profit, multi-stakeholders organisation 
established in 1993. The stated mission of FSC is to “promote environmentally appropriate, socially 
beneficial and economically viable management of the world’s forests”. FSC does so by setting standards 
and granting certification to forest products and forest practices that meet the FSC standards. Three types 
of certification exist under the FSC certification framework: forest management certification, chain of 
custody certification, and controlled-wood certification (or FSC mix). With these various kinds of 
certification and the trademarks and labels associated with them, forest stewardship is then able to 
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Trade Action Plan, the Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance have been put 
in place to promote the political process and the development of a general framework 
under which coordinated and concerted actions at both the regional and national 
dimensions can be undertaken to tackle the issue. 
 
4.2.1. THE SCALE OF ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE 
Illegal logging is a substantial yet worldwide epidemic, taking place in all types of 
forests and across all continents. For the world as a whole, there are some credible 
estimates of the magnitude of illegal logging and related trade. An early but widely 
recognised study by Seneca Creek estimates that each year about eight to ten percent of 
roundwood, lumber, and wood-based panels are being produced globally from illegally 
logged timber. Based on the value of 2002 global forest product trade,93 the annual 
monetary value of the illegal share is assessed to be at US$23 billion. Of this amount, 
only around US$5 billion (22%) worth of wood products of suspicious origin enters 
international trade, with the remaining bulk being consumed domestically (Seneca 
Creek 2004, 6). A more recent study by UNEP and INTERPOL reports that 15–30 
percent of wood traded worldwide, or 50–90 percent of timber harvested in key 
producer tropical countries in Amazon basin, Central Africa, and Southeast Asia, is 
illegal. This represents an illicit commerce with an annual economic value estimated at 
somewhere between US$30–100 billion, or 10–30 percent of the global trade value of 
forest products.94 Moreover, UNEP and INTERPOL add that the 15–30 percent is just a 
conservative estimate as it did not consider the illicit part that was laundered into the 
legal volume or deliberately under-reported. With the escaped share being factored in, 
the final estimate would suggest that 20–50 percent of log harvested worldwide is 
illegal (Nellemann 2012, 6). More estimates can be seen in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis. 
 
Breaking down the picture, the relative gravity of illegal logging varies considerably 
among regions and individual countries, with the majority occurred in Amazon basin, 
Central Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Russian Far East where forest governance and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
provide a link between responsible production and responsible consumption. For more information, 
please see “Forest Stewardship Council. “What is FSC?” https://ic.fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc. 
93 The terms “forest products”, “wood-based products”, and “wood products” are used interchangeably in 
this thesis. 
94 A more conservative estimate provided by World Bank (2012) points out that illegal logging generates 
around US$10–15 billion annually worldwide.  
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management are weak. In the Russian Far East, for example, illegal logging of valuable 
temperate hardwoods is claimed to have reached a point of “crisis proportions”. As 
illustrated in the case of the harvest of Mongolian oak (the most valuable hardwood 
species in the region), the illegally logged volume of this tree species during 2004–2011 
was estimated to be two to four times higher than the permitted harvest volume 
(Smirnov et al. 2013, 9). Throughout the Congo Basin in Africa, Asian and European-
owned transnational logging companies, international banks, and financial institutions 
have been reported to be directly or indirectly implicated in the large-scale illegal 
industrial logging, causing forest loss and other dire consequences for local people and 
wildlife (Megevand et al. 2013). In Southeast Asia, vast areas of valuable tropical 
forests in PNG, Solomon Islands, the Philippines, and other countries have been logged 
by logging companies from China, Malaysia, and the UK to the extent of commercial 
exhaustion (Greenpeace 2005; UNODC 2013). Illegal logging has also been an 
extensive problem in Latin America’s treasured natural forests. In Brazilian Amazon, 
illegal logging is estimated to be as high as of accounting for 35–72 percent of the total 
harvest from the area (Lawson and MacFaul 2010, xvii). In Bolivia, as much as 80 
percent of total wood production is thought to be from illegal sources (Seneca Creek 
2004, 5). In Ecuador (Hembery et al. 2007), Honduras and Nicaragua (Contreras-
Hermosilla el al. 2008), Mexico (Hirschberger 2008), and Peru (Seneca Creek 2004), 
the proportions of illegal logging in relation to its total in-country harvest as suggested 
by the literature all exceed 50 percent (see Table 9.4 in Appendices). 
 
4.2.2. DEFINING ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE 
As with illegal wildlife trade, there have been no harmonised definitions of illegal 
logging and associated trade. While what is illegal largely depends on clarification by 
national laws, diverges exist between government institutions and environmental NGOs 
as to the range of the illegalities that should be covered by the term. On the one hand, 
following the viewpoints of James Turner et al. (2007, 12) and Hembery et al. (2007, 
14–18), government agencies incline to hold a narrow conceptual embrace with a 
limited focus only on the extent to which the involved wood can be traced back to an 
officially sanctioned logging operation. On the other hand, conservation organisations 
tend to subscribe to a broad concept that may not only cover the commonly understood 
non-compliances occurring during harvesting, transport, purchase, and sale. In some 
cases, it may also include other forestry issues such as whether forests are managed 
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sustainably, whether royalties or fees are levied at a fair rate, or whether the concession 
award process conforms to relevant laws and policies. Matthias Dieter (2009, 601) 
disagrees with the adoption of a broad definition, arguing that not only does it detract 
from the key concerns that are due to illegal logging – that is, the deforestation and 
forest degradation, it is also likely to lead to assessments based on such an extensive 
concept being vulnerable to overstatements of the extent of illegal logging. Nonetheless, 
such diverges in definitions are certainly an indicator of the complexity of the issue and 
a reflection of the differentiated philosophies of the organisations concerned (Miller et 
al. 2006, 11).  
 
Within this research confine, illegal logging and associated trade refer to forestry 
practices or activities where the involved timber is harvested, transported, processed, 
bought, or sold in violation of relevant national or international laws.95 This is a generic 
definition drawn from the World Wide Fund (WWF). However, it remains the most 
commonly used by the existing literature and includes all the essential elements that 
entail illegal logging and related trade an urgent concern to the international community.  
 
Illegal logging and associated trade involve a range of “chain of custody” forestry 
practices, which begin with the illegal removals or harvesting of timber, through illegal 
transportation and processing, to the illegal sale, export, and import. At each custodial 
point, there are a variety of ways that the involved timber can become contraband (see 
Table 9.1 in Appendices). At the harvesting point, for example, logging operations can 
go illegally as proceeding without an authorised licence or with a fraudulent licence, 
harvesting of protected tree species, extracting from protected forest areas or outside the 
authorised concessions, or taking timber in excess of authorised quotas (Hayman and 
Brack 2002, 53; Toyne et al. 2002, 10; Elliott 2007b, 503). Additionally, illegality can 
take place at the downstream chain after logging even if the logging operations are of 
themselves in accordance with national laws, however, so long as any of the processing, 
transportation, and trade proceeds in defiance of the procedures or regulatory controls 
imposed by the source, processing, or consumer countries. These may include among 
others unreported or unauthorised movement of timber across state boundaries, 
processing at unlicensed facilities, and misdeclaration to customs upon export or import 
to avoid taxes or other charges (Bricknell 2010, 95; UNODC 2010, 162).  
                                                          
95 WWF. “What is Illegal Logging.” 
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/about_forests/deforestation/forest_illegal_logging/. 
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Similar to illegal wildlife trade, to facilitate the smooth undertaking of the “mainstream” 
logging or trading activities, cross-over practices such as corruption, document fraud, 
and money- or timber-laundering occur equally and repeatedly at each stage of the chain 
of custody. Moreover, the UNEP and INTERPOL note that in the last few years, a list 
of more advanced methods for concealment and timber laundering has been increasingly 
used by illegal operators in conducting logging, laundering, selling, and trading of 
illegal logs. Some of the methods may be more of a continuation of the old strategies 
such as falsification of logging permits or bribes to obtain logging permits. But some 
other practices emanate emerging and innovative characteristics, such as hacking 
government websites to obtain transport permits for larger volumes or transport and 
laundering timber by establishing roads, ranches, and palm oil or forest plantations 
(Nellemann et al. 2012, 6–7). 
 
4.3. CHINA IS AT THE HEART OF THE CONCERN 
4.3.1. DISTINCT DISCOURSES OVER CHINA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL TIMBER TRADE 
In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy by nominal GDP 
and by purchasing power parity.96 In 2012, with its global import and export value 
totalling US$3,867 billion, China ranked the world’s second largest merchandise trader 
only to the US (WTO 2013, 15). Sure is that during this escalating process, China has 
earned itself a host of superlative “hats” such as “the world’s largest exporter of goods” 
and “the world’s biggest manufacturing economy” (Sims 2013). However, among the 
many superlatives, there has been one that is definitely unpleasant for the Chinese 
government and people: the world’s largest importer of illegally harvested timber and 
leading exporter of illegal wood products.  
 
This appears to be a scenario very analogous to what China has been experiencing in the 
field of illegal wildlife trade examined in Chapter 3. In recent years, voices from 
international environmental NGOs concerning China’s global forest footprint have 
continually surfaced, reproaching China’s disgraced role as the world’s largest 
workshop for illegally sourced timber. It has been argued that through its uncritical 
wood import activity, China is in effect “exporting the deforestation to” (EIA 2012, 8) 
                                                          
96 The Guardian. “China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-largest Economy.” February 14, 2011. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy. 
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or “importing rainforest destruction from” (Greenpeace 2005, 9) countries around the 
world so long as they are forest-rich and suffering from poor forest governance and high 
levels of illegal logging problems. In West and South Africa, for example, the Chinese 
presence and trade in the continent’s forests is crystallised by Thornton (2005, 2) as 
“predatory” in nature, or epitomised by Mackenzie (2006; 2009) as “Chinese takeaway” 
– an activity of smuggling back to China large quantities of precious industrial tropical 
hardwoods in the assist of unscrupulous local businessmen and corrupt members of 
government and forest service.  
 
Overall, critics focus on three aspects of China’s wood trade. First, China’s rising 
demand for and uncritical sourcing of cheap wood materials have fairly fuelled or 
exacerbated the illegal logging problems in some of its supplier countries, especially 
those in the developing world. Second, China’s strong import preference over 
unprocessed or marginally processed wood has stripped much of the value in the supply 
chain, leaving little attainable for local poor and disadvantaged and handicapping the 
development of the processing industry in wood export countries. Third, by importing 
illegally logged timber and exporting finished wood-based products made from the 
imported illegal wood, China is virtually laundering the illicit wood into licit goods and 
flooding them into the export markets.  
 
Moreover, such critics resonate particularly acutely when China is positioned in a global 
context where national governments and international donors have poured huge 
amounts of money and resources into trying to stop the corruption and illegality that 
plague the forest sector. Recent legislative developments and governing efforts from the 
EU, US, and Australia to establish licensing systems for verified legal wood and 
prohibit the import of illegal wood have often been treated as an exemplary example of 
an increased concerted effort from the consumer side. In contrast, as one of the world’s 
leading wood consumers, progress to date in China towards dealing with the trade in 
illegal timber has been characterised as “little effective” (Global Timber 2011) or 
“limited” (Morrison 2008, 10; Lawson and MacFaul 2010, 43), with major 
developments largely restricted to bilateral agreements or Memorandum of 
Understandings (MoUs) concluded with Indonesia, Myanmar, the US, and EU. Feasible 
national action plan and proper legislation to prevent and tackle the import and export of 
illegal timber have been missing in China. As such, China has been accused of 
“standing firmly on the side-lines” in the past years (EIA 2012, 1). Expectations from 
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the international community are now high on China to step up its concrete effort to, if 
unable to staunch the entire illicit flows, at least contain the extent of illegal timber 
entering its territory. 
 
When confronted with accusations and pressures from abroad, Chinese government 
officials and scholars have expressed a distinct discourse. Some argue that despite 
China has emerged as a major importer of illegally logged timber, China is actually 
“paying the bill” for developed regions and countries including Japan, the EU, and US 
as they essentially remain behind the real consumers for the bulk of finished wood 
products manufactured from China’s imported illegal timber. Without those leading 
consuming countries taking a fairly proportionate share of the blame, the assertion that 
China’s timber imports alone are responsible for the vast depletion of tropical forests in 
developing countries does not hold water (Zhu 2006).97 Others claim that the motives of 
such critics are to be questioned. Although NGOs are largely intended for conservation 
purposes, the major concerns of many developed countries such as the US is not the 
illegal logging issue per se or the deforestation in producer countries, but the downward 
pressure of illegal timber on the international wood prices that directly reduces the 
profits the forest-related industry in those countries would otherwise receive (Fu 2010). 
In a few cases, some Chinese scholars even draw a connection between the illegal 
timber trade and political coercive strategy, contending that some western countries are 
overstating the part of Chinese market in driving global illegal logging and wielding the 
issue as a political device – as with other sensitive issues such as human right, 
intellectual property, and Renminbi rate – to force the Chinese government to make 
concessions in other areas of desired interests (Chen and Song, 2008). 
 
Despite the substantial divergences in cognition, this chapter argues that even if 
speaking purely from the standpoint of securing China’s long-term interests in the 
global timber trade, the Chinese government has to make changes in its policy 
concerning the import and export of wood products. But before getting to explain why it 
is so, this chapter firstly reviews in the following section the historical record and 
present state of China’s production, use, and trade of forest products. 
                                                          
97 Also see Xinhua News. “Spokesman from State Forestry Administration refuted critics of the threat of 
China’s wood imports to rainforest resources.” June 5, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-
06/05/content_6200451.htm. China Timber News. “The president of China Timber & Wood Products 
Distribution Association, Zhu Guangqian: There is no Such Thing as Global Timber Crisis.” April 4, 
2012. http://www.chinatimber.org/news/44794.html. 
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4.3.2. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S TIMBER TRADE  
China’s production, consumption, and trade of forest products have grown 
tremendously since the mid-1980s (Robbins and Perez-Garcia 2012), and such growing 
pattern continued into the 2000s. Today, China assumes the role as the largest 
processing hub in global market for forest products, each year importing vast volumes 
of raw wood materials (e.g., logs, lumber, and wood chips) from over 100 countries and 
re-exporting the value-added wood products (e.g., plywood, wooden furniture and 
works) mainly to Japan, the US, EU and, to a lesser extent, to Russia, the Middle East 
and elsewhere.  
 
Driven by a multiplicity of factors including rapid economic growth, a large population 
base, improved living standards, expanded domestic wood-processing capacity, and 
increased demand from both internal and external markets for wood-based products 
(Sun et al. 2004a, 3; Canby et al. 2008, 1, Potts and Runnalls 2008, 6; Global Witness 
2009, 97), China’s demand for raw wood materials has burgeoned over the past decade. 
In order to meet this domestic and export-oriented demand, massive amounts of wood 
must be either produced domestically or imported from abroad.  
 
To bolster its domestic timber production, the Chinese government has invested great 
effort in recent years in developing large-scale plantations, notably in the middle-
southern and south China such as the rubber plantations in Yunnan and Hainan Island 
Province (Zhang et al. 2007; ITTO, 2012). In China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2010–
2015, medium-term goals have been set to raise China’s total forest cover to 21.66 
percent of its land and forest stock by 600 million cubic metres by 2015.98 In another 
forest-sector blueprint National Forest Protection and Utilisation Plan 2010–2020 
(NFPUP 2010–2020) proposed by the State Forestry Administration (SFA) and 
approved by the State Council in September 2010, more specific and systematic 
objectives have been outlined. The country is devoted to increasing the forest cover and 
forest stock to 23 percent and 15.8 billion cubic metres respectively by 2020, and in the 
meantime to improving the forest yielding efficacy and restricting the encroachment of 
construction sector on forested land (SFA 2010, 11–2).  
                                                          
98 Xinhua News. “China 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development 2011–2015” 
(in Chinese). March 16, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/16/c_121193916.htm. 
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However, due to constraints including low per capita forest resources, low quality and 
stand productivity levels of the plantations, and stringent domestic forest protection 
programs (e.g., the 1998 nationwide logging ban), China’s domestic production though 
saw itself increased during this period, largely grew at a slow pace that was constantly 
outstripped by its consumption growth. During 2000–2011, China’s domestic 
production of industrial roundwood grew in roundwood equivalent (RWE) volume from 
94.6 million to 142.6 million cubic metres and sawn wood increased from 9.2 million to 
63.8 million cubic metres (Figure 4.1).99 Yet during the same period, China’s domestic 
and export-oriented use of logs soared from 108.2 million to 184.9 million RWE m3 and 
total use of sawn wood jumped from 14.4 million to 94.6 million RWE m3 (FAOSTAT 
2000–2011). As a result, importing from abroad becomes the easiest short-term 
approach for China to bridge this supply gap. 
 
Figure 4.1: China’s domestic production and consumption of logs and sawn wood during 2000–2011 
 
(Source: FAOSTAT 2000–2011) 
Note: Historical data on China’s production of industrial roundwood and sawn wood are sourced from 
FAOSTAT database. Consumption is defined as “production plus imports minus exports”. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2 and 4.3, between 2000 and 2011, China’s imports of timber, 
pulp, and paper products increased sharply, growing in RWE volume from 61.2 million 
to 232.3 million cubic metres and in value from US$11.8 billion to 39.9 billion (UN 
Comtrade Database 2000–2011). Trade data from the Chinese Customs Statistics 
                                                          
99 RWE is a standard measure of the volume of roundwood required for the manufacture of a unit of 
specific wood-based products. 
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Yearbook 2012 (CCSY 2012) confirmed the continuation of the growing trend in 
China’s forest product imports. In 2012 alone, China’s total imports of forest products 
mounted to 237.2 million cubic metres in RWE volume and US$36.4 billion in value.  
 
Figure 4.2: China’s imports of forest products by volume during 2000–2011 
 
       (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2000–2011 and FAOSTAT 2000–2011) 
Note: Data for China’s imports of forest products during 2000–2011 were sourced from the UN Comtrade 
Database, except the part for the volume of China’s imports of paper and paperboard which was extracted 
from FAOSTAT database. For the purpose of aggregating and comparing different forest products, forest 
products are grouped into three broad categories: timber products, pulp, paper and paperboard. 
Delimitation on the constitution of each category is provided in Table 9.2 in Appendices. In addition, the 
physical volume or mass of each category of forest product was converted to RWE volume by using 
corresponding conversion factors provided in Table 9.3 in Appendices. 
 
Figure 4.3: China’s imports of forest products by value during 2000–2011 
 
 (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2000–2011 and FAOSTAT 2000–2011) 
143 
 
 
With respect to the product composition of China’s imports, while paper and 
paperboard imports remained at a consistently marginal level between 2000 and 2011, 
pulp and timber products made up the bulk and a growing proportion of China’s imports. 
In timber product sector, while industrial roundwood and sawn wood overwhelmingly 
dominated the timber product imports, the share of wood-based panels diminished from 
14 percent in 2000 to only an edge of two percent in 2011. This further validates the 
observation concerning the marked expansion of China’s timber processing industry 
with a growing favour over imports of unprocessed or marginally processed wood 
products (e.g., logs, lumber) as opposed to the finished or semi-finished products (e.g., 
plywood, veneer, fibreboard). 
 
Figure 4.4: China’s imports of timber products during 2000–2011 (in 1,000 RWE m3) 
 
     (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2000–2011 and FAOSTAT 2000–2011) 
 
Presently, China’s wood products industry depends on imports for nearly 50 percent of 
its overall supply for forest products. Many of these imports are sourced from the so-
called high-risk producer countries such as Cameroon, Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia, 
whose exports to China are believed to include a significant proportion of illegally 
logged timber and whose forest resources have often in the meantime undergone rapid 
depletion (see Table 9.4 in Appendices). However, with the critical absence of a 
legislative or regulatory arrangement that specifically prevents and tackles the trade of 
illegal timber, it is inevitable that China’s illegal wood imports from these high-risk 
countries have grown considerably in parallel with the aggressive expansion of its legal 
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trade. Following the chain, it is also inevitable that the value-added wood products 
exported from China have been linked with an increasing risk of being manufactured 
from imported illegal wood. 
 
According to the NFPUP 2010–2020, China’s consumption of forest products is 
speculated to rise to 457–477 million cubic metres by 2020, leaving a long-term annual 
consumption-supply gap of 100–150 million cubic metres (SFA 2010, 9). It is certainly 
that such an enduring and yawning deficit will have substantial implications for both 
China and its trading partners.  
 
4.3.2.1. CHANGES IN CHINA’S IMPORT MARKETS 
On the one hand, for those supplier countries, China represents a stable and resilient 
export market in the decade to come, being able to provide rigorous and consistent 
external demand which is essential for the economic recovery and development of 
domestic forestry industry. China’s wood imports account for more than 40 percent of 
Russian timber production, 50 percent of Indonesia’s, 90 percent of Mozambique’s, 70 
percent of Equatorial Guinea’s and several other African countries (Canby et al. 2008). 
As such, the International Institute for Sustainable Development remarked that “Chinese 
demand is often the most significant factor driving the growth of production and exports 
of China’s principal supplying countries” (Potts and Runnalls 2008, 5). However, such a 
fast-paced growing demand from China also implies substantial profits that can be made 
through engagement in feeding what China needs by either legal or illegal means. 
Therefore, China’s full appetite has the potential to fuel or exacerbate the illegal logging 
problems and challenge the established effort by governments and environmental NGOs 
in countries in Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa, which have long been 
suffering from high levels of deforestation and corruption (see Table 9.4 in Appendices). 
 
On the other hand, China is now facing a constantly changing trading environment at 
both ends of China’s import and export markets. Over the past decade, the sheer scale 
and threat posed by illegal logging and related trade have gradually grasped the due 
attention from the international community and promoted an array of concrete actions in 
many parts of the world. In producer countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, 
increased measures have been taken to crack down on domestic hot spots for illegal 
logging and to eliminate the illegal timber from exports (e.g., Obidzinski et al. 2006). 
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Moreover, in hopes of protecting and promoting the development of domestic timber 
processing industry, several of China’s major suppliers including Burma, Cameroon, 
and Indonesia banned the export of unprocessed tropical hardwoods and the resulting 
shortage in the supply directly forced China to turn to temperate hardwoods as a 
substitute.  
 
As such, although China’s uncritical, import-reliant wood sourcing strategy worked 
desirably in the past in the sense of easing its domestic pressure on wood supply and 
facilitating the rapid expansion of its wood processing industry, this strategy causes 
unwanted stains on the global presence of Chinese logging and trading enterprises. Thus, 
this strategy, coupled with its high susceptibility to the policy changes in wood supplier 
countries, can nurture risks of uncertainty and instability in the prospect of securing 
China’s future wood supply.   
 
4.3.2.2. CHANGES IN CHINA’S EXPORT MARKETS 
In major export markets for China’s value-added wood products, a number of forestry 
laws, regulations, and policies bet on promoting environmentally and socially 
responsible forest products have been subsequently introduced into force in the US (US 
Lacey Act 2008), Australia (Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012), the EU 
(EU Timber Regulation 2013), Japan (Japanese Green Purchasing Policy) and other 
developed countries. One of the shared key objectives among the various efforts is to 
exclude illegally sourced wood from the market. This aim is expected to be achieved 
either through imposing a compulsive “due care” (US Lacey Act) or “due diligence” 
(EU Timber Regulation and Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act) on market 
operators to attest to the legality or sustainability of the wood products produced 
domestically or imported from overseas, or through implementing public procurement 
preferences over verified legal and sustainable sources. In response, many large timber 
enterprises in Japan, the EU, and US and several multinational retail corporations (e.g., 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour) are shifting from high- to low-risk sources and favouring certified 
wood products (ITTO 2012, 6). When dealing with wood products imported from high-
risk sources such as the plywood from China which are linked with a high risk of being 
manufactured from the imported illegal wood, international buyers are increasingly 
becoming more sensitive and requiring the accompanying of the third-party verified 
proof (Sun and Canby 2010, 33).  
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Current policy and legislative establishments in China’s major export markets are likely 
to have a durable and rigorous vitality as their host countries have strong incentives to 
do so. A number of predictive studies using Global Timber Trade Modelling confirm 
that the elimination of illegal timber from the international market would have a couple 
of significant effects (Seneca Creek 2004; Turner et al. 2007; Dieter 2009). Of which, 
the most attractive one to those host countries might be the presumably 7–16 percent 
increase in the prices in the international market for timber products exported from 
countries such as New Zealand, the US, and states in the EU where suspicious domestic 
production is believed to be minimal. This would help bring back the lost revenues that 
the wood industries in those countries would otherwise receive in a market environment 
without the presence of illegal timber.  
 
As such, if China insists on its uncritical wood sourcing activity and refuses to clean up 
its supply chain, it faces the risk of losing its established export markets in 
environmentally sensitive countries. Such potential loss of market share might be too 
substantial to be digested by China’s domestic market or other less environmentally 
sensitive markets such as the Middle East and Africa.  
  
4.3.3. AN UNDER-RESEARCHED ISSUE 
It thus becomes apparent for China that, if securing a sustainable wood supply in 
producer countries and preventing its existing export markets in consumer countries 
from dwindling were its desired outcomes for the long run, it needs to develop 
responses commensurate with changes in the international trading environment. It is 
also clear that an essential part of such response mix shall be taking firmer actions to 
rein in imports of illegally logged timber and to promote more responsible practices in 
wood procurement, manufacturing, and exports. Therefore, a full diagnosis of the nature, 
scale, and patterns of global wood flows to China that are tainted by illegal timber is 
imperative and emergent.   
 
China’s trade in forest products and its trends and implications have been relatively well 
explored by the existing literature (Sun et al. 2004a, 2004b; Katsigris et al. 2004; White 
et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2007; Canby et al. 2008; Sun and Canby 2010; Yang and Zhai 
2012). In contrast, the study of China’s illegal timber trade has been limited and 
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incomprehensive. More specifically, on the one hand, the academic emphasis of most 
studies by Chinese scholars is often on the description and identification of China’s 
wood trade patterns, with little attention (probably due to the sensitivity concern) given 
to investigating the nature and extent of China’s imports of illegal wood. On the other 
hand, in the English literature, owing to China’s extensive global forest footprint and its 
far-reaching impact, studies of illegal logging and related trade in many parts of the 
world will inevitably involve, to a varying extent, discussion of China’s role as an 
importer or exporter of illegal wood and its impacts on forestry governance and timber 
markets in the regions or countries under examination. These have thus resulted in a 
number of assessments over the scale of China’s illegal timber trade.100 However, such 
estimates tend to subject to two limitations.  
 
First, many of the published estimates of the share of illegal timber in China’s imports 
tend to be inconsistent, scientifically unverifiable, and outdated. Borrowing 
Schloenhardt’s comment on existing statistics about illegal timber trade, most of the 
published figures are produced “on the basis of seizures, samples or other research and 
much of the available data tend to be referenced circularly and not linked to an original 
source” (Schloenhardt 2008, 7). Second, there has been the absence of a comprehensive 
study of the magnitude of China’s illegal timber imports with a fairly broad coverage in 
terms of both the major forest products and producer countries with illegal logging 
problems. The majority of existing studies either only cover a limited number of high-
risk supplying countries or only consider an incomplete spectrum of wood-based 
products and often ignore pulp and paper in their assessments. For example, EIA’s 2012 
study on China’s illegal timber trade focused only on China’s imports of illegal logs and 
sawn wood. Other timber products (e.g., wood chips) and pulp which demand an 
increasingly greater proportion of China’s trade volume and value were not included in 
their estimates.   
 
4.4. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL TIMBER 
To overcome above limitations, this chapter draws upon the import-source analysis that 
incorporates two sources of baseline data. The first is the latest statistics of China’s 
                                                          
100 Existing reported estimates of the proportion of China’s annual illegal timber imports to its total 
imports of forest products include: 32% in 2000 (Seneca Creek 2004, 4); 9.9% in 2003 (Hembery 2007, 
28), 28% in 2007 (illegal timber as a percent of China’s total production and imports in that year, Global 
Timber 2011); 37–66% in 2008 (Dieter 2009), 50% (Global Witness 2009, 98); 20% in 2010 (Lawson 
and MacFaul 2010, 106); 10% in 2011 (only applied to imports of logs and lumber, EIA 2012, 7). 
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forest product imports from China General Administration of Customs (GAC). The 
second is the published estimates of the level of illegal logging or trade in China’s high-
risk supplier countries collected from government sources or respected research 
institutions. By doing so, this chapter elects to present an updated and comprehensive 
analysis of the extent and commodity composition of China’s illegal wood inflows, to 
identify the major high-risk suppliers and map out the routes for major tainted wood 
flows.  
 
4.4.1. METHODS AND DATA SOURCES 
Traditionally, depending on the defining role (producer, consumer, or processor) of the 
focused countries in global timber trade chain, there have been three methodologies – 
wood-balance modelling, trade data discrepancies, and import-source analysis – being 
commonly drawn on to measure the level of illegal logging in producer countries and 
illegal timber trade in processing and consumer countries (also see Chapter 1). While 
wood-balance modelling is used to quantify illegal logging in producer countries and 
trade data discrepancies applied for calculation of the illegal timber content in specific 
bilateral trade flows, import-source is often the only approach available for estimating 
imports of illegal timber by consumer and processing countries. Most of the published 
estimates for illegal timber imports in the literature have been produced in this manner 
(Lawson 2007a; Lawson and MacFaul 2010, 101).  
 
Import-source analysis calibrates the amount of illegal timber imported by a specific 
consumer or processing country from a particular producer country through multiplying 
the total volume of wood imports with the estimated level of illegal logging or trade in 
that producer country. In the literature, applications of this method include the 
international environmental NGO “Friends of the Earth” (Matthew 2001), WWF 
(Hewitt 2005), Oliver (2005), and Hirschberger (2008) using import-source analysis to 
measure the EU imports and/or exports of illegal wood and related products; Contreras-
Hermosilla et al. (2007) to analyse the global imports of illegal timber from high-risk 
countries and regions; Lawson and MacFaul (2010) to gauge the extent of illegal timber 
flows from five selected producer countries to seven consumer/processing countries; 
and EIA (2012) to estimate China’s annual illegal imports of logs and lumber.  
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While being useful as a means of obtaining the worse-case scenario baseline figures 
with which to improve attention and motivate action (Lawson and MacFaul 2010: 103), 
it should be stressed that import-source analysis has several shortcomings and 
limitations. First, this approach does not account for the portion of timber that has been 
under-reported and therefore not captured by the customs statistics in consumer or 
processing countries. Second, this method does not capture illegal timber that has been 
transhipped through the third-party countries and misdeclared as originating from the 
third-party countries. Third, this method is unable to allow for measuring changes over 
time of a particular country’s illegal wood imports. This is because the estimated rates 
for illegal logging in producer countries that are used to support the import-source 
analysis are fixed figures. The real illegal logging situations in producer countries tend 
to be dynamic and vary over time as a result of a number of factors, for example, the 
improved or decreased effort from governments and private sectors to clean up the 
supply chain. Fourth, this method posits that the estimated levels of illegal logging or 
trade in a producer country, unless specified by the provisos accompanying the 
estimates, are equally applicable to all categories of forest products exported by that 
country. Clearly, this is unlikely the truth as in reality individual wood flows of specific 
product groups from a particular producer country may contain a greater proportion of 
illegal wood than that of other product groups exported from the same country. For 
example, Seneca Creek (2004) estimates that 35 percent of Malaysia’s wood exports is 
of suspicious origin. In contrast, Chatham House (Lawson and MacFaul, 2010: 103) 
reports that the bulk of the wood furniture exported from Peninsular Malaysia is made 
from plantation-grown rubberwood, which is unlikely to have been logged illegally. 
Therefore, the 35 percent estimate is obviously inapplicable to Malaysia’s exports of 
wood furniture.  
 
Nonetheless, when China is the subject of investigation, import-source analysis involves 
two steps to calculate China’s illegal timber imports.  
 
4.4.1.1. STEP ONE: CALCULATING CHINA’S TOTAL RWE VOLUME OF FOREST 
PRODUCT IMPORTS  
Import-source approach measures the illegal content in specific wood flows from a 
particular producer country to China by multiplying the total RWE volume of the wood 
flows with the estimated level of illegal logging or trade in that country. Therefore, 
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three sources of data are required: (1) baseline data; (2) RWE conversion factors for the 
calculation of the RWE volume of China’s wood imports; and (3) estimates of illegal 
logging or trade for individual producer countries.  
 
This chapter uses CCSY 2012 as the baseline data to calculate the physical volume of 
China’s 2012 imports of forest products. CCSY is the only official source of Chinese 
trade statistics and regarded as the best approximation of the actual trade. The 2012 
version of CCSY was the latest series available at the time of conducting this analysis. 
 
The term forest products used in this chapter refers to all goods derived from wood 
through processing of mechanical or chemical decomposition. These mainly include 
timber products (e.g., industrial roundwood, sawn wood, wood-based panels), pulp, and 
paper and paperboards, but exclude non-wood forest products such as non-wood plant 
and animal products (FAO, 2010b). Forest products are grouped and recorded in CCSY 
in accordance with the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS 
system) under which, forest products mainly distribute in Chapter 44, 47, and 48. The 
standard cross-reference between the HS six-digit number and individual forest product 
categories is provided in Table 9.2 in Appendices. 
 
In order to aggregate and compare quantities of different forest products, the physical 
volume (e.g., cubic metres) or mass (e.g., kilograms) of each product category need to 
be converted to a consolidated unit, the RWE volume. As noted early in this chapter, 
RWE is a standard measure of the amount of roundwood required for the manufacture 
of a unit of specific wood-based products. It is a useful tool for assessing trends in the 
forest footprint of a given country’s production, import, export, and consumption of 
wood-based products. Global Timber (2010) suggests that unless credible alternatives 
are available, attempts to assess timber imports from high-risk countries should be best 
adopting the conversion factors provided by authoritative organisations such as FAO 
and International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO). Taking this advice, this 
analysis uses the conversion factors proffered by FAO, ITTO, EU Commission 
Directorate-General Eurostat, and UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for 
most of the forest products (see Table 9.3 in the Appendices). Meanwhile, it also 
incorporates factors from other credible sources (e.g., Sun et al. 2004a; Zhu et al. 2004) 
for forest products that are not covered by above organisations and for differentiation 
among different pulp products as well. 
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4.4.1.2. STEP TWO: CALCULATING THE ILLEGAL WOOD SHARE IN CHINA’S FOREST 
PRODUCT IMPORT 
After converting, on a country-by-country basis, all wood flows to China into RWE 
volume, the second step is to calculate the illegal wood content in each flow from the 
high-risk producer countries to China. For analytical purposes, this analysis assumes 
that the same amount of illegal timber found in producer countries’ exports would be 
identically found in China’s imports.101 Thus, the share of illegal wood in China’s forest 
product imports from a given producer country can be achieved by multiplying the total 
import RWE volume from that country with the estimated level of illegal production or 
export for that country.  
 
Illegal logging estimates are available in the literature for most of the world’s important 
high-risk producer countries such as Indonesia, Mozambique, and the Russian 
Federation which are often amongst China’s major wood suppliers. As published 
estimates of the proportion of illegal timber in a country’s exports of wood products are 
not consistently available in the literature, this analysis assumes that in such cases 
published estimates of the illegal logging rates for that country are considered as the 
proxy for the proportion of illegal wood exports to the overall wood exports from that 
country.102  
 
In reviewing and culling the estimates from the literature, when previous studies offer 
for a specific supplier country more than one estimate of the illegal logging rates or 
offer range estimates (e.g., 30–60 percent), weightings are given to the more recent 
assessments or the more conservative lower-end figures. For countries where illegal 
logging are known to take place in varying extent terms but the quantitative data about 
the share of illegal logging to the overall logging are unavailable in the literature, these 
countries are excluded from this study’s calculation of China’s illegal wood imports – 
                                                          
101 China has to date had no proactive arrangements in place allowing for effective elimination of illegal 
wood from its imports, thus this assumption is applicable for the China side. However, given the large 
number of high-risk supplying countries involved in China’s timber trade, it is difficult to undertake a 
country-by-country dissection of the effects of the established measures in each involved supplying 
country on filtering out illegal timber production and exports. Hence, this analysis supposes that this 
assumption equally applies to China’s high-risk supplying countries.   
102 This might add another limitation to the import-source analysis as not all timber illegally felled in one 
country is destined for the export. A portion of the illegal wood is apparently being consumed 
domestically.  
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despite there have been studies (Seneca Creek 2004; Hirschberger et al. 2008) that 
adopted regional averages as the illegal logging estimates for those countries. This 
analysis’s decision of not to introduce the regional averages is based on two 
considerations. First, with the inclusion only of those countries where the evidence of 
illegal logging and trade is realistic and concrete, this analysis is able to derive a more 
conservative yet reliable estimate of the scale of illegality in China’s wood imports. 
Second, even without drawing upon the regional average approach, this analysis has 
been able to garner from the literature the estimates of illegal logging or trade for a total 
of 44 countries, which virtually cover all China’s outstanding high-risk wood supplying 
countries (see Table 9.4 in Appendices). Countries that are not on the list are often those 
from which wood flows to China are marginal in quantity and therefore, excluding them 
from the analysis will unlikely affect the reliability of the final assessment in any 
significant terms. 
 
4.4.2. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S 2012 IMPORTS OF FOREST PRODUCTS 
China plays a pivotal role in the global forest product market, featuring prominently as 
the world’s largest importer by value and ranking among the top five leading import 
markets for several major forest product categories. According to the CCSY, in 2012 
China imported from more than 228 countries a total of 237.2 million RWE m3 of forest 
products, including timber products, pulp, paper and paperboards, and wooden furniture, 
valued at US$36.4 billion. This represents two percent increase in RWE volume and 
nine percent decrease in value compared to the 2011 imports, or a 287 percent increase 
in RWE volume and 196 percent increase in value in comparison with China’s 2000 
imports. 
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Table 4.1: China and the world’s leading wood importing markets by import value, 2012 
Leading 
importer 
Forest products 
(million US$) 
Percent Leading importer 
Wood chips 
(million US$) 
Percent 
1. China 36,440 10.7% 1. Japan 2,519 48.2% 
2. US 33,216 9.7% 2. China 1,334 25.5% 
3. Germany 28,061 8.2% 3. Turkey 303 5.8% 
4. Japan 17,676 5.2% 4. Finland 192 3.7% 
5. France 15,024 4.4% 5. South Korea 91 1.7% 
Global import 
value 
341,699 100% 
Global import 
value 
5,226 100% 
Leading 
importer 
Logs (million 
US$) 
Percent Leading importer 
Sawn wood 
(million US$) 
Percent 
1. China 7,251 43,1% 1. China 5,521 17.4% 
2. India 2,011 12.0% 2. US 4,188 13.2% 
3. Japan 1,030 6.1% 3. Japan 2,527 8.0% 
4. Austria 742 4.4% 4. UK 1,643 5.2% 
5. South Korea 655 3.9% 5. Italy 1,365 4.3% 
Global import 
value 
16,818 100% 
Global import 
value 
31,641 100% 
Leading 
importer 
Veneer sheets 
(million US$) 
Percent Leading importer 
Pulp (million 
US$) 
Percent 
1. US 321 10.9% 1. China 17,057 29.8% 
2. Germany 181 6.2% 2. Germany 4,558 8.0% 
3. Italy 164 5.6% 3. US 3,502 6.1% 
4. Japan 158 5.4% 4. Italy 2,214 3.9% 
5. China 135 4.6% 5. South Korea 1,872 3.3% 
Global import 
value 
2,929 100% 
Global import 
value 
57,194 100% 
(Source: CCSY 2012 and UN Comtrade Database 2012 
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Figure 4.5: China’s 2012 forest product imports by product sectors 
 
(Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
Figure 4.6: China’s 2012 timber product imports by product category 
 
     (Source: CCSY 2012) 
155 
 
As indicated in Figure 4.5 and 4.6, following the import pattern throughout 2000–2011, 
timber products and pulp continue to be the product segments dominating China’s 2012 
imports, together made up 98 percent of the RWE volume and 88 percent of the value of 
total forest product imports of that year. In timber product sector, industrial roundwood 
and sawn wood endure as the two leading product categories, with combined import 
REW volumes and value respectively accounting for 72 percent and 86 percent of 
China’s 2012 timber product imports. In addition, driven by the fast expansion of 
China’s pulp industry along with the growing demand for wood fibre, 103  China’s 
imports of wood chips have demonstrated a faster growth pace and become the third 
largest product category by both volume (23 percent) and value (nine percent) in 
China’s timber product imports. In contrast, China’s imports of wood-based panels in 
2012, though regained a slight increase in volume compared to the 2011 imports (2.3 
million RWE m3), adhere to in general the track of downward trend occurred since 2000.   
 
The Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America are the three leading supplying regions. 
Combined exports from the three regions to China accounted for 89 percent by RWE 
volume and 86 percent by value of China’s 2012 global forest product imports (see 
Figure 4.7). At the country level, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, and the US hold the 
outstanding positions as the top five suppliers, together supplying 55 percent by RWE 
volume of China’s forest product imports in 2012 (see Table 4.2). Brazil, New Zealand, 
Thailand, UK, and Vietnam constitute the second tier of major suppliers, together 
furnishing 21 percent by RWE volume of China’s 2012 wood imports. Detailed major 
supplier countries for China’s wood imports are provided in Table 4.2.  
 
                                                          
103 According to RISI, China’s demand for imported wood fibre, in the forms of logs, woodchips, and 
other forest products, increased by an average annual rate of nearly 16 percent from 1997–2012. “China 
continues to drive growth in global demand for wood fibre.” August 6, 2013. 
http://www.risiinfo.com/press-release/china-continues-to-drive-growth-in-global-demand-for-wood-fiber/. 
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Figure 4.7 China’s wood supplying markets by regions, 2012 
 
(Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
Table 4.2: China’s leading suppliers by product category, ranked by the RWE volume of China’s 2012 
imports 
Forest products 
overall 
Wood chips Industrial roundwood Sawnwood 
1. US (21%) 1. Vietnam (46%) 1. Russia (30%) 1. Canada (31%) 
2. Canada (13%) 2. Thailand (24%) 2. New Zealand (23%) 2. Russia (30%) 
3. Russia (11%) 3. Indonesia (14%) 3. US (10%) 3. US (11%) 
4. Indonesia (5%) 4. Australia (11%) 4. PNG (7%) 4. Thailand (7%) 
5. Japan (5%) 5. South Africa (1%) 5. Canada (6%) 5. Indonesia (3%) 
Sum: 55% Sum: 96% Sum: 75% Sum: 83% 
Wood-based panels Pulp Paper and paperboard Others 
1. Vietnam (24%) 1. US (30%) 1. Taiwan (31%) 1. Indonesia (39%) 
2. Malaysia (19%) 2. Canada (13%) 2. South Korea (27%) 2. Myanmar (25%) 
3. Thailand (17%) 3. Japan (8%) 3. Japan (18%) 3. Philippines (14%) 
4. Russia (9%) 4. Brazil (7%) 4. Indonesia (15%) 4. Russia (7%) 
5. Indonesia (7%) 5. UK (6%) 5. Thailand (4%) 5. Vietnam (4%) 
Sum: 75% Sum: 65% Sum: 95% Sum: 89% 
(Source: CCSY 2012) 
Note: Percentages in the parentheses indicate the proportion of RWE volume of China’s 2012 total 
imports of that product category.  
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4.4.3. ILLEGAL WOOD FLOWS IN CHINA’S 2012 FOREST PRODUCT IMPORTS  
In 2012, a total of 234 countries were involved as wood suppliers in China’s global 
forest product trade. Among them, 44 countries across four regions (Asia-Pacific, Africa, 
Europe, Latin America) – based on realistic estimates collected from the literature of the 
levels of illegal logging or illegal wood exports in individual countries – have been 
identified by this analysis as high-risk supplying countries (see Table 9.4 in 
Appendices).104  Collectively, wood exports from these high-risk countries to China 
amounted to 82.7 million RWE m3 or 35 percent of China’s 2012 total imports of forest 
products. 
 
By using the import-source approach to assess the content of illegal wood in each of the 
bilateral wood flows from the identified high-risk countries to China, this analysis 
estimates that, in conservative terms in 2012 alone, China imported 24.2 million RWE 
m3 of illegally logged timber or illegally traded wood products from the globe, with an 
import value of over US$4.3 billion. Such a magnitude of illegal timber imports 
represents ten percent by RWE volume and 12 percent by value of China’s global forest 
product imports in that year. 
 
Within the international context, China stands as the world’s singularly largest importer 
of illegal wood, with the second-highest estimated share of illegal wood imports in 
relation to the country’s total imports (ten percent, less than Japan at 20 percent). In 
contrast with other global leading importers, the RWE volume of illegal wood imported 
into China in 2012 is estimated to be almost double that of Japan, the second-highest 
importer (13.5 million RWE m3) and, more than triple that of the US, the third-largest 
importer (7.4 million RWE m3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 China’s wood imports from North America mainly come from America and Canada where illegal 
logging is not recognised as a serious problem. Although exports from these two countries to China 
certainly contain a varying proportion of illegal timber, for analytical purposes, wood flows from the 
third-party countries are not considered in calculation of China’s illegal timber imports.  
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Figure 4.8: China and other world’s leading importers of illegal wood, 2012 (1,000 RWE m3) 
 
      (Source: CCSY 2012, UN Comtrade Database 2012, and FAOSTAT 2012)  
Note: (1) Data on the overall imports of forest products for the world’s leading importing countries in 
2012 were extracted from the UN Comtrade and FAOSTAT database, except for China the import data 
for which were sourced from CCSY 2012. (2) The volume of each country’s illegal wood imports was 
obtained by multiplying the RWE volume of each country’s total wood imports with the published 
estimates of illegal imports as percentages of the overall wood imports for that country. Such estimates 
include Belgium (1.3%), Canada (5%), France (2.5%), Germany (1.4%), Italy (1.7%), Japan (20%), 
Netherlands (2.4%), UK (7.2%), and US (0.7%). Estimates for Japan and Canada were attributed to 
Seneca Creek (2004), the remaining others were quoted from Hembery (2007). (3) Given a wide 
recognition in the literature that pulp in Brazil, Chile, and South Africa is mostly manufactured by legal 
wood from plantations (e.g., Hirschberger et al. 2008), pulp exports from the three countries to above ten 
importing countries were excluded from the calculation of illegal wood flows. 
 
4.4.3.1. ASIA-PACIFIC 
The Asia-Pacific holds both the largest number (14) of identified high-risk countries 
and the largest proportion of illegal wood flows to China. In 2012, China’s wood 
imports from the region totalled 72.6 million RWE m3, with an import value of around 
US$10.4 billion. It is estimated that 15.7 million RWE m3 or 22 percent of the total 
exported from the region to China might have come from illegal sources.  
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Figure 4.9: China’s illegal wood imports by regions, 2012 
 
(Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
Figure 4.10: China’s imports of illegal wood from the Asia-Pacific, 2012 (RWE m3) 
 
               (Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
Indonesia, PNG, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam were the five principal 
suppliers of illegal tropical hardwood in the region, with each flow from any of the five 
to China exceeding one million RWE m3. In all, these five countries supplied 84 percent 
by RWE volume of China’s illegal wood imports from the region, or 55 percent if 
compared to China’s global imports of illegal wood. In consistent with China’s overall 
import preference, wood chips, industrial roundwood, sawn wood, and chemical pulp 
(mainly from Indonesia and Thailand) were the major staples exported from this region 
to China. 
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Figure 4.11: China’s 2012 imports of illegal wood from the Asia-Pacific by product categories (RWE m3) 
 
      (Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
4.4.3.2. AFRICA 
Africa ranks fifth by regions in terms of the RWE volume of wood exports to China. 
During 2012, 4.6 million RWE m3 or US$1.6 billion worth of forest products were 
shipped from the region to China. Some nine countries out of thirty-six China’s African 
suppliers have been identified as high-risk countries. Among them, four countries 
including Cameroon, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon are from the 
Congo Basin area where contains most of Africa’s remaining primary rainforest and 
where illegal industrial logging is recognised as an extensive and accelerated problem 
(Megevand et al. 2013). 
 
The magnitude of illegal wood imported by China from the nine African high-risk 
countries is quantified to be at 1.5 million RWE m3, corresponding to one-third of 
China’s wood imports from the continent. The lion’s share of illegal wood exports is 
exclusively occupied by industrial roundwood and sawn wood, together actually 
comprising 99 percent of the illegal timber exports from the nine high-risk suppliers to 
China. 
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Figure 4.12: China’s 2012 imports of illegal wood from Africa (RWE m3) 
 
           (Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
Overall, forest product trade between the continent’s high-risk countries and China 
indicates a high level of inter-reliance relationship. On the one hand, eight of the nine 
identified high-risk countries are amongst China’s ten largest supplying countries within 
the region,105 with combined wood exports from the eight to China in 2012 virtually 
made up 60 percent of China’s timber imports from the region. On the other hand, 
China often represents an exceedingly important consumer market being able to digest a 
significant, in some cases even dominant proportion of timber products exported from 
these high-risk countries to the world. As shown in the cases of Mozambique (96 
percent), Equatorial Guinea (96 percent), Benin (78 percent), Liberia (78 percent), 
Congo Republic (70 percent), and Gabon (52 percent), exports to China of logs and 
lumber from each of the six countries in 2012 were in excess of half of their respective 
exports to the world (see Figure 4.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 The other two countries which are among Africa’s top ten wood suppliers for China and which have 
not been identified as the high-risk suppliers are South Africa (No.1) and Gambia (No.9). 
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Figure 4.13: Comparison of log and lumber exports from African high-risk countries to China and to the 
rest of the world, by 2012 export value (1,000 US$) 
 
             (Source: CCSY 2012 and UN Comtrade Database 2012) 
Note: (1) Data on the value of log and lumber exports from the identified African high-risk countries to 
the rest of the world were sourced from UN Comtrade Database. (2) Due to the fact that many countries 
in Africa didn’t report data on 2012 forest product trade to the UN Statistics Centre, export value for each 
African high-risk country was obtained by using an inverse method to calculate the import value reported 
by their trade partner countries.    
 
4.4.3.3. EUROPE 
Europe (including the Russian Federation) was the third largest regional supplier by 
both RWE volume and value in China’s 2012 forest product trade. During 2012, the EU 
exports of wood-based products to China reached 59.1 million RWE m3, valued at 
US$9.2 billion. Among the many EU suppliers, Russia was the most outstanding 
supplier in terms of the quantity of wood exports to China. In 2012, Russia supplied 
25.1 million RWE m3 or US$3.7 billion worth of forest products to China. Exports from 
Russia alone to China comprised 42 percent by RWE volume of China’s total imports 
from the EU or 11 percent of China’s global wood imports. 
 
Some 12 countries from the region have been identified as high-risk suppliers, though 
two of them (Azerbaijan and Albania) virtually exported no wood to China in 2012 (see 
Table 4.3). Combined illegal wood from the other ten high-risk countries to China in 
2012 is estimated at 6.3 million RWE m3, with a trade value of close to US$948 million. 
This illegal share accounted for about 11 percent by RWE volume and ten percent by 
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value of China’s wood imports from the region.  
 
The overwhelming majority of illegal wood exported from Europe to China, again, 
came from Russia. In 2012, Russia exported 6.3 million RWE m3 of illegal wood to 
China, mainly in the forms of logs, lumber, and chemical pulp. This represented a 
predominant share (99 percent) of the total illegal wood imported into China from the 
EU. In contrast, illegal wood flows to China from other European countries were fairly 
insignificant in quantity due to the limited scale of the overall bilateral trade of forest 
products. 
 
Table 4.3: Illegal timber exported from identified EU high-risk countries to China, 2012 
EU high-risk 
suppliers 
Export 
volume 
(RWE m3) 
Export value 
(US$) 
Illegal wood 
volume (RWE 
m3) 
Illegal 
timber value 
(US$) 
Illegal timber as 
percent of the total 
exports 
Russia 25,133,055 3,732,592,403 6,283,264 933,148,101 25% 
Latvia 112,758 17,190,898 22,552 3,438,180 20% 
Estonia 39,372 7,021,762 19,686 3,510,881 50% 
Slovakia 96,993 29,273,897 9,699 2,927,390 10% 
Bulgaria 17,566 10,392,310 7,026 4,156,924 40% 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
25,805 9,245,175 516 184,904 2% 
Montenegro 892 244,536 446 122,268 50% 
Macedonia  121 38,930 30 9,733 25% 
Georgia 186 39,046 17 3,514 9% 
Moldova  166 32,417 2 324 1% 
Albania 1 281 0 197 70% 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 24% 
(Source: CCSY 2012) 
 
4.4.3.4. LATIN AMERICA 
Latin America ranked fourth by export volume among the five regional suppliers to 
China. In 2012, Latin America exported a total of 21 million RWE m3 or US$4 billion 
worth of forest products to China. The bulk of wood exports were composed of pulp (in 
particular chemical pulp), which accounted for 92 percent of the region’s wood flows to 
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China. 
 
Some nine countries including Brazil, Mexico, and Peru have been identified as high-
risk supplier countries in the region. During 2012, illegal wood imports from the nine 
countries to China are assessed to be at around 657,368 RWE m3, valued at US$202 
million. Such illegal wood made up 20 percent by RWE volume of China’s wood 
imports from the region. 
  
Of the total illegal wood that China sourced from the region, 64 percent (419,225 RWE 
m3) originated from Mexico, 16 percent (103,703 RWE m3) from Brazil, and eight 
percent (55,757 RWE m3) from Peru. Again, following China’s general import 
preference, industrial roundwood, sawn wood, and recovered paper and paperboard 
were the largest product categories, comprising close 90 percent of the illegal wood 
received by China from the region. 
 
Figure 4.14: China’s illegal wood imports from Latin America, 2012 
 
         (Source: CCSY 2012 and UN Comtrade Database 2012) 
Note: Due to a wide recognition in the literature that pulp and roundwood in Brazil are mostly produced 
by plantation timber from the southern states where illegality is not considered a major issue (e.g., 
Hirschberger et al. 2008; Lawson and MacFaul 2010), pulp was therefore excluded from the calculation 
of China’s illegal wood imports from Brazil though it accounted for 97 percent of China’s total wood 
imports from the country. For Brazilian logs, only based on China customs statistics, it is unable to 
distinguish between the logs produced from Brazilian Amazon (where illegal logging is a thorny problem) 
and those from Brazilian southern states. However, as logs only accounted for less than 1 percent (5,420 
RWE m3) of China’s wood imports from Brazil, its inclusion will not affect the final assessment of 
China’s total imports of illegal wood. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION 
By using the import-source analysis and trade data from the UN Comtrade database, 
FAOSTAT, and CCSY, this chapter has developed a full diagnosis of the nature and 
patterns of China’s global imports of illegal forest products. A number of key findings 
can be encapsulated from this case study: 
 
• In the international/regional transaction chain of illegal timber trade, China sits 
in the middle by acting as a prominent processing hub, each year importing large 
volumes of raw wood materials of illegal or suspicious origin from dozens of 
high-risk producer countries on the one hand, and re-exporting value-added 
wood-based products manufactured from the imported illegal wood mainly to 
markets in the developed countries on the other. With the critical absence of a 
legislative or regulatory establishment that specifically deals with the illegal 
timber trade, China’s illegal wood imports from high-risk producer countries 
have grown considerably in parallel with the aggressive expansion of its legal 
forest product trade. 
 
• By using the import-source approach to assess the content of illegal wood in 
every bilateral wood flows from the 44 identified high-risk supplying countries 
to China, this chapter has given a conservative estimate of the extent of China’s 
global imports of illegal wood. That is, in 2012 alone, China imported 24.2 
million RWE m3 of illegally logged timber or illegally traded wood products 
from the globe, with an import value of over US$4.3 billion. Such a magnitude 
of illegal timber imports represents ten percent by RWE volume and 12 percent 
by value of China’s global forest product imports in that year. It’s worth noting 
that in the existing literature, most of the studies on China’s illegal wood 
imports only cover a limited number of high-risk supplying countries, and/or 
only consider an incomplete spectrum of wood-based products. As such, the 
estimate produced by this analysis is probably at present the most 
comprehensive one considering its relatively broad coverage in terms of both the 
major forest products imported by China and the high-risk supplying countries 
involved in China’s global wood imports. 
 
• Within the international context, China stands as the world’s singularly largest 
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importer of illegal wood, with the second-highest estimated share of illegal 
wood imports in relation to the country’s total imports (ten percent, less than 
Japan at 20 percent). In contrast with other global leading importers, the RWE 
volume of illegal wood flows to China in 2012 is estimated to be almost double 
that of Japan, the second-highest importer (13.5 million RWE m3) and, more 
than triple that of the US, the third-largest importer (7.4 million RWE m3).  
 
• Through the analysis of China-related illegal wood flows, this chapter has 
identified multiple bilateral chains of transaction networks that connect China as 
the consumer and high-risk producer countries as the suppliers. These 
transaction chains represent the upper part of the overall China-oriented 
transaction chain of illegal wood trade, as China not only imports illegally 
logged timber, it also re-exports finished wood products made of the imported 
illegal wood. But cleaning up the upper, supply chain should be the starting 
point for China to tackle its problem of illegal wood trade. 
 
• This chapter has identified a clear pattern associated with China’s imports of 
illegal wood. That is, China’s global sourcing of illegal wood tends to 
concentrate in a limited number of high-risk producer countries. In the Asia-
Pacific, Indonesia, PNG, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam were the five 
leading suppliers of illegal tropical hardwood in the region. The combined 
exports from the five countries to China accounted for 84 percent by RWE 
volume of China’s illegal wood imports from the region, or 55 percent of 
China’s global imports of illegal wood. In Africa, eight high-risk countries – 
including Benin, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, 
Liberia, and Mozambique – supplied nearly all of the illegal wood that China 
sourced from the region, or six percent of the total illegal wood that China 
sourced from the globe. In Latin America, 64 percent of China’s illegal wood 
imports from the region originated from Mexico, 16 percent from Brazil, and 
eight percent from Peru. In Europe, Russia supplied a nearly complete share (99 
percent) of the illegal wood that China collected from the region. 
 
• In consistent with its overall timber trade, China’s imports of illegal wood 
exhibit a strong preference over unprocessed or marginally processed wood 
products. For example, in the Asia-Pacific, 84 percent of China’s imports of 
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illegal wood were composed of industrial logs, pulp, sawn wood, and wood 
chips. In Africa, industrial roundwood and sawn wood together comprised 99 
percent of the illegal timber exports from the region to China. 
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5. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL OZONE-DEPLETING 
SUBSTANCES 
 
This chapter is the third case study of China-related TEC with a specific focus on trade 
in illegal ozone-depleting substances (ODS). The main objective of this case study is to 
understand the “transaction networks” involved in China’s global and regional trade in 
illegal ODS chemicals. 
 
This chapter is organised into three sections. Recognising that the scholarly treatments 
of many key issues of global trade in illegal ODS have been presented less 
systematically, Section 5.1 reviews various discourses and lays them out in an organised 
and coherent fashion. In doing so, it periodises the historical evolution of the 
international illegal trade in ODS into three phases: origins, proliferation and history 
repeating itself. In each stage, this section analyses the scale and scope, trading routes, 
major sources, transiting points, and destinations associated with the illegal trade. 
Section 5.2 garners treatments from the literature concerning the factors and drivers of 
illegal ODS trade and categorises them into three broad groups: protocol-related factors, 
market-related elements, and regulatory and institutional failures. 
 
Section 5.3 firstly uses bilateral trade data collected from the Ozone Secretariat Data 
Access Centre and the UN Comtrade Database to document China’s historical record 
and the present state of ODS production, consumption, and trade. Secondly, this section 
compiles and analyses 85 records of China-related ODS seizures that occurred between 
January 2000 and April 2014. The main purpose of this analysis is to understand 
China’s role in the international and regional transaction chain of illegal ODS trade, the 
scale of China’s black market, the magnitude and diversity of ODS chemicals involved 
in illicit trade, the major destination markets for Chinese-produced ODS, and the 
prevalent methods for smuggling and concealment. 
  
5.1. ILLEGAL ODS TRADE: DEFINITIONS, ORIGINS, SCALES, AND TRENDS 
In the late 1980s, global concerns over an alarming international environmental crisis – 
the thinning of the Earth’s protective ozone layer – eventually led to the ratification of 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (also known as the 
Montreal Protocol). With a view to protecting the ozone layer and sending it back on 
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the track of recovery, this landmark MEA sets up a phase-out system to gradually 
eliminate global production and consumption of a family of ozone-depleting substances 
(ODS) listed in five annexes to the Protocol.106  
 
More than a quarter of a century has passed since its entering into force in 1989, the 
treaty has now been hailed by the international community as “perhaps the single most 
successful international agreement to date”107 in terms of its unprecedentedly universal 
participation by all nations in the world and of its great achievement in ozone layer 
protection. It has been claimed that the treaty can be a classic example and an inspiring 
demonstration of how developed and developing countries can unite under an 
internationally agreed framework to address a global environmental challenge (UNEP 
2012, 6). 
 
Despite the tremendous applause that the Protocol has received, there are still important 
issues, which the Protocol has largely failed to deal with effectively, that continue to 
possess strong potentials to undercut the concerted international effort to protect the 
ozone layer. 108  Among such issues, illegal trade in ODS (including mixtures and 
equipment containing ODS) remains a palpable manifestation of the Protocol’s 
vulnerability. As recognised by the Decision XII/10 (2010) adopted at the seventh 
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Montreal Protocol, illegal trade poses “a threat to 
the global success of ozone layer protection”. 
 
5.1.1. DEFINING THE TERM 
As a subset of the broad environmental crime, illegal trade in ODS can be understood as 
                                                          
106 ODS to be phased out under the Montreal Protocol are listed in four Annexes of Controlled Substances 
to the Protocol. These include: (1) Annex A, Group I and Annex B, Group I: chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
used in aerosol, foam applications, refrigeration, and solvents; (2) Annex A, Group II: halons used in fire 
protection; (3) Annex B, Group II: carbon tetrachloride (CTC) used as a cleaning agent and process agent; 
(4) Annex B, Group III: 1,1,1-trichloroethane (methyl chloroform, short as “TCA”) used as industrial 
solvents; (5) Annex C, Group I: Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) used as transition substances to the 
phase-out of CFCs; (6) Annex C, Group II: Hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) used as solvents, 
cleaning agents and fire suppressants; (7) Annex E: methyl bromide used as a pesticide for soil 
fumigation and in post-harvest application. Annex D to the Protocol is a list of products containing CFCs 
or halons. See UNEP Ozone Secretariat. “The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer”. http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/5. 
107The Ozone Hole. “The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer”. 
http://www.theozonehole.com/montreal.htm. 
108 The continuation and potential expansion of the black market for ODS, the soaring production of 
HCFCs for feedstock use, and the emissions of ODS from banks of equipment and other products have 
been regarded as the three major issues that the Montreal Protocol has thus far failed to tackle in an 
effective manner (UNEP 2013b). 
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the “deliberate evasion of environmental laws and regulations by individuals and 
companies in the pursuit of personal financial benefits” (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2002, 
1). Though the Montreal Protocol itself does not define the term illegal trade, it 
institutes a set of control measures on the production, consumption, and international 
trade of ODS chemicals.109  It is then the legally bounded obligation of the Parties 
operating under both Article 2 (developed countries) and Article 5 (developing 
countries) to translate the control provisions into their domestic legislative and 
regulatory systems and to further implement them adequately. Therefore, it can be said 
that the illegality associated with ODS trade is directly tied to national laws and 
regulations. This is particularly the case after the 1997 Montreal Amendment when 
many Parties have established and implemented a licensing system that consists of 
quota control and license management for the production, consumption, import, and 
export of controlled substances.110 
 
In reality, due to the transnational distribution of consuming and supplying markets and 
trade globalisation, illegal trade often involves cross-border movements of ODS 
chemicals from the source countries to consumer countries, sometimes with third-party 
countries implicated as transit points. Along the chain of custody, illegality takes place 
in various forms, ranging from production, sale, import, export, or use without a licence, 
traded volumes in excess of the authorised allowance, to the import or export without 
payment of royalties or taxes. Accordingly, it follows that ODS chemicals can become a 
contraband in two different ways. First, when ODS are produced illegally by entities not 
registered or authorised by the national ODS administration. Second, when legal 
production of ODS is being diverted into the black market, meaning that although ODS 
remain legal at the source point, they become illicit during the redirection process as 
trading activities violate specific national laws on ODS imports and consumption. In 
both cases, ODS are being produced and circulated in an unregulated and unmonitored 
                                                          
109 According to Article 1 of the Montreal Protocol, “production” refers to the amount of controlled 
substances produced, minus the amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties and 
minus the amount entirely used as feedstock in the manufacture of other chemicals. Recycled and reused 
ODS are not calculated into a Party’s production. “Consumption” refers to production plus imports minus 
exports of controlled substances. See UNEP Ozone Secretariat. “The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer”. http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-
ozone-layer/5. 
110 The Montreal Protocol evolves through the “adjustments” and “amendments” in responding to new 
developments in the ozone layer domain. Since the signing of the Protocol in 1987, several significant 
amendments have been made. These include the 1990 London Amendment, the 1992 Copenhagen 
Amendment, the 1997 Montreal Amendment, and the 1999 Beijing Amendment. 
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fashion, thus undermining a country’s ability to stay compliant with its obligation under 
the Protocol. 
 
Hayman et al. (2002, 10) and Clark (2007a, 1) wrote that when controls restrict the 
supply of an existing environmental commodity or service while the demand for which 
remains buoyant, the emergence of a black market and associated illegal operations is 
par for the course. Illegal trade in ODS has just taken root in and grown out of such a 
historical conjuncture of curtailed supply and unmet demand (e.g., serving cars 
equipped with chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) reliant air-conditioning (AC) systems). 
Apparently, this has hardly been a new or sole phenomenon in the environmental 
management sector, as we have seen in the previous two case studies, the same kind of 
mechanism driving and perpetuating illegal trade in wildlife, timber, and wood products. 
 
5.1.2.  THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ILLEGAL TRADE IN ODS  
From a historical perspective, illegal ODS trade can be conceived of as evolving in line 
with the Protocol’s phase-out schedules through three stages: origins, proliferation, and 
“history reproducing itself”. Each stage is typified by distinct elements including the 
major traded substances and the directions of illegal flows.  
 
5.1.2.1. STAGE ONE: ORIGINS (1989–LATE 1990S) 
Originally, the first cases of illegal ODS trade came to light in the mid-1990s when 
phase-out schedules for CFCs began to effect in Article 2 countries. Except for exports 
to meet the basic domestic needs in Article 5 Parties and a handful of essential or 
critical uses that were exempted from the Protocol’s phase-out embrace, production of 
CFCs for domestic consumption ceased in Europe in 1995 and one year later in the US. 
In the meantime, stringent controls were imposed on CFC imports in Article 2 Parties, 
though again, with limited exemptions given to recycled or reclaimed CFCs and 
repackaging for onward export to Article 5 countries (EIA 2011, 3).  
 
Spatially, illegal trade at this stage was largely confined to non-Article 5 countries, 
mainly featured with brokers based in Europe (e.g., Germany, UK) diverting CFCs and 
halons produced in Central and Southeast Asian countries (notably China and Russia) 
onto the markets in the EU and US, where legitimate supplies had been curtailed but 
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steady demand had somehow persisted (Banks et al. 2008, 15–16). During this period, 
small amounts of illegal CFCs were also reported to be illegally imported into Australia, 
Canada, and Taiwan (Brack 1996, 110). It was reputed that the Russian Federation had 
been the most prominent source for the bulk of illegal CFCs transhipped through 
Europe to the US throughout most of the 1990s (UNEP 2001, 5). Some analysts 
estimated that the proportion of Russian-manufactured illicit CFCs to those produced 
worldwide could be as high as 47 percent (TED 1999). 
 
Estimates of the scale of international illegal trade in ODS during this period vary 
slightly. UNEP (2001, 3) and UNODC (2013, 119) estimated that between 16,000 and 
38,000 tonnes of illegal CFCs were traded globally in the mid-1990s, worth up to 
US$500 million and equivalent to 15–20 percent of the global CFC trade. Chatham 
House and EIA placed the estimated total volume of illegal ODS traded worldwide at 
up to 20,000 tonnes per year, with a value of US$150-300 million, amounting to 12 per 
cent of the global ODS production (Brack et al. 2006, 4).  
 
5.1.2.2. STAGE TWO: PROLIFERATION (EARLY 2000S–CIRCA. 2010)  
The second stage of the development of illegal ODS trade can be exemplified by its 
decline in developed countries contemporaneously with growing proliferation in the 
developing world. It became particularly entrenched in a limited number of developing 
countries.  
 
By the late-1990s, Europe and the US witnessed a clear decline in the level of CFC 
smuggling. This was evidenced by the seizure records released by the US Customs, 
which indicated that during 1992–2001, the volume of confiscated CFCs fell steeply 
from its peak in 1994 of 403,744 kg down to 14,247 kg in 2001 (UNEP Ozone 
Secretariat 2002, 3).  
 
This downward trend arose, in the main, from a combination of four factors. First, in 
1997 the Montreal Amendment required all Parties to “establish and implement a 
system for licensing the import and export of new, used, recycled, and reclaimed 
controlled substances” (Article 4B, Montreal Protocol). Licensing systems have proved 
to be an effective tool in assisting the Parties in the prevention of illegal traffic of 
controlled ODS through mutual notification – regular reporting by exporting countries 
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to importing countries and cross-checking of information between exporting and 
importing countries (MOP Decision IX/8 1997). Second, during the period, both the 
major transit region the EU and the leading consumer country the US had developed 
new responses to stem the influx of illegal CFCs into their territory. In June 2000, the 
EU ratified the Regulation (EC) NO 2037/2000 on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer which introduced a ground-breaking ban on the sale and use of CFCs and halons 
in all member states since 2000. While in the US, in response to the pervasive ODS 
smuggling in Florida and Miami, the US authorities established a task squad on CFC 
smuggling under the aegis of the Justice Department and many other Federal 
governmental agencies. Such a multi-agency approach, along with the special 
enforcement operations against ODS smuggling initiated thereafter such as the “Cool 
Breeze”, had facilitated the flow of information among coordinated agencies and 
deterred many of those involved in either large-scale marine trafficking or small-scale 
passenger trafficking along the US-Mexico borders (Ezra and Newman 2002, 6; 
Andersen et al. 2002, 184–5). Third, thanks to the external donor funding, major 
producer countries like Russia were able to wind down their domestic CFC production. 
In 1996, the World Bank, in collaboration with the international financial entity Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and individual donor nations, launched the “Special 
Initiative for Supplementary Funding”. A sum of US$26.2 million was granted to 
support the Russian government to shut down its internal CFC and halon production 
capacity (UNEP 2001, 10). By 2000, Russia successfully closed its CFC and halon 
production facilities and stopped import and export operations of Annex A- and B-
controlled ODS (MOP Decision XIII/17 2001). This had helped to reduce the flows of 
illegal ODS from high-risk countries to the international black market. Fourth, and 
probably the most important factor, market demand for CFCs dwindled in the EU and 
US in pace with a growing number of CFC-reliant equipment and appliances (e.g., 
refrigerators, air-conditioners) that were either being retrofitted to use ODS alternatives, 
or being eliminated from continuing operation as they reach their end-of-life point, or 
being smuggled together with other “e-wastes” to the developing countries.111  
 
                                                          
111 “E-wastes” refer to discarded electronic devices or their scrapped components such as used computer 
monitors, mobile phones, and TV sets. The issue of smuggling of used ODS-containing equipment 
converges with another issue known as “e-waste dumping” in cases when the involved ODS-based 
products are electronic appliances such as refrigerators and air conditioners (also referred to as 
“household hazardous waste”). Smuggling of such “white goods” poses a serious threat not only to ozone 
layer and climate change, but also to the environment and public health. 
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In parallel with the decline of ODS smuggling in developed countries, developing 
countries started to see illegal ODS trade escalating into a widespread and substantial 
issue as the 1990s drew to close. Following immediately the commencement of the 
1999 consumption freeze in Article 5 countries, evidence derived from seizure records 
and market surveys had been piling up and signifying a strong shift of ODS smuggling 
from the developed to developing world.  
 
With only a few years into the 1999 freeze, instances of illegal trade began to take place 
in a host of developing countries. In particular, the Asia-Pacific region, which 
constituted more than 80 percent of global production and consumption of CFCs, had 
quickly emerged to be the new hub for the black market in ODS (Clark 2007a, 2; Elliott 
2007b, 505). By 2005, countries in the region with proved records of contraband ODS 
seizures included Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam, with China being the main source. Moreover, the problem of 
ODS smuggling seemed to become more acute and entrenched in a small number of 
countries in the region. For example, in Vietnam, in the early 2000s, around 80 percent 
of the CFC-12 imports were estimated illegal (Ezra and Newman 2002, 13). In India, 
between 1999 and 2000, an estimated 900–1000 metric tonnes of illegal ODS were 
smuggled into the country (UNEP 2001, 5). In the Philippines, in 2002, about 15–20 
percent of the CFCs shipped to the country arrived without permits (Brack et al. 2006, 
5); other estimates suggested that illegal trade of CFC-12 in the Philippine might be up 
to 75 percent of the legitimate consumption (Ezra and Newman 2002, 13).   
 
EIA assessed that during the early 2000s the size of illegal CFCs being smuggled into 
developing countries each year was likely on the order of 10–20 percent of the 
legitimate trade. Based on the 2005 figures, smuggling of this magnitude would 
represent an illegal trade in CFCs of approximately 7,000–14,000 metric tonnes per 
annum, with a value of US$25–60 million (Clark 2007b, 1).  
 
More recently, ODS seizures resulted from the special operations “Sky-hole Patching 
Series” provide another string of solid evidence for the widespread nature and 
substantial magnitude of ODS smuggling in the Asia Pacific. In 2006, at the request of 
China Customs, UNEP and World Customs Organisation Regional Intelligence Liaison 
Office for Asia and the Pacific (WCO RILO A/P) coordinated the “Sky-hole Patching 
Operation I”. This regional enforcement operation incorporated partners from customs 
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and environmental authorities of 20 Asian countries and international organisations to 
form a united anti-environmental crime front in the Asia-Pacific to curb the illegal trade 
in ODS and hazardous wastes. The key approach adopted to support the operation was 
the establishment of an informal monitoring and notification system for the keeping 
track of the movement of suspicious shipments when they were imported, re-exported 
or trans-shipped across the territories of member customs (WCO RILO A/P 2007, 3). In 
ODS terms, from September 2006 to October 2007, six member Customs in China, Fiji, 
India, Thailand, and the Philippines reported 27 seizures of a total of 155 metric tonnes 
of contraband ODS. Of which, Thailand and India made the largest number (9) of 
seizures, with each confiscating 65 metric tonnes of CFCs and Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs) and 31 metric tonnes of HCFCs respectively. This was followed by China 
with six seizures of 51 metric tonnes of CFCs and HCFCs, the Philippines with one 
seizure of 5 tonnes of CFCs, and Fiji with one seizure of a small quantity of CFCs. Of 
the chemicals seized, CFC-12 and HCFC-22 were the most traded items in these 
clandestine activities (WCO RILO A/P 2007, 11). 
 
After November 2007, the notification mechanism of suspicious shipments was 
maintained and ODS seizures continued to be reported by the participating countries. 
Till October 2009, an aggregate of 301 cases of ODS smuggling were documented, 
contributing to a total confiscation of 728 metric tonnes of illegal ODS, with 99 percent 
of which being CFCs (UNODC 2013, 117).  
 
Inspired by the successes of the Sky-hole Patching I, in 2010 the WCO RILO A/P and 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction (Division of Technology, Industry and Economics), together 
with customs authorities from over 80 countries, launched the project “Sky-hole 
Patching II”. In this operation, 275 seaports and other strategically selected enforcement 
locations were identified as high-risk points, at which customs officials were advised to 
intensify their risk profiling and physical inspection of suspicious outgoing and 
incoming shipments. Through a six-month action from May to November 2010, the 
joint enforcement operation resulted in the seizure of over 7,500 cylinders of illegal 
CFCs, HCFCs and other controlled ODS chemicals, with a total weighing 108 metric 
tonnes. Although some seizures were reported from Africa, Central Asia, and Europe, 
the majority took place in the Asia Pacific, with China, India, and Thailand recording 
the largest hauls of illicit ODS (WCO and UNEP 2010, 1–2). Today, the operation has 
become an ongoing plan of action being practised each year by customs officials. 
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Updated information from the 2013 Analysis Report by the WCO RILO A/P and Korea 
Customs Service (2013, 17) indicated that during 2012, three seizures of 23 metric 
tonnes of illegal ODS were made in the Asia Pacific.  
 
At the Regional Customs Cooperating Meeting in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
May 2014, customs officers from 19 countries including China were awarded the “2014 
Ozone Protection Award” for their commitment to the prevention and combating of 
unwanted and illegal trade in ODS. Statistics indicated that from September 2012 to 
April 2014, customs officials from the 19 countries contributed to a total of 133 seizures 
of 7,370 pieces of equipment and 9,513 refrigerant cylinders containing more than 467 
metric tonnes of ODS and mixtures. In addition, during the period, the Informal Prior 
Informed Consent (iPIC) – a voluntary consultation mechanism designed to prevent 
illegal and unwanted trade through online information exchange and cross-checking 
between importing and exporting member countries before the issuance of 
export/import licenses – reported the avoidance of 67 unwanted or illegal shipments of 
nearly 846 metric tonnes of ODS chemicals and mixtures (UNEP DTIE OzonAction 
2014a). 
 
5.1.2.3. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF (2010–PRESENT) 
From January 2010, consumption of CFCs was banned worldwide. The challenge for 
the member states to the Montreal Protocol has moved to the prevention of illegal trade 
in methyl bromide and HCFCs, whose consumption is projected to cease in 2015 and 
2040 respectively. In fact, as developing countries froze the use of HCFCs in 2013 and 
developed countries took deeper cuts in line with their commitments under the Protocol, 
concerns have been raised over the likelihood that the history of illegal trade in CFCs 
would reproduce itself in the sector of HCFCs (Grabiel et al. 2013, 48). In reality, 
HCFC smuggling, including both small-quantity smuggling and large-scale smuggling, 
have been evidenced in a number of HCFC seizures occurred in China, French Estonia, 
Greece, India, Italy, UK and the US in recent years, suggesting the existence of a 
pervasive black market for HCFCs with potential to rival that seen with CFCs.  
 
In contrast with the market conditions where illegal CFC trade grew up, the present 
global trading environment provides a more fertile market ground favourable for the 
potential development and prosperity of a black market for HCFCs. First, current scale 
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of global use of HCFCs is much greater than that of CFCs. Since 1998, HCFC 
consumption in developing countries has grown at an average rate of 15 percent per 
year. In 2012, combined consumption in Article-5 Parties amounted to 603,550 metric 
tonnes, 3.2 times more than the peaked consumption of CFCs in 1995 (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of historical consumption of CFCs and HCFCs in Article-5 Parties (metric tonnes) 
 
(Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1996–2012)  
Note: CFC consumption was converted from ODP tonnes to metric tonnes by multiplying the conversion 
factor “1”; for HCFCs, the conversion ratio is “15.35”. These two conversion factors were quoted from 
EIA (2011, 30). 
 
Second, present use of HCFCs is much more widespread and popular than that of CFCs. 
Thanks to their low ozone-depleting potential (ODP), HCFCs were initially introduced 
as transition substances to facilitate the smooth phase-out of CFCs. However, industry 
research shows that HCFCs have now been used for a wide array of purposes not only 
including aerosol propellants, foaming blowing agents, refrigerants, and solvents, but 
also involving feedstock uses and process agents for the manufacturing of other 
chemicals. Moreover, demand for and use of HCFCs seem to have become rooted in 
several industrial sectors in a number of developing countries. A comprehensive survey 
carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2005 on the 
HCFC consumption patterns and trends in nine selected countries revealed a high level 
of concentration in terms of the substances consumed and the consuming industrial 
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sectors involved. 112  In 2005, consumption of HCFCs in the nine sample countries 
totalled 52,140 metric tonnes. HCFC-22 and HCFC-141b were the two most used 
chemicals, combined constituted 97 percent of the total use. Most of HCFC 
consumption appeared to pile up in the refrigeration servicing sector and foam 
manufacturing sector (UNDP 2005, 3, 5–6).  
 
5.2. FACTORS DRIVING ILLEGAL ODS TRADE 
In essence, the core mechanism behind illegal trade in ODS is the special market 
conditions where demand remains unmet due to controlled and curtailed supply. 
However, a comprehensive literature review suggests that the formation of such market 
environment can be articulated to three clusters of factors. This section garners and 
collates treatments in the literature of drivers and factors that are believed to have 
played a part in engendering such market conditions. For clarity, this section categorises 
them into three broad groups: Protocol-related factors, market-related elements, and 
regulatory and institutional failures.  
 
5.2.1. PROTOCOL-RELATED FACTORS 
Protocol-related factors are mainly concerned with the design and loopholes associated 
with the ozone regime established under the Montreal Protocol. These factors are 
claimed to create considerable potential for illegal trade or present loopholes that have 
been exploited by black marketers and fraudsters in the trafficking of controlled ODS. 
 
5.2.1.1. DIFFERENTIATED PHASE-OUT SCHEDULES 
A common criticism of the ozone regime is that the differentiated phase-out schedules 
between Article 5 and non-Article 5 Parties lead to substantial price differentials 
between the international and domestic markets and open the door for large profits to be 
made by smugglers.  
 
                                                          
112 These nine surveyed countries were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, 
Mexico, and Venezuela. 
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In consideration of the political, economic, and technical constraints facing the 
developing countries during the 1980s,113 the Protocol granted a 10-more-year grace 
period for countries operating under Article 5 of the Protocol to – with the financial and 
technical assistance from developed countries – gradually adapt to the international 
standards. The staggered phase-out schedules legitimately enabled developing countries 
to continue producing and consuming CFCs and halons for at least 14 years beyond the 
1 January 1996 phase-out date for non-Article 5 countries. Such different target dates 
for the phase-out implementation resulted in significant price differentials between the 
international markets where the supply was freely available and the prices were low and 
the national markets where the supply was dwindling and the prices were rising. For 
example, it is said that in 1997 a kilogram of CFCs bought in China would only cost 
US$2, but the price rose to US$10–15 per kg when smuggled into the EU (Hayman and 
Brack 2002, 12). Therefore, the large price margins made smuggling of ODS from 
developing to developed countries a highly profitable business.  
 
Moreover, global price discontinuities were further accentuated in countries where tax 
and royalty fees were levied on ODS import or where supply cartels were able to 
maintain inflated prices for ODS on the domestic market (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 
2002, 2). For example, in the US, since 1990 an escalating excise tax was imposed on 
ODS production and import. It is estimated that during that time, one container load of 
CFCs (30,0001b) smuggled into the US would bring the smugglers a quick profit of 
over US$200,000-250,000 due to the price differentials between the low price for CFC 
purchase on the world market and the high wholesale or retail prices in the US (Hayman 
and Brack 2002, 12).  
 
5.2.1.2. RECYCLED SUBSTANCES NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROTOCOL’S CONTROL 
MEASURES 
Compared to virgin ODS, recovered, recycled, and reclaimed ODS are less regulated by 
the ozone regime.114 Under the Montreal Protocol, the amounts recycled and reused are 
                                                          
113 In general, such considerations included: (1) during the 1990s, a number of countries with economies 
in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced political and economic 
upheavals which made them difficult to ratify and comply with the Montreal Protocol. (2) The then 
existence of a large number of ODS-reliant equipment in developing countries made an accelerated 
process of retrofitting or replacing such equipment economically unrealistic. (3) Technical limitations 
remained on the wide availability of low-cost ODS alternatives in many applications. 
114 Decision IV/24 of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol provides detailed definitions 
for the three terms (MOP Decision IV/24 1992). 
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not considered as “production” and thus not included in the calculation of a Party’s 
consumption quotas (Article 1, Montreal Protocol). International trade in non-virgin 
ODS is only subject to the regulation of Article 4B of the Protocol which urges each 
Party to institute a licensing system for the validation and approval of import and export 
of new, used, recycled, and reclaimed controlled substances, as well as the regulation of 
Article 7(3) which requires each Party to report to the Ozone Secretariat separate 
statistical data of its annual import and export of controlled substances whether used or 
not.  
 
The allowance for an ongoing transnational trade of reused and recycled ODS after the 
phase-out date gives rise to a loophole. Smugglers are able to get around the national 
monitoring and control systems simply by falsely disguising and declaring new CFCs or 
halons as recycled, especially when it is difficult to distinguish virgin and used ODS 
gases. However, market surveys show that very few used ODS are actually found on the 
world market, due to the usually lower price of virgin ODS compared with the cost for 
recovering ODS from used machinery or equipment (Grabiel et al. 2013, 51). 
 
5.2.1.3. TRANSIT TRADE 
Under the Montreal Protocol, “transit” or “transit movements” refers specifically to 
“transhipment” where goods from the country of origin are shipped through a third 
country (transit point) but destined for another country for final sale or consumption. It 
is worth noting that the Protocol distinguishes transhipment from another term “import 
and re-export”. Though both involve the presence of an intermediary country, 
transhipment refers to goods being moved through a third country while without leaving 
the port, railway wagon or other temporary storage places on their way from the country 
of origin to the country of final destination. In contrast, in cases of import and 
subsequent re-export, goods are firstly imported into the intermediary country, after 
either being stored for some time or going through certain forms of processing (e.g., 
repackaging), and then re-exported to the final destination country (Brack et al. 2006, 
30–1).  
 
With respect to the responsibility of data report, the Protocol views transit trade as a 
single transaction and imposes the reporting obligations on the country of origin as the 
exporter and the country of final destination as the importer. For import and re-export, 
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the Protocol regards them as two separate transactions and places the reporting 
obligations on the country of origin that first reports the shipment to the country of 
intermediary destination, which subsequently reports the export to the country of final 
destination, and at last the country of final destination reports the import (Article 7, 
Montreal Protocol). Thus, it can be seen that in the case of transhipment, the 
intermediary countries are under no bound obligation to record and report goods passing 
through their territories. While in the case of import and re-export, each of the three 
parties involved equally take a reporting obligation. Nonetheless, both forms of 
transiting goods through a third party, especially those trading hubs or free trade zones, 
can present a serious loophole that smugglers can take advantage of for ODS trafficking. 
 
Typically, illegal traders employ transit points to detour illegal ODS from the source to 
end-use market for two reasons. First, rigorous checking at the customs point of the 
destination country makes a direct relay of the contraband risky, especially when the 
source country has been profiled by the destination country as a hot or high-risk source 
for illegal ODS, and therefore see its shipments prioritised for scrutiny. Second, 
monitoring and control of the movement of ODS in the intermediary country are often 
lax or even largely missing. Being so may be due to either the sheer enormous scale of 
cargo throughput at the trading hubs’ sea and terrestrial ports, which makes it 
impossible to police every flow, or else due to the special policies in free trade zones 
that have looser administrative procedures by design in order to attract international 
investment and reduce local unemployment and poverty. Whatever the reason behind it, 
the very lack of stringent monitoring and control of transited goods in intermediary 
countries implies that they provide a route that illegal dealers can capitalise on to 
obscure the provenance of the illegal chemicals and confuse the tracks. This creates 
extra dimensions of difficulty for the detection and interception of ODS contraband by 
customs officials in the destination countries. 
 
The use of transit scam in transboundary movements of illegal ODS has been a 
recurring and widespread feature throughout the history of ODS trafficking. During the 
second half of the 1990s, as discussed earlier, much of the illegal CFCs entering the US 
originated in Russia but passed through the hands of a set of European companies as 
brokers. A point worth highlighting here is that these contraband CFCs were managed 
to be imported into the US, again, under the disguise of transit trade, with the final 
destination falsely stated on the customs documents as developing countries in Latin 
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America and the Caribbean. In reality, however, detected cases of CFC smuggling into 
Florida and Miami at this time showed that the majority of the illicit CFCs never left the 
US, but ended up in the US domestic markets (Anderson et al. 2002, 184). During 1995 
and 1996, it was discovered that a number of American and European offshore 
territories in the Pacific and Caribbean including Netherlands Antilles and French Saint 
Martine were being used frequently as transit points in laundering CFCs and thereby 
blurring the true destination of the chemicals (UNEP 2001, 17–8; Brack et al. 2006, 33). 
After entering the 2000s, in tandem with the shift of the ODS black market from 
developed to developing countries, several trading hotspots in the Asia Pacific including 
Singapore and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates emerged to be the new transit points 
in transnational illegal ODS trade. EIA’s analysis of seizure data and interviews with 
illegal dealers revealed that a significant proportion of illegal CFCs imported into India 
were transited through Dubai and Singapore, while over half of the total CFCs imported 
into Dubai were re-exported both legally and illegally to Africa, South Asia, and other 
markets (Clark and Newman 2002, 14).  
 
5.2.2. MARKET-RELATED ELEMENTS 
Market-related elements mainly pertain to the factors that either lead to the persistence 
of a high market demand for controlled ODS after the phase-out dates, or contribute to 
the wide availability of illegal ODS on the black markets. 
 
5.2.2.1. HIGH MARKET DEMAND  
As with other black markets, demand inclines to be the ultimate creator of supply. 
According to the literature, the continuation beyond the phase-out schedules of a latent 
market demand for controlled ODS can be attributed to four factors.  
 
First and foremost, the existence of a large number of ODS-containing equipment and 
appliances in use creates sizeable and dispersed service markets. In the US, for example, 
it is argued that the millions of vehicles fitted with CFC-dependent AC systems were 
the largest single source for market demand during the 1990s. It is estimated that over 
90 percent of automobiles running in the mid-1990s were equipped with CFC-reliant 
AC systems; in 1995 this represented around 110 million cars using CFC-12 (Hayman 
and Brack 2002, 12). Even by the year 2002, according to UNEP’s 2002 refrigeration 
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assessment report, at the global level, there were still some 600,000 road vehicles 
equipped with AC systems operating on CFC-12 or R-502, equivalent to half of the total 
number of the vehicles in use in that year (Kuijpers 2003, 8). Another indicator of the 
extent of installed ODS-containing equipment is the “ODS banks”, a jargon used to 
refer to the “total amounts of ODS substances contained in existing equipment, 
chemical stockpiles, foams and other products” (de Jager et al. 2005, 3). According to 
UNEP’s 2006 refrigeration assessment report, the global CFC bank accumulated at 
around 450,000 tonnes, with 70 percent of which estimated to be clumped in Article 5 
countries. HCFCs comprised the dominant refrigerant bank in terms of quantity, 
estimated at more than 1.5 million tonnes, representing 60 percent of the total amount of 
refrigerants in use. Again, the bulk (two-third) of the global HCFC bank resided in 
Article 5 countries (Kuijpers 2007, 2).  
 
Second, ODS-containing equipment usually has a long operating life. Early in the first 
half of the 1990s, major manufacturers initiated the conversion process of new product 
production from CFCs to the use of ODS-free refrigerants. For example, by the end of 
1994, nearly all the major automobiles manufacturers had converted their mobile AC 
systems to the use of HFC-134a (Kuijpers 1998, 13). However, the typically 15–25-
year-long lifespan means that old equipment manufactured using CFC-12 refrigerants 
still comprises the majority of the installed base (de Jager et al. 2005, 51). Therefore, it 
is expected that the longer these products linger on the market, the longer the demand 
for illegal ODS will persist.  
 
Third, for ODS-reliant equipment to be operating on ODS-free chemicals, the 
equipment often requires retrofitting, such as a change of lubricant or replacement of 
expansion device or compressor. However, the cost for equipment conversion is usually 
higher than that of directly acquiring ODS from the black market. Thereby, a kind of 
“symbiotic” relationship is formed between the continuing use of ODS-reliant 
equipment and the illegal trade. That is, the “continuing use” creates a demand for 
cheap ODS, which leads to the emergence of a black market. The black market further 
allows for plentiful supplies of cheap illicit ODS, which in turn extend the operating life 
of the equipment being used. This symbiosis explains in part why the demand for CFCs 
in the service sectors in some developing countries (e.g., India, Indonesia) still remains 
high despite the import of virgin CFCs has been banned since January 2010. For 
example, according to UNEP, the average cost of retrofitting a mobile AC system to 
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enable the use of HFC-134a in Asian developing countries is between US$100–200. In 
contrast, acquiring a 13.6 kg-weighed cylinder of CFC-12 from the black market would 
only cost US$50, which would allow the AC systems to be serviced many times (Liu 
and Bagai 2007, 4). In addition to that, the greater cost of ODS alternatives might also 
serve as a discouragement to the replacement process. For example, the global average 
price for HFC-134a in 2010 was recorded at US$17.23 per kg, some US$3.58 higher 
than that for CFC-12 in that year (Grabiel et al. 2013, 45). 
 
Fourth, the smuggling of used equipment, products, and components (e.g., automobile 
AC units, domestic or commercial refrigeration and heat pump systems) whose 
continuing functioning relies on the supply of controlled ODS further complicates the 
illegal trade problem. This is because the trafficking increases the number of ODS-
reliant equipment and ODS banks in the recipient countries. This, in turn, undermines 
the recipient countries’ ability to reduce demand particularly from the service sector, 
and thus increases the risk of illegal trade. 
 
Initially, the issue of illegal trade of ODS-reliant equipment was brought to the attention 
of the Ozone Secretariat at the Thirteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol in 2001. 
At the meeting, 20 small countries including Argentina were found to be failing to 
comply with their production or consumption baseline, despite receiving considerable 
financial assistance from the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol (MLF). National representatives from these non-complying countries pointed 
to the issues of cheap and ample supplies of illegal CFCs and the growing imports of 
used CFC equipment (especially used vehicles and domestic refrigeration equipment 
operating on CFC-12) as two main culprits for their failure to stay compliant (13th 
MOP Report 2001, 33). In response, the Ozone Secretariat established a list of countries 
that do not manufacture controlled substances for domestic use and do not wish to 
import ODS-containing equipment and products. In addition, a number of Parties 
outlawed the import of used ODS equipment by introducing import bans or other 
regulatory restrictions. Even more aggressively, the EU banned the export to all 
countries of used equipment containing most categories of controlled ODS. Despite all 
these initiatives, however, due to the high costs associated with the shipping, recycling, 
and destruction of used ODS-based equipment in developed countries, smugglers have 
been able to step in and purchase the used equipment at a low price from those holders 
wishing to get rid of such economic burden. As a result, most of the obsolete ODS-
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based goods are smuggled and sold into the developing countries where local people are 
unable to afford the new products.  
 
Today, the dumping problem is taking place again, only with the subject shifted from 
the equipment-containing CFCs to that containing HCFCs, mostly involving the 
equipment designed for HCFC-22 and used in refrigeration and AC sector, as well as, to 
a lesser extent the foaming equipment (Grabiel et al. 2013, 19). Though it remains 
unknown as to the precise magnitude of the ODS-containing products being smuggled 
annually from the developed to developing countries, this problem can be significant as 
corroborated by seizure information. For example, apart from the seizure of 108 tonnes 
of illicit ODS chemicals, the 2010 Sky-hole Patching II operation also contributed to the 
interception of over 660 items of ODS-containing equipment (WCO and UNEP 2010, 
2). This problem highlights the relevance of the sound management of the nearing-end-
of-life products at the exporting side and the regulation of import of used ODS 
equipment at the importing side to the protection of the ozone layer and mitigation of 
climate change. 
 
5.2.2.2. THE READY AVAILABILITY OF ILLEGAL ODS 
On the supply side, the wide availability of contraband ODS tends to be the major 
impediment to the timely elimination of the use of controlled ODS. At the Ninth MOP 
in 1997, the Ozone Secretariat noticed the issue of illegal trade resulting in the 
continuing availability of fairly significant quantities of CFCs in several non-Article 5 
countries after the phase-out of production and consumption of CFCs by January 1996 
(MOP Decision IX/23 1997). This had prevented such Parties from complying with 
their due phase-out obligations and led to greater continued use of CFCs and halons and 
continued ozone depletion.  
 
In general, such ready availability, though stockpiles and recycling from the installed 
banks may play a part, is mainly ascribable to the continuation of production of virgin 
substances in both developed and developing countries. More specifically, as discussed 
in the earlier part of this chapter, such continued production can further be distinguished 
between two different sources: either illegal production going on unregulated or, legal 
production being diverted onto the black market. 
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a. Illegal Production 
For Parties whose freeze or phase-out schedules for a specific controlled substance 
become applicable, it is the Party’s mandatory obligation to take practicable measures to 
regulate and manage its domestic production, consumption, and trade of that substance 
in order to meet the reduction goals under the Protocol. Within this context, what are 
termed “illegal production” points to the part that exceeds the national production limits 
as specified for a specific control period by the Protocol. For example, Paragraph 2, 
Article 2 of the Montreal Protocol requests that, for any non-Article 5 Parties during the 
control period of 1 January 1994 to 1 January 1996, their annual production of the 
controlled substances in Group I, Annex A (A-I, five main types of CFCs) shall not 
exceed 25 percent of their 1986 production baseline. It will be considered as an act of 
non-compliance if the Party concerned produce more than the maximum allowed, and in 
a sense, the part surpassing the permitted quantity may be deemed as illegal production. 
Overproduction at the national level is quite an accumulative result of the ill-regulated 
industrial activities. At the industry level, illegality may be mirrored in various forms of 
unregulated production including unlicensed production or production in excess of the 
quotas specified in a permit issued by the National Ozone Units (NOU).  
 
In history, a typical example for production in excess of the Protocol permits was 
Russia and other Eastern European countries which, though classified as non-Article 5 
countries and scheduled for the 1996 phase-out, experienced hardships in complying 
with the terms of the Protocol due to the political and economic turmoil during the mid-
1990s. As a result, these countries were actually in non-compliance with their 
obligations under the Protocol by continuing to illegally produce controlled substances 
that were supposed to be phased out. As discussed previously, it is claimed that much of 
these overproduced materials were flooded to the black markets in the EU, US and other 
non-Article 5 countries. Other documented instances of production non-compliance 
include Argentina, which reported production of 3,065 ODP tonnes of A-I controlled 
substances during the freeze control period of 1 July 1999 to 1 June 2000, some 319.7 
ODP tonnes more than its maximum permitted. This had placed Argentina in non-
compliance vis-à-vis its obligations under Article 2A of the Protocol for that control 
period (MOP Decision XIII/21 2001). 
 
It deserves to note that “production in excess of the Protocol requirements” as reflected 
in the cases of Russia and Argentina might only represent part of the entirety of illegal 
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production, that is, the part being calculated into a Party’s production or consumption 
quotas and being detected and identified as non-compliant. Yet as substantiated in the 
case of China’s CFC exports after the declared closure of domestic CFC production 
facilities in 2007 (discussed later), there have been significant amounts of illegal 
production going on clandestinely which remain undetected and undocumented by 
Chinese ODS officials.  
 
b. Legal Production 
On top of illegal production, there has been the existence of several forms of legal 
production which are thought to provide another source of ODS being directed to illegal 
commerce and offer a range of opportunities for concealment and disguises.   
 
Under the terms of the Protocol, as mentioned above, a ten-year delay was granted to 
developing countries whose annual consumption level of Annex A substances is lower 
than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any 
time thereafter but prior to the 1999 freeze date (Para. 1, Art. 5, Montreal Protocol). The 
one-decade grace period provides the legal foundation for Article 5 countries to 
continue producing and consuming new CFCs and halons to meet their basic domestic 
needs until the 2010 phase-out date, though the amount produced and consumed each 
year is subject to a gradual reduction control starting from 1 January 1999 (Para. 3, Art. 
5, Montreal Protocol). However, it seemed that some Article 5 Parties were taking 
advantage of this opportunity to produce and consume CFCs and other ODS much more 
than really needed, which had therefore caused a marked growth in ODS production in 
Article 5 countries between 1986 and 1997 (see Figure 5.2). In particular, China, India, 
Brazil and the Republic of Korea were the four largest producers of Annex-A 
substances among Article 5 Parties through the history.  
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Figure 5.2: Production of controlled substances in Annex A (CFCs and Halons) in Article 5 Parties during 
1986 –2012 (ODP tonnes) 
 
(Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1986–2010) 
Note: Historical production of Annex B-I substances (other CFCs) in Article 5 Parties has been 
insignificant in quantity, with annual fluctuation up and down mainly along the level of 25 ODP tonnes 
till 2006 
 
Figure 5.3: Production of A-I (CFCs) controlled substances in major producing Article 5 Parties during 
 
(Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1986–2010) 
 
For non-Article 5 countries, legal production was also permitted to continue after the 
1996 phase-out date for several specified purposes and exempted essential or critical 
uses. First, production of Annex A and B substances for export to meet the basic 
domestic needs of Article 5 Parties was allowed until the 2010 phase-out date applied to 
the developing countries, though again, the quantity produced annually was subject to 
189 
 
gradual reduction control. Some analysts claimed that in the mid-1990s, in addition to 
the flows of the Russian manufactured ODS, considerable amounts of controlled 
substances produced in Europe under the name of export to meet the basic needs in 
developing countries were actually being laundered back into European countries’ 
domestic markets (Andersen et al. 2002, 185). Second, an exemption from the phase-out 
control was given to certain “essential uses”, which are usages that were considered 
critical either for health and safety or for the functioning of society, when no other 
economically, technically, and environmentally acceptable alternatives or substitutes 
were available (MOP Decision IV/25 1992). Therefore, even after the phase-out date, 
non-Article 5 Parties can apply for the production and consumption of four mains CFCs 
(CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-113, and CFC-114), halon-2402, and methyl chloroform for 
essential uses including metered-dose inhalers (MDIs), fire protection, torpedo 
maintenance, aerospace applications, laboratory and analytical critical uses. The 
production and/or import of controlled ODS for exempted essential uses are not 
aggregated into a Party’s ODS consumption quotas. Third, there is also a critical-use 
provision under the Protocol that applies only to methyl bromide. A Party can apply for 
a critical-use exemption (CUE) for methyl bromide which will allow it to produce or 
import a specified quantity of that substance in a given calendar year and use it for the 
specified applications approved by the Parties. Fourth, production and consumption of 
controlled substances for the use as feedstock in the manufacturing of other chemicals 
are not controlled by the Protocol. Therefore, the amounts produced and imported for 
that purpose are not included in the calculation of a Party’s production and consumption 
quotas (MOP Decision VII/30 1995). However, UNEP and EIA have cautioned that the 
large volumes of unmonitored HCFC feedstock production accumulated in developing 
countries might become another source of black market HCFCs, in particular when 
Article 5 Parties take deeper production cuts pursuant to their commitments under the 
Protocol (EIA 2011, 22). 
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Figure 5.4: Essential use exemptions of CFCs during 1996–2012 (metric tonnes) 
 
           (Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1996–2012) 
 
5.2.3. REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES 
Addressing the black market for environmental commodities or services can be 
challenging due to the many complexities that impair the established international and 
national control system. Broadly, Hayman and Brack (2002, 10, 15–7) classify such 
complexities under two rubrics: “regulatory and institutional failures”. In their views, 
regulatory failures refer to inadequate regulations, regulatory loopholes, or the failure to 
deter non-compliance attempts. On the other hand, institutional failures include 
insufficient resources, untrained (or undertrained) staff, or cumbersome administration 
that might prevent the effective operation of environmental controls.    
 
In the ODS sector, if regulatory failures refer to the loopholes associated with the ozone 
regime that create the potential for illegal trade (as discussed previously), then 
institutional failure might specifically embody in several factors that directly cause 
layers of difficulty in the detection and combating of illegal ODS trade. At the 12th 
MOP in December 2000, the Parties recognised the relevance of control over trade 
between Parties of ODS and products containing ODS for the global implementation of 
the Protocol. However, in the meantime, the Parties also acknowledged that the 
effective control at national borders can be difficult due to “the problems in ODS 
identification, the complexity of relevant customs codes, the lack of trained customs 
officers, and the need to approach the problems by cooperative action by all countries” 
(MOP Decision XII/10 2000). Moreover, the parallel existence of legal and illegal ODS 
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on the market implies that the mere presence of a controlled substance cannot be simply 
deemed as a sign of illegality. Further verification of the accompanying documentation 
is required before a judgement on the nature of the goods inspected can be made 
(DeSombre 2000, 63). However, considering the huge numbers of cross-border 
shipments that take place worldwide each day, the complexity and enormous scale of 
work that customs and enforcement personnel have to handle, especially in terms of 
differentiating and triaging between illegal and legal shipments, cannot be understated. 
For example, global ODS imports reached 336,790 metric tonnes in 2012. Drawing 
upon the method used by Chatham House and EIA (Brack et al. 2006, 8),115 this would 
represent around 22,512 transnational shipments to be monitored by enforcement 
agencies in importing countries around the globe in that year alone. 
 
5.3. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ODS 
If it is arguable that the Asia-Pacific has become the new hub for a global black market 
in ODS (Elliott 2007b, 505), then China must be at the centre of the hub, given its 
dominance in the region in terms of its prominent roles as both the largest producer and 
consumer of legal ODS as well as the largest source of illegal ODS.  
 
Since the first revelation in 1997 of the involvement of Chinese dealers in the cross-
border trade of illegal ODS (Clark 2005, 5), the country has had a recorded history of 
over 17 years of consistently supplying the world with illicit ODS chemicals. A rich 
body of evidence –including the growing number of China-related ODS seizures, the 
prevalence of Chinese-produced counterfeit ODS on the global black market, and the 
considerable discrepancies in China’s ODS exports and its major trading partners’ 
imports – has pointed to China’s illegal trade in ODS as being a significant magnitude 
issue. It demonstrates that China is a major source from which large volumes of illegal 
CFCs and HCFCs are being smuggled each year to both developed and developing 
countries around the world. 
  
China’s role in the global and regional trade chain of illegal ODS presents a special 
challenge to the successful implementation of the Montreal Protocol. As Clark (2007a) 
observes, the failure of the Chinese government to curb its substantial outflows of 
                                                          
115 This method for the calculation of the possible numbers of ODS shipments assumes that shipping of 
ODS occurs in 13.6 kg disposable cylinders packed in standard (20-foot) containers. In case of fully 
loaded, one container would contain 1,100 cylinders, weighing 14.96 metric tonnes in aggregate. 
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illegal ODS to the international market has placed an extra burden on customs officers 
across the Asia Pacific and beyond, and in turn has increased the risk of the recipient 
countries’ non-compliance with the Protocol. Though this point of view was 
disapproved by some Chinese officials who insisted that “the emphasis should be on the 
importer to ensure that the trade is legal and does not put them in non-compliance” 
(Brack et al. 2006, 28). 
 
This section aims to investigate China’s profile and function in global trade of illegal 
ODS. To that end, this section will first use data from the Ozone Secretariat Data 
Access Centre and UN Comtrade Database to review China’s history and present state 
of production, consumption, and trade of controlled ODS. Second, this section will 
analyse 85 records of China-related ODS seizures occurred during 2000–2014 to 
unpack the various aspects of the transaction networks associated with China’s illicit 
ODS trade. Specifically, it will explore China’s role in the global and regional trade in 
illegal ODS, the scale and scope of the illegal trade, the major destinations, and the 
methods for smuggling and concealment. 
 
5.3.1. CHINA’S HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF ODS PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, 
AND TRADE 
China acceded to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in June 
1989 and the Montreal Protocol in June 1991. Since then, China has ratified a series of 
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, which included the 1991 London Amendment, 
the 1992 Copenhagen Amendment, the 1995 Vienna Amendment, the 1997 Montreal 
Amendment, and the 1999 Beijing Amendment.  
 
Under the Montreal Protocol, China was classified as a Party operating under paragraph 
1 of Article 5 of the Protocol. In January 1993, China formulated its national plan 
“Country Programme for the Phase-out of Ozone Depleting Substances” (MEP 1999), 
which was approved by the Executive Committee of the MLF in March 1993. Up to 
date, China has received an accumulated US$623 million funding in total from the MLF 
in supporting the fulfilment of its national obligation under the Protocol.  
 
5.3.1.1. CHINA’S PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF CONTROLLED ODS  
China has been historically the world’s leading ODS producer and consumer. With a 
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rapid economic growth, industrialisation, and urbanisation in the past three decades, 
China’s demand for ODS-based products – e.g., rigid foams used in domestic 
refrigerators, refrigerants for servicing AC equipment, aerosols for sprays or paint – 
grew markedly. This surging demand directly resulted in a substantial increase in 
China’s production and use of controlled ODS from the mid-1980s through most of the 
following decade. In 1997, China produced 98,054 ODP tonnes of ODS and consumed 
90,511 ODP tonnes, accounting for around 35 percent and 34 percent of the global ODS 
production (282, 481 ODP tonnes) and consumption (270,026 ODP tonnes) in that year 
(UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1997). At the point following the 1996 
phase-out of ODS production and use in developed countries, this magnitude of 
production and use made China the world’s largest ODS producer and consumer, more 
than doubling the production of India which was in the second position in 1997. China’s 
production and consumption continued to grow into 1998 and reached its historical 
peaks of 121,042 and 166,991 ODP tonnes respectively, before it started to decline (See 
Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5: China’s ODS production and consumption during 1986–2012 (ODP tonnes) 
 
(Source: UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1986–2012) 
 
By substance categories, the majority of China’s ODS production and use concentrated 
in CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-113, halon-1211, halon-1301, and carbon tetrachloride. In 
1997, production and use of these six categories of substances made up 97.3 percent and 
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95.7 percent of China’s 1997 total ODS production and consumption.116 By industrial 
sectors, five major industries including foams, refrigeration and air-conditioning (RAC), 
fire protection, aerosols, and solvents virtually contributed to all of China’s ODS use. In 
1997, the amount consumed by the five industrial sectors accounted for 98.8 percent of 
China’s total ODS use (MEP 1999). Moreover, these sectors tended to share a number 
of common characteristics, which included rapid growth, geographic dispersion of 
enterprises, and growing profitability of ODS production (World Bank 2013, 1, 53). 
These patterns created extra hardships in managing China’s ODS phase-out. 
 
As operating as an Article 5 Party, starting from 1 July 1999, China is bound to freeze 
both production and consumption of major ODS chemicals at the average of 1995–1997 
baseline levels, then gradually reduce its production and use of CFCs and halons by 50 
percent by 2005 and 85 percent by 1 January 2007, before finally completing the phase-
out by 1 January 2010 (see Table 9.5 in Appendices). As part of the effort to contain its 
domestic production, China banned new halon and CFC-aerosol production facilities in 
1990 and 1991, and all new CFC production facilities in 1993 (World Bank 2004b, 17).  
 
In 1993, following the approval by MLF of its Country Programme, China entered into 
a partnership with the World Bank Montreal Protocol Program. Ever since then, with 
assistance from the implementing agencies (the World Bank and UNDP), China has 
successively put in place five ODS phase-out projects within the broad framework of its 
national plan. While the fifth project the “HCFC Phase-out Management Plan (HPMP) 
(Stage I)” is still going on (UNDP 2011), the fourth phase-out project “CN ODS IV”, 
completed in 2013, has helped China to reduce significant amounts of ODS production 
and consumption. 
 
Adapted on the lessons learnt from the previous three projects, the fourth phase-out 
project ‘CN ODS IV’ devised a distinctive sectoral-level approach. It consisted of nine 
discreet phase-out sector plans that covered halon production and consumption, mobile 
air conditioning (MAC), CFC production, polyurethane (PU) foam, industrial and 
                                                          
116 First, it should be noted that China’s production and consumption of carbon tetrachloride were 
insignificant in quantity, only in the order of zero and 110 ODP tonnes respectively in 1997. However, in 
1998 China’s production and consumption of this substance suddenly surged to 35,090 and 85,628 ODP 
tonnes. Second, the UNEP Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre only provides data on production and 
consumption of controlled substances aggregated at the “Annex-group” level. Data on China’s 1997 
production and use of specific ODS are quoted from the China Country Programme. 
. 
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commercial refrigeration (ICR), process agent and carbon tetrachloride (CTC) 
production, 1,1,1-Trichloroethane (TCA), aerosols, and the accelerated CFC and halon 
phase-out. Over the life of the project from 1997 to 2013, a total of US$440 million 
from the MLF had been disbursed yearly to support the project (World Bank 2013). 
Upon its completion in 2013, the CN ODS IV project brought about a substantial 
reduction in China’s production (over 100,000 ODP Tonnes) and consumption (over 
110,000 ODP Tonnes) of ozone-harming gases and substances, ensuring a timely and 
cost-effective fulfilment of China’s obligations under the Protocol (World Bank 2014). 
By 2009, China’s consumption of CFCs, halons, and CTC was down from the 1997 and 
1998 peaks to only 370, 986 and 87 ODP tonnes respectively, and a drop of similar 
extent was also seen in the production sector (see Figure 5.6 and 5.7). Moreover, this 
project also enabled China, by 1 July 2007, to shut down and dismantle five of the six 
remaining CFC production facilities in Changshu City (near Shanghai), allowing China 
to realise its CFC and halon phase-out commitments two and a half years ahead of the 
2010 schedule.117 Until 1 January 2010, except for minor quantities approved by the 
Parties to the Protocol for exempted essential or critical uses, China had, at least on 
paper, completely eliminated the production and consumption of CFCs, halons, CTC 
and TCA – five years ahead of the initial schedule.  
 
Figure 5.6: China’s phase-out of CFC, halons and carbon tetrachloride production (ODP tonnes) 
 
         (Source: Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1997–2012) 
Note: Production and consumption after 2009 were for essential or critical uses approved by the Parties to 
the Protocol. 
                                                          
117 UN News Centre. “China Closes Ozone Depleting Chemical Plants as Part of UN Initiative”. July 3, 
2007. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23121#.U-BsSFeyJed. 
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Figure 5.7: China’s phase-out of CFC, halon and carbon tetrachloride consumption (ODP tonnes) 
 
          (Source: Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1997–2012) 
 
Yet alongside the decline in production and consumption of CFCs, halons, and CTC, 
China’s production and consumption of HCFCs have grown at an average annual rate of 
29 and 21 percent respectively since 1998 (see Figure 5.8). In 2012, China produced 
34,414 ODP tonnes of HCFCs and ranked the world’s biggest HCFC producer (86 
percent), followed by India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Argentina. Though the 
bulk of ODS manufactured in China is traded legally, thanks to the enormous size of its 
production, China remains a major source for most of the illicit HCFCs traded on the 
international black market.  
 
Figure 5.8: China’s production and consumption of HCFCs during 1986–2012 (ODP tonnes) 
 
          (Source: Ozone Secretariat Data Access Centre 1986–2012) 
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Pursuant to the accelerated HCFC phase-out schedule adopted at the 19th MOP in 2007, 
the proximate and intermediate control targets for China as an Article 5 Party include 
the freeze on production and consumption of HCFCs at the averaged 2009–2010 
baseline level from 1 January 2013 and 10 percent reduction by 1 January 2015. To aid 
the Chinese government to achieve the freeze and reduction goals, the 64th Meeting of 
the MLF Executive Committee approved China’s 2011–2015 HCFC Phase-out 
Management Plan (Stage-I) and appointed UNDP as the implementing agency. Four 
months later, at the 65th Meeting, the MLF Executive Committee approved China’s 
HCFC phase-out plan in solvent sector. As such, the stage I of China’s HPMP consisted 
of HCFC phase-out plans in seven industrial sectors, including the HCFC production, 
PU foam, extruded polystyrene (XPS) foam, room air conditioning (RAC), industrial 
and commercial refrigeration (ICR), servicing and solvent sectors, with the overall 
funding from MLF amounted to US$270 million. In April 2013, the 69th Meeting of the 
MLF Executive Committee approved another large funding package, which contains an 
amount up to US$385 million to be allocated over 17 years to help China to achieve the 
entire elimination of its industrial production of HCFCs by 2030. Upon completion, this 
will result in the prevention of the emission of over 4.3 million metric tonnes (300,000 
ODP tonnes) of HCFCs and eight billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
greenhouse gas emissions.118   
 
5.3.1.2. CHINA’S EXPORTS OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
On top of being the global leading producer and consumer, for the past decade, China 
has also been the world’s major exporter of a variety of controlled substances including 
methyl bromide, CFCs, halons, methyl chloroform, and HCFCs. Between 2002 and 
2012, China ODS exports grew steadily at an average annual rate of 18.7 percent, from 
71,719 metric tonnes in 2002 to 397,718 metric tonnes in 2012. During this period, 
while exports of CFCs and halons were decreasing gradually along with China’s phase-
out schedules, HCFCs and methyl bromide increased constantly and now constitute the 
two largest stables in China’s ODS exports.  
 
 
 
                                                          
118 MLF. “Multilateral Fund Approves Landmark Project for China with Ozone and Climate Benefits: Up 
to US$385 Million of Funding over the Next 17 Years”. April 22, 2013. 
http://www.multilateralfund.org/InformationandMedia/default.aspx?PageView=Shared. 
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Figure 5.9: China ODS exports by substance categories during 2002–2011 (metric tonnes) 
 
           (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2002–2012) 
Note: (1) Data on China’s ODS exports for the periods of 2002–2006, 2007–2011 and 2012 were 
extracted from the UN Comtrade Database by using HS 2002, HS 2007, and HS 2012 respectively. (2) 
HS 2002 and HS 2007 in the UN Comtrade Database do not distinguish between the sub-category 
substances under the Annex C to the Protocol, only data aggregated at the Annex-level are available. The 
cross-reference between the major controlled ODS and HS codes is provided in Table 9.6 in the 
Appendices. (3) Due to its low ODP index (0.12), methyl bromide is not significant in quantity when 
converted from metric tonnes to ODP tonnes. 
 
Presently, China is the world’s largest HCFC exporter. In 2012, China supplied the 
world a total of 213,758 metric tonnes of Annex-C controlled substances, valued at 
US$438.8 million. Following was the US exporting to the world 13,984 metric tonnes 
and Netherlands 13,758 metric tonnes. HCFC-22 took up the biggest share (70 percent) 
in China’s HCFC exports, then followed by HCFC-123 and other HCFCs (see Figure 
5.10). Major export markets for Chinese HCFCs clustered in East and South Asia and 
the Middle East, including Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia 
(see Figure 5.11). 
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Figure 5.10: China’s 2012 exports of HCFCs by substance categories (metric tonnes) 
 
               (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2012) 
 
Figure 5.11: The world’s top ten export markets for Chinese HCFCs, 2012 (metric tonnes) 
 
            (Source: UN Comtrade Database 2012) 
 
5.3.2. PROFILING CHINA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL ODS  
Seizure data are often the most relevant and oft-drawn reference in the study of the 
black market for environmental goods, including ODS. 119  In comparison with the 
seizure information on illegal wildlife trade, publicly accessible data on illegal ODS 
                                                          
119 Seizure reports, market investigations, and discrepancy analysis of bilateral ODS trade data are often 
the three most important sources of data for the study of illegal trade in ODS. Other indicators of illegal 
trade in ODS might include the market prices of illicit chemicals which are presumed to rise as controls 
come into place and legitimate supplies diminish, and the growth in market share of legal alternatives 
(EIA 2011, 10). 
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seizures are lesser in both availability and quantity terms. 120  There are no 
comprehensive information repositories for ODS seizures that are comparable to 
TRAFFIC Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions which compiles all possible anecdotal 
reports on global seizures of illegal wildlife. ODS seizure information scatters in a 
number of reports by governmental agencies, environmental NGOs, and international 
organisations.  
 
Paragraph 7 of the MOP Decision XIV/7 (2002) invites Parties to report verified cases 
of illegal ODS trade to the Ozone Secretariat in order to facilitate the exchange of 
information. To encourage Parties to report, the Decision intentionally excludes the 
illegally traded quantities from counting in a Party’s consumption quotas provided that 
the Party does not place the said amounts on its own market. However, the results so far 
have proved to be not so satisfactory. This is not only because only a limited number of 
countries showed the willingness to report ODS seizures made in their enforcement 
activities, but also because the seizure data reported were sometimes incomplete, with 
information on the intended destination of or smuggling methods for the traded ODS 
often missing. For example, in the case of China-related seizures, this chapter identifies 
22 countries around the world that have ever intercepted illegal exports from China of 
controlled substances in the past years. While only six countries, including Argentina, 
Japan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan, made their reports to the 
Ozone Secretariat.   
 
Nevertheless, through an extensive literature review and interviews with Chinese 
officials working at the ODS administration agencies, this chapter has been able to 
collect and compile 85 records of China-related ODS seizures which have been made by 
both Chinese and international enforcement agencies between January 2000 and April 
2014 (see Table 9.8 in Appendices). This database may not provide an exhaustive 
coverage, but it is certainly an as-complete-as-possible collection that this chapter can 
                                                          
120 Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) database might be a good source for ODS seizure information 
though it is assessable to only authorised customs officials in its member countries. This WCO-
maintained database is claimed to contain more than 150,000 pieces of information on seizures of various 
illegal commodities, including drugs, weapons, and tobacco. According to Gwang-hyeon Jang, the 
intelligence analyst of the WCO RILO A/P, seizures of illegal environmental goods actually accounted 
for only a small proportion of the total seizure records. For example, in 2004, the CEN database compiled 
78,233 seizure records. Of which, the two largest seizure categories were drugs (52,313) and tobacco 
(10,727),  seizures of environmental goods only included CITES-protected flora and fauna (6,270 
records), hazardous wastes (6 records), timber smuggling cases (6 records) (Jang 2004). Also see CEN 
webpage: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/instruments-and-
tools/cen.aspx. 
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arrive at by individual effort. The main objective is, through the analysis of the seizure 
data, to understand China’s role in the international and regional transaction chain of 
illegal ODS trade, the scale of China’s black market, the magnitude and diversity of 
ODS chemicals involved in illegal trade, the major destination markets for Chinese-
produced ODS, and the prevalent methods for smuggling and concealment. 
 
In ideal cases, each record of the ODS seizures would contain information on the date of 
seizure, the substances traded, the country of origin, destination and transit points (when 
applicable), the quantity of the confiscated, and the methods for smuggling and 
concealment. Akin to but slightly different from the definition adopted in Chapter 3 
(China’s global trade in illegal wildlife), the term “China-related” is here meant to 
comprise two classes of seizure cases. First, “Class A” includes seizures which occurred 
within or outside China, with China as the source country for the contraband ODS. 
Second, “Class B” includes seizures involving China as the transit country through 
which illegal ODS were intended to be smuggled from the source to the destination 
country. Note that in contrast with the categorisation of wildlife seizures in Chapter 3, 
the classification of ODS seizures does not encompass cases where China was involved 
as the destination or consumer country. Being so is because all the China-related ODS 
seizures collected by this chapter pertain exclusively to China as either the supplier of 
the illegal ODS, or the transit point along the trading routes. Moreover, a comparison 
between the number of Class A (79 records) and Class B (4 records) clearly reveals the 
overpowering dominance of China’s role as the world’s outstanding supplier of illegal 
ODS, at least for the past ten more years.121    
 
5.3.2.1. SCALE OF CHINA’S BLACK MARKET FOR ODS 
Excluding cases where the quantities of the seized ODS were not provided or were 
recorded in non-standard units (e.g., recorded in number of cylinders while the 
specification of the used cylinders was not available), the 85 record cases of China-
related ODS seizures made over the 14-year time span resulted in an aggregate 
confiscation of 1,967 metric tonnes of contraband ODS. This represents an average 
annual magnitude of 140 metric tonnes of illicit ODS being manufactured mostly in 
mainland China and traded to international markets. If we draw on the method used by 
                                                          
121 Two seizures are not considered for this comparison due to the lack of information on the implied 
sources, though seizures did take place within China. 
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UNODC (2013: 119), which suggests that the seized amounts only account for five 
percent of the entire illegal trade, then those 140 metric tonnes will translate into 2,620 
metric tonnes of illegal ODS flowing mainly from China to the international black 
market on an annual basis. 
 
Table 5.1: Major indicators of China’s illegal trade in ODS 
Substances traded 
Number of 
seizures 
In standard unit (kg) In non-standard units 
CFC-11 3 92,200 200 cylinders of various size 
CFC-12 34 618,575 6,293 cylinders of various size 
CFC-112 1 268,200 --  
CFC-113 3 48,210 -- 
Unknown kinds of CFCs 6 6,152 36 cylinders of various size 
CFCs containing 
equipment 
6 
e.g., fridges, refrigerators, freezers, 
chillers, compressors 
Unable to aggregate due to 
incompatible measures 
HCFC-22 18 817,097 636 cylinders of various size 
HCFC-123 1 2,500 -- 
HCFC-141b 2 7,700 -- 
Unknown kinds of HCFCs 1 25,850 -- 
HCFCs containing 
equipment 
7 e.g., AC units, refrigerators, fridges 
Unable to aggregate due to 
incompatible measures 
Halon-1211 2 51,467 -- 
Methyl bromide 1 27,472 -- 
Unknown kinds of ODS 12 1,328 -- 
Total -- 1,966,751 -- 
Note: Table 5.1 is based on an analysis of China-related ODS seizures made worldwide between January 
2000 and April 2014. 
 
CFCs and HCFCs were the two main groups of ODS found in seizures. Of the total 
seized, 1,033 metric tonnes or 54 percent were contraband CFCs, recovered from 53 
seizures. 853 metric tonnes or 44 percent were illegal HCFCs, derived from 29 seizures. 
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There were also small amounts of methyl bromide (27 metric tonnes), halon-1211 (0.5 
metric tonnes), and some 1.3 metric tonnes of unspecified kinds of ODS. 
 
Within the CFC family, CFC-12 was the most favoured CFC chemical in illicit trade. 
Some 619 metric tonnes of seized CFC-12 made up 60 percent of the total seized CFCs. 
This was followed by CFC-112 and CFC-11, respectively accounting for 26 and 9 
percent of the total CFCs busted. The popularity of CFC-12 on China’s ODS black 
market is also supported by its markedly higher seizure number: 34 seizures involved 
the interception of illicit CFC-12, substantially higher than the number of the seizures of 
any other controlled chemicals. On the other hand, among the HCFC substances, 
HCFC-22 remained the most traded item, with 18 seizures resulting in 817 metric 
tonnes of contraband HCFC-22 (see Table 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.12: Variation by year of the annual volume of seized ODS (January 2000–April 2014) 
 
 
Figure 5.12 visualises the annual variation of the volume of seized ODS. One puzzling 
aspect that can be drawn from this chart is the continuing presence of enormous 
quantities of Chinese-produced CFCs on the international black market even after the 
Chinese government shut down nearly all CFC manufacturing plants by July 2007. 
From 2008 to 2010, for example, Russian authorities intercepted, from three separate 
smuggling attempts, a total of 560 metric tonnes of illegal CFCs produced in China. 
Russia seized 268 metric tonnes of Chinese CFC-112 in 2008 and 266 metric tonnes of 
Chinese CFC-12 in 2009 (EIA 2011, 26–7). In 2010, some 26 metric tonnes of Chinese 
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CFC-12 were seized again by Russian customs (INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 29–30). 
In all three cases, the virgin chemicals were mislabelled and misdeclared as recycled 
substances even though the Chinese government itself had admitted that it did not have 
the capacity to recycle such a large amount of CFCs (UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 5).  
 
Substantial amounts of illegal Chinese CFCs also appeared on the black markets in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Kenya and Uzbekistan. Possible explanations for the stubborn 
persistence of illegal Chinese CFCs on the global black market include the diversion for 
illegal use of established stockpiling prior to the 2007 production halt, as well as the 
continuing operation of unregulated production facilities (UNODC 2013, 118). 
Furthermore, for the scenario of possible ongoing illicit production, interviews with 
Indonesian ODS traders revealed more specific details (Clark 2005, 16). Some large 
Chinese ODS producers, which had previously been paid by the MLF to shut down their 
CFC production lines, had actually turned themselves into key brokers linking other 
illicit ODS producers and their overseas customers. That is, they acquired CFCs from 
other smaller, illicit domestic plants and capitalised on their established transnational 
client networks to supply overseas markets with illicit CFCs.   
 
5.3.2.2. MAJOR DESTINATION MARKETS 
Analysis of seizure data provides important information on the major destinations for 
Chinese-produced illegal CFCs and HCFCs. In total, seizure data identified 23 countries 
and territories as recipients of Chinese illegal ODS. Based on the size of the seized 
chemicals, Russia, the US, India, Japan, and Spain comprised the top five destination 
markets (see Figure 5.13), although the types of chemicals most favoured in the markets 
vary among localities. 
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Figure 5.13: Major destination markets for Chinese-produced illegal ODS (kg) 
 
 
Russia is the largest recipient of Chinese illegal ODS. From 2007 to the first half of 
2014, Russian enforcement made nine seizures of illegal CFCs and HCFCs sourced in 
China, weighing in an aggregate of 679 metric tonnes. The average volume for each 
seizure was 85 metric tonnes. CFC-12, CFC-112 CFC-113, and HCFC-22 were the 
most prevalent chemicals traded to Russia. An intimidating aspect of this line of 
trafficking was the large-scale nature of individual shipments, which suggests the 
involvement of well-financed enterprises in both countries. Except for one seizure 
involving the movement of 130 illicit ODS-containing AC split systems, all of the 
remaining eight seizures had implication in each case of smuggling from China to 
Russia of vast amounts of illegal ODS, ranging from the lowest four metric tonnes to 
the highest 268 metric tonnes (see Table 9.8 in Appendices). The latest haul occurred in 
January 2014 when the Russian Ministry of the Interior carried out a major operation 
for the detention and arrest of organisers and perpetrators suspected of responsible for a 
transnational ODS smuggling scheme. The operation raided more than 20 hideouts and 
ended with the arrest of four suspects as well as the seizure of 34,440 kg of illegal CFCs 
and HCFCs contained in 1,500 refrigerant cylinders. Illegal substances were decanted 
from the original cylinders into ones mislabelled as containing ozone-safe refrigerants 
like ethylene-glycol and HFC-134a. Shipment paper indicated that these chemicals were 
sourced in mainland China and destined for Moscow by rail and road transportation 
(UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 7).  
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Although the US ranked second in terms of the volume of the seized ODS, the bulk of 
the seizures were the result of a series trafficking by a Florida-based company from 
March 2007 to April 2009. Within that two-year period, this company managed a 
succession of 11 shipments of a total of 418 metric tonnes of HCFCs, with a market 
value estimated at around US$4 million. Instead of a direct course of delivery from 
China to Florida, the shipments were transhipped via Caribbean islands to evade 
inspection (EIA 2011, 26–7). 
 
Between 2004 and 2013, Indian authorities made seven seizures of Chinese HCFCs, 
amounting to 221 metric tonnes. Among the seven seizures, five unusually concentrated 
in a short five-month period from March to July 2013 and all involved containerised 
shipments of large volumes of Chinese HCFC-22. In March 2013, the Indian 
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence intercepted the largest-ever recorded smuggling of 
Chinese HCFCs: 183 metric tonnes of HCFC-22 contained in five bulk isotanks. The 
goods were ascertained as originating in China and bounded for a factory in Gujarat 
State, India. Despite the shipment papers alleged the imports were operating under an 
Export-Oriented-Unit (EOU) scheme, it was determined that the EOU license was being 
misused and that the refrigerants were believed to be illicitly diverted for domestic uses 
(UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014, 5). 
 
Japan’s seizures of illicit Chinese ODS took place mainly in 2001 and 2002, during 
which the Japanese authorities made eight seizures of a total of 192 metric tonnes of 
Chinese-produced CFC-12. The only recorded seizure by Spain, of 150 metric tonnes 
Chinese HCFCs, was made in a grand operation coded “Refreshco”, initiated by the 
Spanish Guardia Civil in February 2012. The seven-month-long operation culminated in 
December 2012 with confiscation of more than 150 metric tonnes of Chinese HCFC-22 
and the detention of 97 people purportedly to be involved in the illegal trade.122 Two 
Spanish companies were on suspicion of illicit diversion onto the EU markets of several 
hundred tonnes of Chinese HCFCs which were imported for re-export purposes during 
2010–2012.123 Most of the chemicals were said to be sold to serve refrigeration systems 
on fishing vessels with Russian and Lithuanian flags. 
                                                          
122 ARC News. “Ninety-seven Arrested in Spain for R-22 Offences.” December 17, 2012. http://www.acr-
news.com/ninety-seven-arrested-in-spain-for-r22-offences. 
123 According to the “EU Regulation 1005/2009”, the use of virgin HCFCs has been prohibited since 1 
January 2010 and the use of recycled or reclaimed HCFCs for the maintenance or serving of refrigeration, 
air-conditioning and heat pump equipment will also be prohibited after 31 December 2014. However, 
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Taiwan’s role as a consuming market seems not significant. From the Epaper “Ozone 
Layer Protection in Taiwan 2003–2013”, this chapter collected only two records of 
illegal ODS imports to Taiwan. 124  Of them, one reported that during 1999–2004, 
Taiwan Customs intercepted a total of 51 metric tonnes of halon-1211 containing 
extinguishers from six separate illicit imports. Taiwan banned the import of virgin 
halons in 1994 and the import of halon-containing equipment in 2000.125 The other one 
reported that between January and July 2007, Taiwan Customs and Costal Guards 
successfully foiled five attempts of ODS smuggling to Taiwan. Some 33 metric tonnes 
of CFC-12 were confiscated under the terms of the 1996 CFCs import ban and eight 
metric tonnes of HCFC-22 were impounded due to the lack of import permits.126 
 
Hong Kong’s role as a transit point, as seen in the case of China’s illegal wildlife trade, 
is not evident based on the available seizure data. Only two Hong Kong-related ODS 
seizures were collected by this chapter. One was made in September 2009, when the 
Hong Kong authorities seized 1,600 kg of CFC-12 contained in 100 cylinders. The other 
one was made in November 2011, when the Hong Kong Customs intercepted a 
consignment of 6,800 kg of CFC-12 believed to be destined for Thailand. In both cases, 
the possible sources for the illegal ODS were not provided (see Table 9.8 in 
Appendices). 
 
5.3.2.3. METHODS FOR SMUGGLING AND CONCEALMENT 
ODS trafficking is fluid and transitional in nature, and seasoned smugglers tend to adapt 
to changing circumstances to develop innovative and sophisticated techniques to 
circumvent the established regulatory systems. Existing literature sums up a range of 
methods that have been employed in the ODS trafficking. In general, such methods fall 
into the following six broad sets: front door smuggling, false labelling, misdeclaration, 
fake recycled or reclaimed, concealment, and transhipment fraud (see Table 5.2). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
EU-based companies are still allowed to import HCFC-22 but with the bound obligation to re-export the 
whole amounts of imports after repackaging to non-EU countries. 
124 “Ozone Layer Protection in Taiwan” is an Epaper run by the Taiwan Industrial Technology Research 
Institute. It compiles ODS-related news (including news reports on ODS seizures) and ODS-related 
regulations and laws in Taiwan. Between 2003 and 2012, a total of 24 volumes have been released. See 
http://www.saveoursky.org.tw/epaper/listall.php?lang=e.   
125 Ozone Layer Protection in Taiwan Epaper Vol.5, January 1, 2004. 
http://www.saveoursky.org.tw/epaper/showmailid.php?id=99&lid=9 
126 Ozone Layer Protection in Taiwan Epaper Vol.19, August 18, 2010. 
http://www.saveoursky.org.tw/epaper/showmailid.php?id=381&lid=47 
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Excluding 22 cases where the information on smuggling methods was not provided or 
where the illicit ODS were simply transiting via a third country due to geographical 
proximity, this chapter has filtered out 63 cases with disclosed information on the 
methods for smuggling and concealment (see Table 9.8 in the Appendices).  
 
Table 5.2: Summary of commonly used smuggling methods 
Smuggling methods Description 
Front door 
smuggling 
Front door smuggling describes situations where enforcement is not in place or 
ineffective, and smugglers do not even attempt to disguise the illegal shipments, 
but instead simply rely on the fact that the authorities won’t pay special attention 
to the movements. 
False labelling 
False labelling refers to illegal ODS being smuggled in cylinders or packaging 
being labelled as non-regulated chemicals or other legal merchandise, for 
example, canisters containing CFC-12 are sometimes labelled as containing HFC-
134a instead. 
Misdeclaration 
Misdeclaration often occurs at the border checkpoints where illegal ODS are 
disguised using labels on the shipping documents or invoices that falsely identify 
the goods contained within as other similar, legal chemicals. In practice, this 
method may involve variations depending on the illegal purposes the perpetrators 
intend to achieve, such as “under-invoicing” where the real value or quantities of 
the declared goods are being understated to avoid tax or save the use of import or 
export quotas. 
Fake recycled or 
reclaimed 
Fake recycled/reclaimed involves virgin ODS being mislabelled or misdeclared as 
recovered, recycled or reclaimed chemicals. In some cases, illegal traders may 
deliberately add contaminants to make the virgin one look like used. This might 
create an extra source of danger for the equipment or personnel handling or 
inspecting the equipment due to the unstable and explosive nature of some of the 
contaminated gases. 
Concealment 
Concealment involves many variations. Some might be simple, involving hiding 
illegal ODS in mix with legal products like furniture, plastics, or garments and 
transporting via cars or ships. Other variations might be complex and 
sophisticated, such as ‘double layering’ where containers of illegal ODS are 
hidden within a larger, specially-designed container or compartment, or hidden 
behind a layer of legal merchandise while cursory inspection won’t be able to 
uncover. 
Transhipment fraud 
Transhipment fraud involves shipments of legal ODS ostensibly destined for legal 
end-use markets that are diverted at transit points onto the black market. 
(Source: UNEP 2001, 16–7; Grabiel et al. 2013, 50–7; UNODC 2013, 117. Revised by the author) 
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Analysis of seizure data shows that “misdeclaration” is the most commonly used 
method. Commonly seen practices include CFC-12 being misdeclared as non-regulated 
substances such as HFC-134a or HCFC-22 (when HCFC-22 was not subject to control), 
or misdeclared as legal merchandise such as aluminium, plastic racks, garments, mist 
lamps and cartons, or bathtubs and handicrafts. HCFC-22 was misdeclared as HFC-
134a or ethylene-glycol and methyl bromide was misdeclared as foaming agents. 
Incentives for misdeclaration vary by cases. In some cases, licensed traders misreport 
the nature or understate the quantities of the declared goods to avoid the use export or 
import quotas. In other cases, traders understate the real value of the declared goods to 
avoid tax payments and/or possibly to avoid drawing attention and additional inspection 
from customs. 
 
“Concealment” is the second most common method and in practice it may vary in its 
degrees of sophistication. Some may be simple, involving hiding CFC-12 with legal 
merchandise such as furniture, plywood and glass products or in personal luggage or car 
boots as in cases of passenger trafficking of small amounts. Others are complex and 
sophisticated, involving “double layering” where CFC-12 is hidden behind a layer of 
non-regulated substances such as HFC-134a or HCFC-22, or concealed in larger 
custom-designed containers like metal oil drums, or secret spaces like coach luggage 
compartments or secluded cabins in fishing boats. 
 
In addition, the methods of “false labelling” and “fake recycled or reclaimed” are also 
used by illegal dealers. In false labelling, logos of branded products such as “Honeywell” 
were appropriated to disguise counterfeit CFCs. Canisters containing CFC-12 and 
HCFC-22 were mislabelled as containing non-regulated substances, and equipment 
containing HCFC-22 was falsely labelled as HFC-410a units. Fake recycled or 
reclaimed mainly involved virgin CFCs being mislabelled as recycled substances. 
 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
In this case study, based on the analysis of 85 China-related ODS seizures, I have 
analysed China’s global trade in illegal ODS with respect to its scale, the magnitude and 
diversity of ODS chemicals involved in illegal trade, the major exporting markets for 
Chinese-produced illegal ODS, and the prevailing methods for smuggling and 
concealment. A number of key findings concerning China’s role and function in 
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global/regional trade in illicit ODS can be summarised as follows: 
• In the international and regional transaction chain of illegal ODS trade, China 
has been functioning as the world’s leading source of illegal ODS. Between 
2002 and 2014, China supplied the international black market with at least 1,840 
metric tonnes of illegal ODS, with an average annual outflow of 131 metric 
tonnes (the figure of 1,840 does not include the amounts of ODS recovered from 
four seizures where the implied source country was either not China or not 
provided).  
 
• CFCs and HCFCs were the two groups of ODS that dominated the illegal trade 
from China to the world. Of the total ODS recovered from 85 seizures, 54 
percent (1,033 metric tonnes) were contraband CFCs, 44 percent (853 metric 
tonnes) were illegal HCFCs. Further, within the CFC family, CFC-12 was the 
most traded CFC chemical in illicit trade, accounting for 60 percent of the total 
seized CFCs. Among the HCFC substances, HCFC-22 remained the most 
favoured item in illegal trade, comprising nearly 96 percent of the total seized 
HCFCs. 
 
• Some 23 countries and territories have been identified by this study as the 
recipients of Chinese illegal ODS. Based on the size of the seized chemicals, 
Russia, the US, India, Japan, and Spain comprised the top five destination 
markets, although the types of chemicals most favoured vary among localities. 
Illegal exports to these five countries constituted 90 percent of China’s total 
outflows of illegal ODS to the world. 
 
• Based on the available seizure data, Hong Kong’s role as a transit point, as seen 
in the case of China’s illegal wildlife trade, is not evident in China’s illegal ODS 
trade. 
 
• Misdeclaration and concealment are the two most frequently used methods in 
moving illegal ODS out of China. Often seen practices in ODS trafficking 
include CFC-12 being misdeclared as non-regulated substances (e.g., HFC-134a 
or HCFC-22), or misdeclared as legal merchandise (e.g., aluminium, plastic 
racks, garments, mist lamps and cartons, or bathtubs and handicrafts). HCFC-22 
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was misdeclared as HFC-134a or ethylene-glycol, and methyl bromide was 
misdeclared as foaming agents. In the case of concealment, illegal ODS may be 
hidden in mix with legal merchandise (e.g., furniture, plywood, glass products), 
hidden in personal luggage or car boots, concealed behind a layer of non-
regulated substances, or concealed in larger custom-designed containers, such as 
metal oil drums, secretive spaces like coach luggage compartments, or secluded 
cabins on fishing boats. 
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6. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO TEC 
 
National-level control of environmental crime relies primarily on individual states’ 
effort to transfer ratified multilateral environmental agreements into national legislation, 
to impose regulations on domestic trade, to criminalise serious environmental offences, 
to set administrative or criminal penalties to deter illegal trade, and to allocate sufficient 
resources to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate such offences.  
 
In the three case studies, this thesis has identified that the part played by China in the 
international/regional illegal trade of environmental goods changes by cases. In the 
wildlife sector, China acts as the world’s dominant consumer for illegal wildlife. In the 
timber sector, China remains the world’s largest importer of illegally felled and traded 
timber and the leading exporter of value-added wood products made of the imported 
illegal wood. In the ODS sector, China emerges as the world’s leading supplier of 
illegal ODS in the international black market. Overall, there are two common features 
that cut across the three environmental sectors: the sheer massive scale of China-related 
illegal trade and the deep embeddedness of China in the international/regional illegal 
transaction chain. These two features, on the one hand, pose a significant challenge to 
the Chinese government in tackling its TEC problems. On the other hand, they have 
also determined that Chinese effort and progress made toward addressing its illegal 
internal trade will likely have a substantive, positive overflowing effect on the whole of 
the international and regional illegal trade. The unique contextual features place China 
in a distinctive position where the Chinese government should seize the opportunity and 
take on a more important or even leading role in the international and regional effort to 
fight against the illegal trade in environmental goods.  
 
It is encouraging to see that the Chinese government has invested great effort in recent 
years in addressing illegal trade and combating environmental offences. Therefore, 
noticeable progress has been made in improving China’s legal framework and in 
strengthening its internal and transnational enforcement cooperation. However, there 
still are crucial limitations that stymie the effective containment of China’s illegal trade 
in each of the three TEC sectors. This chapter examines China’s legal frameworks on 
and enforcement responses to the illegal trade of the three categories of environmental 
goods. In particular, this chapter will identify the key challenges that China faces in 
tackling the illegal trade in each of the three environmental sectors. In the concluding 
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chapter (Ch7), I will weave together the three strands of understandings developed by 
this thesis – the accounts of networked threats and responses produced in Chapter 2, the 
empirical findings of transaction networks in China’s illegal trade made by the three 
case studies, and the regulatory or enforcement challenges identified in this Chapter – in 
order to pinpoint the critical points where China’s wildlife authorities can step in to 
build their networked responses to TEC.  
 
6.1. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE 
6.1.1. CHINA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WILDLIFE 
In wildlife sector, China has established a relatively sound legislative and regulatory 
mix for the protection and administration of wildlife resources as well as for the 
prevention and detection of wildlife offences. Overall, China’s legal framework of 
wildlife can be seen as composed of four levels: (1) major wildlife-related national laws 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC); (2) national regulations by the 
State Council; (3) administrative normative documents (e.g., Announcements, Circulars, 
Directives, and Orders) by the primary wildlife administration authorities at the 
ministerial level (e.g., State Forestry Administration (SFA)); 127  and (4) criminal 
judiciary interpretations and opinions by the Supreme People’s Court and the Superior 
People’s Procuratorate. The administrative normative documents and judiciary 
interpretations and opinions mainly serve as an instrument to guide the enforcement of 
national wildlife laws and wildlife-related provisions in the Criminal Law. Although the 
departments of wildlife protection and administration at provincial and municipal levels 
do make and adopt regulations and measures by themselves to govern local wildlife-
related activities, they largely follow the guidance of their ministerial superiors and 
focus on implementation.  
 
Among the major national wildlife laws and regulations, there are Wildlife Protection 
Law (1988), Criminal Law (1997), Regulations on the Implementation of Terrestrial 
Wildlife Protection (1992), and the Regulations on the Management of Import and 
Export of Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora (2006) (see Table 9.10 in Appendices). 
Apart from major national wildlife laws and regulations, there are several national laws, 
                                                          
127 SFA is the principal national agency for wildlife protection and administration in China. Over the past 
two decades, SFA has, independently or in conjunction with other ministerial agencies, released tens of 
wildlife-related administrative normative documents in the forms of Order, Announcement, Circular, 
Measures, and Directives.  
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including Fishery Law (1986), Customs Law (1987), Environmental Protection Law 
(1989) and Forestry Law (1985), which are less directly related to wildlife, but contain 
provisions concerning certain aspects of the protection and administration of wildlife 
resources. In addition to the domestic legislative and regulatory establishments, China 
has been a party to several wildlife-related international treaties, which include acceding 
to CITES in 1991, to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitats in 1992, and to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 1992.  
 
The 1988 Wildlife Protection Law (thereafter WPL 1988), as China’s first national 
legislation on wildlife protection, has been the centrepiece in China’s wildlife legal 
framework. Other national or local wildlife regulations were enacted in pursuance of the 
WPL 1988 and exist to enforce the relevant provisions therein. Since 2015, a number of 
Chinese laws relating to ecosystems and the environment have been placed under the 
NPC’s scrutiny to ensure that they are compatible with the ideology of “ecological 
civilisation” promoted by the Xi Jinping Administration. As part of this general 
overhaul, in December 2015, the WPL 1988 underwent its first major revision in 
twenty-six years since it came into force in 1989. After two rounds of revision and 
public submissions, the amended WPL will be officially taking effect on 1 January 2017 
(thereafter WPL 2017). In general, more than what is suggested by its name, this law not 
only protects wildlife, it also legalises the domestication, captive breeding, and 
utilisation of wildlife, as well as enabling the development of a wildlife industry in 
China. 
 
6.1.1.1. THREE-LEVEL PROTECTION ON WILDLIFE 
According to Article 2 of the WPL 2017, wildlife protected by the law includes two 
types of wild animals: (1) terrestrial and aquatic wildlife species that are rare and 
valuable or in danger of extinction; and (2) terrestrial wildlife species that are beneficial 
or of important ecological, scientific or social value. Based on the grading and 
categorisation of wildlife species, China adopts a three-level protection framework 
(Art.10, WPL 2017).  
 
For wildlife species classified as rare and valuable or endangered, the State affords the 
highest level of protection called “special state protection” (SSP), which is further 
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differentiated between two sub-tires: the first class SSP (Class-I SSP) and the second 
class SSP (Class-II SSP). In January 1989, the SFA and the Ministry of Agriculture 
jointly released the List of Wildlife under Special State Protection to specify the detailed 
range of wildlife species under SSP (SFA and Ministry of Agriculture Order 1999 No.1). 
In 2003, the SFA levelled up the protection status for all specimens of musk deer 
(Moschus spp.) from Class-II to Class-I SSP (SFA Order 2003 No.7). As such, currently, 
the list of Class-I SSP covers a total of 97 species which include, for example, Tibetan 
antelope (Pantholops hodysoni), snow leopard (Nefelis nculosa), clouded leopard 
(Panthera pardu), tiger (Panthera tigris), and Asian elephant (Elephas maximus) which 
are often seen in the illegal trade. The list of Class-II SSP contains 160 species 
including pangolins (Manis pentadactyla), black bear (Selenaretos thibetanus), brown 
bear (Ursus arctos) and other species. In April 1993, the List was expanded to include 
species that are not native to China, but covered by the CITES Appendix I and II (e.g., 
rhino, crab-eating macaque, and African elephant). The protection status allocated for 
the CITES-listed species follows the CITES’s classification, with species in CITES 
Appendix I being granted the Class-I SSP and, species in CITES Appendix II being 
given the Class-II SSP (SFA Circular 1993 No.48).  
 
The second level of protection encompasses species that are not covered by the List of 
SSP, but are valued by local governments and are thus put under the local special 
protection. Governments at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region levels are 
responsible for the drafting, issuance, and amendment of the list of wildlife under local 
special protection. At last, the third level of protection is given to species with important 
ecological, scientific or social values. In 2000, the SFA released the List of State 
Protected Terrestrial Wildlife of Beneficial or of Important Economic or Scientific 
Value, which contains 1,591 species from five orders including Mammalia, Aves, 
Amphibia, Reptilia, and Insecta (SFA Order 2000 No.7).128  
 
Each of the three levels corresponds to a varying degree of protection, as reflected in the 
differences in the administration agencies in charge of issuing the permits or drafting 
the protection lists as well as in the differences in the administrative or criminal 
                                                          
128 It’s worth noting that in the WPL 2016, the third level of protection is given to wildlife with 
“important ecological, scientific and social value”. In contrast, the counterpart clause in the WPL 1988 
was written as “wildlife that is beneficial, or having important economic or scientific value”. To some 
extent, the change of the wording from “economic, beneficial” to “ecological, social value” might reflect 
an emphasis shift of the legislature to the ecological and social benefits brought by wildlife, not merely on 
their economic values. 
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liabilities and penalties assigned to relevant offences. For example, according to Article 
21 of the WPL 2017, the issuance of permits for hunting of wildlife under Class-I SSP is 
within the remit of the departments of wildlife administration under the State Council. 
In contrast, the issuance of permits for hunting of wildlife under Class-II SSP is 
deferred to the departments of wildlife protection at the provincial and municipal levels. 
 
6.1.1.2. CAPTIVE BREEDING OF WILDLIFE UNDER SSP 
China takes an encouraging and supportive stance on wildlife captive breeding, but it 
puts the breeding operations of wildlife under SSP for commercial purposes under a 
licensing control. Article 3 of the WPL 2017 lays down the guiding principle that: 
 
Art. 3. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of units and individuals 
engaged in scientific research and captive breeding of wildlife.   
 
Furthermore, Article 25 of the WPL 2017 states that: 
  
Art. 25. The State supports relevant scientific research institutions in captive 
breeding of wildlife under SSP for the purpose of protection of the species 
concerned. For captive breeding of wildlife under SSP for purposes other than 
protection (emphasis mine), the State implements a licensing scheme. Individuals 
or organisations intending to captive breed wildlife under SSP shall obtain the 
approval of the department of wildlife administration under the government at the 
levels of province, autonomous region or municipality, and shall obtain a captive-
breeding permit. 
 
Article 25 of the WPL 2017 has been the most important legal basis for China’s 
domestic “farming” of wildlife under SSP for commercial trade and utilisation, although 
there are other administrative regulations and edicts that further regulate how the 
breeding operations and commercial utilisation of captive-bred wildlife shall proceed. 
 
In January 1991, the SFA released the Measures for the Management of Licensing for 
Domestication and Captive Breeding of Wildlife under Special State Protection (1991) 
(thereafter referred to as the “Measures (1991)” for brevity) to assist the enforcement of 
the licensing scheme. The Measures (1991) defines wildlife allowed for captive 
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breeding as “terrestrial wildlife under SSP”, and delineates the licensable scope of 
purposes for domestication and breeding as including “protection, research, scientific 
experiments, exhibitions or other economic purposes” (Art. 2, Measure (1991)). It is 
notable that the licensable scope under the Measures (1991) is much wider than that 
defined in the WPL (1988 and 2017). More importantly, captive breeding of wildlife 
under SSP for “economic purposes” has been plainly written into the licensable scope. 
It is this provision which gives the national and provincial forestry authorities the green 
light to issue licences to those domesticating and breeding nationally protected wildlife 
such as Siberian tiger, moon bear, and clouded leopard for commercial exploitation. 
 
According to the Measures (1991), any individuals and entities can apply for the 
captive-breeding licence so long as they meet the requirements on having fixed sites, 
proper equipment, sufficient funding, necessary technologies and personnel, and 
secured sources of food for the scale and type of the breeding operations (Art. 3). As to 
the application procedures, the Measures (1991) states that: 
 
Art. 5. Individuals and entities intending to captive breed wildlife shall apply to 
local wildlife administration under the government at the county level and shall 
submit the “Application Form for Domestication and Captive Breeding of Wildlife 
under SSP”. Domestication and captive breeding of wildlife under Class-I SSP 
shall report to and obtain the approval of the State Forestry Administration; 
domestication and captive breeding of wildlife under Class-II SSP shall report to 
and obtain the approval of wildlife administration under the government at the 
levels of province, municipality or autonomous region.  
 
Note that under the WPL 1988 and the Measures (1991), the SFA is the authorised 
agency in charge of the evaluation of applications and issuance of licences for captive 
breeding of wildlife under class-I SSP. However, under the WPL 2017, the licensing 
authority for captive breeding of wildlife under both Class-I and Class-II SSP has been 
vested to wildlife administrations at the levels of province, municipality, and 
autonomous region. International environmental NGOs such as EIA have expressed 
their concerns over such a policy change, claiming that deferring responsibility for 
managing breeding operations to the provinces would decrease the level of oversight at 
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the central level of the government.129 Nonetheless, as a subordinate regulation to the 
WPL, relevant provisions in the Measures (1991) are expected to be amended in the 
near future in order to be in concert with the WPL 2017.   
 
In June 2003, the SFA and other eleven ministerial authorities together published the 
Circular on the Need to Adapt to New Situations and Strengthen the Work on 
Prohibiting Illegal Hunting, Catching and Trade of Terrestrial Wildlife (2003). This 
Circular identified three major challenges in the domestic wildlife conservation and 
utilisation. First, considerable levels of illegal hunting and catching activities have 
resulted in a sharp decline in the population of many species. Second, illegal trade has 
been rampant, with cases of illegal buying, transport, processing, and sale of terrestrial 
wildlife recurred in many parts of China. Third, the number of the severe cases and 
wildlife offences has increased markedly in recent years. In addition, the Circular, for 
the first time, proposed to allow captive breeding for commercial trade and utilisation of 
those terrestrial species for which there already exist successful breeding technologies. 
Compared to the 1991 Measure’s wording of “[integrating] other economic purposes” 
in the licensable scope for captive breeding of wildlife under SSP, this Circular’s 
proposal, by specifically using the terms “commercial trade and utilisation”, represents 
another major leap toward even greater commercialisation of China’s captive breeding 
industry.  
 
Pursuant to this proposal, two months later, the SFA issued the Circular on the Release 
of the List of 54 Terrestrial Wildlife Species….that Are Allowed for Domestication and 
Captive Breeding for Commercial Trade and Utilisation (2003) (see Table 9.10 in 
Appendices). As such, from 4 August 2003 onwards, all 54 terrestrial species named on 
the list – including one species under Class-I SSP (sika deer), five species under Class-
II SSP (red deer (Cervus elaphus) and other four species under the Psittacidae family) – 
are officially open to domestication and farming for commercial purposes.130 
 
                                                          
129 EIA. “China’s Wildlife Protection Law.” https://eia-international.org/our-work/environmental-crime-
and-governance/illegal-wildlife-trade/tigers-other-asian-big-cats/chinas-draft-wildlife-protection-law. 
130 Article 28 of the WPL 2016 gives SFA the authority to revoke protection status from species under 
SSP in light of the fact that for those species, there have been well-proven knowledge and technologies 
for captive breeding. In fact, at the 20th meeting of the twelve session of the NPC Standing Committee on 
25 April 2016, attendants already discussed the possibility of removing sika deer (Cervus nippon) from 
the list of Class-I SSP based on arguments that the technology and knowledge for captive breeding of sika 
deer have been well-established and the population of captive-bred sika deer across China has reached 
several millions. See NPC People News. “The Revision of the WPL Enters the Second Round.” April 25, 
2016. http://npc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0425/c14576-28302692.html. 
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6.1.1.3. TRADE AND UTILISATION OF WILDLIFE UNDER SSP   
In China’s wildlife legal framework, trade and utilisation have been expressed as 
Jingying Liyong in Chinese. This Chinese phrase’s literal translation is “management 
and utilisation”; but in Chinese wildlife legal parlance, the term management (Jingying) 
refers to sale and purchase in the business setting, while utilisation (Liyong) refers to the 
use of wildlife and their parts and products, for purposes such as scientific research and 
experiments, public exhibitions and performances, and the manufacture of a variety of 
products (e.g., healthcare products, medicines, arts and crafts, and pelt products). 
China’s wildlife laws and regulations legalise trade and utilisation of wildlife under SSP 
for an authorised range of purposes, but they outlaw the trade and utilisation for other 
purposes. Therefore, it is important to have a clear notion that under China’s wildlife 
legal framework, what forms of trade and utilisation of wildlife under SPP are legal and 
what are illegal. 
    
In general, the WPL 2017 prohibits the sale, purchase, and utilisation of wildlife under 
SSP and their products, but gives exemptions to the trade and utilisation for a specified 
range of purposes and requires these exemptions to be subject to control by government 
approvals and the “special marking” scheme. The WPL 2017 states that: 
 
Art. 27. Sale, purchase, and utilisation of wildlife under SSP or products thereof 
shall be prohibited. Where the sale, purchase or utilisation of wildlife under SSP or 
products thereof is necessary for scientific research, captive breeding, public 
exhibition or performance, heritage conservation or other special purposes 
(emphasis mine), the units concerned shall obtain the approval of the department of 
wildlife administration under the government at the level of province, municipality 
or autonomous region, and shall obtain the special markings in accordance with 
relevant regulations to ensure the traceability of the wildlife products.   
 
Art. 29. Production and utilisation of wildlife and products thereof as medicines 
shall comply with laws and regulations relating to pharmaceutical management. 
 
Art. 30. Production and trade of food made of wildlife under SSP or products 
thereof … shall be prohibited. Purchase of wildlife under SSP or products thereof 
for use as food shall be prohibited. 
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In the WPL 1988, it was originally its Article 22 that banned the sale, purchase, and 
utilisation of wildlife under SSP and granted virtually the same range of exemptions. 
But it was also the same Article 22 that included the following paragraph – which has 
been deleted from the WPL 2017 – that stated:  
 
Second Para., Art. 22. Units and individuals that domesticate and breed wildlife 
under SSP may, by presenting their domestication and captive-breeding licences, 
sell wildlife under SSP or products thereof, in accordance with relevant regulations, 
to the purchasing units designated by the government.  
 
Although this paragraph from the WPL 1988 has already been removed in revised drafts 
for the WPL 2017, during the intervening 28 years, it has already been fully translated 
into the many subordinate regulations drafted in pursuance of the WPL 1988. For 
example, Article 9 of the Measures (1991) dictates that licensees must obtain the 
approval of SFA before they sell or utilise captive-bred wildlife under Class-I SSP and 
their products, and must obtain the approval of the department of wildlife administration 
at the provincial level before they sell or utilise captive-bred wildlife under Class-II SSP. 
As for the designated purchasing units, the Regulations on the Implementation of 
Terrestrial Wildlife Protection (1992) states that: 
  
Art. 25. The list of designated purchasing units for captive-bred wildlife under SSP 
and products thereof shall be drawn up by the department of wildlife administration 
under the government at the level of province, autonomous region or municipality, 
and shall be approved by the government at the same level. Designated purchasing 
units must register, by presenting the approval documents, at the local department 
of administration for industry and commerce.  
 
Art. 27. Sale or purchase of wildlife under SSP or products thereof at pedlars’ 
market is prohibited 
 
Two clear points emerge from a reading of these provisions. First, sale, purchase, or 
utilisation of state protected wildlife is normally prohibited in China, 131  but a few 
                                                          
131 Violations of the WPL face administrative penalties including confiscation of wildlife products and 
illegal proceeds, license revocation or monetary fines. Acts causing “serious harm” are considered 
criminal offences under Provisions 151, 340 and 341 of the Criminal Law of China, incurring criminal 
penalties ranging from fines, to fixed-term imprisonment or even life sentences. 
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exemptions exist. Second, trade and utilisation of captive-bred wildlife under SSP and 
their products are legal, but such trade and utilisation are only allowed to occur among 
entities or enterprises that are licensed or designated by the government, and prior to 
sale or utilisation, the units concerned shall obtain the approval of the competent 
wildlife administration.  
     
It is understood that Article 27 of the WPL 2017 is a general and principled prohibitive 
clause applied to trade or utilisation of wildlife under SSP. Wildlife referred in this 
article shall be read as including both wild and captive-bred population, and including 
both the species covered by the List of Wildlife under SSP and the species not native to 
China but listed in CITES Appendix I and II. Following the general prohibition, 
exemptions come in to legalise certain forms of trade and utilisation of wildlife under 
SSP. That is, if trade or utilisation is necessary for the purposes specified in Article 27 
of the WPL 2017, they are allowed to carry on with prior approval from relevant 
wildlife administration and are subject to the special marking scheme.  
 
Note that under Article 27 of the WPL 2017 and its counterpart clause (Arc. 22) of the 
WPL 1988, there contains, among the exempted purposes, an extra licensable category 
written as “other special purposes”. Although both the WPL 1998 and 2017 have not 
explicitly ruled out the “commercial purposes” from the licensable scope, considering 
that the legislative intentions behind these exempted purposes in Article 27 of the WPL 
2017 and Article 22 of the WPL 1988, we have good reasons to believe that both WPL 
do not intend to include trade or utilisation for commercial purposes in the category of 
“other special purposes”. This is because all the specified exemptions in the WPL are 
related to scientific research, species and heritage conservation, and public education, 
while the commercial trade or utilisation of wildlife under SSP is surely of little avail to 
the wildlife conservation and education. 
  
However, by inscribing economic purposes into the licensable scope, the Measures 
(1991) made an illegal “opening” out of the confines of the WPL 1988. As a sectoral 
regulation subordinate to the national law of the WPL, the Measures (1991) has 
illegally expanded the category of “other special purposes” to include “economic 
purposes” as a cause for exemption for commercial farming. Following this, it is not 
surprising that the Measures (1991) has further authorised and legalised the commercial 
trade and utilisation of captive-bred wildlife under SSP. This is surely a breach in which 
 222 
 
a basic national law (WPL 1988) has been ill-interpreted and manipulated by a 
subordinate regulation (Measure (1991)) to open a backdoor for commercial trade and 
utilisation of wildlife under SSP. 
 
In addition to the above general provisions on wildlife trade and utilisation, the State 
Council, SFA, and other ministerial authorities have issued a number of administrative 
regulations that legalise or prohibit certain forms of trade and utilisation of certain state 
protected species. In May 1993, in reaction to an initiative by the US to threaten trade 
sanctions against China on account of China’s domestic trade in rhino horns and tiger 
parts (WWF 2012, 3), China’s State Council issued the Circular on the Ban of Trade of 
Rhino Horns and Tiger Bones (1993). This Circular is still in force today. Included in 
the Circular is an outright ban on the import, export, sale, purchase, transport, carrying 
or posting of rhino horns and tiger bones, including any identifiable body parts, arts and 
crafts made of or TCM containing ingredients of such body parts. Moreover, rhino horn 
and tiger bone are erased from traditional medicine pharmacopoeia, and the use of rhino 
horns and tiger bones for the making of medicines is forbidden thereafter the ban. 
Products containing rhino horn or tiger bone that were produced before the ban are 
required to be sealed and banned from trade.  
 
Note that this Circular does not ban trade in tiger pelts and pelt products. It is this 
Circular that has been, over the past ten years, giving the international community an 
illusion, that China has fully prohibited domestic trade in parts and derivatives of tiger 
(including captive-bred). However, at a CITES standing committee meeting held in 
Geneva 2014, a Chinese delegate admitted in public for the first time that China permits 
trade in pelts from captive-bred tigers, but bans trade in tiger bones (Khadka 2014). 
Even so, as we will see in the following sections, under China’s special marking scheme, 
not only the trade of tiger pelts products, but also the trade of tiger bone products such 
as tiger bone wine and tiger bone pain-killing paster, are all enabled and legalised by the 
SFA’s special marking scheme and are going on at a commercial scale.  
 
To enforce the State Council 1993 Ban, in November 1993, the Ministry of Health 
released the Circular on Changing the Ingredients and Names of Traditional Chinese 
Medicines Containing Rhino Horn or Tiger Bone (1993). On top of reiterating the ban 
on the production and trade of TCM containing ingredients of rhino horn or tiger bone, 
the Circular authorised the use of leopard bones as a substitute to tiger bones for the 
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making of internally applied medicines. Also, it mandated a change of the names of 
products that contain the words “rhino horn” and “tiger bone”, with the TCM and 
healthcare products containing the words “tiger bone” required to be changed into “bone 
strengthening” and the word “rhino” to be replaced by “west”.132 This explains why this 
study has only been able to detect the “bone strengthening” products under the SFA’s 
special marking scheme, while unable to spot tiger bone products. 
 
In June 2005, the SFA, Ministry of Health, State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), and the State 
Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine (SATCM) together released an internal 
document: the Circular on the Launching of a Pilot Project for the Use of Captive-bred 
Tiger Bones in Medicines and the Gradual Reduction in the Use of Leopard Bones 
(2005). Unlike other SFA documents which are accessible to the public, the full content 
of this Circular has been unavailable on SFA’s websites, though its name has appeared 
in several normative documents issued by the provincial forestry authorities as a 
supplementary implementation guideline to the Circular. As indicated by its title, this 
Circular seems to authorise the re-use in medicines of bones harvested from farmed 
tigers. At a time when the State Council 1993 Ban is still effective, issuing such a 
Circular is no doubt in violation with the 1993 Ban. If it is the case, this is the second 
point of breach that this chapter has identified in China’s wildlife legal system where a 
subordinate normative overly defies a regulation of a superior legislative order.133  
 
In January 2003, the SFA and SAIC released the Circular on Straightening out 
Manufacturing and Processing Businesses Utilising Wildlife and Their Products and 
Launching the Pilot Marking Scheme (2003). This Circular introduced a pilot marking 
scheme called Special Marking for Trade and Utilisation of Wildlife and Products 
Thereof. Such markings have been given to commercial entities and their wildlife 
                                                          
132 In Chinese phonetic system, the words “rhino” and “west” share the same pronunciation. 
133 In the literature on wildlife value orientation (WVO, or beliefs about the relationships between human 
and wildlife), it is suggested that currently the predominant WVO in China is materialism (Zinn and Shen 
2007; Teel etc. 2007). Materialists regard wildlife as exploitable resources for human use. Based on a 
review of China’s wildlife legal frameworks in this chapter, we clearly see the influences of materialism 
on wildlife legislation, for example, the use of wording like “wildlife with important economic value” in 
the WPL 1988, as well as on policy implementation, for example, the two identified points of breach in 
which Chinese wildlife administration manipulated or even overly defied superior laws or regulations to 
give way to commercial farming and utilisation of endangered wildlife. Research on the cultural 
embeddedness in the content of national and sub-national laws and regulations or the implementation of 
such laws and regulations is indeed important if such influences were to be reversed, however, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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products. Wildlife products registered with a special marking can then be transported 
and sold legally.  
 
Table 6.1: Key junctures in the expansion of the list of pilot entities covered by the special marking 
scheme 
Key junctures Expansion of the list of pilot entities under the scheme 
From 1 May 2004 
• Applying marking scheme to ivory carving factories and retail outlets. Only licensed ivory 
carving factories and retail outlets can legally operate. Ivory products in sale or exhibition are 
mandated to be accompanied by a unique identity card issued by the SFA, and an extra 
photograph of the ivory product is required for items weighing more than 50g. The number of 
licensed ivory carving factories and retail outlets increased from 9 and 31 in 2004 to 34 and 130 
in 2015 respectively. 
• Applying marking scheme to business entities manufacturing or selling Erhu made of Python 
skins. The combined number of licensed manufacturers and sellers increased from 17 in 2004 
to 105 in 2015.
 
 
From 1 Jan. 2005 
• Applying marking scheme to production, trade and individual possession of wildlife 
specimens. 
• Applying marking scheme to companies producing and selling healthcare products and food. 
The fresh & frozen meat of Siamese crocodile (Crocodylus siamensis, CITES Appendix-I) by 
Heilongjiang Longyin Import & Export Company Ltd as well as the “Xiongsen bone 
strengthening wine” and “bear gall bladder wine” by Guangxi Xiongsen Wine Company Ltd 
were granted by the SFA a special marking for commercial production and trade. Later in 2008 
and 2015 respectively, five products of bone strengthening wine products from another two 
companies were given the markings. Of them, three bone strengthening wine products from 
Heilongjiang Siberian Tiger Park have been reported by media of using bones from captive 
tiger for ingredients of these three wine products.134 
From 1 Jul. 2005 
• Applying marking scheme to production and trade of TCM containing authentic musk or bear 
bile. 
• Applying marking scheme to the processing and trade of pelt products made of wildlife under 
SSP.
 
 
From 1 Jan. 2006 
• Applying marking scheme to production and trade of TCM containing leopard bones. 
• Applying marking scheme to businesses that captive breed wildlife under SSP including 
tigers, leopards, lions, elephants, giant panda, bears, snub-nosed monkey and so on. 
From 1 Jan. 2008 
• Applying marking scheme to production and trade of TCM containing Saiga horns, pangolin 
scales, or rare snake species. 
• Applying marking scheme to production and trade of tiger and leopard pelts and their 
products 
 
Between May 2003 and April 2015, the SFA and other ministerial authorities have 
issued eighteen regulations and announcements, expanding the list of pilot entities 
covered by the special marking scheme from the initial two to over 500.135 Wildlife 
                                                          
134 Liaoning Evening News. “Siberian Tiger Park Disclosed Selling Tiger Bone Wine” (in Chinese). May 
25, 2014.  http://liaoning.lnd.com.cn/htm/2014-05/27/content_4030343.htm. 
135 This figure only counts the marked business entities that produce or sell wildlife products. It does not 
consider the hospitals designated for clinic use of TCM containing ingredients of wildlife under SSP. 
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products marked for commercial production and trade range over healthcare products 
and food, TCM, arts and crafts, Chinese traditional instrument, animal specimens, and 
pelt products. Gradually, over the past 12 years, the ivory carving factories and retail 
outlets, the production and trade of tiger and leopard pelts and their products, the 
production and trade of TCM containing Saiga horn, pangolin scale, rare snake species, 
musk, and bear bile, the production and trade of healthcare products such as tiger bone 
wine and bear bile wine as well as of exotic wildlife meat such as Asian Bullfrog 
(Class-II SSP) and Siamese crocodile (Crocodylus siamensis, CITES Appendix-I), all 
have been added to the embrace of the marking schemes, legalising the commercial 
production, utilisation, and trade of such products. 
 
Table 6.2: Statistics of the number of business entities covered by special marking scheme (by Jul. 2016) 
Products made of  
wildlife under SSP 
Number of authorised business entities Source* 
Ivory 
• Licensed entities for carving or processing 
ivory tusks: 34 
• Licensed retail outlets: 130 
SFA Announcement: 2015 
No.9 
Erhu involving the use of python 
skins 
Licensed manufacturing and selling entities: 
105  
SFA Announcement: 2004 
No.1; 2004 No.6; 2005 
No.3, No.5 
TCM containing ingredients of 
authentic musk or bear bile 
• Licensed manufacturing and selling entities: 
9 
• Designated hospitals for clinical use: 64 
SFA Announcement: 
2005. No.3, No.5; 2008 
No.15; 2014 No.1; 2015 
No.8  
TCM containing ingredients of Saiga 
horn, pangolin scale, or rare snake 
species (only apply to species 
classified as special state protection 
or included in CITES Appendices)^   
• Designated hospitals for clinical use of 
TCM containing Saiga horn: 492 
• Designated hospitals for clinical use of 
TCM containing pangolin scale: 711 
• Designated hospitals for clinical use of 
TCM containing rare snake species: 702 
SFA Announcement: 2008 
No.15; 2015 No.8 
Products made of the pelts of wildlife 
under SSP 
Licensed entities manufacturing or selling pelt 
products made of pelts of wildlife under SSP: 
66 
SFA Announcement: 2005 
No.3, No.5; 2007 No.8; 
2009 No.6; 2011 No.4; 
2012 No.1; 2013 No.6; 
2014 No.1; 2015 No.8 
Healthcare products, food and 
cosmetics containing ingredients of 
wildlife (not limited to species under 
SSP) 
Licensed entities processing and selling such 
products: 97  
SFA Announcement: 2003 
No.3; 2005 No.5 
* All SFA Announcements can be found at the SFA Home Website: http://www.forestry.gov.cn/. 
^ Overlaps exist among the designated hospitals for the clinic use of the three categories of TCM. 
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6.1.2. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE 
In recent years, China has taken a number of important steps toward wildlife 
conservation and tackling illegal trade. In July 2011, the SFA announced the launch of 
China’s Tiger Recovery Program, a national plan that aims to recover the endangered 
Amur, Bengal and Indo-China tiger species through measures including increasing and 
improving tiger habits, establishing monitoring and patrolling system, and cracking 
down on poaching, smuggling and illegal trade of tiger products.136 In May 2013, China, 
along with other seven countries, submitted its National Ivory Action Plan to the CITES 
Secretariat.137 This action plan was a rejoinder to the CITES Secretariat’s request on 
China – which was identified in a previous report by TRAFFIC (Milliken 2013, 14) as 
the premier end-use market in the international illegal ivory trade – to outline its 
concrete activities that are to be taken in the areas of legislation and regulation and of 
national and international enforcement to curtail domestic illegal ivory trade.138 
 
Following the action plan, China took a series of high-profile moves to signal its firm 
stance against the illegal ivory trade. In July 2014, 6.15 tonnes of confiscated ivory 
accumulated through enforcement activities were publicly destroyed in Dongguan, 
Guangdong Province.139 In May 2015, another batch of 662 kg of illegal ivory and 
carvings seized since 2014 was publicly crushed again in Beijing. On the destruction 
ceremony, the head of the SFA, Zhao Shucong, announced a ten-point action plan on 
combating China’s illegal wildlife trade, with part of the plan being China’s first ever 
commitment to phase out legal, domestic commercial processing and sale of ivory and 
products.140 During a state visit to Washington in September 2015, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping and the US President Barack Obama both committed to enact “nearly complete 
bans” on ivory import and export (including putting restrictions on the import of ivory 
as hunting trophies), and to take significant and timely steps to halt the domestic 
                                                          
136 WWF. “China Launches Plan to Recover Wild Tigers.” July 29, 2011. 
http://en.wwfchina.org/?3760/China-Launches-Plan-to-Recover-Wild-Tigers. 
137 The full context of this national action plan has been unavailable. 
138 CITES Secretariat. “Eight Countries Submit National Action Plans to Combat Illegal Trade in 
Elephant Ivory.” May 16, 2013. 
https://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr/2013/20130516_elephant_action_plan.php. 
139 TRAFFIC. “China Destroys 6.15 Tonnes of Seized Ivory in an Historic Move Hugely Symbolic for 
Demand Reduction Efforts.” June 1, 2014. http://www.traffic.org/home/2014/1/6/china-destroys-615-
tonnes-of-seized-ivory-in-an-historic-mov.html. 
140 TRAFFIC. “China Signals End to Domestic Ivory Market during Destruction of Illegal Stockpile.” 
May 29, 2015. http://www.traffic.org/home/2015/5/29/china-signals-end-to-domestic-ivory-market-
during-destructio.html. 
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commercial trade of ivory.141 Following this, in October 2015, the SFA announced a 
one-year interim ban on the import of African ivory hunting trophy and a suspension of 
ivory-related administrative licensing service (SFA Announcement 2015 No.17). In 
March 2016, the SFA renewed the import ban by extending its lifespan until 31 
December 2019 and widening its scope of application not only to the import of African 
elephant ivory acquired as hunting trophies, but also to the import of African elephant 
ivory tusks and carvings (SFA Announcement 2016 No.3). In the latest announcement 
released by the SFA in March 2017, it mandated the gradual shut down of a total of 173 
ivory processing and selling entities, with 67 of them scheduled to close down before 31 
March 2017 and the remaining 105 by the end of 2017 (SFA Announcement 2017 No.8). 
 
In enforcement arena, Chinese law enforcement has a consistent record of, and a good 
reputation for, its interception of illegal wildlife trade. In the “Wildlife Crime Scorecard” 
by WWF (Nowell 2012, 29), China scored 0.58 and ranked ninth among 42 countries 
under the category of “law enforcement effort ratio” (LEER), which is an indicator used 
to analyse how effective the national enforcement agencies are in interdicting illicit 
wildlife trade. The score was obtained by dividing the number of in-country wildlife 
seizures by the total number of seizures linked to that country during 1999–2010. 
Applying the LEER method to the China-related wildlife seizure data collated in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, with some 258 seizures made by enforcement authorities in 
mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong as compared to some 105 China-related 
seizures made in other countries,142 China would have a much higher enforcement ratio 
of 0.71 for its law enforcement achievement during the period from 1996 to 2013. 
  
Forest police and customs remain the two major wildlife enforcement units in China. 
During 2004–2013, Chinese customs officials nationwide dealt with a total of 930 
wildlife-related criminal cases, leading to the apprehension and prosecution of some 
1,395 criminal suspects.143 Between 1984 and 2014, it is reported that China’s forest 
police throughout the country handled an aggregate of 4.56 million forest and wildlife-
                                                          
141 The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States.” September 25, 
2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-
visit-united-states. 
142 Although these 105 wildlife seizures were made by enforcement agencies in other countries, China 
was involved as either a destination or source for the seized wildlife products. 
143 Xinhua News. “China Openly Destroyed 6.1 tonnes of Seized Ivory” (in Chinese). January 7, 2014. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2014-01/07/c_125965013.htm. 
 228 
 
related cases, with 6.67 million offenders being brought to justice.144 According to the 
SFA, in 2015 alone, forest police countrywide dealt with some 31,746 forest and 
wildlife-related criminal cases and 202,418 administrative cases. Some 601,508 
offenders were imposed penalties of various terms; some 358,465 cm3 of wood products 
and 476,776 wild animals were seized.145  
 
In December 2011, China established the National Inter-agencies CITES Enforcement 
Coordination Group (NICECG) to serve as a liaison office to facilitate the collection 
and exchange of intelligence, enhance capacity building, and orchestrate joint 
enforcement activities. The NICECG consists of representatives from the SFA, SAIC, 
Ministry of Public Security (MPC), General Administration of Customs (GAC), and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The CITES Management Authority (MA) of China, hosted by 
the SFA, is the coordinating body of the NICECG. According to the SFA, by March 
2016, some 37 provinces (including municipal cities and autonomous regions) have 
copied the NICECG and instituted their own inter-agencies CITES enforcement 
coordinating offices. 146  In May 2012, the NICECG was awarded the Certificate of 
Commendation by the CITES Secretary-General for two nationwide wildlife law 
enforcement operations – “Forest Police Operation” and “Shield of Country Gate 
Operation” (see Table 9.9 in Appendices) – carried out under the auspices of NICECG 
in early 2012.147  
 
Based on the data the author collected for this chapter, it is estimated that between 1999 
and the first half of 2016, Chinese wildlife enforcement agencies have organised and 
initiated at least 12 large-scale nationwide enforcement operations against wildlife 
offences. The latest two operations were launched and deployed by the SFA, including 
the “Spring Operation” in April 2016 aimed at clamping down on the illegal catching, 
hunting, and eating of nationally protected bird species,148 and the “Thunder Operation” 
                                                          
144 Forestry Gov. News. “Forest Police Handled more than 4 Million Forest and Wildlife-related Cases in 
the Past Three Decades” (in Chinese). June 16, 2014. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/3566/content-
683619.html. 
145 China Green Times. “Forest Police achieved a marked success in cracking down on forest crime” (in 
Chinese) February 17, 2016. http://www.greentimes.com/green/news/gasj/slga/content/2016-
02/17/content_329082.htm. 
146 Forestry Gov. News. “China receives wide applause from international community for its achievement 
in endangered wildlife protection” (in Chinese). March 7, 2016. 
http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/443/content-849412.html. 
147 CITES Secretariat. “CITES Secretariat Praises China for Major Nationwide Wildlife Law 
Enforcement Operations.” May 9, 2012. https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2012/20120509_certificate_cn.php. 
148 Xinhua News. “85,000 Wild Animals Seized from a Nationwide Forest Police Special Operation” (in 
Chinese). June 15, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-06/15/content_5082493.htm. 
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in September 2015 focusing on suppressing the illegal killing, sale, purchase, and 
transport of endangered wildlife and their products.149 As it can be seen in Table 6.3, in 
many of these operations, there involved in each the participation of tens of thousands 
of enforcement personnel, the putting on record of hundreds or thousands of wildlife-
related criminal and administrative cases, the detainment and arrest of hundreds of 
wildlife offenders, the inspection of a vast number of local niche markets, wildlife stalls, 
shops, hotels, and restaurants, and the seizure of a substantial volume of wild animals 
and products.    
 
Internationally, China has purposefully elevated its cross-border enforcement 
coordination by actively engaging in transnational enforcement operations against 
wildlife smuggling and illegal trade. Since 2010, China wildlife enforcement units, 
including customs and forest police, have participated in a series of regional and 
international wildlife enforcement operations and, have made significant seizures of 
illicit wildlife products and detained hundreds of wildlife criminals. These included the 
INTERPOL-led “Operation RAMP” that targeted illegal trade in reptiles and 
amphibians, 150  the World Customs Organisation-coordinated “Operation GAPIN” 
designed to combat illegal cross-border trade in great apes,151 and the Chinese-organised 
“Operation Cobra Series I, II, and III” that aimed at dismantling transnational wildlife 
crime syndicates.152 In the Cobra series, China played a leading role in proposing and 
co-organising the global crackdowns, managing the sharing of intelligence, and 
conducting the follow-up investigation and prosecution. The Cobra-II conducted in 
January 2014 also witnessed the first-ever joint China-Africa undercover sting operation 
                                                          
149 China Green Times. “SFA Deployed the “Thunder Operation” against Forest and Wildlife-related 
Offences” (in Chinese). October 14, 2015. http://bhs.forestry.gov.cn/portal/zrbh/s/1492/content-
807348.html. 
150 China Green Times. “China Engaged in International Enforcement Operation and Made Significant 
Contributions” (in Chinese). February 5, 2012. http://www.greentimes.com/green/swdyx/2012-
02/05/content_165759.htm. 
151 China Green Times. “China Engaged in WCO-led Enforcement Operation against Illegal Trade of 
Great Apes” (in Chinese). March 10, 2011. 
http://www.greentimes.com/green/news/lyyf/fzxw/content/2011-03/10/content_123282.htm. 
152 Forestry Gov. News. “International Cooperation on Wildlife Protection and Cracking Down on 
Wildlife Smuggling” (in Chinese). February 17, 2014. 
http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/bhxh/s/650/content-658051.html. CITES Secretariat. “Successful 
Operation Highlights Growing International Cooperation to Combat Wildlife Crime.” June 18, 2015. 
https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/iccwc_press_release_cobra_III. 
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that resulted in the dismantling of a major ivory trafficking syndicate and the extradition 
of a Chinese national implicated in the syndicate from Kenya to China.153 
 
These are all encouraging progress and achievements made by Chinese wildlife 
authorities. However, the control of illegal wildlife trade in China still faces significant 
challenges. In many cases, the most prominent challenge tends to be the absence of 
sustained and consistent enforcement by local wildlife enforcement agencies to ensure 
an adequate implementation of China’s control measures on wildlife trade and 
utilisation. As discussed early in this Chapter, China’s wildlife legal framework 
legalises and enables the captive breeding of rare and endangered wildlife and the 
commercial trade and utilisation of such captive-bred wildlife and their products on the 
one hand, while set up a complex licensing system – e.g., hunting permits, captive-
breeding permits, ivory registration and identification scheme, and the special marking 
scheme – with a view to regulating legal trade and preventing illegal trade on the other. 
These control measures, if properly enforced, will certainly have a positive impact on 
containing China’s illegal internal trade. However, reliable evidence collected by this 
study shows that such a licensing system has often been poorly enforced or even 
unenforced by local wildlife administration and enforcement authorities. As revealed in 
several field surveys and undercover investigations conducted by researchers and 
environmental NGOs (e.g., EIA, Elephant Family) in many parts of China, widespread 
non-compliance exists in local niche marketplaces that openly sell protected wildlife 
and in local restaurants that secretly or semi-openly serve wildlife as exotic meals 
(Meng et al. 2009; EIA 2009). It exists in government-accredited ivory carving factories 
that manufacture on smuggled ivory tusks, in retail outlets that sell illicit ivory products 
(EIA 2011; Martin and Vigne 2011; Gabriel et al. 2012; Vigne and Martin 2014). It 
exists in officially-licensed pharmacies that sell illegal TCM containing ingredients of 
nationally protected wildlife (Li et al. 2007).  
 
In a way, it can be said that the existence of a legal market for wildlife from sources 
such as captive breeding and international auctions (in the case of ivory)154, and the 
                                                          
153 CITES Secretariat. “Nepal, China, Kenya and the Lusaka Agreement Task Force Recognized for 
Exemplary Enforcement Efforts.” October 7, 2014. https://cites.org/eng/CITES-
SG_certificate_commendation_10072014. 
154 After banning all international commercial ivory trade in 1989, CITES agreed in 1997 to allow 
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to make an experimental sale from their existing legal stocks of raw 
ivory in order to raise funds to support elephant conservation activities. In 2008, four Chinese companies 
including the National Arts & Crafts Group Corporation, Beijing Ivory Carving Factory, Guangzhou 
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weak enforcement of the licensing schemes have been the two most significant culprits 
for China’s raging illegal trade. This is because, on the one hand, the presence of a legal 
market aids in the creation and continuation of the market desirability and acceptability 
for wildlife products and further entrench the culture of commodifying and consuming 
endangered wildlife products such as ivory, tiger pelts, and TCM containing bear bile. 
In turn, this will likely draw more people into the consumer market and drive up the 
total demand for wildlife products. In a way, as the aggregate market demand increases 
while the legal supply (e.g., captive-bred sources or international auctions) remains the 
same, it is unsurprising that the new and unmet demand will encourage the development 
of greater illegal sources of supply, as manifested in more illegal poaching in source 
countries and more cross-border smuggling of such commodities to China. On the other 
hand, the ineffective enforcement of the licensing schemes provides a conduit for illegal 
dealers to launder the illicit wildlife products into the legal market.  
 
6.2. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL TRADE IN FOREST PRODUCTS 
In the past few years, China has taken a number of important steps to curtail its illegal 
trade in forest products. These include efforts to improve China’s domestic forestry 
governance, promote its timber legality verification schemes (TLVS), develop 
guidelines on investment and logging operations for companies operating overseas, and 
strengthen international cooperation through establishing bilateral forums and 
agreements with the major producer and consumer countries. Despite the progress 
above, key challenges remain. Compared to the lack of consistent enforcement on the 
ground in the wildlife sector, the biggest challenge facing China in tackling its illegal 
trade in forest products is the absence of a national legislative or regulatory 
establishment that explicitly demarcates timber legality and thus provides a practical 
instrument for enforcement authorities to determine the legal timber and prevent the 
illegal import and export. 
 
6.2.1. CHINA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREST PRODUCT TRADE 
Currently, China has established a relatively solid legal framework for the protection of 
domestic forest resources and administration of internal forest product trade. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Daxin Ivory Factory, and Beijing Mammoth Art Co., Ltd. purchased about 62 tonnes of elephant tusks 
from a one-off ivory auction in Southern Africa (Gao and Clark 2014, 24).  
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Symbolised first and foremost by the Forestry Law (1985, amended in 1998) and the 
Regulations on the Implementation of the Forestry Law (2000), this legal framework 
institutes a system of detailed rules and procedures for the ownership of forest resources, 
tree planting and afforestation, annual quota control on timber felling, and a chain of 
licensing schemes for timber logging, processing, and transport. These laws and 
regulations provide for the basic definitions on the legality for timber logging, transport, 
manufacturing or processing, and sale within China’s territory. For example, according 
to the Forestry Law (1985), logging companies must obtain a valid logging permit to 
harvest timber and must comply with the requirements (e.g., quotas) specified by the 
logging permit (Art. 32). In addition, logging companies must also comply with the 
1998 logging that prohibits all forms of logging within State-owned forests. Timber 
transporters and carriers who transport timber not belonging to the State management 
sources must have a valid timber transportation certificate (Art. 37). Under the 
Regulations (2000), it is required that timber processing enterprises must be legally 
registered and hold a valid timber processing certificate when processing wood in forest 
areas (Art. 34).  
 
Driven by concerns for the deterioration of the forest environment and flooding, in 2000 
the Chinese government initiated the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) to 
mediate deforestation and restore protective watersheds. This program comprised two 
policies: prohibiting commercial logging in state-owned forests upstream of the 
Yangtze River as well as upstream and midstream of the Yellow River; and reducing 
logging in key state-owned natural forests in Heilong Jiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia 
(Sun et al. 2016, 2). In 2010 China decided to implement “NFPP Phase II” which put 
the natural forest areas around the Danjiangkou Reservoir under the coverage of the 
logging ban.155 In April 2014 the SFA adjusted its logging policy in Heilongjiang from 
“reducing logging” to a full ban.156 In its “13th Five-Year Plan for the Protection of 
Ecological Environment”, China State Council claimed that by the end of 2016 
commercial logging of natural forests has been completely ceased in all key state-owned 
forest areas.157 In March 2017 the SFA made another big move, announcing that by the 
                                                          
155 Forestry Gov. “Introduction on the Natural Forest Protection Programme Phase II” (in Chinese). 17 
May 2011. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/3891/content-607357.html. 
156 Xinhua News. “Full ban on the Commercial Logging in State-owned Natural Forests in Heilongjiang 
Province Will Enter Into Force on 1 April” (in Chinese). 31 March 2014. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-03/31/c_1110032560.htm. 
157 China State Council. “Circular of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the 13th Five-Year 
Plan for the Protection of Ecological Environment” (in Chinese). 5 December 2016. 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/05/content_5143290.htm. 
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end of 2017 China will gradually stop commercial logging in natural forests under all 
kinds of ownership. This means not only the state-owned natural forests, but also the 
collectively- and private-owned natural forests will also be banned from commercial 
logging.158 
 
In contrast with domestic timber trade, the import and export of forest products in China 
are largely governed by a number of statutes and regulations that are not directly related 
to forest products. These mainly include the Customs Law (1987), Law on the Import 
and Export Goods Inspection (2002), Foreign Trade Law (2004), Regulations on the 
Origin of Import and Export Goods (2005), Regulations on the Administration of Import 
and Export of Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora (2006), and the Measures for the 
Administration of Import and Export License of Wild Fauna and Flora (2014) (see 
Table 9.11 in Appendices). 
 
Depending on the classification of the forest products traded, China implements two 
different import/export control mechanisms. First, China implements a special national 
licensing scheme for the import and export of rare and endangered plant species and 
products thereof, whose import and export for commercial purposes are prohibited or 
restricted by CITES, or whose export is restricted by the State. China CITES MA and 
the GAC are responsible for the making and adjustment of the HS Commodity Appendix 
of Import and Export on Wild Fauna and Flora, which defines the range of animal and 
plant species, the import and export of which are subject to licensing control. According 
to the 2014 HS Commodity Appendix, currently, a total of 4,413 plant species from the 
CITES Appendices and/or the List of Wild Flora under SSP are being placed under the 
national import/export licensing control. 159  Under the licensing scheme, entities 
intending to import or export forest products enumerated in the HS Commodity 
Appendix must apply to the China CITES MA for an import/export license, which 
consists of a certificate/permit for import/export/re-export and a species certificate.160 
                                                          
158 China Talk. “Interpretation of the Full Ban on Commercial Logging in Natural Forests” (in Chinese). 
10 May 2017. http://fangtan.china.com.cn/2017-05/10/content_40781984.htm 
159 China CITES MA and GAC. “Joint Announcement 2013 No.6.” December 29, 2013. 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab515/info698016.htm. 
160 Note that the “certificate for import/export/re-export” and the “permit for export” have different ranges 
of application. The certificates apply to plant species that are covered by both the HS Commodity 
Appendix and the CITES Appendices and that are required by CITES to be subject to control measures in 
international commercial trade. In contrast, the permits apply to plant species that are covered by the HS 
Commodity Appendix and for which China has a full sovereignty in the administration of their import and 
export. In the case of importing/exporting plant species whose import and export for commercial trade are 
prohibited or restricted by CITES, the entities concerned shall, in addition to obtaining the “certificate for 
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One import/export license can only be used for one-time import/export and repeated use 
is illegal. 
 
Second, for the majority of forest products whose import and export are not prohibited 
or restricted by CITES or by China – which comprises the bulk of China’s forest 
product import – China enforces a general licensing scheme. In addition to having a 
business registration certificate, entities engaged in import and export of such forest 
products shall hold an import/export operation license issued by the competent 
commerce authorities. For customs clearance, the Customs Law (1987) mandates that 
the consignee for import goods, or the consignor for export goods, shall make an 
accurate declaration and submit the import/export operation license and other relevant 
documents to the Customs for examination (Art. 4). May vary by cases, common 
documents needed for customs clearance for the imported or exported forest products 
include: the import/export license, packing list, bill of lading, purchase or sale contracts, 
shipping/delivery order, timber quarantine certificate, certificate of origin, certificate for 
non-regulated species listed in the HS Commodity Appendix, receipts for payment of 
appropriate tariffs and others.  
 
In China’s legal framework for forest product trade, there are only a few provisions that 
involve a mention of requiring entities concerned to verify the origin of the imported 
timber, or of advising the trading companies to avoid purchasing forest products of 
suspicious origin. For example, Article 14 of the Regulations on the Origin of Import 
and Export Goods (2004) states that when conducting an examination to determine the 
origin of the import goods, the customs may request the consignee to provide the 
certificate of origin issued by the exporting country or region. Where necessary, the 
Customs may request the authorities concerned of the exporting country to verify the 
certificate of origin. Article 34 of the Regulations on the Implementation of the Forestry 
Law (2000) requests the purchasing units not to procure timber without a legal logging 
permit or other lawful documents testifying its legal origin. Overall, in China’s legal 
framework for timber trade, there have been no explicit treatments to the legality 
verification for the imported forest products, and this tends to be the biggest obstacle for 
China to curb its illegal timber trade. However, it is encouraging that this weakness has 
                                                                                                                                                                          
import/export”, also acquire the official certificate for export/import issued by the CITES MA in 
exporting/importing country or region. 
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been partially overcome by China’s recent effort in developing its own timber legality 
verification schemes (TLVS). 
 
6.2.2. CHINA’S TIMBER LEGALITY VERIFICATION SCHEMES 
From October 2009, the Research Institute of Forestry Policy and Information under the 
Chinese Academy of Forestry (CAF) worked in collaboration with the non-profit group 
ProForest on developing China national TLVS. By late 2011, three reports were 
produced under this collaboration. The first two reports reviewed changes in market 
requirements for legal and sustainable timber in China’s major exporting markets and 
existing TLVS in selected consumer countries (Proforest 2010a, 2010b). The third 
report proposed a draft China national TLVS, which suggested two mechanisms for the 
verification of the legality of imported timber. The first is the Chinese Government-
guided Timber Verification Scheme (CGTVS), under which bilateral agreements 
between China and timber-producing countries would be established to define the 
timber legality, management processes, and valid legality documentation. The second is 
the Chinese Association-guided Timber Verification Scheme (CATVS), which is a 
voluntary mechanism designed to be used when trading with countries with which 
China has not yet established a CGTVS agreement. Under the CATVS, mutual 
recognition of a particular timber legality verification system is expected to be achieved 
between industrial associations in China and their counterparts in timber-producing 
countries (Oberndorf 2013, 14–5; Wellesley 2014, 11; Chen 2014). 
 
At the time of drafting this chapter, little progress has been made in promoting CGTVS, 
though China National Forest Products Industry Association (CNFPIA) has taken 
several steps towards developing CATVS. In 2009, with the SFA’s commission, the 
CNFPIA initiated the programme on the development of standards, procedures, 
licensing, product markings, and management processes for CATVS. As so far, four 
Association standards and regulations have been released (Zhang 2014). These include 
China Timber Legality Verification Standard (2012 Trial), Detailed Measures for the 
Implementation of China Timber Legality Verification Standard (2012 Trial), Wood 
Processing Industry Self-disciplinary Pledge to Procure Wood of Legal Origin (2012 
Trial), and the Measures for the Administration of the Verification Procedures, 
Markings and Certificates for China Timber Legality (2012 Trial) (CNFPIA 2012). 
Under China Timber Legality Verification Standard (2012 Trial), the term “timber 
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legality” is defined as “harvesting, transport, processing, and sale of timber in 
compliance with relevant national laws and regulations and relevant international 
agreements that China has signed” (Art. 2.2). Wood processing enterprises are advised 
to take a due diligence to avoid purchasing wood products which are linked with the 
risk of coming from illegal origin or “destructive harvest” (Art. 2.5). Moreover, trading 
enterprises are instructed to implement a chain-of-custody system that tracks and 
records the whole process from timber logging, transport to final sale. In enforcement 
terms, for imported wood products to be deemed as legal, the Standard stipulates that 
the importing enterprises need to present the certificate of origin and customs 
documentation issued by both exporting and importing countries.  
 
In November 2012, at the second Forest Products International Trade Forum held in 
Nanning, Guangxi, CNFPIA launched its pilot TLVS program. Eight of CNFPIA’s 
member companies were chosen to be the first batch of volunteers to implement the 
program. Overall, the verification process begins with CNFPIA members applying for 
the membership of the CNFPIA TLVS and signing a self-disciplinary pledge to confirm 
their commitment to be compliant with the TLVS. Then the enterprises that have proven 
fully conformable with the legality standards will be issued a “Legal Timber 
Verification Certificate” and allowed to use the logo of “Legal Timber” on their wood 
products. To facilitate the program’s implementation, a legality verification 
management office and an online timber-tracking system were established under the 
auspice of CNFPIA (Zhang 2014). 
 
6.2.3. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
Internationally, China has established several regular dialogue mechanisms and 
concluded a series of bilateral agreements with a number of key producer and consumer 
countries. In December 2007, China and the US signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on combating illegal logging and associated trade on the 
occasion of the Third Meeting of their Strategic Economic Dialogue. Under the MoU, 
the two sides decided to establish a bilateral forum that will be attended by 
representatives from multiple agencies on both sides, and that will identify key priority 
activities for cooperation to combat illegal logging and promote trade in forest products 
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from legal and sustainable sources.161 As so far, the forum has met six times. At the 
sixth meeting of the bilateral forum in March 2015, both sides agreed to continue the 
regular exchange and information sharing through the bilateral forum, to strengthen 
dialogue and engagement under regional and multilateral fora such as the APEC Experts 
Group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade, and to establish partnerships with civil 
society and private sector to increase effort to tackle illegal logging and related trade.162   
 
In January 2009, China and the EU established a Bilateral Coordination Mechanism 
(BCM) under the China-EU Dialogue on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance 
(FLEG). The BCM is intended to serve as a forum for policy dialogue, and a 
mechanism for sharing information on policies and legal frameworks as well as for 
coordinating initiatives stopping illegal logging and associated trade. It meets annually 
and develops a multi-annual workplan and operating modalities.163 According to its 
2016 workplan, current planned activities under the BCM include developing trilateral 
cooperation between China, Indonesia, and the EU on promoting trade of legally 
sourced timber and timber products, and holding talks to explore the options of 
including FLEGT licensed timber under the Chinese timber legality verification 
system.164 
 
In 1984, Australia and China signed the Australia-China Agricultural Cooperation 
Agreement (ACACA) to promote their cooperation on forestry matters and enhance 
trade opportunities. In 1988, the China-Australia Joint Working Group on Forestry 
(JWGF) was established under the ACACA. Further in September 2009, the two sides 
concluded a MoU on combating illegal logging and associated trade in support of 
sustainable forest management. Under the China-Australia JWGF, the Illegal Logging 
Working Group was created to host meetings and carry out the priority areas for 
cooperation identified by the MoU, which include, for example, encouraging trade in 
                                                          
161 Office of the US Trade Representative. “US and China Announce Memorandum of Understanding on 
Illegal Logging and Associated Trade at SED III.” December, 2007.  https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2007/december/us-and-china-announce-memorandum-underst. 
162 US Department of State. “US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track.” 
June 24, 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm. 
163 European Commission and China SFA. “EU-China Bilateral Coordination Mechanism on Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance.” January 30, 2009. http://www.illegal-logging.info/content/eu-china-
bilateral-coordination-mechanism-forest-law-enforcement-and-governance. 
164 European Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (EUFLEGT). “China-EU BCM 2016 
Workplan.” 10 March, 2016. http://www.euflegt.efi.int/eu-china. 
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timber and wood products from verified legal sources, enhancing forest law 
enforcement, and sharing information on forest certification schemes.165  
 
In December 2002, China and Indonesia signed a MoU concerning cooperation in 
combating illegal trade of forest products. Under the MoU, the two sides consented to 
improve forest enforcement for controlling illegal logging and related trade and 
promoting adaptive forest practices toward sustainable forest management. Identified 
areas for cooperation included the study of illegally logged forest products and illegal 
trade, joint development of systems for the timely collection and exchange of data and 
information on timber trade, forest laws and regulations and so forth.166 In August 2002, 
China and Japan concluded a similar MoU on illegal logging and related trade and 
sustainable management. In this document, the two countries agreed to develop a 
legality verification system for forest products traded between them, although there 
have been no media reports on the updates of the development of such a system (Momii 
2014, 10–1). 
 
In May 2006, following the exposure by the environmental NGO, Global Witness, of 
the large-scale timber trafficking between Kachin State in Burma and Yunnan Province 
in China, Burma and China signed the Interim Measures to Manage Timber and 
Mineral Cooperation between Burma and Yunnan Province. This agreement contained 
a Burmese pledge to ban logging and timber transport in Kachin State as well as a 
Yunnan Provincial Government (of China) pledge to henceforth require all Chinese 
importers to obtain both an import license from the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of 
Commerce and a certificate issued by Burmese officials demonstrating the legal origin 
of the timber (Global Witness 2009, 4). By 2010, these measures had helped reduce the 
illegal timber imports across the Sino-Burmese border by 70 per cent (Lawson and 
MacFaul 2010, 46). However, the illicit trade in logs via the land border between 
Kachin State and Yunnan re-bounded back to 900,000 cubic metres in 2014 (EIA 2015, 
5). In September 2015, the Yunnan Provincial Government issued a notice that enforced 
                                                          
165 Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. “Australia’s bilateral 
relationships on forestry.” http://www.agriculture.gov.au/forestry/international/regional#australia-and-
china. 
166 Indonesia Ministry of Forestry and China SFA. “Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
Cooperation in Combating Illegal Trade of Forest Products.” December 18, 2012. 
http://www.unecefaoiufro.lsu.edu/responsible_trade/documents/2003-2006/rt03_010.pdf. 
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a four-month interim suspension on the import of Burmese wood products.167 Follow-up 
monitoring of the main crossing points along the China-Burma border by the EIA 
confirmed a sharp downturn in the volume of illegal timber being smuggled between 
Kachin State and Yunnan Province.168 In addition, the Global Environmental Institute, a 
Beijing-based NGO, reported that in 2015, it organised several informal dialogues and 
exchange visits for representatives from China SFA, Burmese Ministry of Forestry, 
research institutions, and NGOs. It is said that a MoU on forestry cooperation and 
sustainable timber trade was an important topic in the informal discussions (Ren and Ji 
2015).  
 
6.3. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL TRADE IN ODS 
Similar to the dilemma that this chapter has identified in China’s illegal wildlife trade, 
in the ODS sector, China has also implemented a series of national phase-out projects 
and instituted a relatively robust regulatory mix for the production, use, and trade of 
controlled ODS. However, the issue of illegal production and export of controlled ODS 
continues, again as a result of the ineffective enforcement by local authorities. 
 
6.3.1. CHINA’S CONTROL TARGETS AND MEASURES ON ODS PRODUCTION AND USE 
Let’s begin with a brief recap on China’s control targets on ODS production and use, 
which have been discussed to some extent in Chapter 5. China acceded to the Montreal 
Protocol in 1991 and was classified as a Party operating under Article 5 of the Protocol. 
In 1993, China formulated its national plan the Country Programme for the Phase-out 
of Ozone Depleting Substances, in which the country’s control missions were set to 
completely phase out the production and consumption of CFCs, halons and carbon 
tetrachlorides (CTCs) by 1 January 2010 and 1,1,1-trichloroethane by 1 January 2015. 
In early 2004, China signed an agreement with the MLF Executive Committee for the 
CFCs/CTC/halon accelerated phase-out plan, under which China committed to bring 
forward the end date for its CFCs production from 1 January 2010 to 1 July 2007 (MLF 
Secretariat 2010a, 185). In 2007, at the 19th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol, China adopted another accelerated HCFCs phase-out process agreed to by the 
Parties with the proximate goal setting for Article 5 Parties as a freeze on production 
                                                          
167 China Wood168 News. “Import of Burmese Wood Suspended for Four Months” (in Chinese). 
September 9, 2015. http://www.wood168.net/woodnews/43121.html. 
168 EIA. “Hiatus in Timber Smuggling from Myanmar to China.” March 7, 2016. https://eia-
international.org/hiatus-in-timber-smuggling-from-myanmar-to-china. 
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and use of HCFCs at the average 2009–2010 baseline level by 1 January 2013, and 
further 10 per cent reduction by 1 January 2015. 
 
Between 1993 and 2013, with financial support from MLF and technical support from 
the World Bank as the implementing agency, China put in place four national phase-out 
projects (“CN ODS Series”) to reduce its domestic production and use of controlled 
ODS in different industrial sectors. Upon the completion of the fourth projects “CN 
ODS IV” in 2013, China had successfully eliminated more than 100,000 ODP tonnes of 
production and 110,000 ODP tonnes of consumption of CFCs, halons, CTC and TCA 
(World Bank 2014). On 21 June 2007, China Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) released the Circular on the Nationwide Ban of the Production of CFCs, 
stipulating that, except for essential or critical uses exempted by the Montreal Protocol, 
CFC production would be completely banned from 1 July 2007 onwards. Ten days later, 
the MEP signed a contract with the last six remaining CFC and halon-producing firms 
for the final closure of their production lines, marking the successful conclusion of its 
CFCs/CTC/halon accelerated phaseout plan (MEP 2007). 
 
In July 2011, the 64th Meeting of the MLF Executive Committee approved China’s 
2011–2015 HCFC Phase-out Management Plan (HPMP, Stage-I) and UNDP as the 
implementing agency. This HPMP was an integral part to achieve China’s 2013 and 
2015 control targets for HCFC production and consumption. Four months later, at the 
65th Meeting, the MLF Executive Committee approved China’s HCFC phase-out plan 
in the solvent sector. As such, the stage I of China’s HPMP consisted of HCFC phase-
out plans in seven industrial sectors which included the HCFC production, polyurethane 
(PU) foam, extruded polystyrene (XPS) foam, room air conditioning (RAC), industrial 
and commercial refrigeration (ICR), servicing and solvent sectors, with the overall 
funding from MLF amounted to US$270 million (MLF Secretariat 2010b). In 
December 2011, a launching meeting was held in Shanghai, marking the formal start-up 
of China’s accelerated HPMP (UNDP 2013, 2). In September 2014, China announced 
the closure of five HCFCs production lines, resulting in the phase-out of 58,864 tonnes 
of HCFC production, amounting to 16 per cent of the total HCFC production that China 
has agreed to close by 2030.169  
                                                          
169 World Bank. “Press Release: China Announces Major Reduction in Ozone Depleting Gases on 
International Ozone Day.” September 15, 2014. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
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6.3.2. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL ODS TRADE  
Since 1995, the MEP and other ministerial authorities enacted tens of administrative 
edicts and regulations concerning ODS administration (see Table 9.12 in Appendices). 
These include, for example, the Circular on the Ban of New Production Facilities for 
CFCs and CFC-reliant Equipment (1997), Circular on the Implementation of Quota 
and Licensing Control on CFC Production (1999), and the Measures for the 
Administration of ODS Import and Export (1999). Through these edicts and regulations, 
China established its ODS legal framework which imposes rigorous control on the new 
ODS production facilities on the one hand, and adopts the quota control and a licensing 
scheme for the production, consumption, import, and export of controlled ODS on the 
other. In 2000, the MEP, GAC and the Ministry of Commerce together released the 
Regulations on Further Strengthening the Management of ODS Import and Export. This 
document approved the three ministerial departments to institute and maintain, in a 
collective manner, the National Management Office for ODS Import and Export (ODS 
Management Office) as the designated apparatus in charge of the administration of 
import and export of controlled ODS.  
 
Under China’s quota and licensing scheme, enterprises wishing to produce, consume or 
trade CFCs, halons and other controlled ODS must apply to the MEP or the ODS 
Management Office for the corresponding production/use/import/export quotas and 
permits, and conform to relevant quota limits and data reporting requirements. The 
MEP decides on the allocation of the annual quotas among the registered eligible 
enterprises, based on the calculation of China’s total production and use quotas allowed 
under the Montreal Protocol and China’s country programme. Local environmental 
protection and commercial authorities and customs officials are responsible for the daily 
enforcement of ODS regulations in their respective remit areas via on-site supervision, 
annual audits or customs inspections. In 2010 and 2014 respectively, China updated its 
ODS legislative framework through the enactment of two new regulations – the 
Regulations on the Administration of ODS (2010) and the Measures for the 
Administration of the Import and Export of Controlled ODS (2014). According to the 
two regulations, production, consumption, import, or export without a permit, or with a 
permit but in violation of relevant requirements on quota limits or the use of permits, 
are all considered illegal. Offences can attract administrative penalties that range from 
                                                                                                                                                                          
release/2014/09/15/china-announces-major-reduction-in-ozone-depleting-gases-on-international-ozone-
day. 
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the maximum fines of CN¥1 million, confiscation of illegal proceeds, dismantlement of 
production facilities, to the license revocation and future application disqualification. 
  
In 2007, China joined the Informal Prior-informed Consent Mechanism (iPIC), a 
voluntary and informal mechanism run by the UNEP DTIE OzonAction that is intended 
for the exchange of information on bilateral trade of controlled ODS among iPIC 
member countries and prevention of unauthorised ODS imports and exports (UNEP 
DTIE OzonAction 2016).170 Since its entry, China has been one of the most active users 
of this mechanism, which has helped China to prevent a number of unauthorised exports 
of ODS. A recent case occurred in September 2014 when China ODS Management 
Office, with iPIC consultation with the EU Commission, successfully prevented an 
unlicensed export of 60 metric tonnes of HCFC-22 to an EU company.171 
   
Between 2006 and 2010, China Customs participated in the transnational enforcement 
operations Sky-hole Patching Operation Series I and II, which aimed at combating 
illegal trade of ODS and hazardous wastes. In the Series I of the Operation, the Chinese 
enforcement effort resulted in six seizures of 51 metric tonnes of CFCs and HCFCs. In 
the Series II, China, India, and Thailand recorded the largest hauls of illegal ODS 
(WCO and UNEP 2010, 1–2). In addition, between 2009 and 2013 China also engaged 
in a series of WCO-coordinated global customs initiatives coded Earth Goddess 
Operations Phase-I, II, and III. The series operations targeted the illegal transfer of 
hazardous wastes from the EU and North America to the Asia-Pacific, and enabled 
Chinese customs to intercept tens of illegal shipments of waste batteries, waste slag, 
tires and a small number of ODS-containing equipment.172  
 
What we outlined above are all positive developments made so far by China. However, 
a similar dilemma experienced in China’s wildlife sector seems to be replicating itself in 
the ODS sector: the ineffective enforcement by local enforcement authorities tend to be, 
again, the main cause for China’s role as the major source of illegal ODS in the 
                                                          
170 As of 2016, there are 113 countries that have participated in the iPIC, see UNEP DTIE OzonAction 
2016. 
171 UNEP in EU Online Newsletter. “Informal Prior-informed Consent Consultations Prevented Illegal 
Trade in Ozone-depleting Substances.” September, 2014. 
http://unepineurope.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194:informal-prior-informed-
consent-ipic-consultations-prevented-illegal-trade-in-ozone-depleting-substances-ods&catid=41:unep-on-
the-ground. 
172 Xinhua News. “GAC: Earth Goddess Operation Initiated with a Target on Foreign Wastes” (in 
Chinese). October 9, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2013-10/09/c_125499316.htm. 
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international black market. If China’s relevant ODS laws and regulations were enforced 
adequately and effectively at each enforcement point from the license distribution, 
production surveillance to export control, there would not have been a coterie of ODS 
dealers based in Zhejiang engaging in annual illegal shipping of more than 8,000 ODP 
tonnes of CFCs out of China (Clark 2005, 3). Adequate and effective enforcement of 
the 2007 CFC production ban would also have helped to contain not only the kinds of 
ODS seizures that have been described in chapter 5 but also, given that the quantity of 
contraband often accounts for only a fraction (e.g., five percent, see UNODC 2013, 119) 
of the entire illegal business, the production of chemicals that have almost certainly 
been successfully smuggled. 
 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined China’s legal framework and enforcement responses in the 
wildlife, forest and ODS sectors, as well as identified a number of key regulatory and 
enforcement challenges that prevent China from effectively dealing with environmental 
crime. These challenges are surely informative as they tell us where should China’s 
authorities step in so as to improve their efficacy in addressing the illegal trade problem.   
 
• In the wildlife sector, this chapter argues that the existence of a legal market 
enabled by China’s legal framework, especially the SFA’s special marking 
scheme, as well as the poorly enforced, or even unforced, licensing schemes by 
local wildlife authorities, have been the two most prominent factors for China’s 
raging and spreading illegal wildlife trade. This is because, on the one hand, the 
presence of a legal market aids in the creation and continuation of the market 
desirability and acceptability for wildlife products and further entrenches the 
culture of commodifying and consuming endangered wildlife. In turn, this will 
likely draw more people into the consumer market and drive up total demand for 
wildlife products. In a way, as the aggregate market demand increases while the 
legal supply (e.g., captive-bred sources or international auctions) remains the 
same, it is unsurprising that the new and unmet demand will encourage the 
development of greater illegal sources of supply, as manifested in more illegal 
poaching in source countries and more cross-border smuggling of such 
commodities to China. On the other hand, the ineffective enforcement of the 
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licensing schemes also provides a conduit for illegal dealers to launder the illicit 
wildlife products into the legal market. 
 
• In the timber sector, this study argues that the issue of China’s illegal trade in 
forest products is concentrated in the import of illegally logged or traded timber 
on the one hand, and the export of wood products made of the imported illegal 
wood on the other. In order to address China’s illegal timber trade as a whole, 
this study stresses that China should start by cleaning up the upper, supply chain, 
namely the wood import. In this regard, after assessing China’s legal framework 
and responses, this chapter has identified that, the biggest challenge to China’s 
containment of its illegal wood import has been the lack of a national legislative 
or regulatory framework. Such a framework would explicitly demarcate the 
timber legality and thus provide a practical instrument for enforcement 
authorities, especially the customs officials, to determine the legal timber and 
prevent the illegal import and export. In the meantime, this study understands 
that the definitions of timber legality are totally contingent on each timber-
producing country’s legislation and regulations, and therefore they tend to vary 
substantially among countries. For these reasons, this chapter recognises that 
China’s unilateral effort to address its illegal import problem, however 
competent, will not be enough. The upshot of this understanding is that China 
and timber producing countries need to work together to establish a mutually-
accepted verification system that sets up an enforceable definition of timber 
legality, as well as a concomitant of sets of procedures, standards, and 
certificates for the correct implementation of the timber legality. Only through 
this, will China be able to curb its illegal wood import. 
 
• In the ODS sector, this chapter has identified that, although China has 
implemented a series of national phase-out projects and instituted a relatively 
robust regulatory mix for the production, use, and trade of controlled ODS, the 
ineffective enforcement by local authorities has remained to be the major 
obstacle for China to address its issues of illegal ODS production and export. 
This chapter argues that if China’s relevant ODS laws and regulations were 
enforced adequately and effectively at each enforcement point from the license 
distribution, production surveillance to export control, there would not have 
been a coterie of ODS dealers based in Zhejiang engaging in annual illegal 
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shipping of more than 8,000 ODP tonnes of CFCs out of China. Likewise, 
adequate and effective enforcement of the 2007 CFC production ban would also 
have helped to contain not only the kinds of ODS seizures that have been 
described in chapter 5 but also, given that the quantity of contraband often 
accounts for a fraction of the entire illegal business, the production of chemicals 
that have almost certainly been successfully smuggled. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the central goal of this study has been to produce an in-depth 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of China-related TEC. To that end, this study 
took the Greater China – which includes mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan – as the specific geographic focus for its investigation into three key TEC 
sectors (illegal trade in wildlife, forest products, and ODS). In doing so, this study also 
adopted an interdisciplinary approach that drew the conceptual insights from multiple 
strands of literature to explore and understand the utility and relevance of network 
models in both facilitating TEC (for illegal operators) and addressing TEC challenges 
(for regulatory and enforcement agencies).  
 
Overall, this study has sought to achieve the central goal in a four-step sequence. Firstly, 
it built in Chapter 2 a network-centric conceptual framework based on the idea of 
“networked threats require networked responses”. Secondly, it applied the concept of 
networked threats to the study of China’s global trade in illegal wildlife, forest products, 
and ODS (Ch3–5). Thirdly, it examined in Chapter 6 China’s legal frameworks and 
enforcement responses and identified the key challenges facing China in each of the 
three selected TEC sectors. 
 
In the fourth step, this concluding chapter weaves together three lines of understandings 
derived from this study – the accounts of networked threats and responses produced in 
Chapter 2, the empirical findings of transaction networks in China’s illegal trade made 
by the three case studies (Ch3–5), and the regulatory and enforcement challenges 
identified in Chapter 6. The purpose of doing so is to generate practicable prescriptions 
on how Chinese regulatory and enforcement agencies might apply the notion of 
networked responses to the formulation of regulatory or enforcement strategies for 
addressing the key challenges facing them.   
 
7.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: NETWORK THREATS AND NETWORKED RESPONSES 
In Chapter 2, this study has developed a network-centric conceptual framework based 
on the idea of “networked threats require networked responses”. This framework 
focused on addressing two key questions: what essentially constitutes a networked 
threat, and what forms a networked response. 
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7.1.1. NETWORKED THREATS 
In Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, with a detailed discussion of networks as an organisational 
form for illegal actors with respect to their definition, typology, structures, and 
defensive and offensive strengths, this study argued that networked threats can be 
understood as containing two-fold meanings.  
 
First, networked threats, for the purpose of this dissertation, refer to transaction 
networks, in which specific illegal commodities are moved along a series of dispersed 
independent individuals and/or groups who act around the black markets for illicit 
proceeds. The notion of transaction networks describes the basic dynamics of 
smuggling or trafficking activities and portrays a specific black market or illegal 
industry as a whole.  
 
When applied to TEC settings, this study argued that transaction networks represent the 
transnational chain of the black markets for specific environmental goods. In this way, 
transaction networks take the shape of a commodity chain that intersects the countries 
of source, transit, and consumer; they are composed of a wealth of illegal operators – 
ranging from opportunist offenders, professional poachers, brokers, organised groups, 
laundering financial entities, and corrupt officials. Through the transaction chain, illegal 
environmental goods are being produced, taken or harvested, processed, transported, 
exported, imported, distributed, sold, and consumed. The transnational dimension 
warrants transaction networks a challenge that can hardly be successfully addressed 
solely by a state’s own effort and resources. 
 
The analytical focus of transaction networks is on the black markets in its entirety. 
Points of investigation on transaction networks include among others the defining role 
(source, transit, or consumer) of a particular country involved in the international and 
regional illegal trade chain, the scale and scope of the black markets, the magnitude and 
diversity of environmental contraband involved in trafficking or trade, the methods used 
in conveyance and concealment of illegal goods, the established smuggling routes, and 
the affected countries.  
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Second, this study argued that networked threats can also be used to refer to directed 
networks. Directed networks are the covert and illegal organisations that adopt networks 
as the organisational structure to deploy their members and align their relationships, or 
as a strategy or tactic to design their illegal operations. When employed in this manner, 
networks afford illegal operators a host of organisational and operational advantages, 
including adaptability and resilience, over their legal foes the hierarchically organised 
state actors. When applied to TEC settings, directed networks refer to the organised 
criminal groups involved in trading and smuggling of environmental goods. This study 
argued that the interrelationship between transaction networks and directed networks 
lies in that transaction networks are made up of a web of dispersed directed networks 
and individual offenders whose self-interests-driven activities articulate with one 
another along the chain of custody and work as a whole in sustaining the smooth 
functioning of the overall black markets. 
 
While both terms – transaction networks and directed networks – can be of analytical 
utility, for three reasons clarified in Chapter 1 – the lack of a robust literature that 
identifies and analyses China’s role and utility in the international and regional illicit 
trade, the requirement on different approaches and data sources – this study decided to 
only apply the concept of transaction networks to the three case studies. In each of the 
three case studies, by using the identified points of investigation as the guidance and 
through the analysis of seizure and trade data collected from public sources, this study 
has provided a deep map of transaction networks involved in China’s illegal trade. 
 
7.1.2. NETWORKED RESPONSES 
In Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, taking the proposition of “taking networks to fight networks” 
as the starting point, this study has sought to enrich this idea by drawing on the work of 
several influential scholars to develop a nascent yet coherent chain of conceptual logic 
that accounts for the proliferation of global networks and the notion of networked 
responses.  
 
At the first juncture of the logical chain, this study observed that the convergence of 
social organisational evolution and information revolution lays down the organisational 
and material basis for the rise of networks. This is because the combination of the 
network form and new ICT allows for the co-existence in a network arrangement of 
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both centralised decision-making and a decentralised organisational and operational 
layout among geographically distant and, functionally or managerially autonomous 
components of the network. 
 
At the second logical juncture, this study noted that the pervasive expansion of 
networks throughout the entire social structure induces a process of power diffusion on 
the bottom layer, or the layer of nonstate actors and transnational issues, of the three-
dimensional international system. On one side of the power diffusion, illicit or “dark-
side” actors such as terrorism and transnational crime groups are adopting networks in 
designing their organisational structures and operational tactics. The unique defensive 
and offensive strengths that networks afford their carriers transform dark-side actors 
into a transnationalised and networked threat for state actors.  
 
On the other side of the power diffusion, in the face of the rise of transnational actors 
and issues, hierarchically based state actors experience increasing faults and 
inefficiencies in dealing with the growing complexity of such issues. This directly leads 
to the inability of the nation-states to govern effectively by acting alone. In a hope to 
enhance their ability to cope with transnational issues, unitary states are adapting by 
disaggregating themselves into the component government institutions, such as 
regulatory and enforcement agencies. These government units are interacting 
independently in specific issue areas not only with their foreign counterparts under the 
framework of government networks, but also with the private and civic non-state actors 
under various forms of public-private partnership. The landscape of the government 
networks and public-private partnerships is an analogue of what may be called a “Lego 
World”, a world in which the government institutions as the building blocks of 
sovereign states can be taken apart, put together with one another and with a wide range 
of NGOs, civic and corporate actors. 
 
In this emerging Lego World, this study argued that the nature and source of power – 
defined in terms of the capacity to address transnational issues – have changed in a way 
that resource-based power is losing strength to relational power and hard power is 
increasingly outperformed by soft power (at least relatively). A core element of power in 
the Lego World consists in the ability to mobilise relevant entities and connect them 
toward a common purpose. Against this backdrop, this study identified two critical 
abilities as the key sources of network-related power that are most relevant for the 
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addressing of transnational issues. The first is “network-making power” (connectivity-
based power), which stresses the ability to create networks or networks of networks. 
The second is “networked power” (favourable network position-based power), which 
focuses on the ability to obtain and retain advantageous positions within an influential 
network. 
 
In the chapter conclusion, this study argued that networked responses are not a standard, 
formatted mode of regulatory or enforcement responses. Instead, network responses 
should be understood as a special way of thinking and acting: a way that sees a bright-
side actor (e.g., enforcement agencies) as operating in an environment occupied by 
various networks and entities, which simultaneously present challenges in terms of 
amplified (networked) threats, as well as opportunities in terms of power amplifiers for 
the bright-side actor, in the sense that they could potentially be leveraged for tackling 
these threats. In other words, in addition to the traditional logic of increasing resource 
power, network thinking emphasises cultivating connections or relational resources 
rather than cultivating physical or hard resources. 
 
On the other hand, network thinking analyses an actor first by looking at whether or not 
it is a participant of an influential network, and whether it is placed in an advantageous 
or disadvantageous, a favourable or less favourable position in that network. Then, 
network thinking will consider strategies to move that actor from a less favourable 
position to a favourable one. This study argued that the overall logic underlying 
networked way of thinking and action is that, in an increasingly networked, horizontal 
world, power comes from connections with and the positioning within influential 
networks and, that power is critical for dealing with transnational issues (including 
TEC). 
 
7.2. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL WILDLIFE 
In Chapter 3, based on the analysis of 363 seizure reports coupled with other sources of 
information, this study has scrutinised China-oriented transaction chain of illegal 
wildlife trade with respect to its scale, high-profile wildlife commodities, methods for 
conveyance and concealment, and the smuggling routes and hot spots. This study 
argued that in the international and regional transaction chain of illegal wildlife, China 
sits at the core by acting as a dominant consumer. China’s immense internal market 
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demand for wildlife products for a variety of uses has tended to be the most relevant 
driver for China-related transnational illicit trade and smuggling of endangered wildlife. 
 
In Chapter 6, after a close examination of China’s legal framework on and enforcement 
response to illegal wildlife trade, this study has identified two most significant factors 
for China’s raging and spreading illegal trade. These are the existence of a legal market 
enabled by China’s legal framework, especially the SFA’s special marking scheme, as 
well as the poorly enforced licensing schemes by local wildlife authorities. This is 
because, on the one hand, the presence of a legal market aids in the creation and 
continuation of market desirability and acceptability for wildlife products and further 
entrenches the culture of commodifying and consuming endangered wildlife. In turn, 
this will likely draw more people into the consumer market and drive up total demand 
for wildlife products. In a way, as the aggregate market demand increases while the 
legal supply (e.g., captive-bred sources or international auctions) remains the same, it is 
unsurprising that the new and unmet demand will encourage the development of greater 
illegal sources of supply, as manifested in more illegal poaching in source countries and 
more cross-border smuggling of such commodities to China. On the other hand, the 
weak enforcement of the licensing schemes provides a conduit for illegal dealers to 
launder the illicit wildlife products into the legal market. 
 
Based on the two challenges identified above, this study argues that China can step in to 
address its illegal wildlife trade in the following ways. 
 
First, against the presence of the legal market, the Chinese government and its agencies 
may respond in two ways. On the one hand, they may wish to establish a one-district-
rule that prohibits the entire internal trade in captive-bred wildlife, just like what the 
Chinese government has pledged to do to its domestic trade of ivory products. On the 
other hand, if such a complete ban is economically unfeasible at present – given China’s 
enormous industry for wildlife farming as well as the large numbers of wildlife 
processing and selling businesses173 – the Chinese government may consider measures 
to alleviate its burgeoning internal market demand for endangered wildlife. For sure, 
crafting such measures requires an understanding of China’s wildlife consumer market, 
                                                          
173 For example, it is estimated that there are currently 5,000 to 6,000 tigers being farmed in China. See 
Yale Environment 360. “How Tiger Farming in China Threatens World’s Wild Tigers.” January 20, 2015. 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/how_tiger_farming_in_china_threatens_worlds_wild_tigers/2839/. 
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such as the profiles and motivations of wildlife users. This necessitates another research 
project, which is also one of the directions for future study identified by this thesis. 
 
Second, against the enforcement failures, this study argues that China’s wildlife 
enforcement agencies should scale up their efforts to ensure an adequate 
implementation of the licensing schemes and to prevent the illegal wildlife products 
from entering the legal market. This study proposes that China can do so through 
strengthening its domestic and transnational enforcement networking.    
 
On the one hand, this study noted that the localities where illegal wildlife trade takes 
place are often “fixed”, mostly occurring in places such as local niche marketplaces for 
birds, pets, flowers, and antiques, restaurants, street stalls, registered or unregistered 
processing sites and retail outlets, pharmacies, and online shopping stores. The presence 
of these network “nodes” which amplifies the threat by housing a significant amount of 
such illicit activities on location as well as facilitating or encouraging illicit activities 
elsewhere (by fanning expectation of lower transaction costs of doing such illicit 
businesses), also provides an opportunity. It enables wildlife enforcement units to have 
a close monitoring on such trading localities, making it possible for a timely detection 
and punishment of wildlife offenders, and thus sending a strong message to the public 
about their zero tolerance stance against the illegal trade. This will help deter potential 
offenders and prevent illegal trade.  
 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, the overall jurisdiction of the administration of 
legal trade and the detection and prevention of illegal trade falls into a chain of 
regulatory and enforcement authorities, which include customs, forest police, industry 
and commercial bureau, food and drug administration, environmental protection bureau, 
and other government agencies. The cross-agency nature entails the need for a 
coordinating body to orchestrate the dispersed efforts from various government agencies 
that are under the leadership of different government ministers. On this point, as noted 
in Chapter 6, China has established the Inter-agencies CITES Enforcement 
Coordination Group (ICECG) at both the central and provincial levels in order to 
facilitate the collection and exchange of intelligence, enhance capacity building, and 
coordinate joint enforcement activities. While this is a positive move, this study argues 
that the national and provincial ICECGs should not only focus on organising the 
campaign-mode inter-agency enforcement operations, but more importantly, it should 
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play a bigger role in supervising and exhorting the local wildlife authorities to sustain 
consistent enforcement of wild laws in their routine work.     
 
On the other hand, at the international and regional levels, in Chapter 3, this study has 
identified a number of leading suppliers of illegal wildlife for China. These include 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, DR Congo, 
Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania in Africa, and India and the Russian Far East. 
Moreover, by analysis of the cross-border trafficking around China’s border areas, this 
study has identified multiple transaction chains that connect nodes in China as the 
consumer, and specific neighbouring countries as the sources or transit points. Each of 
these transaction chains is typified by the trafficking or trade in a specific range of wild 
animals. Knowledge about the China-oriented transaction chains will be instrumental in 
not only assisting China’s border enforcement units in developing a more targeted 
interception strategy, but also informing China on how to tailor its regulatory and 
enforcement cooperation with particular parties and which parties to prioritise. 
 
7.3. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL FOREST PRODUCTS 
In Chapter 4, based on the import-source analysis and bilateral trade data from the UN 
Comtrade Database, FAOSTAT, and CCSY, this study has presented a full diagnosis of 
the nature, scale, and patterns of China’s global imports of illegal forest products, as 
well as identified multiple major transaction chains of illegal wood between the high-
risk supplying countries and China.  
 
In particular, this chapter has revealed a clear pattern associated with China’s illegal 
wood import. That is, China’s global sourcing of illegal wood has tended to concentrate 
in a limited number of high-risk producer countries. In the Asia-Pacific, Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam were identified as 
five leading suppliers of illegal tropical hardwood in the region. The combined exports 
from the five countries to China accounted for 84 percent by RWE volume of China’s 
illegal wood imports from the region, or 55 percent of China’s global imports of illegal 
wood. In Africa, eight high-risk countries – including Benin, Cameroon, Congo 
Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, and Mozambique – supplied 
nearly all of the illegal wood that China imported from the region, or six percent of the 
total illegal wood that China sourced globally. In Latin America, 64 percent of China’s 
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illegal wood import from the region came from Mexico, 16 percent from Brazil, and 
eight percent from Peru. In Europe, Russia supplied a nearly complete share (99 percent) 
of the illegal wood that China collected from the region. 
 
In Chapter 6, this study argued that the issue of China’s illegal wood trade resides in the 
import of illegally logged or traded timber on the one hand, the export of wood-based 
products made of the imported illegal timber on the other. In order to address China’s 
illegal wood trade as a whole, this study stressed that China should start by cleaning up 
the supply chain. In this regard, after assessing China’s existing legal framework and 
responses, this study identified that the biggest challenge to China’s containment of its 
illegal wood import has been the lack of a national legislative or regulatory framework. 
Such a framework would explicitly demarcate the timber legality and thus provide a 
practical instrument for enforcement authorities to determine the legal timber and 
prevent the illegal import and export.  
 
However, in the meantime, this study understood that the definitions of timber legality 
are totally contingent on each timber-producing country’s legislation and regulations, 
and therefore they tend to vary substantially among countries. For these reasons, this 
study recognised that China’s unilateral effort to address its illegal import problem 
within its borders, however competent, will not be enough. The upshot of this 
understanding is that China and timber producing countries need to work together to 
establish a mutually-accepted verification system that sets up an enforceable definition 
of timber legality, as well as a concomitant of sets of procedures, standards, and 
certificates for the correct implementation of timber legality. Only through this, will 
China be able to curb its illegal wood import. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, this study noted that since 2009, the Chinese Academy of 
Forestry (CAF) worked in collaboration with the ProForest on developing China 
national timber legality verification schemes (TLVS). In 2010, a draft China national 
TLVS was proposed under this collaboration, which suggested two mechanisms for the 
verification of the legality of imported timber: Chinese Government-guided Timber 
Verification Scheme (CGTVS) and Chinese Association-guided Timber Verification 
Scheme (CATVS). Currently, though little progress has been made in promoting 
CGTVS, China National Forest Products Industry Association (CNFPIA) has taken 
several steps towards developing CATVS. These include the launch of a pilot CATVS 
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program in 2012 in which eight timber processing companies were chosen as the first 
batch of volunteers for the program. 
 
This study argues that the draft China national TLVS represents a prospect policy 
framework which, if fully and adequately implemented, promises to play a significant 
role in combating illegal logging and associated trade, promoting the sustainable 
development of China’s international wood trade, and improving China’s international 
image. However, this study argues that there still remains plenty of work to be done 
before the framework can operate as expected.174  
 
Under the CGTVS, progress towards developing bilateral agreements with timber-
exporting countries need to be accelerated, particularly with those high-risk supplying 
countries in the Asia-Pacific and Africa as identified in Chapter 4. While under the 
CATVS, present CNFPIA definition of timber legality is merely China’s unilateral 
explanation, and lacks feasibility in enforcement terms in international forest products 
trade. Thus, closer coordination and deeper communication between the CNFPIA and 
its counterparts in timber supplying countries are essential in order to arrive at a shared 
understanding of the timber legality and a set of procedures, standards, and certificates 
necessary for the implementation of timber legality. Moreover, a regular electronic 
platform for the real-time exchange of information between China and timber-producing 
countries may be needed to enable the exporting countries to respond to, in a timely 
fashion, Chinese requests for verification of timber legality certificates. 
 
This study noted that China has begun to explore the possibility of including PNG – 
which has been identified by Chapter 4 as China’s largest supplier of illegal wood in the 
                                                          
174 Since China’s national TLVS is still in its infancy and expected to take a long period for it to grow up 
to its full potential, it is therefore an option that China may turn to the certificates issued by the world’s 
leading timber certifiers like the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) to verify the legality of imported 
forest products. However, two problems might undermine the efficacy of the FSC certificates in 
facilitating the policing of illegal timber flows. Firstly, it cannot take for granted that all FSC-certified 
companies will refrain from abusing the certificates and always trade legally. An example for this is that a 
FSC-certified timber trading company the “Dalhoff Larsen and Horneman” was exposed to have 
purchased US$304, 870 worth of illegally logged timber from two Liberian companies in 2012 and re-
exported such illegal timber to Bangladesh, China and France (Global Witness 2014). Secondly, forest 
owners/managers or producers and traders of forest products in many of China’s high-risk supplying 
countries have not joined the Forest Stewardship. For example, according to the FSC statistics, there have 
been so far only three FSC-certified companies in Papua New Guinea and seven in Solomon Islands (data 
on the number of the FSC certificate holders in above two countries were collected from the FSC online 
certificate database which can be found at https://info.fsc.org/certificate.php (assessed 14 July 2017)). For 
more information about the Forest Stewardship, please refer to footnote No.92 on page 133 or visit the 
FSC webpage (https://ic.fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc). 
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Asia-Pacific – into its CATVS. This study suggests that China should take into account 
the following two points when it expands its CATVS.  
 
First, China should take PNG as an opportunity to accumulate experiences and expertise, 
or more ambitiously, to work out a streamlined mechanism for augmenting the coverage 
of its CATVS to a supplying country. This mechanism may then be able to provide two 
potential benefits. On the one hand, it may act as a best practice example that can be 
generalised to incorporating other high-risk supplying countries into China’s CATVS. 
On the other hand, it may pave the way for the potential signing of a bilateral agreement, 
which is necessary for the development of China’s CGTVS.  
 
Second, as noted above, China’s global sourcing of forest products tends to concentrate 
in a limited number of timber producing countries. The concentration indicates that if 
China is able to curtail its illegal imports from such hot-spot countries, it will help 
China reduce significantly its imports of illegal timber at the international level. Thus, 
this study suggests that these hot-spot countries should be high on China’s list of 
priorities when it pounders on which supplier countries should be incorporated first into 
its CATVS.  
 
7.4. CHINA’S GLOBAL TRADE IN ILLEGAL ODS 
In Chapter 5, based on the analysis of 85 records of China-related ODS seizures, this 
study has dissected China-oriented transaction chain of illegal ODS, with respect to the 
scale of China’s black market, the magnitude and diversity of ODS chemicals involved 
in illicit trade, the major destination markets for Chinese-produced ODS, and the 
prevalent methods for smuggling and concealment. 
 
In Chapter 6, this study has identified a similar dilemma experienced in China’s wildlife 
sector replicating itself in the ODS sector. That is, the ineffective enforcement by local 
authorities has again tended to be the major obstacle for China to address its issues of 
illegal ODS production and export, despite China has implemented a series of national 
phase-out projects and instituted a relatively robust regulatory mix for the production, 
use, and trade of controlled ODS.  
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This study noted that controlling the outflows of illegal ODS across borders is relatively 
easier than preventing and intercepting the transnational inflows. This is because illegal 
ODS producers and dealers are often themselves the unregistered, or even registered, 
ODS producing or trading companies, which tend to spatially cluster in a few localities 
in China, such as Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Shenzhen, as revealed by seizure data in 
Chapter 5. The two features imply that the intelligence gathered from seizures or other 
sources are more directional and thus likely to lead the enforcement agencies to trace 
back to the original producers or distributors of the illegal ODS detected.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that China can enhance its ODS regulation and enforcement 
in two ways. On the one hand, the ODS administration and enforcement agencies 
should act in a more dutiful manner by incorporating regular inspection and surveillance 
of local ODS producing and trading companies into their daily work. The aim is to 
control the ODS supply chain by ensuring that ODS producing and trading companies 
remain fully compliant with the production quota limits and reporting obligations. 
Additionally, the enforcement agencies may impose severe penalties as prescribed 
under China’s ODS legal framework, such as revoking licenses, maximum fines, and 
dismantling production facilities, on firms who are proven to have involved in illegal 
production or trading of controlled ODS. Since the annual number of ODS seizures 
made by enforcement authorities tends to be far smaller than that of wildlife seizures, 
ODS enforcement authorities shall take advantage of every ODS seizure and dig out the 
intelligence that would be useful in guiding them to identify the original producers.   
 
On the other hand, in Chapter 5, this study has identified the prevailing methods used in 
smuggling and concealing ODS, as well as multiple bilateral transaction chains that 
connect to China as the source, and to India, Russia, the US and other countries as the 
major recipients of Chinese-produced illegal ODS. These tips are informative not only 
for making a more tailored and targeted enforcement interception strategy; they also 
inform China of the priority countries with which it should strengthen its regulatory and 
enforcement cooperation. Thus, this study suggests that prior to the issuance of an 
export license, China’s National ODS Management Office should enhance information 
exchange and verification with its counterparts in the identified hot importing countries 
through the UNEP’s Informal Prior-informed Consent Mechanism. 
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7.5. LEARN TO DEVELOP AND HARNESS NETWORK-RELATED POWER 
In the closing part of this thesis, let’s reflect again on the question that what 
enlightening policy implications can the concept of networked responses offer for 
China’s environmental authorities in terms of addressing the TEC problems? To recap 
briefly, this thesis argues that against the backdrops where environmental crime has 
already turned into a transnational issue that requires concerted coordination among all 
affected countries on the one hand, and networks has increasingly become the major 
organisational carrier for such coordination on the other, China’s environmental 
authorities need to make changes to attune themselves to the new situations. In many 
cases, such adjustments involve thinking and acting in a way that promotes networked 
coordination.  
 
To do so, China needs firstly recognise its undeniable part in sustaining the international 
illegal trade (through either supplying with or consuming illegal environmental goods), 
and acknowledge its unavoidable shared responsibility in curtailing the problems. 
Secondly, to maximise its efforts against environmental crime, China shall craft a 
networked response, for which the key to success lies in fostering two important 
network-related power: networked power and network-making power.  
 
To formulate and implement this networked response, China’s environmental agencies 
may in the first place assess if there is already a proper network arrangement that has 
been operating effectively in the concerned issue area. If the answer is yes, China needs 
then to consider joining the network instead of insisting on working along. If this is not 
case, China may wish to create a network of appropriate form in order to connect the 
dispersed efforts toward the shared environmental issues. But before doing so, China 
shall identify the key actors who have a stake in, or who have valuable resources that 
are crucial for, the addressing of such issues. Following that, China shall invest into 
building relationships with the identified players and creating infrastructures to foster 
and host those networks.  
 
Depending on the major functions anticipated, China may wish to create enforcement 
networks in the wildlife and ODS sector to overcome its weak enforcement problem; to 
create harmonisation networks in the forest sector to standardise laws and regulations 
on timber legality between China and its high-risk trading partners; and to continue to 
make good use of existing information networks in the ODS sector such as the Informal 
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Prior-informed Consent Mechanism for the prevention of unauthorised ODS trades. 
This thesis argues that networked coordination is not only a solution to shared 
environmental challenges, but also a way through which China can extend its regulatory 
reach and increase its soft power and influence over other countries. 
 
7.6. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study suggests three directions for future research. First, within the network-centric 
conceptual framework, this study argued that networked threats can be interpreted along 
two dimensions: transaction networks and directed networks. This study has only 
applied the concept of transaction networks to the study of China’s global trade in 
environmental goods. Thus, the first future direction to extend this PhD thesis is to 
explore whether or not the organised crime groups involved in China-related TEC are 
structured in directed networks, shaped in hub or all-channel network models, or in 
some kinds of mutation that combine both archetypal structures and/or hierarchical 
elements.  
 
In Chapter 1, this study suggested that before engaging in a costly and time-consuming 
research on the aspects of directed networks in China-related TEC, it makes more sense 
if we can accrue reliable evidence that supports the existence of organised criminal 
groups in China’s illegal trade. In Chapter 3, this study argued that seizures of large-
scale and cross-border shipments of illegal environmental goods are often a good 
measure of the presence of organised criminality. This is because the trafficking of large 
quantities of environmental contraband across a long distance from source countries to 
the end-use markets involves a complicated process that can only be handled with a 
competent level of expertise, financial resources, and the managing, organising, and 
marketing capabilities. 
 
In the wildlife and ODS sectors, this study has identified several trafficking routes and 
illegal environmental goods that most likely involve organised crime groups. For 
example, in illegal trade in ivory, this study collected 20 China-related large-scale ivory 
seizures during 1997–2013. The average weight of ivory derived from each of these 
seizures exceeded 500 kg, which strongly indicates the devastating role played by 
professional and well-organised criminal networks in trafficking ivory from the source 
countries to China. In illegal ODS trade, this study has identified that one intimidating 
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aspect of ODS trafficking between China and Russia was the large-scale nature of 
individual shipments. This study collected nine seizures that involved smuggling of vast 
amounts of illegal ODS from China to Russia during 2007–2014, with the volumes of 
ODS in each seizure case ranging from the lowest four metric tonnes to the highest 268 
metric tonnes. This also suggests the involvement of well-financed enterprises in the 
Sino-Russian trade of illegal ODS. 
 
Second, in Section 7.2 of this chapter, this study suggested that China shall seek to 
curtail its burgeoning domestic demand for endangered wildlife products, if it is unable 
to adopt a complete ban on domestic trade in captive-bred wildlife. This study 
recognises that doing so requires a comprehensive understanding of China’s wildlife 
consumer market, such as the profile and motivations of wildlife users, in order to 
reverse the consumer attitudes on wildlife and promote behavioural change.  
 
Third and finally, in Section 7.3, this study recognised that China’s attempt to include 
PNG in its CATVS is a positive move, and suggested that China should take PNG as an 
opportunity to accumulate experiences and expertise, or more ambitiously, to work out 
a streamlined mechanism for augmenting the coverage of its CATVS to a supplier 
country. Therefore, a study on how the CNFPIA can work together with the wood 
associations and other stakeholders in PNG to streamline the process may be imperative.  
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9. APPENDICES 
 
Table 9.1: Illegal forest practices at different custodian points 
Custodial point    Various ways in which timber can become contraband 
Harvesting or 
extracting 
(1) Logging in protected area 
(2) Logging in unprotected areas without authorised permits or with falsified or re-
used permits 
(3) Obtaining permits through bribes 
(4) Harvesting of protected tree species 
(5) Extracting from protected forest areas or outside authorised concessions 
(6) Logging in excess of permit or concession quotas 
(7) Underreporting harvest volume and tax payable 
(8) Ignoring selective cutting guideline 
(9) Clear-cutting the natural forest without replantation afterwards, or replantation 
fails to meet the specified requirement (including the extent of replantation fails 
to meet the required rate; replanting with low-quality species or at low density) 
(10) Harvesting technologies in use violate mandatory environmental safeguards 
relating to minimising damage to the soil and environment 
Transportation 
(1) Falsifying log transportation documents 
(2) Accepeting fraudulent log transport documents 
(3) Unauthotised or unreported movement across state boundaries 
Processing 
(1) Processing timber at unlicensed facilities 
(2) Expanding capacity without authorisation 
(3) Operating in violation of environmental, social and labour laws 
Import & export 
(1) Logging import & export in defiance of trade restrictions and/or national 
control measures 
(2) Misdeclaration of the size, quality, place-of-origin or species of timber at the 
point of import or export to avoid trade restrictions or higher taxes 
(3) Transfer pricing, such as nil profit accounting and manipulating revenue flows 
for services to avoid revenue 
Other associated 
illegal activities 
(1) Logging in breach of contractual obligations such as without an environmental 
impact assessment 
(2) Obtaining harvesting concessions via unlawful means such as corruption  
(3) Laundering illegal timber through a concession 
(Source: Brack et al. 2002, 53; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007, 16, 36; Bricknell 2010, 95; UNODC 
2010, 162;) 
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Table 9.2: Cross reference between major forest products and the HS six digital codes 
Wood-based products Corresponding HS six digital codes 
Fuel wood etc.  440110 
Wood chips and particles 440121, 440122 
Wood residues 440130 
Wood charcoal 4402 
Industrial roundwood 4403 
Hoop wood 4404 
Wood wool or flour 4405 
Railway or tramway sleepers 4406 
Sawn wood 4407 
Veneer sheet 4408 
Continuously shaped wood 4409 
Particleboard 4410 
Fibreboard 4411 
Plywood 4412 
Densified wood 4413 
Wooden works 4414-4421 
Wood pulp 4701-4705 
Other fibre pulp 4706 
Recovered paper 4707 
Paper & paperboard Chapter 48 
Timber products Chapter 44 
Pulp Chapter 47 
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Table 9.3: Conversion factors 
Product HS codes 
Units used  
in CCSY 
Density factor 
(m3/MT) 
Physical volume to RWE 
volume  
Fuel wood etc.  440110 kg 1.38 1 
Wood chips and 
particles  
440121, 440122 kg 1.6 1.8 
Wood residues 440130 kg 1.5 1 
Wood charcoal 4402 kg 6 1 
Industrial 
roundwood 
4403 m3 -- 1 
Hoop wood 4404 kg 1.4 2 
Wood wool/flour 4405 kg 1.4 1 
Railway or 
tramway sleepers 
4406 m3 -- 2 
Sawn wood 4407 m3 -- 1.43 
Veneer sheet 4408 kg 1.33 2.5 
Continuously 
shaped wood 
4409 kg 1.4 1.9 
Particleboard 4410 kg 1.54 1.5 
Fibreboard 4411 kg 1.42 1.8 
Plywood 4412 kg & m3 1.33 or -- 2.5 
Densified wood 4413 kg 1.4 2 
Wooden works 4414–4421 kg -- 1.25 
Wood pulp 4701–4705 kg -- 
Mechanical pulp (4701): 3 
Chemical pulp (4702–04): 4 
Semi-chemi. pulp (4705): 3.3 
Other fibre pulp 4706 kg -- 2.6 
Recovered paper 4707 kg -- 2.6 
Paper & 
paperboard 
48 kg -- 2.8 
Furniture 
940161, --69, 
940330–60 
kg 1.4 2 
Note: Conversion factors in the table were mainly sourced from: (1) EU Commission Directorate-General Eurostat, 
FAO, ITTO, and UNECE, Joint Forest Sector Questionnaire; (2) UNECE and FAO 2010; (3) Sun et al. 2004a; Zhu et 
al. 2004. Supplementary references include Contreras-Hermosilla 2007, 41–2; Katsigris et al. 2004, 241. 
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Table 9.4: China’s high-risk supplying countries 
High-risk 
supplier 
countries 
Estimated illegal 
logging/trade 
rate 
Source 
Annual forest 
change during 
2005–10 (%) 
Corruption 
perception index 
(score & 
ranking)  
Asia-Pacific 
Cambodia 90% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 −1.22 20 (160) 
Indonesia 40–61%  
Lawson and MacFaul 
2010, 6 
−0.71 32 (114) 
Kyrgyzstan 7% SAVCOR 2005, 8 +1.87 24 (150) 
Laos 45%;  Seneca Creek 2004, 5 −0.49 26 (140) 
Malaysia 14–25% 
Lawson and MacFaul 
2010, 6 
−0.42 50 (53) 
Myanmar 50% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 −0.42 21 (157) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
70% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 −0.49 25 (144) 
Philippines 46% Hirschberger 2008, 39 +0.73 36 (94) 
Solomon Islands 50% Global Timber 2007 −0.25 -- 
South Korea 30% Hirschberger 2008, 39 −0.11 55 (46) 
Taiwan (China) 45% Hirschberger 2008, 39 -- 61 (36) 
Thailand 40% World Bank 2006, 9 +0.08 35 (102) 
Tajikistan 17–23% SAVCOR 2005, 8 0 22 (154) 
Vietnam 20–40% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 +1.08 31 (116) 
Africa 
Benin 80% 
Contreras-Hermosilla et 
al. 2007, 17 
−1.06 36 (96) 
Cameroon 22–35% 
Lawson and MacFaul 
2010, 6 
−1.07 25 (144) 
Congo Republic 40% Global Timber, 2007 −0.05 22 (154) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
80% Global Timber, 2007 −0.71 19 (163) 
Gabon 50–70% Seneca Creek 2004, 4 0 34 (106) 
Ghana 59–65% 
Lawson and MacFaul 
2010, 6 
−2.19 46 (63) 
Liberia 80% Seneca Creek 2004, 4 −0.68 38 (83) 
Mozambique 50–70% 
Contreras-Hermosilla et 
al. 2007, 17 
−0.53 30 (119) 
Nigeria 90% Hirschberger 2008, 39 −4 25 (144) 
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High-risk 
supplying 
countries 
Estimated illegal 
logging/trade 
rate 
Source 
Forest annual 
change 
during 2005–
10 (%) 
Corruption 
perception index 
(score & 
ranking)  
Europe 
Albania 9% 
Markus-Johansson 2010, 
92 
–0.15   31 (116) 
Azerbaijan 24% SAVCOR 2005, 8 0 28 (127) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
2% SAVCOR 2005, 8 0 42 (72) 
Bulgaria 40% Hirschberger 2008, 39 +1.47 41 (77) 
Estonia 50% Hewitt 2005, 33 –0.31 68 (28) 
Georgia 9% SAVCOR 2005, 8 –0.09 49 (55) 
Latvia 20% Hewitt 2005, 33 +0.34 53 (49) 
Macedonia  25-30% Hirschberger 2008, 39 +0.47 44 (67) 
Moldova 1% SAVCOR 2005, 8 +1.24 36 (102) 
Montenegro 50% Hirschberger, 2008 0 44 (67) 
Russian 
Federation 
25% World Bank, 2006: 9 +0.01 28 (127) 
Slovakia 10% Marusak et al. 2005, 43 +0.01 47 (61) 
Latin America 
Bolivia 80% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 –0.53 34 (106) 
Brazil 35-72% 
Lawson and MacFaul 
2010, 6 
–0.42 42 (72) 
Colombia 42% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 –0.17 36 (94) 
Costa Rica 25% 
Contreras-Hermosilla et 
al. 2007, 17 
+0.9 53 (49) 
Ecuador 70% Hembery et al. 2007 –1.98 35 (102) 
Honduras 30-50% 
Contreras-Hermosilla et 
al. 2007, 17 
–2.16 26 (140) 
Mexico 70% Hirschberger 2008, 40 –0.24 34 (106) 
Nicaragua 50% 
Contreras-Hermosilla et 
al. 2007, 17 
–2.11 28 (127) 
Peru 80%-90% Seneca Creek 2004, 5 –0.22 38 (83) 
Note: (1) Annual forest change rates indicate the annual forest gain (+) or loss (-) in percent of the 
remaining forest area during 2005–2010. Data on annual forest change were sourced from “Global Forest 
Resources Assessment 2010” by FAO (2010). (2) Figures in the column of “Corruption perception index 
(score & ranking)” indicate: figures at the left side represent the perceived level of corruption, with “0” 
denoting highly corrupt and 100 as very clean; figures in the parentheses indicate the ranking of the 
country’s level of corruption among 177 countries and territories around the world. Data on corruption 
perception indexes were sourced from “Corruption Perception Index 2013” by Transparency International 
(2014). 
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Table 9.5: Control measures and phase-out schedules under the Montreal Protocol 
Annex A – Group I: Five main CFCs (CFC-11, -12, -113, -114, and -115) 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1986 Base level Average of 1995-97 
Freeze July 1, 1989 Freeze July 1, 1999 
75% reduction January 1, 1994 50% reduction January 1, 2005 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
85% reduction January 1, 2007 
  100% reduction 
January 1, 2010 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
 
 
Annex A – Group II: Halons (halon-1211, -1301, and -2402) 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1986 Base level Average of 1995-97 
Freeze January 1, 1992 Freeze January 1, 2002 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1994 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
50% reduction January 1, 2005 
  100% reduction 
January 1, 2010 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
 
 
Annex B – Group I: Other fully halogenated CFCs 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1989 Base level Average of 1998-2000 
20% reduction January 1, 1993 20% reduction January 1, 2003 
75% reduction January 1, 1994 85% reduction January 1, 2007 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
100% reduction 
January 1, 2010 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
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Annex B – Group II: Carbon tetrachloride (CTC) 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1989 Base level Average of 1998-2000 
85% reduction January 1, 1995 85% reduction January 1, 2005 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
100% reduction 
January 1, 2010 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
 
 
Annex B – Group III: 1,1,1-trichloroethane (methyl chloroform, or TCA) 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1989 Base level Average of 1998-2000 
Freeze January 1, 1993 Freeze January 1, 2003 
50% reduction January 1, 1994 30% reduction January 1, 2005 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
70% reduction January 1, 2010 
  100% reduction 
January 1, 2015 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
 
 
Annex C – Group I: HCFCs (consumption) 
Applicable to consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 
1989 HCFC consumption + 
2.8% of 1989 CFC 
consumption 
Base level Average of 2009-10 
Freeze 1996 Freeze January 1, 2013 
35% reduction January 1, 2004 10% reduction January 1, 2015 
75% reduction January 1, 2010 35% reduction January 1, 2020 
90% reduction January 1, 2015 67.5% reduction January 1, 2025 
99.5% reduction 
January 1, 2020, and thereafter 
use restricted to the servicing 
of RAC equipment existing at 
the date 
97.5% reduction 
(averaged over 
ten years 2030-
40) 
January 1, 2030, and thereafter 
use restricted to the servicing 
of RAC equipment existing at 
the date 
100% reduction January 1, 2030 100% reduction January 1, 2040 
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Annex C – Group I: HCFCs (production) 
Applicable to production 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 
Average of 1989 HCFC 
production + 2.8% of 1989 
CFC consumption + 2.8% of 
1989 CFC consumption 
Base level Average of 2009-10 
Freeze January 1, 2004 Freeze January 1, 2013 
75% reduction January 1, 2010 10% reduction January 1, 2015 
90% reduction January 1, 2015 35% reduction January 1, 2020 
99.5% reduction 
January 1, 2020, and thereafter 
use restricted to the servicing 
of RAC equipment existing at 
the date 
67.5% reduction January 1, 2025 
100% reduction January 1, 2030 
97.5% reduction 
(averaged over 
ten years 2030-
40) 
January 1, 2030, and thereafter 
use restricted to the servicing 
of RAC equipment existing at 
the date 
  100% reduction January 1, 2040 
 
 
Annex C – Group II: HBFCs 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
100% reduction 
January 1, 1996 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
 
 
Annex C – Group III: Bromochloromethane 
Applicable to both production and consumption 
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
100% reduction 
January 1, 2002 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
100% reduction 
January 1, 2002 (with possible 
essential use exemptions) 
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Annex E – Group I: Methyl bromide 
Applicable to both production and consumption  
Non-Article 5(1) Parties Article 5(1) Parties 
Base level 1991 Base level Average of 1995-1998 
Freeze January 1, 1995 Freeze January 1, 2002 
25% reduction January 1, 1999 20% reduction January 1, 2005 
50% reduction January 1, 2001 100% reduction 
January 1, 2015 (with possible 
critical use exemptions) 
70% reduction January 1, 2003   
100% reduction 
January 1, 2005 (with possible 
critical use exemptions) 
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Table 9.6: Cross reference between controlled ODS and HS codes 
Controlled ODS under the Montreal Protocol 2002 HS 2007 HS 2012 HS 
Annex A, Group I (CFCs)    
CFC-11 2903.41.00 2903.41 2903.77 
CFC-12 2903.42.00 2903.42 2903.77 
CFC-113 2903.43.00 2903.43 2903.77 
CFC-114 2903.44.00 2903.44 2903.77 
CFC-115 2903.44.90 2903.44 2903.77 
Annex A, Group II (Halons)    
Halon-1211 2903.46.10 2903.46 2903.76 
Halon-1301 2903.46.20 2903.46 2903.76 
Halon-2402 2903.46.90 2903.46 2903.76 
Annex B, Group I (Other CFCs)    
CFC-13 2903.45.10 2903.45 2903.77 
CFC-111 2903.45.15 2903.45 2903.77 
CFC-112 2903.45.20 2903.45 2903.77 
CFC-211, -212, -213, -214, 215, -216, -217  2903.45 2903.77 
Annex B, Group II (CTC)    
Carbon tetrachloride 2903.14.00 2903.14 2903.14 
Annex B, Group III    
1,1,1-trichloroethane (methyl chloroform) 2903.19.10 2903.19 2903.19 
Annex C, Group I (HCFCs)    
HCFC-22 2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.71 
HCFC-123 2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.72 
HCFC-141, 141b 2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.73 
HCFC-142, 142b 2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.74 
HCFC-225, 225ca, 225cb 2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.75 
HCFC-21, -31, -121, -122, -124, -131, -132, -133, -
151, -221, -222, -223, -224, -226, -231, -232, -233, -
234, -235, -241, -242, -243, -244, -251, -252, -253, -
261, -262, -271 
2903.49.10 2903.49 2903.79 
Annex C, Group II (HBFCs)     
All Hydrobromofluorocarbons 2903.49.30 2903.49 2903.79 
Annex C, Group III    
Bromochloromethane 2903.49.80 2903.49 2903.79 
Annex E, Group I    
Methyl bromide 2903.30.33 2903.39 2903.39 
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Table 9.7: Smuggling methods identified by this analysis 
Smuggling 
methods 
Number 
of seizures 
Description 
Front door 
smuggling 
15 
• More often seen in terrestrial transport where goods were simply loaded on cars 
or trucks or stored in the car boot and moved across borders. 
False labelling 7 
• Logos of branded products such as ‘Honeywell’ were appropriated to disguise 
counterfeit CFCs; 
• CFC-12 was mislabelled as non-regulated substances such as HFC-134a or 
HFC-410a; 
• HCFC-22 was mislabelled non-regulated substances such as HFC-134a and 
HFC-404a; HCFC-22 containing equipment were mislabelled as R-410a units; 
• Found in instances of both sea shipment and road transport. 
Misdeclaration 25 
• CFC-12 was misdeclared as non-regulated substances such as HFC-134a or 
HCFC-22 (when R22 was not subject to the Protocol control), or misdeclared 
as legal merchandise such as aluminium, plastic racks, garments, mist lamps 
and cartons, or bathtub and handicrafts;  
• HCFC-22 being misdeclared as HFC-134a or ethylene-glycol;  
• Methyl bromide being misdeclared as foaming agents;  
• Incentives for misdeclaration might vary by cases. In some instances, registered 
traders misreport the nature or understated the quantities of the declared goods 
for the end of avoiding or saving the use of export/import quotas. In other 
instances, traders understated the real value of the declared goods to avoid the 
due tax payment.  
Fake recycled 
or reclaimed 
4 • Virgin CFCs were mislabelled or misdeclared as used recycled substances 
Concealment 15 
• CFC-12 was hidden behind layers of non-regulated substances such as HFC-
134a or HCFC-22 (when R22 was not controlled by the Protocol), or concealed 
in custom-designed containers such as processed metal oil drums, or secret 
spaces like coach luggage compartment or secluded cabins in a fishing boat; 
• CFC-12 was concealed in mix with legal merchandise such as furniture, 
plywood, glass products etc.  
• In passenger trafficking, small quantities of ODS were hidden in personal 
luggage. 
Transhipment 
fraud 
2 
• HCFC-22 imported under re-export scheme was diverted onto domestic market; 
• HCFC-22 was moved through a third party to disguise the real origin of the 
traded items; 
• Most likely occurred in sea shipment of large quantities of illegal ODS. 
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Table 9.8: Compilation of China-related seizures of illegal ODS 
Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded* 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
1 Malaysia 2000 CFC-12 Not indic. 4,600 cylinders China Malaysia Mislabelling Clark, 2007a: 2 
2 Japan Jul/2001 CFC-12 11,745 
39,150 cans 
(300g/each) 
China Japan 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 2 
3 Japan Jul/2001 CFC-12 123,300 
411,000 cans 
(300g/each) 
China Japan 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 2 
4 Japan Jul/2001 CFC-12 11,160 
35,999 cans 
(310g/each) 
China Japan 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 2 
5 Japan Jul/2001 CFC-12 31,112 
103,705 cans 
(300g/each) 
China Japan Not indicated UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/7, 2004, 2 
6 Japan 3/Oct/2002 CFC-12 4,536 
18,142 cylinders 
(250g/each) 
China Japan 
Double layering; 
misdeclared as 
antifreeze 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/7 2004, 2; 
UNEP 2013b, 53 
7 Japan Jun/2002 CFC-12 2,871 
11,483 cans 
(250g/each) 
HK Japan 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 2 
8 Japan Jun/2002 CFC-12 2,708 
10,830 cans 
(250g/each) 
HK Japan 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 2 
9 Japan Oct/2002 CFC-12 4,536 
18,142 cans 
(250g/each) 
China Japan 
Misdeclared as ethylene 
glycol 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/7 2004, 2 
10 Philippines May/2003 CFC-12 539 
454 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Philippines 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/7 2004, 2 
11 Philippines May/2003 CFC-12 15,504 
1,140 cylinders 
(13.5kg/each) 
China Philippines 
Mislabelled as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/INF/6 2003, 3 
12 Philippines Jun/2003 CFC-12 28,000 
2,076 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Philippines Double layering UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/7 2004, 2 
13 Sri Lanka Apr/2003 CFC-12 Not indic. 200 cylinders China Sri Lanka 
Misdeclared as HFC-
134a 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/INF/7 2004, 2 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
14 Indonesia 2004 CFCs Not indic. 2 containers China Indonesia Not indicated Clark 2007a, 3 
15 India 2004 CFC-12 Not indic. 160 cylinders China India 
Hidden beneath 
plywood 
Clark 2007a, 3 
16 China Jan/2005 HCFC-123 2,500 Not indicated China Not indicated Misdeclaration Liu and Bagai 2007, 16 
17 China Jun/2005 
Methyl 
bromide 
27,472 
2,020 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Not indicated Misdeclaration Liu and Bagai 2007, 17 
18 China 15/Mar/2006 CFC-12 14,416 
1,060 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Not indicated 
Misdeclared as 
aluminium 
Liu and Bagai 2007, 17 
19 Argentina Mar/2006 HCFC-22 500 Not indicated China Argentina Misdeclared as HFCs 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.18/INF/6 2006, 2; 
EIA 2011, 26–7 
20 China 15/Apr/2006 CFC-12 1,840 
200 cylinders 
(9.2kg/each) 
China Not indicated 
Misdeclared as plastic 
racks, mail trousers 
Liu and Bagai 2007, 17 
21 China 8/Jun/2006 CFC-11 Not indic. 200 cylinders China Not indicated 
Misdeclared as “mist 
lamps, cartons” 
Liu and Bagai 2007, 17 
22 China 13/Sep/2006 CFC-12 752 Not indicated China Not indicated 
Mixed with glass 
products 
Liu and Bagai 2007, 17 
23 China 27/Nov/2006 CFC-12 7,480 Not indicated China Not indicated Not indicated Liu and Bagai 2007, 37 
24 Kyrgyzstan 2007 Halon-1211 467 
2,400 car fire 
extinguishers 
South 
Korea 
Kyrgyzstan Transiting China Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
25 Kyrgyzstan 2007 
R12, R22 
CE 
Not indic. 
27 fridges; 6 
showcase refrigerator 
South 
Korea 
Kyrgyzstan Transiting China Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
26 Kyrgyzstan 2007 CFC CE Not indic. 110 freezers China Kyrgyzstan Not indicated Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
27 Uzbekistan 2007 CFCs Not indic. 72 litres China Uzbekistan Not indicated Miller and Batchelor 2009, 49 
28 Uzbekistan 2007 CFCs Not indic. 24 cylinders China Uzbekistan Hidden in vehicle Miller and Batchelor 2009, 49 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
29 Uzbekistan 2007 
Unknown 
ODS 
Not indic. 
Unknown number 
of ODS containers 
China Uzbekistan Hidden in vehicle Miller and Batchelor 2009, 49 
30 Russia 2007 CFCs 4,080 
300 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Russia Not indicated Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
31 Russia 2007 CFC-113 43,680 160 barrels China Russia False declaration Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
32 Seychelles 2007 
R11, R12 
CE 
Not indic. 
88 refrigerators 
and chillers 
China Seychelles  UNEP/OzL.Pro.20/INF/3 2008, 5 
33 South Korea 2008 CFC-11 73,400 not indicated 
South 
Korea 
Russia 
Transiting China; virgin 
mislabelled as recycled 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 6 
34 Russia 2008 CFC-112 268,200 Not indicated China Russia 
Virgin mislabelled as 
recycled 
EIA 2011, 26–27 
35 Kyrgyzstan 2008 CFC CE Not indic. 8 refrigerators 
South 
Korea 
Kyrgyzstan Transiting China Miller and Batchelor 2009, 48 
36 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
408 
30 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan 
Transiting Kyrgyzstan; 
hidden in coach luggage 
compartment 
Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
37 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
54 
4 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
38 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
Not indic. 1 piece of AC unit China Uzbekistan Not indicated Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
39 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
27 
2 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
10 Uzbekistan 2008 CFCs Not indic. 12 cylinders China Uzbekistan Hidden in a car Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
41 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
91 
25 refrigerators 
plus 4 cylinders 
China Tajikistan Transiting Uzbekistan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
42 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
Not indic. 48 cylinders China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
43 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
163 
12 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
44 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
14 Not indicated China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
45 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
122 
9 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
46 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
82 
6 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
47 Uzbekistan 2008 
Unknown 
ODS 
367 
27 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan Miller and Batchelor 2009, 50 
48 US 2009 HCFC-22 418,654 
29,107 cylinders in 
11 shipments 
China US 
Transiting Caribbean 
Islands 
EIA 2011, 26–27 
49 Russia 2009 CFC-12 266,100 Not indicated China Russia 
Virgin mislabelled as 
recycled 
EIA 2011, 26–27 
50 HK 2/Sep/2009 CFC-12 1,600 100 cylinders Unknown Not indicated Not indicated Koeppen 2011 
51 Uzbekistan 2010 CFC-12 Not indic. 120 cylinders China Uzbekistan Not indicated EIA 2011, 26–27 
52 Uzbekistan 2010 
CFC-12; 
HCFC-22 
Not indic. 36 cylinders China Uzbekistan Not indicated EIA 2011, 26–27 
53 India 2010 
CFC-12; 
HCFC-22 
Not indic. 
1,150 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China India Mislabelled as R-134a INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 25 
54 Uzbekistan 2010 CFCs Not indic. 13 refrigerators China Uzbekistan Not indicated EIA 2011, 28 
55 Uzbekistan 2010 HCFC-22 Not indic. 
2 AC units; 22 
freezers, 2 
refrigerators 
China Uzbekistan Not indicated EIA 2011, 28 
56 Uzbekistan 28/Jan/2010 CFC-12 Not indic. 
7 cylinders R12; 
50 cylinders R600 
China Uzbekistan Not indicated UNEP/OzL.Pro.22/INF/4 2010, 2 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
57 Uzbekistan Jan/2010 CFC-12 Not indic. 70 cylinders China Uzbekistan Not indicated UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 6 
58 Uzbekistan 10/Jan/2010 HCFC-22 Not indic. 2 refri.; 2 AC units China Uzbekistan Not indicated UNEP/OzL.Pro.22/INF/4 2010,2 
59 Uzbekistan 6/Jul/2010 R134a, R12 36 Not indicated China Uzbekistan Hidden in the car boot UNEP/OzL.Pro.22/INF/4 2010, 2 
60 Kazakstan Apr/2010 CFC-12 Not indic. 
1 compressor; 10 
refrigerant 
cylinders 
China Kazakstan 
Hidden in personal 
luggage 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 5 
61 Russia 
Jun-
Nov/2010 
CFC-12 26,000 
26 containers (1 
metric 
tonnes/each) 
China Poland Misdeclared as recycled 
INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 29–
30; UNEP DTIE OzonAction 
2012, 6  
62 Kenya May/2010 CFCs 2,000 Not indicated China Kenya Not indicated Grabiel et al. 2013, 14 
63 China 25/Jun/2010 CFC-12 15,000 
1,140 cylinders 
(13.6 kg/each) 
China Not indicated Not indicated Koeppen, 2011 
64 Taiwan 
Jan-
Aug/2010 
CFC-12; 
HCFC-22 
41,476 Not indicated China Taiwan 
Hidden in secret cabins; 
misdeclaring as R-134a 
Ozone Layer Protection in 
Taiwan Epaper. Vol.19, Aug. 18, 
2010. 
65 Kyrgyzstan 11/Jun/2011 
CFC-12; 
HCFC-22 
50 Not indicated China Uzbekistan 
Transiting Kyrgyzstan; 
hidden in luggage 
INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 31; 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 7 
66 Kyrgyzstan 7/Dec/2011 HCFC-22 19 
19 cylinders 
1kg/per 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 7 
67 Kyrgyzstan 8/Jul/2011 HCFC-22 12 
12 cylinders 
(1kg/each) 
China Uzbekistan Transiting Kyrgyzstan UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 7 
68 Kyrgyzstan 6/Aug/2011 
HCFC-22 
CE 
Not indic. 71 refrigerators China Uzbekistan 
Transiting Kyrgyzstan; 
without import 
permission 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 7 
69 HK 15/Nov/2011 CFC-12 6,800 Not indicated China Thailand 
Misdeclared as ‘bathtub 
and handicrafts’ 
Dorji 2013; Koeppen 2011 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
70 Canada Feb/2011 HCFC-22 Not indic. 600 cylinders China  Canada Misdeclared as R-134a 
INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 29; 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2012, 6 
71 Spain 
Feb-
Dec/2012 
HCFC-22 150,000 Not indicated China Spain Not indicated 
ARC News Dec. 17, 2012; UNEP 
DTIE OzonAction, 2014b, 9–10 
72 Russia Feb/2012 
R12; R113; 
R141b 
19,090 1,150 cylinders China Russia Misdeclared as R134a 
INTERPOL and UNEP 2013, 29; 
Hong et al. 2013, 22 
73 China 16/Nov/2012 HCFC-22 11,560 
850 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Netherlands Mislabelled as R134a 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
9 
74 Russia Aug/2013 R22 CE Not indic. 
130 AC R22 split 
systems 
China Russia 
Mislabelled as R410a 
units 
EIA 2013, 12 
75 Cyprus 11/Oct/2013 R22 CE Not indic. 
2 AC units 
containing R22 
China Cyprus Mislabelled as R410 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
11 
76 India 1/Mar/2013 HCFC-22 182,902 5 ISO tanks China India Re-export tricks 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
5 
77 India 25/Jul/2013 HCFC-22 14,960 
1,100 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China India 
Hidden between 
furniture works 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
4–5 
78 India 23/May/2013 HCFC-22 9,547 
702 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China India 
Hidden between 
declared goods 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
6 
79 India 6/Jun/2013 HCFC-22 8,106 
596 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China India 
Hidden between 
declared goods 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
6 
80 India 20/Jun/2013 HCFC-22 5,494 
404 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China India 
Hidden between 
declared goods 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
6 
81 China 2013 CFC-12 2,079 
184 cylinders 
(11.3kg/each) 
China 
South 
Africa 
Mislabelled and 
misdeclared as R410a 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
8 
82 Tajikistan 17/Jan/2013 HCFC-22 98 
7 cylinders 
(13.6kg/each) 
China Tajikistan Hidden in sealed ivory 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
15 
83 Russia Jan/2014 
R11, R12, 
R22, R141b 
34,440 1,500 cylinders China Russia 
Misdec. as ethylene-
glycol and R134a 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
7 
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Order 
Reporting 
country 
Date of 
seizure 
Substance 
traded 
Volume 
(kg) 
Volume (in non-
standard units) 
Implied 
source 
Implied 
destination 
Smuggling methods Information source 
84 Russia Apr./2014 R22, R141b 25,850 1,660 cylinders China Russia 
Misdeclared as R134a 
and R404a 
UNEP DTIE OzonAction 2014b, 
7–8 
85 Taiwan 1999-2004 
Halon-1211 
CE 
51 not indicated 
Not 
indicated 
Taiwan 
Illegal import; from 6 
independent seizures 
Ozone Layer Protection in 
Taiwan Epaper Vol.5, Jan.1, 2004 
 
* “CE” is the abbreviation for “containing equipment”. “CFC-12 CE” denotes CFC-12 containing equipment.
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Table 9.9: China’s nationwide wildlife law enforcement special operations during 1999–2016 
Time 
frame 
Operation 
codename 
Main results 
10–30 
Apr. 1999 
Kekexili No.1 
Operation 
17 poaching networks dismantled; 66 arrests; seizures included 1,658 Tibetan 
antelope pelts, 545 antelopes, 28 heads and 4 pelts of wild yak 
15–29 Jan. 
2000 
Southern No.2 
Operation 
Over 500,000 enforcement officers mobilised; 264 criminal cases cleaned up, 8,370 
marketplaces inspected; seizures included over 40,000 wild animals, 28,000 kg of 
wildlife products, 1,652 wildlife pelts 
21 Nov.–
24 Dec. 
2001 
Eagle Hunting 
Operation  
27,000 hotels and restaurants and 6,000 wildlife marketplaces inspected; 4,147 
criminal cases uncovered; seizures included 620,000 live wild animals and 65,205 
kg of wildlife products 
17–26 
Dec. 2002 
Migratory Birds 
Operation 
16,385 hotels and restaurants and 3,374 marketplaces inspected; 1,829 wildlife 
administrative cases dealt with; 52 wildlife criminal cases uncovered; 318 arrests; 
seizures included 10,000 live birds and 9,403 kg of bird products 
10–19 
Apr. 2003 
Spring Thunder 
Operation 
170,000 enforcement officers mobilised; 80,000 hotels, restaurants and pedlars 
market inspected; 9,179 wildlife cases solved; 9,521 fined, detained or arrested; 
seizures included 938,501 wild animals (including 45,515 wild animals under SSP) 
and 30,000 kg of wildlife products   
21 May–
17 Sept. 
2007 
Green-Shield 
No.2 Operation  
970,000 enforcement officers mobilised; 1,316 nature reserves, 1,244forest parks, 
4,147 State-owned forest stations and 48,625 wood processing workshops 
inspected; 110,000 cm3 wood products seized; 65,165 cases dealt with, involving 
67,363 persons, including a large-scale seizure in Yangjiang Guangdong that 
involved 5,371 Asian water monitor (Varanus salvator, Class-I SSP), 30 pangolins, 
21 bear paws, and 3,283 tortoises and turtles    
Early 2012 
Forest Police 
Operation  
Over 700 wildlife cases uncovered, involving 1,031 offenders; 13 wildlife criminal 
networks dismantled; 7,155 illegal wildlife stalls and 628 illegal online wildlife 
shops being shut down; 520 websites involved in selling illegal wildlife closely 
monitored; seizures included 130,000 wild animals, 2,000 wildlife products and 
147 wild animal skins  
Early 2012 
Shield of 
Country Gate 
Operation 
13 arrests; 21 smuggling networks dismantled; seizures included 337,400 kg of red 
sandal wood, 30,000 kg of yew timber, 1,367 kg of ivory and 876 horns of Saiga 
antelope 
1–30 Apr. 
2013 
2013 Skynet 
Operation 
80,000 enforcement officers mobilised; 6,020 antique and flower-bird marketplaces 
inspected, 186 websites believed to involve in illegal trade requested to be rectified; 
5,784 illegal wildlife stalls being shut down, 328 licensed trading sites being 
suspended; 679 wildlife cases dealt with; 100,000 wild animals seized, valued at 
CN¥7.9 million 
1 Apr.–30 
Jun. 2014 
2014 Skynet 
Operation 
55,900 forest police mobilised; 3,498 antique and flower-bird marketplaces 
inspected; 280 licensed business entities producing or selling wildlife products 
being suspended; 3,571 illegal wildlife stalls being shut down; 137 websites 
implicated in illegal sale being closely monitored; 93,400 wild animals seized, 
valued at over CN¥5.3 million 
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Time 
frame 
Operation 
codename 
Main results 
1 Sept.–30 
Nov. 2015 
Thunder 
Operation 
250,000 forest police mobilized; 35,000 wildlife cases uncovered, involving 
39,000 offenders; 78 wildlife-related criminal networks being dismantled; 
seizures included 56,000 m3 of illegal wood, 130,000 wild animals, total value 
amounted to CN¥130 million 
20 Apr.–20 
May 2016 
Spring Operation 
342 wildlife criminal cases dealt with, 507 arrests; seizures include 85,000 wild 
animals and 2,268 wildlife products, valued at around CN¥47 million 
Source: (1) 1999 Kekexili No.1 Operation. See Forestry Gov. News. “Briefing on Kekexili No.1 Special 
Operation” (in Chinese). August 27, 2004. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/slga/2557/content-407104.html.  
(2) 2000 Southern No.2 Operation. See Sina News. “Documentary: “Southern No.2 Operation: Wildlife 
Protection in Yunnan” (in Chinese). February 25, 2000. http://news.sina.com.cn/society/2000-2-25/65041.html. 
(3) 2001 Eagle Hunting Operation. See People. Cn. News. “Eagle Hunting Operation” (in Chinese). November 
26, 2001. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/55/20011126/613146.html. 
(4) 2002 Migratory Birds Operation. See Xinhua News. “Ten-days-long Migratory Birds Operation Rescued 
Ten Thousand Birds” (in Chinese). December 27, 2002. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-
12/27/content_671367.htm. 
(5) 2003 Spring Thunder Operation. See People. Cn. News. “SFA: Wildlife Protection Spring Thunder 
Operation Launched” (in Chinese). April 10, 2003. 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/huanbao/20030411/968909.html. 
(6) 2007 Green-Shield No.2 Operation. See People. Cn. News. “SFA Announces Ten Superintended Cases 
under the Green-Shield No.2 Operation” (in Chinese). December 8, 2007. 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/6501752.html. 
(7) 2012 Forest Police Operation. See CITES Secretariat. “CITES Secretariat Praises China for Major 
Nationwide Wildlife Law Enforcement Operations.” May 9, 2012. 
https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2012/20120509_certificate_cn.php. 
(8) 2012 Shield of Country Gate Operation. See People. Cn. News. “Shield of Country Gate Operation Seized 
more than CN¥88 Billion Worth of Contraband, Hazardous Wastes Listed as the Target” (in Chinese). January 
29, 2013.  http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0129/c1004-20355592.html. 
(9) 2013 Skynet Operation. See Forestry Gov. News. “Forest Police ‘2013 Skynet Operation’ Fully Unfolded” 
(in Chinese). April 25, 2013. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/3566/content-598261.html. 
(10) 2014 Skynet Operation. See Forestry Gov. News. “Forest Police ‘2014 Skynet Operation’ Starts to Draw 
the Net” (in Chinese). July 29, 2014. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/72/content-692585.html. 
(11) 2015 Thunder Operation. See China Green Times. “SFA Deployed the “Thunder Operation” against 
Forest and Wildlife-related Offences” (in Chinese). October 14, 2015. 
http://bhs.forestry.gov.cn/portal/zrbh/s/1492/content-807348.html. 
(12) 2016 Spring Operation. See Xinhua News. “85,000 Wild Animals Seized from a Nationwide Forest Police 
Special Operation” (in Chinese). June 15, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-06/15/content_5082493.htm. 
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Table 9.10: List of China’s wildlife-related laws and regulations 
Year 
of EIF 
Authority of 
issuance 
Title 
National laws 
1988 NPC Wildlife Protection Law (amended in 2016) 
1997 NPC Criminal Law 
Major regulations 
1989 MOA and SFA List of Wildlife under Special state protection (MOA and SFA 1989 Order No.1) 
1991 SFA 
Measures for the Management of Licensing for Domestication and Captive 
Breeding of Wildlife under Special state protection 
1992 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of Terrestrial Wildlife Protection 
1993 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of Aquatic Wildlife Protection 
1993 State Council 
Circular on the Ban of Trade in Rhino Horn and Tiger Bone (State Council [1993] 
39) 
1993 SFA 
Circular on the Approval of Incorporating Portion of the CITES-listed Wild 
Faunas into the ‘List of Wildlife under Special state protection (SFA [1993] 48) 
1993 Ministry of Health 
Circular on Changing the Ingredients and Names of Traditional Chinese 
Medicines containing Rhino Horn or Tiger Bone (Ministry of Health [1993] 59)  
2003 SFA 
Adjustment to the List of Wildlife under Special state protection (SFA Order 2003 
No.7) 
2003 SFA and SAIC 
Circular on Straightening out the Manufacturing and Processing Businesses 
Utilising Wildlife and Their Products and Launching the Pilot Marking Scheme 
(SFA [2003] 3) 
2003 SFA 
Emergent Circular on Imposing Stringent Control over Trade, Utilisation, 
Domestication and Captive Breeding of Wildlife (SARS) (SFA [2003] 34) 
2003 
SFA and other 11 
ministerial 
authorities  
Circular on the Need to Adapt to New Situations and Strengthen the Work on 
Prohibiting Illegal Hunting, Catching and Trade of Terrestrial Wildlife (SFA 
[2003] 99) 
2003 SFA  
Circular on the Release of the List of 54 Terrestrial Wildlife Species Including 
Sika Deer that Already Have Mature Technology for Domestication and Captive 
Breeding and that Are Allowed for Domestication and Captive Breeding for 
Commercial Trade and Utilisation (SFA [2003] 121) 
2004 
SFA, Ministry of 
Health, SAIC, SFDA, 
and SATCM  
Circular on Further Strengthening the Conservation of Musk Deer and Bear 
Resources and Management of Medicines Containing Ingredients of  Musk or 
Bear Body Parts (SFA [2004] 252) 
2005 SFA 
Circular on the Issuance of the “Interim Provision on Technical Management 
Related to the Domestication, Captive Breeding and Utilisation of Wild Fur 
Animals” (SFA [2005] 91) 
2005 
SFA, SAIC, Ministry 
of Health, SFDA, and 
SATCM 
Circular on the Pilot Project for the Use of Captive-bred Tiger Bones and Gradual 
Reduction of the Use of Leopard Bones (SFA [2005] 139) 
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Major regulations 
2005 SFDA Regulations on Report and Evaluation of Healthcare Products and Food 
2006 SFDA 
Circular on Matters concerning the Use of Leopard Bones (SFDA [2006] 
118) 
2006 State Council 
Regulations on the Management of Import and Export of Endangered Wild 
Fauna and Flora 
2007 SFA and SEAC 
Circular on the Implementation of Marking Scheme for Tiger and Leopard 
Pelts and Products and Further Regulation on the Trade and Utilisation 
(SFA [2007] 206) 
2007 
SFA, Ministry of 
Health, SAIC, 
SFDA, and 
SATCM 
Circular on Strengthening the Conservation of Saiga, Pangolins and Rare 
Snake Species and Regulation on the Management of Medicines Containing 
Ingredients of Saiga, Pangolins, or Rare Snake Species (SFA [2007] 242) 
2008 SFA 
Circular on Further Strengthening the Administration of Ivory Tusks and 
Products (SFA [2008] 258) 
2009 SFA 
Circular on Strengthening the Protection and Management of Wild Tigers 
and stringently Cracking Down on Smuggling and Illegal Trade of Tiger 
Parts and Products (SFA [2009] 298) 
2010 SFA 
Circular on the Review, Rectification, Supervision and Inspection of Venus 
with Wildlife Displays and Performances (SFA [2010] 195) 
2010 MOHURD 
Circular on Opinions on Strengthening Zoo Management (MOHURD 
[2010] 72) 
2012 CAA 
Emergent Circular on Prohibition of Illegal Auction of Rhino Horns, Tiger 
Bones and Elephant Ivory 
2016 SFA Circular on the Abrogation of Some Normative Documents (SFA [2016] 54) 
Judicial interpretations and opinions 
2000 
The Supreme 
People’s Court 
Interpretation on the Application of Law for Criminal Cases of Wildlife 
Resources Destruction 
2000 
The Supreme 
People’s Court 
Interpretation on the Application of Law for Smuggling Cases 
2001 
SFA, Ministry of 
Public Security 
Jurisdiction and Standards for Prosecution of Forestry and Terrestrial 
Wildlife-related Criminal Cases 
2008 
The Supreme 
People’s 
Prosecutorate  
Stipulation on the Standards for Criminal Case Prosecution under the 
Jurisdiction of Public Security Organs 
Note: CAA (China Association of Auctioneers); MOA (Ministry of Agriculture); MOHURD (Ministry of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development); SAIC (State Administration for Industry and Commerce); SATCM 
(State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine); SFA (State Forestry Administration); SFDA (State 
Food and Drug Administration); Year of EIF (Year of Entry into Force) 
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Table 9.11: List of China’s forestry laws and regulations 
Year of 
EIF 
Authority of issuance Title 
National Laws  
1985 NPC Forestry Law (amended in 1998) 
1987 NPC Customs Law (amended in 2013) 
1992 NPC Law on the Quarantine of Entry and Exit Animal Plant  
2002 NPC Law on the Import and Export Goods Inspection 
2004 NPC Foreign Trade Law 
Major regulations 
1997 State Council 
Regulations on the Implementation of the Law on the Entry and Exit 
Quarantine of Animal and Plant  
2000 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of the Forestry Law 
2002 Ministry of Commerce Regulations on the Import and Export of Commodity 
2005 State Council Regulations on the Origin of Import and Export Goods 
2005 Ministry of Commerce Measures for the Administration of Licenses for the Import of Goods 
2006 State Council 
Regulations on the Administration of Import and Export of Endangered Wild 
Fauna and Flora 
2014 SFA and GAC 
Measures for the Administration of Import and Export License of Wild Fauna 
and Flora 
Regulations under China Association-guided Timber Verification Scheme (CATVS) 
2012 CNFPIA China Timber Legality Verification Standard (2012 Trial) 
2012 CNFPIA 
Wood Processing Industry Self-disciplinary Pledge to Procure Wood of Legal 
Origin 
2012 CNFPIA 
Detailed Measures for the Implementation of China Timber Legality 
Verification Standard 
2012 CNFPIA 
Measures for the Administration of the Verification Procedures, Markings and 
Certificates for China Timber Legality (2012 Trial) 
Note: NPC (National People’s Congress); SFA (State Forestry Administration); GAC (General 
Administration of Customs); CNFPIA (China National Forest Products Industry Association); Year of EIF 
(Year of Entry into Force) 
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 Table 9.12: List of China’s ODS laws and regulations 
Year of 
EIF  
Authority of 
issuance 
Title 
National Laws, Country Programme, and List of controlled ODS 
1993 State Council Country Programme for the Phase-out of Ozone Depleting Substances 
2000 NPC 
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (amended in 2015) (only Art. 85 has a 
reference to ODS) 
2010 State Council Measures for the Administration of Ozone-depleting Substances 
2010 
MEP, NDRC, 
MIIT 
Announcement on the List of Controlled ODS (MEP [2010] 72) 
Regulations on the administration of the introduction/expansion of new ODS production facilities 
1995 SBPCI 
Circular on Strengthening the Administration of the Expansion of CFC Production 
lines (SBPCI [1995] 340) 
1997 MEP et al. 
Circular on the Ban of New Production Facilities for CFCs and CFC-reliant 
Equipment (MEP [1997] 733) 
2003 MEP 
Circular on the Strict Control of New or the Expansion of CTC Production 
Facilities (MEP [2003] 28) 
2003 MEP 
Circular on the Strict Control of New/Expansion of/Rebuilding of the Production 
Facilities for 1,1,1-trichloroethane and Methyl Bromide (MEP [2003] 60) 
2004 MEP 
Announcement on the Prohibition of the Introduction of New Production Facilities 
that Rely on ODS as the Process Agents (MEP [2004] 410) 
2005 State Council 
Decision on the Implementation of Scientific Outlook on Development and 
Strengthening Environmental Protection (Art. 18 and 28) 
2006 MEP 
Supplementary Circular on the Strict Control of the Introduction or Expansion of 
New Production Facilities that Consumes Carbon Tetrachloride (MEP [2006] 15) 
Regulations on the quota and licensing control of the production and use of controlled ODS 
1997 MEP and MPS 
Circular on the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control of the Production 
of Halon-based Fire Extinguishers (MEP [1997] 764) 
1997 MEP 
Detailed Measures for the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control of the 
Production of Halon-based Fire Extinguishers 
1999 MEP 
Circular on the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control on CFC Production 
(MEP [1999] 128) 
1999 MEP 
Detailed Measures for the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control on CFC 
Production 
2004 MEP 
Announcement on the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control of Methyl 
Bromide Production (MEP [2004] 155) 
2004 MEP 
Announcement on the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control of Methyl 
Chloroform Production (MEP [2004] 303) 
2005 MEP 
Circular on the Implementation of Quota and Licensing Control of CTC Production 
and Consumption and the Registration Administration of CTC Sale (MEP [2005] 
289) 
2006 MEP 
Circular on the Promulgation of the “Measures for the Administration of Licenses 
for the Production and Consumption of Methyl Chloroform and the Registration of 
the Sale Methyl Chloroform” (MEP [2006] 21) 
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Regulations on the import and export of controlled ODS 
1999 MEP, MOC, GAC Measures for the Administration of ODS Import and Export (repealed in 2014) 
2000 MEP, MOC, GAC 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (First 
Batch)” (MEP [2000] 10) 
2000 MEP 
Regulations on Strengthening the Administration of the Import and Export of 
Controlled ODS (repealed in 2014) 
2001 MEP, MOC, GAC 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (Second 
Batch)” (MEP [2001] 6) 
2001 MEP etc. 
Matters Concerning the Control of the Import of Automobiles that are Equipped with 
CFC-12 Reliant Air Conditioning Systems or Compressors (MEP [2001] 207) 
2004 MEP, MOC, GAC 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (Third 
Batch)” (MEP [2004] 25) 
2005 MEP et al. 
Announcement on the Prohibition of the Import and Export of Industrial and 
Commercial Compressors that Use CFC Refrigerants (MEP [2005] 117) 
2006 MEP 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (Fourth 
Batch)” (MEP [2006] 25) 
2009 MEP, MOC, GAC 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (Fifth 
Batch)” (MEP [2009] 161) 
2012 MEP, MOC, GAC 
Circular on the Release of the “List of Controlled ODS in Import and Export (Sixth 
Batch)” (MEP [2012] 78) 
2014 MEP, MOC, GAC Regulations on the Administration of the Import and Export of Controlled ODS 
Prohibitive regulations on the production and consumption of controlled ODS 
1994 MPS and MEP 
Circular on the Ban of Equipping Halon-containing Fire Extinguishers in Non-
essential Places (MPS [1994] 94)  
1997 MEP et al. Announcement on the Ban of the Use of CFCs in Aerosol Industry (MPS [1997] 366) 
1997 CMIF 
Circular on the Ban of the Use of CFCs in the Manufacturing of New Automobiles 
(CMIF [1997] 99) 
1998 MPS 
Circular on the Ban of the Use of Halon-1202 as the Fire Extinguishing Agents (MPS 
[1998] 30) 
1999 MEP and CMIF 
Circular on the Ban of the Equipment of CFC-12 Reliant Air Conditioning Units in 
Newly Produced Automobiles (MEP [1999] 267) 
2003 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Use of Carbon Tetrachloride as the Cleaning Agents 
(MEP [2003] 69) 
2004 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Use of CFC-113 as the Cleaning Agents (MEP 
[2004] 449) 
2004 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Production and Sale of Industrial and Commercial 
Refrigeration Compressor and Related Products that Consume CFCs (MEP [2004] 
452) 
2005 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Production and Consumption of CFC-113 (MEP 
[2005] 60) 
2006 SAG and MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Use of Methyl Bromide in Grain Storage Industry 
(SAG [2006] 4) 
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Prohibitive regulations on the production and consumption of controlled ODS 
2006 STMD and MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Use of CFC-11 as the Tobacco Swelling Agents 
(STMD [2006] 2) 
2007 MEP Announcement on the Nationwide Ban of the Production of CFCs (MEP [2007] 43) 
2007 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Use of CFCs as the Foaming Agents (MEP [2007] 
45) 
2007 MEP et al. 
Announcement on the Ban of the Production, Sale, Import, and Export of Household 
Appliances that Consume CFCs as the Refrigerants or Foaming Agents (MEP [2007] 
200) 
2009 MEP 
Announcement on the Ban of the Production and Consumption of TCA (MEP [2009] 
39) 
Note: CMIF (China Machinery Industry Federation); MOC (Ministry of Commerce); MEP (Ministry of 
Environment Protection); MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology); MPS (Ministry of Public 
Security); NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission); SAG (State Administration of Grain); 
SBPCI (State Bureau of Petroleum and Chemical Industry); STMD (State Tobacco Monopoly 
Administration); Year of EIF (Year of Entry into Force) 
 
 
